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Abstract 
 
This study analyses the authority of Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti in Amman, Acre, 
and Jaffa. He is the master of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, a Sufi ṭarīqa 
(brotherhood) which originated in Acre but is now based in Amman. It examines 
how the changing religious climate and the challenges faced by the Palestinian 
people affect the role of the Shaykh and the cohesion of the community. This 
study approaches both the concept of authority and the practice of fieldwork from 
a relational perspective, and discusses the challenges faced when doing multi-
sited fieldwork using Graham Harvey’s concept of ‘methodological guesthood’. 
The study analyses how the founding Shaykh’s charisma is maintained in 
a ṭarīqa which is institutionalised on traditional (kinship) lines, and focuses on the 
doctrinal, functional and locational aspects of Shaykh Ahmad’s authority by 
examining the underlying paradigm of authority, as well as the different roles his 
followers attribute to him, how these are connected to the functions of the 
zawāya (lodges) in Amman and Acre, and how this affects the ṭarīqa’s place in 
society and in the arena of ‘Muslim Politics’ (as understood by Eickelman and 
Piscatori).  
This is mainly done by focusing on the emic concept of tarbiya 
(education), which corresponds to Berger and Luckmann’s concept of 
‘socialisation’ and Asad’s approach to the transmission of a discursive tradition 
that is in a continuous process of transmission and reinterpretation through the 
institutionalised relationship between Sufi shaykhs and followers. The study 
argues that the process of tarbiya and the mode of communication between 
Shaykh and follower – which mainly consists of indirect communications and 
signs to be identified and interpreted by the follower – allows the ṭarīqa to value 
both individuality and submission to the Shaykh; it also allows it to be centralised, 
while at the same time adaptable to local circumstances. This thus explains the 
development of a discursive tradition, the functioning of a translocal ṭarīqa, and 
the changing position of a Sufi shaykh, enabling us to see that a Sufi movement 
can be both traditional and innovative.  
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Transcription of Arabic Words 
 
 
ء In the middle of the word: ’ 
At the beginning of a word: only if it is the 
first root letter 
ض ḍ 
ب b ط ṭ 
ت t ظ ẓ 
ث th ع ‛ 
ج j غ gh 
ح ḥ ف f 
خ kh ق q 
د d ك k 
ذ dh ل l 
ر r م m 
ز z ن n 
س s ه 
ة 
h 
a / at (in an iḍāfa construction) 
ش sh و w / ū 
ص ṣ ي y / ī 
 
 
I have not used diacritics and italics when transcribing personal and geographical names 
(including names of mosques), and when using words that are common in English, such 
as sharia, fatwa, and the two main Muslim festivals, Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr.  
In the case of names of Islamic prophets that are also known in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, I have used the Arabic names rather than the English ones.  
In some cases I have used the anglicized plural of an Arabic word, most notably in the 
case of shaykhs.  
Whenever referring to a specific shaykh, I have capitalized the word.  
When quoting from an English source, I have maintained the spelling of the original text. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Akkā al-munā, yā Sīdī, kull al-hanā’ fīhā 
Tasharrafat bi-‛Alī, Allāh yahanīhā 
 
Acre is the thing one yearns for, o Sīdī, all the longing is for her 
She welcomed Ali [Nur al-Din al-Yashruti], may God give her the good life1 
 
Soon after the Tunesian Ali Nur al-Din al-Yashruti arrived in Acre in 1850 and 
started teaching in the Zaytuna Mosque, he began to acquire followers from the 
Galilee, the Levant and the wider Muslim world. Nowadays the ṭarīqa2 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya3 is particularly strong in East Africa, but it continues to 
have a presence in the Levant and among Arab communities in the Gulf and the 
Americas. While the number of followers is slowly declining, the devotion of the 
remaining followers to the current Shaykh, Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti, and to the 
community remains strong. 
Like most Sufi ṭuruq, the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya revolves around the 
Shaykh. Historically, the theology supporting the Shaykh’s position, strengthened 
by miracle stories and given a material dimension through the wealth of the ṭarīqa 
in money and land, made the Shaykh the axis of the ṭarīqa and a charismatic 
figure beyond the close circle of followers, playing a notable role in society at 
large. His zawāya4 in Acre and Tarshiha functioned as pilgrimage centres for his 
                                                  
1 Nashīd, recited by ZA2 in Interview with twelve followers in Zarqa on 01-11-2013, hereafter 
referred to as Interview ZA1. 
2 Ṭarīqa (pl. ṭuruq) literally means ‘path’. In Sufism, it refers to the path towards God, to the 
practices one has to undertake to travel on this path towards God as taught by one’s murshid 
(guide) – devotional, ethical, intellectual, social etc. – and to the institution which gathers those 
who follow the same path. It is often translated as ‘brotherhood’ or ‘order’. 
3 I have chosen to vocalize the name of the ṭarīqa as ‘Shadhuliyya’ rather than the more common 
‘Shadhiliyya’, because this is the vocalization used on the booklet in which the most important 
wird (litany) of the ṭarīqa – the waẓīfa (see chapter 6) – is printed. This vocalization corresponds 
with the pronunciation used in the Palestinian dialect. 
4 Plural of zāwiya, literally means ‘corner’, and in the Sufi context is usually translated as ‘lodge’ 
or ‘hospice’, where followers of the ṭarīqa and visitors live, visit, meet, practice their rituals, study, 
etc. It is a religious institution that is connected to a Sufi shaykh and / or ṭarīqa and can take many 
different forms. It can be one building or a big complex. It can be a centre of (mystical) religious 
 18
many followers in the Levant and beyond, and the first two Shaykhs, Shaykh Ali 
Nur al-Din al-Yashruti and Shaykh Ibrahim al-Yashruti, were buried in the zāwiya 
in Acre. There was a very strong link between the Shaykh, the zāwiya and the 
community (see chapters 1 and 3). 
When in 1948 Israel was established and Palestinian society was 
destroyed as most Palestinians were killed or driven into exile – the event 
Palestinians know as the nakba (‘catastrophe’) – the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya 
was also severely affected. Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi became a refugee 
residing in Beirut, most of the awqāf5 were taken by Israel, and the zawāya in 
Acre and Tarshiha became inaccessible to all but a few followers. This radically 
altered the physical infrastructure of the ṭarīqa as the community was dispersed 
and the borders were closed, and the physical link between the Shaykh, the 
zāwiya and the community was disrupted (see chapters 3, 8 and 11). 
The religious climate has changed and has affected and continues to 
affect Palestinians and their host societies in several ways. During the Mandate 
period, Palestinian nationalism was increasingly articulated in Islamic terms. After 
the rise of secularist nationalist movements and a brief decline of religion in the 
public space after World War II, in the late 1970s an Islamic revival came 
underway both in individual lives and the nationalist groups (see chapters 1, 3, 4 
and 8). The relation between the local and the global changed in religion as it did 
in other aspects of life, and the place of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in these 
complex and dynamic trends needs to be taken into account in order to 
understand the contemporary situation of the ṭarīqa. 
After the demise of his father in 1980, Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti moved 
the centre of the ṭarīqa to Amman, again adapting its infrastructure to new 
circumstances and shifting the ṭarīqa’s second geographical spiritual centre to a 
new country. The Shaykh and his followers insist that nothing changed on the 
                                                                                                                                                   
instruction and practice, a hospice for guests, the home of a community. It sometimes includes a 
tomb-shrine. It often has an important role in society. 
5 Plural of waqf, ‘religious endowment’, a charitable trust founded according to the sharia (Islamic 
law). Generally speaking, a waqf is unalienable and its proceeds serve towards the upkeep of an 
institution for public benefit. See Michael R.T. Dumper, Islam and Israel: Muslim Religious 
Endowments and the Jewish State (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994). 
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spiritual level as the spiritual relationships are stronger and independent of 
physical connections, and that only the material manifestations of these 
relationships were affected. The Shaykh continued to develop the ṭarīqa and 
embarked on a revival of the ṭarīqa by investing in the human infrastructure of the 
community: he strengthened the links with his followers in Israel, republished the 
ṭarīqa’s main books, built a new zāwiya in Amman and two in Lebanon, and 
began to renovate the zāwiya in Acre (see chapters 3, 4, 8 and 11). 
This is one of many examples that contemporary Sufism is still very much 
present, even though it has been thought for a long time that Sufism – 
understood as a backward traditional survival – will decline in a continuously 
modernising world.6 This approach to Sufism has its roots in the Western post-
Enlightenment belief in ‘progress’ and Orientalist ideas of Islam and Sufism, 
leading Westerners to believe that they were furthest on this path of ‘progress’ 
and therefore had the moral duty to ‘help’ others – while oppressing and 
exploiting them, legitimizing their economic expansion and later colonial 
enterprise. In this process of ‘modernization,’ traditional elements such as 
religion were considered to be declining (an idea known as the secularisation 
thesis).7 This is still a common view in the West that underlies many academic 
works and policies towards the non-Western world, and many non-Westerners 
have adopted this framework to understand their own history.8 One can also find 
this attitude in Israeli policies and in much Israeli academic work on Arabs and 
specifically Palestinians.9 
Another way of understanding Sufism that derives from the same 
Orientalist post-Enlightenment thinking but does appreciate the continued social 
                                                  
6 Julia Day Howell and Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Sufism and the “Modern” in Islam,’ in Sufism and 
the “Modern” in Islam, ed. Julia Day Howell and Martin van Bruinessen (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2007), 8; Ilan Pappé, The Modern Middle East (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 10; Dale 
F. Eickelman and James P. Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 2nd ed. (Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 22–24.  
7 Malcolm Hamilton, The Sociology of Religion. Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives, 2nd 
ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), 185–186. 
8 Pappé, The Modern Middle East, 1–13. 
9 Ilan Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians: A History of the Palestinians in Israel (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 2011), 277, 279; Dan Rabinowitz, ‘Oriental Othering and National 
Identity: A Review of Early Israeli Anthropological Studies of Palestinians’, Identities: Global 
Studies in Culture and Power 9, no. 3 (2002): 305–25. 
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and political relevance of Sufism embraces it as the ‘tolerant, peaceful, 
moderate, other Islam’ in the struggle against ‘radical jihadi Islam’.10  
Since the 1970s scholars have questioned the understanding of 
modernization as a linear process and the imperialist ideology behind it. The 
secularisation thesis has been challenged and reformulated as it is 
acknowledged that it is not a unilinear and uniform process, in an extensive 
discussion which is complicated by the many different conceptions of ‘ religion’ 
and ‘secularisation’. Either way, it is acknowledged that religion continues to play 
a role in contemporary societies, but that it has developed significantly under 
influence of and in reaction to both modernity and Modernism.11 The increasing 
interaction between cultural anthropology and historiography led to an attitude 
which stressed that ‘change was a complex event, at times accentuating 
traditional patterns of behaviour, at times totally transforming them.’12 By 
focussing on the history of subaltern groups, historians have shown that 
contemporary societies are the result of a complex dynamic of interactions and 
reactions to the imperialists and their culture.13 
The modernization theory and secularisation thesis are also challenged by 
scholars of Sufism, who understand Sufism as a religious tradition which has 
always developed dialectically within its context, and is a diverse phenomenon 
with many different ideas and practices and socio-political roles. Many scholars 
have pointed to the relationship between shaykh and follower as both the 
spiritual and the material axis around which Sufi communities have always 
revolved (and in most cases continue to revolve). In the words of Catharina 
Raudvere and Leif Stenberg:  
 
                                                  
10 Linda Sijbrand, ‘Orientalism and Sufism: An Overview’, in Orientalism Revisited, ed. Ian 
Richard Netton (London & New York: Routledge, 2013), 98–114. 
11 For ‘modernity’ and ‘Modernism’, see Howell and Van Bruinessen, ‘Sufism and the “Modern” in 
Islam’, 5; Valerie J. Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt (Columbia SC: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1995), 358–359, 422. Based on Bruce Lawrence, Defenders 
of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt against the Modern Age (Columbia SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1995), 17–18, 23–42, esp. 27. For an overview of the debate on ‘secularisation’, 
see Hamilton, The Sociology of Religion, 185–214. See paragraph 1.5. 
12 Pappé, The Modern Middle East, 9; Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 24–28. 
13 Pappé, The Modern Middle East, xii, 1, 10. 
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Contemporary Sufism dwells and develops between traditionalism in local 
Muslim communities, in the midst of national and political projects, in 
transnational movements emphasizing the links between diaspora and 
homelands, in the argumentation in favour or against the notion of a global digital 
Muslim community.14 
 
This study is placed within the broader research problem of Sufism in 
contemporary society and the task of redefining the concepts of ‘tradition’ and 
‘modernity’ after the discrediting of modernization theory. An important aspect of 
this research problem is the issue of the changing authority of Sufi shaykhs in the 
globalising world. 
Aiming to add another case study to the literature on contemporary 
Sufism, my first intention is to examine how the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya 
operates in the contemporary world as a ‘lived religion’.15 This will be done by 
focussing on the understandings, practices and experiences of the community of 
followers, and by contextualising the ṭarīqa, to see how the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya as a translocal ṭarīqa currently led from Amman but with strong roots 
in its country of origin – Palestine – operates within the boundaries set by the 
challenges faced by the Palestinian people and by the changing religious climate. 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Research on the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya is very limited and strongly focussed 
on the late nineteenth century, with later periods treated as sidetracks in studies 
dealing with Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s period or Sufism in the contemporary 
Levant. The present study aims to start filling this gap in order to achieve a 
                                                  
14 Catharina Raudvere and Leif Stenberg, ‘Translocal Mobility and Traditional Authority. Sufi 
Practices and Discourses as Facets of Everyday Muslim Life’, in Sufism Today. Heritage and 
Tradition in the Global Community, ed. Catharina Raudvere and Leif Stenberg (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2009), 2. 
15 See for example Raudvere and Stenberg on ‘Sufism in everyday life’. Ibid., 6. 
 22
deeper understanding of this fascinating ṭarīqa and of contemporary Levantine 
Sufism and Palestinian religions in general. 
There are several Arabic biographies of the founder, Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din 
al-Yashruti. The most important ones – accepted by the ṭarīqa itself – are the 
books by his daughter Fatima al-Yashrutiyya: Riḥla ilā al-Ḥaqq (1954),16 Nafaḥāt 
al-Ḥaqq (1963),17 Mawāhib al-Ḥaqq (1966),18 and Masīratī fi Ṭarīq al-Ḥaqq 
(1981).19 The first three were critically evaluated by Josef van Ess in 1975, who 
aimed to give a reconstruction of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s milieu.20 He makes 
some remarks regarding the Yashrutiyya as he found it in Lebanon in the 1970s. 
He values Fatima al-Yashrutiyya and her work as a survival of ‘a lost world’ but is 
quite cynical when describing the contemporary leadership and religiosity of the 
ṭarīqa: 
  
The Yashrutiyya surprises by its tight central leadership and the ecumenical 
spread of its followers. It has not achieved this by itself; its old core is even more 
decayed than older brotherhoods that are more rooted in history. Two things give 
it strength today: the Palestinian refugees’ feeling towards their homeland, which 
serves as a crystallization point, and the identification with the leading circle in a 
remote African region, especially on the Comoros Islands and Madagascar.21 
 
                                                  
16 Fatima al-Yashrutiyya, Riḥla ilā al-Ḥaqq (Beirut, 1954), 2nd revised edition published in 1979, 
3rd edition published in 1990, 4th edition published in 1997. This book mainly deals with the life of 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din, and from the second edition onwards includes an extensive theoretical 
discussion of Sufi thought (in the first edition this discussion was incorporated in the main 
narrative). 
17 Fatima al-Yashrutiyya, Nafaḥāt al-Ḥaqq (Beirut, 1963), 2nd edition published in 1978, 3rd edition 
published in 1982, 4th revised edition published in 1997. This book collects sayings by Shaykh Ali 
Nur al-Din. 
18 Fatima al-Yashrutiyya, Mawāhib al-Ḥaqq (Beirut, 1966), 2nd edition published in 1979, 3rd 
revised edition published in 1997. This book collects accounts of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s karāmāt. 
19 Fatima al-Yashrutiyya, Masīrati fī Ṭarīq al-Ḥaqq (Beirut, 1981), 3rd revised edition published in 
1997. This is Fatima al-Yashrutiyya’s autobiography. 
20 Josef van Ess, ‘Libanesische Miszellen 6: Die Yašrutiya’, Die Welt des Islams 16 (1975): 1–
103. 
21 Ibid., 91. The same cynicism is present in his description of Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi, 
discussed here in chapter 5. 
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Without a methodological discussion of his fieldwork, and no examples or 
references to back up these statements, we should be hesitant to place too much 
value on such remarks without additional research. 
Frederick de Jong included the Yashrutiyya in his survey articles on 
Middle Eastern and Palestinian Sufism based on his research in the early 1980s, 
using a socio-historical approach, focusing on the institutional aspect of Sufism.22 
In this context he also pays attention to the relations between centre-periphery 
relations and schismatic movements in the Yashrutiyya’s history. Regarding the 
Yashrutiyya in the early 1980s, he notes a modest revival and asks himself if it is 
typical of the Palestinian situation or part of a more universal trend.23 
Itzchak Weismann discusses the Damascene Yashrutiyya as part of his 
discussion of the development of Islamic thought in late nineteenth-century 
Damascus.24 While an interesting work to understand the dynamics in late 
nineteenth-century Syria, it does not deal with the ṭarīqa in Palestine then or now. 
He briefly discusses the contemporary Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya (early 2000s) in 
his overview article on contemporary Sufism in Syria and Israel, in which he 
discusses new forms of discourse and organisation of Sufi ṭuruq, and their level 
of adaptation to ‘Syrian and Israeli realities’. Treating the Yashrutiyya in one 
paragraph, he classifies them as more successful than the Qadiriyya and less 
succesfull than the Khalwatiyya, without explicit discussion.25  
Recently there has been more interest in Sufism in Israel and the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya has been mentioned sporadically.26 A non-academic 
                                                  
22 Frederick de Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, Studia 
Islamica 58 (1983): 149–81; Frederick de Jong, ‘Les Confréries Mystiques musulmanes au 
Machreq Arabe. Centres de gravité, signes de déclin et de renaissance’, in Les Ordres Mystiques 
dans l’Islam. Cheminements et Situation Actuelle, ed. Alexandre Popović and Gilles Veinstein 
(Paris, 1986), 204–43.  
23 De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 180. 
24 Itzchak Weismann, Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman 
Damascus (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 219–224, 252–255. 
25 Itzchak Weismann, ‘Sufi Brotherhoods in Syria and Israel: A Contemporary Overview’, History 
of Religions 43 (2004): 308–309, 316. For a more extensive discussion of this article, see 
paragraph 8.2.4.1. 
26 Ron Geaves, ‘“That Which We Have Forgotten”: The Emergence of “Traditional Islam” as a 
New Movement in Global Muslim Religious Contestation’, Journal for the Academic Study of 
Religion 26, no. 1 (2013): 40–41; Chen Bram, ‘Spirituality under the Shadow of the Conflict. Sufi 
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book has been written by Zeev ben Arieh, an Israeli tourguide from the Jewish 
‘new spirituality’ network. It is written with the support of ‘the representative’ of 
the ṭarīqa In Israel and is therefore treated as primary material in paragraphs 9.3 
and 10.3 when discussing this particular follower’s view.27 
The Yashrutiyya in East Africa has been discussed by B.G. Martin.28 
Chanfi Ahmed and Achim von Oppen have included the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya 
in their research on holy places in the southern Swahili world in the early 2000s, 
leading to several articles on the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya’s history and 
translocal links in the Comoros and Tanzania.29 While these articles are very 
interesting in their own right and in this thesis have been used as comparative 
material (see chapter 1 and the final conclusion), we should be careful to draw 
conclusions on them regarding the wider Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya until more 
research has been done to examine the translocal connections between the 
ṭarīqa in the Levant and in East Africa. 
Hassan Abu Hanieh wrote a survey on Sufism in Jordan for the Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung in 2011, in which he also discusses the Yashrutiyya.30 Due to the 
nature of the work he does not treat the ṭarīqa extensively and his information is 
solely based on a few websites, interviews with outsiders and an interview with 
Shaykh Abd al-Jalil al-Ansari (1944), who claims to be a shaykh of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya and speak for the ṭarīqa at large but is not accepted as 
                                                                                                                                                   
Circles in Israel’, Israel Studies Review 29, no. 2 (2014): 131. For a more extensive discussion, 
see paragraph 8.2.4.2. 
27 Ze’ev Ben Arieh, Zawiya. Siporo shel Misdar Sufi Shazilia Yashrutiya bi-Isra’el (Jerusalem: 
Hutsa’at Sfarim Ari’el, 2011). Ben Arieh’s website is Mysteries of Israel, http://israelmystery.co.il, 
accessed 07-05-2014. 
28 B.G. Martin, Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth-Century Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976), 152–158. 
29 Chanfi Ahmed and Achim von Oppen, ‘Saba Ishirini: A Commemoration Ceremony as the 
Performance of Translocality around the South Swahili Coast’, in On Archaeology of Sainthood 
and Local Spirituality in Islam. Past and Present. Crossroads of Events and Ideas, ed. Georg 
Stauth(Bielefeld & Piscataway NJ: Transcript, 2004), 89–103; Chanfi Ahmed, ‘Un Pèlerinage 
Maritime des Disciples de La Shâdhiliyya en Tanzanie’, in Une Voie Soufie Dans Le Monde: La 
Shâdhiliyya, ed. E. Geoffroy (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2005), 398–413; Chanfi Ahmed, 
‘Networks of the Shādhiliyya Yashruṭiyya Sufi Order in East Africa’, in The Global Worlds of the 
Swahili. Interfaces of Islam, Identity and Space in 19th and 20th-Century East Africa, ed. Roman 
Loimeier and Rüdiger Seesemann (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006), 317–42. 
30 Hassan Abu Hanieh, Sufism and Sufi Orders: God’s Spiritual Paths. Adaptation and Renewal in 
the Context of Modernization, trans. Mona Abu Rayyam (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2011), 
138–141, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/08884.pdf. 
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such by Shaykh Ahmad and his branch of the Yashrutiyya.31 It does not go 
deeply into the ṭarīqa’s ideas, practices, and organisation, nor does it discuss its 
followers and their relationship with Shaykh Ahmad. Abu Hanieh’s account 
therefore does not give a clear picture of the situation of the ṭarīqa in 
contemporary Jordan. 
There are also a few academic studies by followers of Shaykh Ahmad on 
aspects of the philosophy of the ṭarīqa.32 Due to time constraints I decided not to 
include these in my analysis as the aim of this study is to analyse the 
community’s ‘lived religion’, the followers’ understandings and how this relates to 
the functioning of the ṭarīqa and its pattern of authority – not so much the ‘high 
philosophy’ but the ‘everyday philosophy’ as understood and acted upon by the 
community.I have spoken to the authors in interview and informal settings, and 
have therefore included their views as members of the community, but their 
deeper understanding of the philosophy of the ṭarīqa and how it relates to Sufi 
philosophy in general is beyond the scope of this study. I fully appreciate that in 
order to arrive at a complete understanding of the ṭarīqa one has to use a 
combination of several methodologies and take the ṭarīqa’s conceptual and 
philosophical development into account, and I by no means claim to have written 
the final word on this ṭarīqa. This study is meant as a modest first step towards 
understanding what the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya means for its followers today, in 
the hope that this will lead to further research using additional methodologies in 
the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
31 Informal discussions with followers in Amman and Acre. 
32 Wafa Ahmad Sawafta, ‘Unmūdhaj min al-Wujūd al-Ṣūfī fī al-Mashriq al-‘Arabī: al-Madrasa al-
Shādhiliyya al-Yashruṭiyya wa Shaykhuha al-Shaykh ‘Ali Nūr al-Dīn al-Yashruṭī (Lebanese 
University, 2003); Wafa Ahmad Sawafta, Nazariyyat al-Ḥubb al-Illāhi ‛anda Lisān al-Dīn ibn al-
Khaṭīb wa-l-Shaykh ‛Alī Nūr al-Dīn al-Yashruṭī, 2012; Umar Muhammad Sa’id Laloh, al-Maḍāmin 
al-Tarbawiyya li-l-Fikr al-Ṣūfī fi al-Islām, 2012. 
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Focus of the Study 
 
My first intention was to make a comparison between the contemporary 
Yashrutiyya in Israel and Lebanon, analysing the ṭarīqa’s development as part of 
a translocal movement in different contexts. Because of the dearth of academic 
knowledge on the contemporary Yashrutiyya, my research problem was initially 
phrased very broadly. While conducting initial observations and interviews in 
Acre, I realized the importance of the Shaykh for the followers and decided to 
focus on Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti’s role and authority, substituting Lebanon for 
Jordan as a second focus of fieldwork because he is based there. 
Authority is based on the recognition of legitimacy, as opposed to power 
which is based on coercion and force.33 The literature on authority and charisma 
stresses that charisma is attributed by people and that authority is a relationship. 
Bruce Lincoln sees authority essentially as the capacity for ‘authoritative speech’, 
a speech act which is accepted by its audience by virtue of the speaker and his 
or her office (see paragraph 1.3).34 This relationship is culturally defined and the 
elements of authority need to be identified within the context of the tradition in 
which this authoritative relation takes place. The first task of this study is 
therefore to identify the relevant elements and patterns of authority for this 
particular Shaykh – Shaykh Ahmad al-Hadi al-Yashruti – in this particular ṭarīqa – 
the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya – and to see whether there is a difference among 
the different local communities. We shall see how the mode of communication 
that belongs to this relationship is essential to understand the Shaykh’s authority. 
When gaining more understanding of the ṭarīqa and talking to more 
people, three interrelated issues related to the question of authority seemed 
paradoxical to me and drove the rest of the research. The first is that the 
translocal ṭarīqa is organised and experienced as extremely centralised,35 while 
one of its main values is to adapt to local circumstances. The second potential 
                                                  
33 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 58. 
34 Bruce Lincoln, Authority. Construction and Corrosion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994), 1–2, 168. 
35 Also noted by De Jong and Weismann. De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-
Century Palestine’, 179–180; Weismann, ‘Sufi Brotherhoods in Syria and Israel’, 316. 
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paradox is between two of the four arkān al-ṭarīqa (‘pillars of the ṭarīqa’):36 fikr 
(thought, contemplation) and taslīm (submission). These potentially conflicting 
elements are not experienced as contradicting on the spiritual level by Sufis in 
general and by the followers, and we will see that they are allowed to practically 
co-exist through the nature of the relationship between Shaykh and follower and 
the mode of communication with the Shaykh.  
The third paradox is that of the significant differences in the messages 
communicated to outsiders by the Shaykh (and most of his followers in Amman, 
Acre and Jaffa), and by AKR, the mutawallī37 of the waqf in Acre, who in addition 
to the responsibilities bestowed upon him by the shaykh regarding the 
administration of the ṭarīqa’s real estate in Acre, presents himself as ‘responsible 
for external affairs of the ṭarīqa in Israel and the West’. Despite the fact that he 
acts as the ṭarīqa’s representative when dealing with outsiders, the Review Panel 
(see paragraph 2.4) stress that ‘[a]fter consulting with the Sheikh and with AKR 
himself, it became clear to us that AKR has responsibilities that are limited to 
managing the endowment (Waqf), and does not represent the Sheikh nor the 
Path in other matters’ and that his views should be seen as personal opinions, 
except ‘on a case by case basis’.38 Even so, in practice he functions as the 
representative in Israel as for many outsiders he is the main, if not the only, 
member of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya they speak to. The social consequences 
of these different images further complicate the issue. When confronted with 
these differences, AKR refers to the same mode of communication that solves 
the first two paradoxes, but the result is significantly less convincing and the co-
existence of these two messages remains problematic. 
                                                  
36 In addition to adherence to the sharia, the four pillars of the ṭarīqa are maḥabba (love), dhikr (all 
those acts that serve to remember God), fikr (thought, reflection), and taslīm (submission). See 
chapter 6. 
37 A mutawallī is the custodian of a waqf (religious endowment), appointed by the qāḍī (Islamic 
judge) (in the text, I have used the anglicized plural mutawallīs rather than the Arabic 
mutawalliyūn). 
38 Review Panel, ‘General Comments and Remarks’, 20-08-2014, 3-4; Review Panel, ‘Specific 
Comments on Conclusions of Individual Chapters’, 4; Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and 
Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 56. 
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Due to constraints of time and access this study focuses on Amman and 
Acre as the two spiritual centres of the ṭarīqa. These were the places I was able 
to build sufficient networks of personal and professional relations, understand the 
local politics, and transcend the language barrier to a sufficient degree to enable 
me to gather meaningful information. I also spent an intensive week in Jaffa. 
Because of the brevity of my stay and the informal character of the data obtained 
there, and because of the strong ties between the communities in Acre and Jaffa, 
I do not use the data to discuss the situation in Jaffa on its own account, but to 
provide information against which to clarify the conclusions reached in Acre, and 
to give a preliminary understanding of the situation in Jaffa. 
Access to the communities in Umm al-Fahm, Nablus and Tubas was 
restricted as I was only able to meet and interview one person per community 
(the muqaddam in the case of Umm al-Fahm and Tubas, and a notable follower 
in Nablus – all in group settings). Because my aim is to achieve an 
understanding of the ‘lived religion’ and of the dynamics within communities this 
was not enough material on which to base a proper analysis, and I have chosen 
not to include these communities in this study. I have occasionally mentioned 
these interviews in the footnotes when they provide an interesting comparative 
point to what was discussed in the main text. I conducted one interview in Zarqa 
– which I treat as part of the community in Amman as the followers there 
participate in life in the zāwiya in Amman to such a degree that I deem this 
justified. 
This study focuses on the inner core of the followers of Shaykh Ahmad, 
who refer to themselves as abnā al-ṭarīqa, ikhwānnā, fuqarā’, and murīdīn,39 who 
have made the conscious decision to live and worship in accordance with the 
rules of the ṭarīqa, and have done mubāya‛a.40 The muḥibbīn41 and other 
                                                  
39 Abnā al-ṭarīqa (‘the children of the ṭarīqa’) and ikhwānnā (‘our brothers’ – sometimes also 
khawātnā, ‘our sisters’) are terms used by the followers of Shaykh Ahmad to refer to themselves. 
They also call themselves fuqarā’ (sg. faqīr), 'poor people’ who do not care for material wealth 
and are fully dependent on God, and murīdīn (sg. murīd), seekers. 
40 The pledge of allegiance to the doctrines and practices of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya and the 
authority of the Shaykh In the Sufi tradition (and in Islamic culture in general), the oath of 
allegiance is called bay‛a. It is the acceptance that the person to whom allegiance is promised 
derives his authority from God (either due to his spiritual power or due to a political doctrine that 
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members of society who are in touch with the tarīqa have not been included in 
this study. Some experts’ opinions and initial observations on the role of the 
Yashrutiyya in society at large will be discussed, but a definite conclusion 
regarding the larger impact of the ṭarīqa in society awaits further research. 
 
 
Research Questions 
 
In this study I aim to answer the following question: What is the relation between 
Shaykh Ahmad al-Hadi al-Yashruti and his followers in the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya in Amman, Acre and Jaffa, in a context shaped by the disruption of 
the link between Shaykh, shrine and community and the challenges of a 
changing religious climate? 
I will address the following sub-questions: On which elements is his 
authority based? Is his authority charismatic or institutionalised? What does he 
mean to the followers in different contexts, which roles does he take on and are 
attributed to him? How does he exercise these roles? What role does this give 
the community and the individual followers in their specific contexts? Where does 
this exercise of authority take place (what is the ‘stage’ of his authority)? How 
does this affect the larger societies in which these communities and individuals 
are present? How does this affect the doctrinal, practical and communal 
cohesion of the ṭarīqa? 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
teaches this), and it is therefore an oath of adherence to this person’s teachings and/or a promise 
of obedience. The pledge of new Muslims to the Prophet is the prototype on which both bay‛a to 
the ruler and to a Sufi shaykh build. The mubāya‛a is considered to go back to the Prophet’s time 
and is mentioned in the Qur’an in the Āyat al-Mubāya‛a (Sūrat al-Fatḥ 48:10, more commonly 
known as Āyat al-Bay‛a) (see chapter 6) 
41 A muḥibb (pl. muḥibbīn) is someone who loves and respects the Shaykh but has not dedicated 
him/herself fully to the Shaykh and the ṭarīqa through the mubāya‛a. 
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Research Methods 
 
Because of the focus on contemporary lived religion and the understanding of 
authority as a relationship, this study has an inductive character and is based on 
anthropological fieldwork.42 Following Graham Harvey, I approach fieldwork as a 
relational activity and as ‘methodological guesthood’ and consider myself a 
‘guest-researcher’.43 Due to the multi-site character of this project, the socially 
defined codes of guesthood in different localities influenced my access to the 
communities and the collection of data as I was obliged to use different research 
methods (see chapters 1 and 2). 
My fieldwork consisted of participant observation (attending meetings in 
the zawāya and visiting people) and of interviews. After a first official invitation for 
which permission had to be sought, in Acre I was free to meet and talk to people 
and I conducted several individual semi-structured interviews. In Jaffa, where I 
only spent a week altogether, most of my meetings were highly informal and 
most of my data therefore stem from informal (unrecorded) discussions. In 
Amman two ladies were responsible for accompanying me whenever I visited the 
zāwiya and for arranging meetings and interviews, which were always done in 
groups of 10-15 people. While posing difficulties for data comparison, these 
different codes of guesthood are reflections of the position of the ṭarīqa in society 
in the different localities and of the different levels of influence the Shaykh has 
over the dissemination of knowledge, and are therefore interesting sets of data in 
their own right. 
When analysing my data, I used a combination of testing hypothetical 
patterns of authority as derived from the secondary literature, and deriving 
                                                  
42 Marion Bowman and Ülo Valk, ‘Introduction: Vernacular Religion, Generic Expressions and the 
Dynamics of Belief’, in Vernacular Religion in Everyday Life: Expressions of Belief, ed. Marion 
Bowman and Ülo Valk (Sheffield: Equinox, 2012), 7; Leonard Norman Primiano, ‘Afterword. 
Manifestations of the Religious Vernacular: Ambiguity, Power, and Creativity’, in Vernacular 
Religion in Everyday Life, ed. Bowman and Valk, 384. 
43 Graham Harvey, ‘Guesthood as Ethical Decolonising Research Method’, Numen 50, no. 2 
(2003): 125–46; Graham Harvey, ‘Field Research. Participant Observation’, in The Routledge 
Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion, ed. Michael Stausberg and Steven 
Engler (London etc: Routledge, 2011), 217–44. 
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elements and patterns of authority from the data. Keeping in mind the different 
research settings and the resulting different methods of data collection, I have 
undertaken a comparison of the followers’ attitudes to the Shaykh and the 
zawāya, and the process of tarbiya (upbringing, training, education, pedagogy) in 
Amman, Acre and Jaffa, and addressed the question how the followers continue 
to identify as one community even though the situations in which they enact their 
tradition are so different – how the ṭarīqa can be centralised while at the same 
time being adaptable – through their relationship and mode of communication 
with the Shaykh. 
 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 1 will discuss Sufism as a discursive tradition and what this means for 
our understanding of Sufi authority and our identification of hypothetical elements 
of authority. Here we shall also discuss theories of authority focusing on 
institutionalisation and socialisation, the maintenance of charisma in Sufi 
movements, and the development of authority in contemporary Sufism. In the 
second chapter, we shall discuss the anthropological research methodology as 
sketched above in more depth. Chapter 3 sketches the historical framework in 
which the Yashrutiyya developed and the role of the Shaykh and his relation with 
the shrine and the community in pre-1948 Palestinian society, finishing with the 
developments of the ṭarīqa since 1980 to give a basic understanding of the 
ṭarīqa’s history against which the discussion of authority will become intelligible. 
Part II (chapters 4-7) discusses Shaykh Ahmad’s authority in Amman. 
After a historical overview of Palestinians, Islam and the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya in Jordan (chapter 4), we examine the elements on which Shaykh 
Ahmad’s authority is based for the followers in Amman, and which roles they 
attribute to him, arguing that based on the conviction that the Shaykh is the 
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embodiment of the nūr muḥammadī44 and the ‛aqīda,45 the Shaykh is mainly 
presented as a teacher and guide. Chapter 5 examines how these roles are 
enacted in the process of tarbiya in which the relationship and the possibility of 
communication between Shaykh and follower is developed. Chapter 6 deals with 
the role the zāwiya in Amman plays in this process as the ‘stage of authority’, 
and what this means for the community’s position in Jordanian society. 
Part III (chapters 8-11) deals with Acre and Jaffa. Chapter 8 examines the 
situation of the Palestinians, Islam and Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Israel (and 
especially in Acre) after 1948, after which we examine which roles are attributed 
to the Shaykh in Acre and Jaffa (chapter 9). While ideas of the Shaykh as 
teacher and guide are important, the Shaykh as a father is the predominant 
image in Acre and Jaffa. Chapter 10 discusses the process of tarbiya, the 
development of the relationship between Shaykh and follower, and the mode of 
communication between them among the followers in Acre and Jaffa. The views 
of AKR will be discussed separately in both chapters to examine in what way 
they are related to the views of the followers and of Shaykh Ahmad. In chapter 
11 we discuss the role of the zāwiya in Acre as an element of the Shaykh’s 
authority as followers continue to look towards it as al-zāwiya al-umm (‘the 
mother zāwiya’). In addition to its spiritual importance, the current renovations 
draw attention to its social role, as the diverging narratives of followers and AKR 
explored in chapters 9 and 10 materialize and gain in social relevance. 
                                                  
44 The nūr muḥammadī is the ‘Muhammadan light’, the primordial light from which everything was 
created, the first stage of God’s self-disclosure. It is the unifying principle of all archetypes. The 
nūr muḥammadī was manifested in all the prophets and lives on in the awliyā. It is one of the 
reasons the Sufis venerate the Prophet Muhammad to such a high degree, which is reflected in 
prayers and songs, and the celebration of the mawlid al-nabī, which is the major festival for many 
Sufi ṭuruq. Toshihiko Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical 
Concepts (Berkeley & London: University of California Press, 1984), 236–238; Hoffman, Sufism, 
Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 59–60, 89; Arthur F. Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet: The 
Indian Naqshbandiyya and the Rise of the Mediating Sufi Shaykh (Columbia SC: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1998), 214–216. 
45 ‛Aqīda, often translated as ‘belief’, ‘creed’, ‘dogma’ or ‘doctrine’. For the followers of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya it is an umbrella term that encompasses both faith (īmān) and divine law 
(sharī‛a), which consists of devotional and social rules. It is not just an abstract theoretical 
concept, but is present in the hearts and minds of the followers – a good follower ‘has the ‘aqīda 
inside’. See paragraph 5.1. 
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Finally, in the conclusion we shall discuss how charisma is maintained 
through adherence to the past and through innovation, and how our 
understanding of authority as a relationship, and especially our understanding of 
the modes of communication within this relationship, helps us achieve a deeper 
understanding of a contemporary traditional movement – explicitly contextualised 
and adaptive, yet believing in the transmission of essential unchanging values as 
embodied by the Shaykh, and how these beliefs and practices help the Shaykh 
to maintain a high level of authority and the community to maintain a high level of 
cohesion, allowing the tarīqa to be highly translocal and local at the same time, 
managing the restrictions faced by the situation of the Palestinian people.  
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THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
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Chapter 1 
Authority in Sufism 
 
 
The Arabic word translated as Sufism is taṣawwuf, literally meaning ‘the process 
of becoming a Sufi’. It is the verbal noun of the fifth form of the root ṣ-w-f – this 
fifth form has the basic connotation of ‘assimilating or taking on a religious or 
ethnic identity’. Carl Ernst argues that ‘[d]efinitions of Sufism are, in effect, 
teaching tools.’ The term is used to cover ‘a broad spectrum of spiritual qualities’, 
both mystical and ethical, and their external social and historical manifestations. 
The European equivalents of the term came into being during the eighteenth 
century.1 
From then onwards, ‘Sufism’ has been seen as ‘Islamic mysticism’ when 
focussing on its written sources, or ‘popular Islam’ when adopting an 
anthropological approach. Nowadays scholars are calling for the 
contextualisation of ‘Sufism’ as a discursive tradition which revolves around the 
relationship between shaykh and follower. This chapter will first track this 
development and then continue to discuss how to approach Sufi authority, first by 
redefining the concepts ‘tradition’ and ‘charisma’ and arguing that authority 
should be seen as a relationship, then by looking closer at authority in Islam and 
Sufism. Finally, we shall discuss how ‘modernity’ has led to rationalisation and to 
the ‘fragmentation of authority’ and how this has impacted Sufi movements. 
 
 
1.1 Orientalism and Sufism as Islamic Mysticism 
 
Some notions of Islam had existed in Europe since the Arab and Berber armies 
challenged European-based powers almost immediately after the death of the 
                                                  
1 Carl W. Ernst, The Shambhala Guide to Sufism (Boston MA: Shambhala, 1997), 21–31. 
Keeping in mind the broad meaning of the Arabic term, we shall use the English term here.  
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Prophet.2 European ideas on Islam and Sufism were formed more clearly during 
the eighteenth century when travellers, colonial officials and scholars visited and 
studied the Orient. In his seminal book Orientalism (1978), Edward Said argued 
that Orientalists – both artists and academics – constructed their own idea of the 
‘Orient’, giving rise to gross distortions in Western understanding of Islam and 
Muslims. They aimed to uncover the essence of ‘the East’ and did so mainly by 
fabricating stereotypes with little base in reality. According to Said, this has not 
only influenced the attitudes towards the ‘Other’ but also (re)defined the 
European ‘Self’, and supports the continuing imbalance of power in the world 
between the ‘West’ and the ‘Other’.3 Ernst argues that these imperial ideas on 
Islam and Sufism still underpin contemporary ideas on Sufism, both among 
Muslims and non-Muslims, Sufis and non-Sufis.4 
The Western concept of religion and mysticism in general, and of Islam 
and Sufism in particular, is rooted in the eighteenth century during which religions 
were increasingly seen as hierarchically ordered expressions of a universal 
truth.5 J.G. Herder (1744-1803) saw a people’s language, myths, folk-tales, 
beliefs, customs, etc. as expressions of the people’s essential spirit, or 
Volksgeist. To make sense of this diversity within a universalist framework, 
G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) posited the idea of ‘history as a singular civilizing 
process’ of ‘progress’ in which all peoples develop at a different pace towards the 
same goal, and can be hierarchically ordered based on the criterion how close 
                                                  
2 In the earliest centuries of contact, Muslims were mainly seen as the enemy to be feared, 
although there were also trade connections. Islam was seen as a Christian heresy, or as a false 
religion coming from a false prophet. Gradually however, Bible scholars began to realise that 
knowledge of Arabic might be useful to better understand the Hebrew and Aramaic scriptures. 
The importance of Arabic scientific texts for disciplines such as mathematics, physics, philosophy 
and geography led to many translations, and interest for Islamic literature and religious texts 
increased. Albert Hourani, ‘Islam in European Thought’, in Islam in European Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 7–10; J. Brugman and F. Schröder, Arabic 
Studies in the Netherlands (Leiden: Brill, 1979); K. Humayun Ansari, ‘The Muslim World in British 
Historical Imaginations. “Re-Thinking Orientalism”?’, in Orientalism Revisited, ed. Netton, 3–32. 
3 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003). 
4 Ernst, The Shambhala Guide to Sufism, 16; Raudvere and Stenberg, ‘Translocal Mobility and 
Traditional Authority’, 2. See for example the works of Sayyid Hossein Nasr, Frithjof Schuon, and 
Mircea Eliade. 
5 Hourani, ‘Islam in European Thought’, 14.; Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World 
Religions, or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 1–2. 
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they are to this goal. As both language and religion were seen as expressions of 
the Volksgeist, these ideas were linked to the theory of ‘language families’ 
according to which Indo-European or Aryan languages were superior to Semitic 
languages due to the level of which they were capable of ‘inflection’, a syntactical 
structure which according to the philologists attested to creativity and a spirit of 
freedom. Because Semitic languages only had partial inflection, scholars 
concluded that Semitic peoples and religions were seen as rigid, legalistic and 
stagnant. While originally a Semitic religion, Christianity’s Aryan roots were 
stressed, especially Greek ‘rationality’ and susceptibility to ‘progress’. The Aryan 
Geist was considered closest to the universal truth, which in their eyes gave the 
Europeans the right and duty to rule the world.6 
On this path of ‘progress’, some believed that reason and science would 
take over from religion.7 Mainstream religion came to be seen as rational, social, 
liberal, institutional, and masculine, whereas ‘mysticism’ was considered 
irrational, antisocial, fanatical, sensual and female. Others espoused ‘mysticism’ 
as the universal religion that was manifested in different degrees in specific 
peoples and religions, most notably in Christianity. They saw the universal goal 
of ‘mysticism’ as the searching for and the intangible and ineffable ‘experience’ of 
God, the Infinite, the Universal Truth.8 
There are several problems with this universalist essentialist approach to 
mysticism and Sufism. First of all, it is a term that developed in a Western context 
and does not always fit other traditions. In Western scholarship the term has 
become ill-defined and conflated with other terms.9 Second, there is the focus on 
‘experience’, which is subjective and therefore epistemologically impossible to 
understand as an outsider – and even for an insider when we take ‘mystical 
experience’ to happen during an altered state of consciousness. The term fails  
                                                  
6 Hourani, ‘Islam in European Thought’, 25–30; Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, xiii–
xiv, 24–25, 177–178, 199.  
7 Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, xiii–xiv, 177–178. See for example the thinking of 
Ernest Renan (1823-1892) and Auguste Comte (1798-1857). 
8 Leigh Eric Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern Mysticism’, Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion 71, no. 2 (2003): 277–279, 287. 
9 William B. Parsons, ‘Introduction. Teaching Mysticism: Frame and Content’, in Teaching 
Mysticism, ed. William B. Parsons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3–4. 
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to distinguish between episodic experience and mysticism as a process that, 
though surely punctuated by moments of visionary, unitive, and transformative 
encounters, is ultimately inseparable from its embodied relation to a total 
religious matrix: liturgy, scripture, worship, virtues, theology, rituals, practice, and 
the arts.10 
 
To this we should add that ‘mysticism’ came to be seen as detached from 
the material world and from the devotional, ethical and socio-political practices 
related to it, even though the term originated in the context of spiritual, religious, 
social and political struggles, and helped explorers, colonizers and missionaries 
relate to other cultures and religions, and became ‘part of an Orientalist strategy 
of appropriation’.11 ‘Material practices’ were ‘spiritualized’ and depoliticized, 
turning them ‘into expressions of something timeless and suprahistorical’. 
Tomoko Masuzawa calls this ‘the sacralizing character of Orientalism’.12 
According to Grace Jantzen this approach  
 
had become a way of keeping politics, materiality, embodiment, power relations, 
and social ethics off the scholarly table. The very depoliticization of ‘religious 
experience’ was, in other words, highly political and required dismantling.13 
 
In this period Orientalists defined Sufism as ‘Islamic mysticism’. The first 
Europeans to come into contact with Sufis were travellers in the seventeenth 
century who stressed the Sufis’ perceived social marginality and ‘the exotic, 
peculiar, and behaviour that diverges from modern European norms’.14 From the 
                                                  
10 Ibid., 4–5. 
11 Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern Mysticism.’ Schmidt discusses the roots of modern mysticism 
in New England Unitarianism that sought an antipositivist, antimaterialist religion that enabled 
political and religious union in the context of the American Civil War. It provided the possibility of 
dialogue in the global encounter of religions – but Schmidt points out that at the same time it 
served as a strategy for appropriation, providing a vision of union on Protestant terms. 
12 Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, 20. 
13 Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern Mysticism’, 274. 
14 Ernst, The Shambhala Guide to Sufism, 3. Ernst stresses the Protestant roots of these 
travellers. The influence of different religious backgrounds on the image of Sufism awaits further 
research. 
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eighteenth century onwards, colonial officials studied Persian and Arabic and 
became especially interested in Sufi poetry and philosophy. Because of their 
literal understanding of the language of love, passion, longing, drunkenness, etc., 
they saw Sufism as a foreign, Aryan, element in Islam, ‘a flower in the desert’, 
and they searched for Sufism’s roots in the Indo-Aryan cultures of India, Persia, 
Greece, and Christianity.15 
Because of their focus on what they perceived as the alien and antinomian 
aspects of Sufism, Orientalists believed that Sufis did not adhere to the sharia16 
and that there was a deep division between Sufis and ‘orthodox’ scholars, the 
‛ulamā’ (religious scholars) and fuqahā’ (Islamic jurists). The Orientalists admired 
what they called ‘High Sufism’, the civilized, Aryan, intellectual, urban, 
philosophical, poetical, esoteric mysticism, but they argued that after its ‘golden 
age’ from the ninth to the twelfth century, when Sufism became institutionalized, 
it declined into ‘Low Sufism’ or ‘folk religion’.17 They studied Sufi poetry and 
philosophy from the ‘golden age’ and in line with the understanding of ‘mysticism’ 
as purely transcendental and therefore apolitical, they focussed only on the 
spiritual aspects of the texts, with no interest for their historical and social context 
or their contemporary manifestations.18 
                                                  
15 Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1987), 8, 12–14; Alexander Knysh, ‘Historiography of Sufi Studies in the West’, in 
A Companion to the History of the Middle East, ed. Youssef M. Choueiri (Malden MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005), 126–127; Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, 202–203; Ernst, The 
Shambhala Guide to Sufism, 15; Everarde Berendsen, ‘“Als een Bloem in de Woestijn.” Zes 
Theorieën over de Herkomst van het Vroege Soefisme’ (Bachelor, University of Leiden, 2008); 
Sijbrand, ‘Orientalism and Sufism.’ 
16 Islamic law as contained in God's revelation. It is discussed, described, and explained in fiqh, 
which is based on Qur’an, Hadith, analogous reasoning (qiyās), the consensus of the scholars 
(ijmā), and sometimes the opinions of individual scholars (ijtihād). Because this is the only access 
Muslims have to the divine law, the result of fiqh is often also referred to as sharia. There are four 
legal schools (madhāhib) in Sunni Islam that ‘follow the same legal principles and recognize each 
other as valid interpretations of the law’. Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 
423–424. 
17 Examples of this approach are A. J Arberry, Sufism. The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1950); Reynold A. Nicholson, The Mystics of Islam (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1975); J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1971). 
18 Ernst, The Shambhala Guide to Sufism, 16; Ron Geaves, The Sufis of Britain: An Exploration 
of Muslim Identity (Cardiff: Cardiff Academic Press, 2000), 2–3. 
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The organizational aspects of Sufism, the contemporary ṭuruq or 
brotherhoods, were studied by social scientists affiliated with the colonial rulers 
who saw the ṭuruq as potentially effective instruments to mobilize the population. 
They largely ignored the historical development and the ideas of the 
brotherhoods they studied, and colonial rulers devised policy based on these 
views in order to neutralize potential rival sources of authority.19 
Even though among the earliest Orientalists there were scholars who 
disagreed with these theories on the basis of a thorough analysis of Sufi texts or 
extensive fieldwork, such as Frid. Aug. Deofidus Tholuck (1799-1877),20 Louis 
Massignon (1883-1962),21 Ignaz Goldziher (1850-1921), and Christiaan Snouck 
Hurgronje (1857-1936),22 these Orientalist approaches continued to influence 
research on Sufism.23 As was common in the academia of this period, the 
historical and philological approach and the social sciences hardly mixed.24 Even 
when scholars were aware that these are not separate religious phenomena but 
                                                  
19 Ernst, The Shambhala Guide to Sufism, 1–18, 205–211; Geaves, The Sufis of Britain, 2–3. A 
good example is French colonialist anthropology of the Maghreb. Colonial officials and scholars 
(such as Évariste Levi-Provençal, Jacques Berque and Alfred Bel) distinguished between what 
they saw as the Arab hierarchically organized towns and the Berber egalitarian tribes, which led 
to an immense array of related dichotomies: High Islam - Low Islam, orthodox - non-orthodox, 
‛ulamā’ - marabouts/saints, sharia - tribal law, puritanical scripturalism - ritualistic saint-worship, 
text-based authority - person-based authority. This understanding led to the ‘Berber Decree’ of 
1930 in which two sets of laws were imposed for Arabs and Berbers, in a classic move of divide-
and-rule. Scott A. Kugle, Rebel between Spirit and Law: Ahmad Zarruq, Sainthood and Authority 
in Islam (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 52–55; Vincent J. Cornell, Realm of 
the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), 
xxvi. 
20 Frid. Aug. Deofidus Tholuck, Ssufismus sive Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica, 1821. 
21 Louis Massignon, Essai sur les Origines du Lexique Technique de la Mystique Musulmane, 
1922. 
22 Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1888); Ibid., Verspreide 
Geschriften (Leiden: Brill, 1923-1927). 
23 Hourani, ‘Islam in European Thought’, 41–50; Christopher Melchert, ‘The Transition from 
Asceticism to Mysticism at the Middle of the Ninth Century C.E.’, Studia Islamica 83 (1996): 51; 
Ernst, The Shambhala Guide to Sufism, 15–16; Berendsen, ‘“Als een Bloem in de Woestijn”’, 14–
15; Sijbrand, ‘Orientalism and Sufism’, 102–105; Raudvere and Stenberg, ‘Translocal Mobility 
and Traditional Authority’, 2. 
24 R.S. O’Fahey and Bernd Radtke, ‘Neo-Sufism Reconsidered’, Der Islam 70 (1993): 54.; Howell 
and Van Bruinessen, ‘Sufism and the “Modern” in Islam’, 8–9. 
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different aspects of the same phenomenon, they tended to focus on one of 
them.25 
In response to Western cultural, social, and political hegemony, including 
these early Christian critical approaches to Islam and Sufism, several scholars 
chose to work from within the Islamic tradition and provide an inside 
understanding (often associated with the Traditionalist school), such as Henry 
Corbin (1903-1978), Martin Lings (1909-2005), Seyyed Hossein Nasr (1933). 
Some authors worked from a perennialist perspective, most notably René 
Guénon (1886-1951) and Frithjof Schuon (1907-1998).26 Daphne Habibis sees 
this as part of a larger counter-culture approach challenging mainstream Western 
modernist ideology, valuing intuition and emotion over reason, creativity over 
intellect, ‘psychological unification instead of compartmentalisation’, antagonism 
towards materialism and rules, spirituality over institutionalised religion, and 
community over individuality, anonymity and separation.27 The phenomenological 
approach was also adopted by some scholars of Islam, especially by Annemarie 
Schimmel (1922-2003). 
By the 1960s relativist approaches such as constructivism and 
poststructuralism became more common; ‘Pattern and interpretive theories, as 
opposed to causal, linear theories, were now more common’ as ‘[t]he search for 
grand narratives was being replaced by more local, small-scale theories fitted to 
specific problems and specific situations.’28 In anthropology greater attention was 
given to historical issues such as the contingent development of ideas and social 
structures, to issues of economic and political inequality and oppression, and to 
the role of religion in these issues on local and global levels. Issues related to 
                                                  
25 An excellent example of historical philological studies of Sufism is Annemarie Schimmel’s book 
Mystical Dimensions of Islam (1987), which acknowledges the importance of the social aspect of 
Sufism but does not cover it in detail. 
26 Wouter J. Hanegraaff, ‘Empirical Method in the Study of Esotericism’, Method and Theory in 
the Study of Religion 7, no. 2 (1995): 110. For the Traditionalists, see Mark J. Sedgwick, Against 
the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
27 Daphne Habibis, ‘The Problem of Values in Muslim Research: The Case of Sufism’, Asian 
Studies Review 15, no. 2 (1991): 20. 
28 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, ‘Introduction. The Discipline and Practice of 
Qualitative Research’, in Handbook of Qualitative Research, ed. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna 
S. Lincoln, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks CA: SAGE Publications, 2005), x, 18–20. 
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imperialism, colonialism, globalisation and worldwide political and economic 
networks formed the background of these new projects.29  
There was an increasing interest in socio-economic approaches to Islamic 
history and in contextualising Sufism rather than searching for its origins and its 
essence, and for the historical analysis of Sufism’s role in society.30 At first the 
distinction between High and Low Islam, ‘scholars, saints and Sufis’, and the 
focus on Sufism’s antinomian aspects were perpetuated by anthropologists such 
as Clifford Geertz and Ernst Gellner, and historian Nikki Keddie.31 On a doctrinal 
level, this opposition was challenged by J.S. Trimingham who showed the link 
between Sufi philosophy and ṭuruq by describing the connection between the 
theory of wilāya32 and the social organisation of the ṭarīqa as disciples turn to and 
                                                  
29 Michael Lambek, A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishers, 
2002), 471. In Islamic Studies, names associated with this shift are Clifford Geertz, Talal Asad 
and Dale F. Eickelman. See for example Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development 
in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971); Clifford Geertz, The 
Interpretation Of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Talal Asad, The Idea of an 
Anthropology of Islam (Washington DC: Georgetown University, Center for Contemporary Arab 
Studies, 1986); Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in 
Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Dale F. Eickelman, The 
Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach, 4th ed (Upper Saddle River NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 2001); Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics. 
30 A noteworthy example is social historian Nikki R. Keddie’s edited book Scholars, Saints, and 
Sufis (1972), in which she aims to contextualise Islamic people and movements. For example, 
Vincent Crapanzano analyzes the Moroccan Hamadsha in two different settings to show the 
brotherhoods degree of adaptability to different social contexts. Vincent Crapanzano, “The 
Hamadsha,” in Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 
1500, ed. Nikki Keddie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 328. 
31 Even though Nikki Keddie noted that the institutions of the ‛ulamā’ and Sufis were intertwined, 
she defined Sufism as ‘the more popular and generally less learned religious groups’. Nikki 
Keddie, “Introduction,” in Scholars, Saints and Sufis, ed. Keddie, 1. In the same volume, Gellner 
argued that ‘urban Sufi mysticism is an alternative to the legalistic, restrained, arid (as it seems to 
its critics) Islam of the ‛ulamā. Rural and tribal ‘Sufism’ is a substitute for it.’ Ernest Gellner, 
“Doctor and Saint,” in Scholars, Saints and Sufis, ed. Keddie, 308–309. Geertz and Gellner 
described society as ‘a drama of religiosity’ in terms of social typical actors who they saw as 
representing social structure. These abstract figures reduced social actors to stereotypes who 
‘represented’ rather than ‘made’ culture, and gave an overly simplified image of society. Asad, 
The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam, 6–8; Kugle, Rebel between Spirit and Law, 36, 250 note 
42. 
32 Walī (pl. awliyā) literally means ‘friend, someone who is close, someone who is under 
protection’. The general Arabic and Islamic tradition, a walī is a ‘next of kin, ally, friend, helper, 
guardian, patron, saint’, and it has a broad range of meaning in political and legal contexts. In 
Sufism, a walī or walī Allāh is ‘someone who is close to God, someone who is under God’s 
protection’, often translated problematically as 'saint’. The friend of God has acquired God’s good 
qualities, is blessed with spiritual powers (such as the ability to perform karāmāt (miracles), and 
possesses spiritual and sometimes socio-political authority. In Sufi theosophy ideas on the awliyā 
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organize around the walī.33 Vincent Cornell argued that one has to look at the 
doctrinal context of sainthood to understand the Moroccan cult of saints.34 The 
anthropologist Michael Gilsenan argued that the ṭuruq are present in all levels of 
society enacting many functions, and that the ideological disagreements between 
some Sufis and ‘ulamā’ reflect historical problems and struggles over authority as 
Sufis claimed to be ‘a new order of religious specialists claiming a new order of 
knowledge and the capacity to mediate the relation between God and man.’35 
This was taken up by De Jong and Bernd Radtke in their edited volume Islamic 
Mysticism Contested (1999), in which they argued that there is no clear cut 
essential dichotomy between exoteric ‛ulamā’ and esoteric Sufis, and that the 
many cases in which aspects of Sufism and particular individuals and groups of 
Sufis have been criticized throughout history – sometimes even leading to 
                                                                                                                                                   
have been discussed since the ninth century, including ideas on a hierarchy of awliyā, the highest 
walī being the quṭb (axis), and the khatam al-wilāya (seal of the awliyā).  
Wilāya is the spiritual and/or worldly authority exercised by a walī based on his closeness to God, 
often translated problematically as ‘sainthood’. Broadly speaking, wilāya conveys the meaning of 
‘power, authority, domain of authority’, while the closely related concept of walāya conveys the 
meaning of ‘friendship, closeness’. Due to the general absence of vocalization, the two are often 
indistinguishable in written texts, and they rely on each other for their meaning. Schimmel, 
Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 199–213; Cornell, Realm of the Saint, xviii–xx; Ernst, The 
Shambhala Guide to Sufism, 58–80; A. Christmann, ‘Reclaiming Mysticism: Anti-Orientalism and 
the Construction of “Islamic Sufism” in Postcolonial Egypt’, in Religion, Language and Power, ed. 
N.S. Green and M. Searle-Chatterjee (New York: Routledge, 2008), 92–103; Buehler, Sufi Heirs 
of the Prophet, 13. For more on the concept in the broader Islamic tradition, including its use in 
the Qur’ an and its political and legal uses in Sunni and Shi’i Islam, see Hermann Landolt, 
‘Walāyah’, Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Mircea Eliade (New York: Macmillan, 1987), vol 15 316-
323. 
33 Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, chapter 5, ‘The mysticism and theosophy of the orders’. 
Trimingham’s work has been criticized for numerous reasons, not least because of his theory of 
decline, as he believed that that ‘Sufism’ declined since its ‘golden age’ of classical intellectual 
Sufism in the twelfth century into the rural variant of the contemporary brotherhoods. De Jong 
considered the chapter on Sufi philosophy the best part of the book, even though in his view 
Trimingham did not give enough attention to Ibn Arabi, did not link the Sufi philosophy to his 
theory of development, and failed to link it to the religious practices of the brotherhood. O’Fahey 
and Radtke, “Neo-Sufism Reconsidered,” 54; Frederick de Jong, “Periodization, Categorization, 
and Simplification in a Comprehensive Survey,” Journal of Semitic Studies 17 (1972): 279-285, 
republished in Sufi Orders in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Egypt and the Middle East. Collected 
Studies (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2000), 249–55. 
34 Cornell, Realm of the Saint, xxi, xxiv, 272. 
35 Michael Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt. An Essay in the Sociology of Religion 
(Manchester: Oxford University Press, 1973), 10–11. 
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outright persecution – should always be examined in their socio-political 
context.36 
The clearest call to combine philological and social science methods – 
and as a result to go beyond the distinction between Sufis, saints and scholars – 
has been put forward by Bernd Radtke and Frederick de Jong in their discussion 
of ‘Neo-Sufism’. The term ‘Neo-Sufism’ was first coined by Fazlur Rahman to 
denote the – in his view – radical break within Sufi thought in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries as several Sufi leaders reformed the content and 
organizational form of Sufism with the aim of making it more involved in society 
and more compatible with orthodox Islam.37 The term was taken over by several 
scholars until it was questioned by Radtke and R.S. O’Fahey, who combined the 
analysis of colonial sources with an analysis of the writings of the Sufi leaders 
associated with the legacy of Ahmad ibn Idris (1749/50-1837), and reached the 
conclusion that there is more continuity with previous developments and more 
overlap in the relationship between Sufism and ‘orthodoxy’ than is commonly 
believed, that the eighteenth-century revival movements should be seen as a 
continuation of the dynamic Islamic tradition, and that the criticism to which 
Sufism has been subject since its earliest centuries is based as much on power 
struggles between different religious factions as on ideological issues.38 
 
 
1.2 Contextualising Sufism - Sufism as a Discursive Tradition 
 
In order to go beyond the distinction between tradition and modernity, to bring 
methods from the social sciences and humanities together, and to contextualise 
                                                  
36 Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke, eds., Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of 
Controversies and Polemics (Leiden: Brill, 1999). For a more extensive discussion of this issue, 
see paragraph 1.3. 
37 O’Fahey and Radtke, ‘Neo-Sufism Reconsidered’, 55–57; Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 2nd ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).  
38 O’Fahey and Radtke, ‘Neo-Sufism Reconsidered’, 52–53. In addition to Ahmad ibn Idris, they 
discussed Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sanusi (1787-1859), Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani (1793-
1852), Ibrahim al-Rashid (1817-1874), Ahmad al-Tijani (1737-1815). For more on the eighteenth-
century reform movements, see paragraph 1.5.1. 
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Sufi movements, scholars approach Sufism as a discursive tradition and focus on 
the centrality of the relation between shaykh and disciple, and the physical 
aspects of Sufism in the form of embodiment and theories of space.  
Nile Green understands Sufism as ‘a tradition of powerful knowledge, 
practices and persons’ (italics in original),39 and follows Edward Shils’s 
understanding of a ‘tradition’ as ‘anything which is transmitted or handed down 
from the past to the present’, whether they be objects or (normative) ideas; Shils 
sees tradition as a ‘guiding pattern’, a pattern of behaviour, words and practices, 
or a pattern of submission to authority. Shils envisages traditions as consisting of 
a ‘multiplicity of judgments about a multiplicity of objects’ which are component 
elements that in certain clusters or combinations receive a name and are 
portrayed as a separate tradition either by insiders or outsiders. These separate 
traditions are grouped in families and branches, and separate spheres of tradition 
(e.g. political, religious, literate) overlap and exchange elements. This is how one 
minor tradition belongs to and interacts with other traditions in its past and 
present in dynamics of imposition, addition, amalgamation, absorption and 
fusion, or outright conflict.40 As Marshall Hodgson pointed out: ‘No tradition is 
isolable from others present in the same social context. (A culture, indeed, may 
be defined as a complex of interdependent traditions.)’41 
Tradition is ‘the past in the present but it is as much part of the present as 
any very recent innovation.’42 More important than the past as it actually 
happened is the perception of this past in the present, which depends on ‘the 
construction, dissemination and acceptance of authoritative historical narratives’, 
providing ‘a pool of resources which can be drawn upon in traditional and modern 
settings to sanction present practice.’43 It consists of what are considered to be 
essential, central elements which exist in combination with other variable 
elements – although even those elements considered to be essential and 
                                                  
39 Nile Green, Sufism: A Global History (Chichester, West Sussex & Malden MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2012), 3. 
40 Edward Albert Shils, Tradition (Chicago etc: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 262–286.  
41 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, 
vol. 1 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974), 83. 
42 Shils, Tradition, 13. 
43 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 29; Shils, Tradition, 195. 
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unchanging at a certain time and place might become variable as the tradition 
develops. The connection to this temporal chain and to what are perceived to be 
essential elements can provide an individual and/or a community with a sense of 
identity and belonging in time and space.44  
Therefore, while ‘traditions’ are often seen by insiders and outsiders as 
eternal and unchanging institutions which exist outside of the individual, Shils 
stresses that traditions are not self-perpetuating but are enacted and modified by 
individuals through continuous selection and interpretation, which makes tradition 
interpretive, dynamic, creative, and accumulative, leaving room for development 
and diversification as people feel the need to improve their tradition, make it 
more ‘authentic’, or adapt to new circumstances.45 Dale F. Eickelman and James 
P. Piscatori see these elements of tradition as symbols which are subject to 
continuous interpretation due to their ambiguous nature, simultaneously 
providing a connection to the past and an opportunity for change.46 
This brings us to the question who has the authority to make and enforce 
these selections and interpretations and to decide what are the accepted limits 
within which this can be done – the ‘custodian’ or ‘exemplar’ of tradition. These 
limits are mainly maintained through institutions where future custodians of the 
tradition are trained to uphold the ‘correct’ pattern of ideas and practices.47  
The process whereby these interpretations are transmitted to the community 
leads to the blurring of these limits of tradition48 and to the existence of parallel 
traditions which are intrinsically linked through adherence to what are considered 
the essential elements, challenging the perceived dichotomy between what is 
commonly seen as ‘official religion’ and ‘popular or folk religion’.49 In order to go 
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beyond this dichotomy, folklorists and scholars of religion discuss ‘vernacular 
religion’. As understood by Leonard Primiano, 
 
[v]ernacular religion is, by definition, religion as it is lived: as human beings 
encounter, understand, interpret, and practice it. (...) The process of religious 
belief refers to the complex linkage of acquisition and formation of beliefs which 
is always accomplished by the conscious and unconscious negotiations of and 
between believers.50 
 
Primiano points out that there is no abstract, ‘pure’ form of religion as even the 
religious elite express their own form of their tradition in their own specific time 
and place: ‘Since religion inherently involves interpretation, it is impossible for the 
religion of an individual not to be vernacular,’ even if this individual is a member 
of the religious elite.51 
We should keep in mind however that while the term ‘official religion’ does 
not make sense from the etic perspective of religious studies, it does appear in 
emic perceptions; usually, the belief in a leader’s superior knowledge or in the 
authenticity of a regulating institution is part of the individual’s or community’s 
belief system and should therefore be reintroduced as part of this ‘vernacular 
religion’. In such situations, Marion Bowman’s understanding of religion 
consisting of three interacting components is useful, as she distinguishes  
- ‘official religion (meaning what is accepted orthodoxy at any given time, 
although this is subject to change); 
- folk religion (meaning that which is generally accepted and transmitted 
belief and practice, regardless of the official view); 
- individual religion (the product of the received tradition, plus personal 
beliefs and interpretations).’52 
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When seeking to understand ‘lived religion’, we are concerned with the 
interaction of these levels, as individuals transmit and interpret the belief systems 
they have inherited from their communities and from the institutions of ‘official 
religion’. Many different factors interact with the individual in a continuous 
process of ‘creative self-understanding, self-interpretation, and negotiation’ to 
form ‘a unified organic system of belief’, which in turn becomes part of the social 
environment.53 This continuous interpretation is ‘a living process exhibiting both 
conservative/passive and dynamic changing qualities’.54 
In his seminal article ‘The idea of an anthropology of Islam,’ Talal Asad 
proposes to understand Islam as a discursive tradition based on the central 
elements of Qur'an and Hadith – both a product of power and cooperating with 
power in producing authority and discipline.55 In Sunni Islam, the ‛ulamā’ – 
especially the legal scholars – acquired the authority to interpret scripture and 
prescribe the behaviour based on this interpretation, defining what is called 
‘orthodoxy’: the combination of ‘right’ creed and ‘right’ practice. They thus 
became the custodians of the Islamic Sunni tradition. Norman Calder also 
characterizes this as ‘a discursive process, an ongoing process of interpreting 
their own past’, in which scholars always acknowledged their intellectual 
ancestors. The importance of certain issues fluctuated, and there was room for 
dispute within flexible boundaries; it is a discursive tradition, influenced by the 
historical situation and outside elements, but always revolving around itself.56 
Devin DeWeese states that ‘we may find the Qur’an to be much more of an 
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“interactive” text than commonly thought, with its authority resting in part on the 
affirmative engagement of believers.’57 
Asad points to the central role of teaching in maintaining this tradition, 
creating space for reason and argument within tradition.58 For Shils, a sacred text 
(gone through a process of selection and canonization) is just as much a tradition 
as its (accumulative) interpretations, both in their physical and their textual forms. 
In the Muslim religious sciences these interpretations derive their legitimacy from 
the texts on which they are based, the Qur’an and the Sunna,59 but also on the 
soundness of the interpreter’s reasoning.60 Shils argues that ‘[t]he process of 
rationalization – clarifying, refining, and making logically consistent – itself 
modifies the tradition and therewith the meaning of the sacred text itself.’61 In 
addition to the rational transmission of teachings, Asad points to the role of 
disciplinary practices to form people’s identities and instill values and behaviour 
as ‘embodied practical, emotional, and conceptual dispositions’. They are thus 
‘the multiple ways in which religious discourses regulate, inform and construct 
religious selves.’ In addition to Weber’s focus on the repressive and manipulative 
aspects of power, Asad focuses on ‘the conditions within which obedient wills are 
created’ by transforming dispositions. Obedience thus becomes a virtue, rather 
than a loss of will.62 
In this process of teaching power is enacted and resistance can take 
place:  
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It should be the anthropologist’s first task to describe and analyze the kinds of 
reasoning, and the reasons for arguing, that underlie Islamic traditional practices. 
It is here that the analyst may discover a central modality of power, and of the 
resistance it encounters – for the process of arguing, of using the force of reason, 
at once presupposes and responds to the fact of resistance. Power, and 
resistance, are thus intrinsic to the development and exercise of any traditional 
practice.63 
 
Therefore, ‘orthodoxy is not a mere body of opinion but a distinctive relationship 
– a relationship of power’,64 and one should look at the conditions under which 
this power is exercised and the extent to which this power is accepted or 
resisted. 
Steven T. Katz argues that not only are the reports of mystical 
experiences bound by historical cultural factors and religious tradition, but that 
also the experiences themselves are structured and limited by these and other 
factors. He points to the importance of teachers and models, of the education 
process and of mystical literature in the cultivation of mystical consciousness and 
of mystical experiences. He argues that mystical experience, the accounts of 
these experiences and the interpretations of canonical sources based on them 
therefore tend to maintain the authority of these canonical sources rather than 
reject and transcend them. Furthermore, he stresses that when a mystic does 
challenge (aspects of) religious authority, s/he does so by framing his/her 
experience in terms of sacred scripture. The charismatic moment is thus securely 
grounded in tradition.65  
As did Katz, Green stresses the conservative nature of Sufism, as its 
adherents continuously look backwards for their legitimacy and strive to return to 
the primordial state before creation. Also, he points out that it is part of the 
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Islamic tradition, ‘rooted in a wider Muslim model of reliable knowledge in which 
the sanction and security of past authority (whether of the Prophet or of the 
saintly “friends” of God) was of overwhelming importance.’66 Specific Sufi 
communities are composed of elements of tradition that come forth from the Sufi 
tradition and the wider Islamic tradition. Which elements are stressed and which 
are neglected, which elements are developed and in what direction, depends on 
the specific context of this community, and who has the authority to perform, 
guide and control these selections and interpretations.67 
Definitions of Sufism are part of ‘a continuous debate on the meanings of 
Islam’ not only in academic circles, but also in contemporary Islamic discourse as 
people are vying for the authority to speak for Islam and define what Sufism is, 
what its relationship to Islam is, and who has the final word on these issues.68 
Most Sufi movements are part of the Islamic discursive tradition, focused on the 
Qur’an and Sunna, and Asad’s approach is therefore a good starting point when 
examining the Sufi discursive tradition. This raises the question which are the 
elements of their tradition that make them particularly Sufi. We can therefore 
apply the discussion on Islam as a discursive tradition to the Sufi tradition by 
asking ourselves ‘whether, besides these founding texts, devotional and 
charismatic practices cannot also function as reference points for what is counted 
as Islamic.’69 
Julia Day Howell and Martin van Bruinessen argue that there are elements 
of tradition or ‘paradigmatic concepts that shape both social relations and ritual 
practice across place and time wherever people draw on the Sufi heritage’: the 
bond between shaykh and disciple, the bond between the disciples, the concrete 
‘meeting place that provides a physical locus for the enactment of those relations’ 
– even though these bonds are constructed in different ways in different 
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contexts.70 Lincoln identifies four overlapping ‘forms of expression’ or ‘domains’ 
of religion: discourses, practices (both everyday and ceremonial), communities 
(and fellowships and networks), and institutions.71 When we apply these to Sufi 
movements, we see that the religious leader and spiritual guide (shaykh, 
murshid, pīr) is the central figure, the central element, the axis around which all 
these domains turn, linking them all together. Therefore, many researchers 
stress that the relationship between shaykh and disciple is central to Sufism, and 
many debates in Sufi Studies centre on the authority of Sufi leaders.72 
While for most Sufi movements the fact that they are a part of the larger 
Muslim tradition is essential, we should keep in mind that in the contemporary 
world, there are groups which identify as Sufi but not as Muslim, taking elements 
from the Sufi tradition but reinterpreting them, and altogether leaving some 
elements that are more specifically Muslim. Some people identify themselves as 
Sufis without following a shaykh. In some cases, several paradigms even coexist 
in the same movement.73 
 While Sufism is generally seen as the mystical dimension of Islam, and 
certainly does include elements that have come to be associated with the 
concept of ‘mysticism’ (such as the spiritual development of the believer and 
his/her quest for a direct experience of the divine), the Sufi tradition 
encompasses much more than that. Valerie Hoffman, for example, shows that 
while some of her respondents did mention esoteric aspects, the common 
understandings of Sufism among contemporary Egyptian Sufis focus on ethics 
and purification of the soul in the framework of the sharia, and on love – love for 
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God, for the Prophet and his family, and for the shaykh and the brethren.74 Ron 
Geaves suggests that by combining the emic definition of Ali al-Hujwiri (990-
1077) that the Sufi is he who adopts ṣafā (purity), and Hoffman’s etic definition of 
Sufism as ‘purification of the heart, sincerity of worship, and renunciation of the 
fleshly passions’, we reach an understanding of Sufism as ‘practical Islam.’75 
 In the words of Seyyed Hossein Nasr: ‘No understanding of Islamic 
spirituality is possible without comprehension of the element of love for God.’76 
Hoffman points out that maḥabba, love, is intimately connected with all aspects 
of Sufi life:  
 
The redemptive qualities of love for the Prophet and his family, the deep love that 
exists in the shaykh-disciple relationship, and dhikr [remembrance] as a function 
of love for God (…) It is almost impossible to discuss any aspect of Sufi 
experience without reference to love.77  
 
The love between God and His creation is celebrated in Sūrat al-Mā’ida 5:54: ‘He 
loves them and they love Him.’78 While all Muslims love God out of obedience or 
fear, Sufis stress that they love God for His own sake rather than out of self-
interest. While early Sufis focused on their fear for God and practised extreme 
asceticism and withdrawal from society,79 soon Sufis started to focus on love for 
God and all his creation and the yearning (shawq) that accompanied this. The 
first Sufi who showed this pure selfless love for God was Rabia al-Adawiyya 
(d.ca.788-92): ‘I have not worshipped Him from fear of His fire, nor for love of His 
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garden, so that I should be like a lowly hireling; rather, I have worshipped Him for 
love of Him and longing for Him’.80 Writers such as Ja’far al-Sadiq (d.765), Harith 
al-Muhasibi (d.857), Dhu al-Nun al-Masri (d.859), Abu Sa’id al-Kharraz (d.890 or 
899) and Samnun al-Muhibb (d.910-11) further explored the themes that love 
and yearning are the path towards God, until one sees God in every beautiful 
thing and reaches true understanding. Samnun saw love as the supreme spiritual 
abode which does not diminish as other spiritual states do, and as unavoidably 
connected with adversity (balā) and suffering.81  
During the tenth and eleventh centuries these ideas became central to Sufi 
mysticism and terminology. The most important love mystic in this period was 
Mansur al-Hallaj (d.922), who was the first to see love not as the path to God but 
as the Divine Essence itself, and love for God as leading to the unity (ittiḥād) of 
lover and beloved.82 Other important love mystics were Abu al-Husayn al-Nuri 
(d.907), Abu al-Qasim al-Junayd (d.910), and Abu Bakr al-Shibli (d.945).83 By the 
eleventh and twelfth century, an antinomian love mysticism was flowering in 
Khurasan – in this respect Abdullah Ansari of Herat (1006-1089) should be 
mentioned, and Abu Sa’id ibn Abi-l-Khayr of Nishapur (967-1048), who was the 
first to use secular love poetry to illustrate his mystical experiences.84 Abu Hamid 
Muhammad al-Ghazali (d.1111) argued that no matter what seems to be the 
object of love, God is always love’s ultimate source.85 His brother Ahmad al-
Ghazali (d.1126) worked in the tradition of both Baghdadi and Khurasani love 
mysticism and like al-Hallaj identified Love (‘ishq – passionate love) with God. He 
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also saw all love as ultimately originating from God. According to him, Love can 
only be grasped through contemplation and intuition (dhawq)86, not rational 
knowledge.87 Leonard Lewisohn writes that Ahmad al-Ghazali is considered to be 
the ‘foremost metaphysician of love in the Sufi tradition’, and ‘the founder of the 
literary topos and mystical persuasion known as the “Religion of Love” 
(madhhab-i ‘ishq) in Islam.‘88 Other influential Sufis who wrote about maḥabba 
and ‛ishq were Ruzbihan Baqli (1128-1209)89 and Muhyi al-Din ibn Arabi (1165-
1240), who wrote both theoretical works and poetry on the topic of love.90 In the 
famous Persian poetry of Sa’di (1210-1291) and Hafez (1325-1390), Jalal al-Din 
Rumi (1207-1273) and Mahmud Shabistari (1288-1340), romantic and divine love 
are inextricably intertwined and cannot be distinguished.91 
 In contemporary Sufism, love is still considered the central characteristic. 
Love for God is the foundation of all love, from which flows love for the Prophet 
and his family, for the awliyā (particularly one’s shaykh), and from there to all 
creation: ‘The Sufi whose heart is filled with love for God is able to see God’s 
love for all his creation. Such a person is able to love other creatures ‘in God,’ 
through his love for God.’92 Hoffman’s description of Egyptian Sufism can be 
extended to other regions: it ‘is not an abstract mysticism. It is, typically, a deeply 
personal relationship of love and veneration, and the most frequent immediate 
object of this love and veneration is the Prophet Muhammad.’93 This love inspires 
prayers and songs on the Prophet and leads Sufis to imitate him as thoroughly 
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as possible, aiming to lead the same devotional and ethical life. This love has ‘a 
soteriological quality’ as it is often seen as the ultimate form of worship and the 
best way to reach God and enter His paradise.94  
This focus on love of God has often been seen as that aspect of religion 
which transcends the boundaries of religion. Some contemporary Sufi 
movements indeed reach out to other religious groups to form an interfaith 
dialogue based on this shared love. Translations of Persian poetry (especially 
Rumi’s work) are widely popular in Western spirituality as odes to love as the 
divine force transcending religions.95 It should be noted, however, that most Sufi 
groups see maḥabba as the force that draws them closer to God and inspires 
them to obey the Islamic rules and rituals and infuse those with a deeper 
meaning.96 
To develop this loving relationship with God and draw closer to Him, 
believers should engage in devotional practices, first of which are the obligatory 
ṣalāa (ritual prayer) and the general Islamic practice of du‛ā’ (supplication).97 
Sufis are known for their supererogatory contemplative practices, the most 
important of which is dhikr (remembrance, invocation), ‘the quintessence of 
worship and the central means of spiritual actualization’. It is a religious 
obligation mentioned in the Qur’an (Sūras 2:152, 3:190-91, 33:41, 72:8), and has 
been developed in Sufism as a concept involving many methods and practices 
and interpretations. Muhammad Isa Waley describes dhikr as ‘the methodical 
and repeated invocation of a formula, either aloud or in silence, individually or 
collectively. This formula can be a Divine Name, wird (litany, pl. awrād), or 
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poetry, and is instructed by the spiritual teacher.98 The wird is a ‘set, 
supererogatory personal devotion observed at specific times, usually at least 
once during the day and once again at night.’99 The practice of reciting awrād 
goes back to the Prophet, and consists of reciting pious formulas, Qur’anic 
verses and prayers composed by spiritual leaders. They differ per ṭarīqa, and in 
many cases the shaykh gives the disciple a personal wird according to his 
personal needs and spiritual advancement. In the case of collective dhikr, it is 
regulated by the shaykh or his representative.100 Dhikr can be accompanied by 
music (samā‘)101 and/or bodily movement and dancing (raqs),102 which are quite 
controversial issues in the Sufi tradition. Another related contemplative practice is 
khalwa (spiritual retreat).103 
Dhikr is performed by ‘gathering together the dispersed powers of the soul 
and focusing them on the Real himself’,104 at first performed by the tongue, then 
by the heart, until it pervades the entire being of the believer and continues 
unconsciously. Waley calls this ‘ethical’ or ‘moral’ dhikr: ‘the act or state of 
striving to be constantly mindful of God in every waking moment of one’s life’. 
There is a measure of reciprocity involved, as Sufis believe that God will 
remember the person who remembers Him by bestowing blessings upon him: 
‘So remember Me, and I will remember you.’105 The practice of dhikr leads to 
knowledge of the Divine as the purification of the heart and the drawing closer of 
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104 William C. Chittick, Imaginal Worlds: Ibn Al-ʻArabī and the Problem of Religious 
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dhikr, dhākir (person who does the dhikr) and madhkūr (that which is 
remembered) is considered an inward journey of unforgetting the truths planted 
in the soul before birth that have since been forgotten.106 
 Complementary to dhikr is fikr or tafakkur,107 discursive or contemplative 
reflection, ‘the power of thought or cogitation, the ability of the soul to put 
together the data gathered by sense perception or acquired from imagination in 
order to reach rational conclusions’.108 Abu Hamid al-Ghazali incorporated both 
meditative reflections (tafakkur and ta’ammul) and more intellectual types of 
thought in the category of fikr.109 Subjects of these reflections can be human 
qualities and their corresponding actions, the Divine Names and Attributes, God’s 
creation and the manifestations of His Wisdom and Creative Power – never His 
Essence. When performed in the right way fikr is connected to dhikr, as such a 
reflection ‘brings to the heart a knowledge which transforms it and heightens the 
consciousness and spiritualizes the action of the seeker.’110 If used improperly, ‘it 
is one of man’s greatest obstacles to this knowledge.’111 According to Ibn Arabi, it 
can only be used properly when it is part of a wider programme of spiritual 
practice aimed at purifying the soul and clearing the inner vision. He 
distinguished between fikr, rational thought disengaged from the senses, and 
‘imagination’, the inner perception that perceives with the inner (non-physical) 
senses, which leads to unveiling (kashf). Perfect knowledge of God needs both – 
one knows God’s transcendence (tanzīh) through reason, and one sees His 
immanence (tashbīh) through imagination.112 
                                                  
106 For a thorough discussion of contemplative practices in Sufism, including a more thorough 
discussion of the spiritual transformations that happen on this inward journey, see Waley, 
‘Contemplative Disciplines in Early Persian Sufism.’ 
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108 William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn Al-ʻArabi’s Metaphysics of Imagination 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 159. 
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541–547. 
110 Ibid., 541–544. 
111 Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 162. 
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Essential in all these practices, including the general Islamic practices of 
ṣalāa and duā, is the cultivation of ādāb, including sincerity of intention (ikhlāṣ) 
and proper awareness and concentration (ḥuḍūr).113 Ādāb in general means 
correct behaviour, manners, courtesy, social and ethical etiquette as appropriate 
for certain functions and contexts,114 and in the Sufi sense it encompasses the 
embodiment of Sufi values and the outer manifestation of one’s inner spiritual 
states: ‘perfect refinement of words and deeds by weighing himself in the scale of 
the Law as embodied in the person of the Prophet.’115 It is closely related to the 
concept of akhlāq (ethics).116 Another related concept is sulūk, the verbal root of 
which means ‘to travel or follow a road’, and in the Sufi context refers both to 
progression on the Path to the Divine, and to the required ‘traveling-manners’ 
which the traveler (sālik) needs in order to undertake the journey: ‘appropriate 
spiritual attitude and proper ethical comportment’, in other words ‘spiritual 
correctness’ – it thus combines the associations with the concepts of the Sufi 
ṭarīqa and Sufi ādāb.117 
                                                  
113 Waley, ‘Contemplative Disciplines in Early Persian Sufism’, 503, 532–534. 
114 In the pre-Islamic period, ādāb was a synonym of sunna and referred to praiseworthy habits 
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116 Akhlāq or Islamic ethics gradually developed from several sources, namely pre-Islamic Arab 
codes of behavior, the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet and his Companions, and Persian 
and Greek ethical systems. As the Sunna became the basis of the sharia, it also strongly 
influenced the development of ādāb and akhlāq. By the eleventh century these had formed an 
amalgamation which described good character (ḥusn al-khuluḳ) which was valued by scholars of 
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Gibb, ‘Ak̲h̲lāḳ’, EI2 I 325-329; Louise Marlow, ‘Advice and Advice Literature’, Encyclopaedia of 
Islam, Third Edition (Brill Online, 2007); Peter Adamson, ‘Ethics in Philosophy’, EI3 (Brill Online, 
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117 Leonard Lewisohn, ‘Sulūk’, EI2 IX 861-863. Lewisohn points out that the term came in use in 
the twelfth century as a synonym of the Qur’anic concept ṭarīq (path), was first mentioned by al-
Qushayri and then used extensively by al-Ghazali in Iḥyā ‛Ulūm al-Dīn, after which it was fully 
incorporated in Sufi terminology. 
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It is essential to travel this path under guidance of a spiritual guide. Dhikr 
is considered to be so powerful that it has to be performed with permission (idhn) 
of and under guidance of a shaykh lest the disciple be overwhelmed.118 This 
necessity is illustrated by the Sufi saying that ‘when someone has no shaykh, 
Satan becomes his shaykh.’ The disciple should be in the hands of his shaykh as 
in the hands of a corpse washer.119 Sufis often refer to the Qur’anic story of 
Moses and ‘one of God’s servants’ (identified with al-Khidr) in Sūrat al-Kahf 
18:65-82 to illustrate that the gnostic should be obeyed due to his superior 
knowledge of the hidden consequences of acts.120 A spiritual master has reached 
high levels on the Path and as such can see into the heart of hidden things 
(firāsa),121 including the hearts of his followers, which enables him to teach them 
exactly according to their needs and abilities. Lewisohn stresses that there is a 
wide diversity in ‘programmes of mystical behaviourism and spiritual pedagogy’ 
encompassing a wide range of spiritual exercises and the appropriate ādāb, all 
prescribed by and to be followed under the guidance of the spiritual teacher.122 
Sufi shaykhs thus transform the general principles of the Islamic and Sufi 
tradition – especially the sharia but also concepts of ādāb and akhlāq – ‘into 
individualized mechanisms of moral discipline.’123 
As the disciple develops spiritually, s/he progresses on the Path through 
different ‘resting places’ (manāzil, sg. manzil124) – spiritual stages (maqāmāt, sg. 
maqām) and states (aḥwāl, sg. ḥāl). They are ‘the psychological, moral, and 
spiritual attributes and perspectives that mark degrees of spiritual growth which 
travelers on the path to God must experience, assimilate, and in most cases 
                                                  
118 Waley, ‘Contemplative Disciplines in Early Persian Sufism’, 526–529; Gardet, ‘D̲h̲ikr’; Denny, 
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pass beyond.’125 The maqāmāt are acquired after effort and form stable stages 
that the seeker can always return to, whereas the aḥwāl are considered received 
through divine grace and succeed or alternate each other. They are usually 
grouped in complementary pairs that must be actualized together in an 
‘ascending hierarchy’.126 Every Sufi author has his own progressive classification 
of maqāmāt and aḥwāl with different concepts occupying different places in such 
classifications – maḥabba for example is seen by Abu Bakr al-Kalabadhi 
(d.ca.990) as the highest maqām, and for al-Ansari as the first of the aḥwāl.127  
The seeker’s experiences and the related behaviour are conceptually 
organized through the maqāmāt and aḥwāl as they frame the devotional 
practices and the development of ādāb, ‘the main disciplinary practices through 
which the Sufi notions of morality are grounded as embodied practical, 
emotional, and conceptual dispositions.’128 The spiritual states need to be 
expressed in deeds (‛amal) in order to be recognized and to form the base of Sufi 
identity and authority. These deeds can range from the miraculous to the social 
in the form of the correct performance of ādāb, thus creating a framework of 
social morality (which, as we shall see, can also be interpreted as a miracle of 
the shaykh who inspires this correct behaviour). This process ‘aims to produce 
social actors whose discourses and practices are framed and disciplined by an 
internalized normative framework.’129 Thus, obedience to the leader and 
adaptation to the social framework are seen as a virtue.130 
The goal of the Path is fanā’ and baqā (annihiliation and survival in God), 
the experience of the Divine, annihilation of the temporal selfhood in God' (fanā’ 
fi-llāh)131 and the affirmation of tawḥīd (existential Oneness),132 as the seeker has 
                                                  
125 Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 10. 
126 Ibid. Chittick gives the examples of hope and fear, expansion and contraction, intoxication and 
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127 L. Gardet, ‘Ḥāl’, EI2 (Brill Online, 2012); Elisséef, ‘Manzil.’ 
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returned to the moment of the primordial convenant (mithāq) (see above).133 Self-
affirmation is erased until only God’s self-disclosure remains. Fanā’ is not a 
simple negation, but it has to be accompanied and replaced – and thus validated 
– by a new subsistence (baqā); it is the annihilation from a specific mode of lower 
consciousness and the simultaneous subsistence through a specific mode of 
higher consciousness, a new mode of witnessing (shuhūd) which is understood 
as unveiling (kashf) – it is the human vision of the Real disclosing itself in all 
things.134 It is the annihilation of self-consciousness and of the imperfect human 
attributes, which are replaced by a pure consciousness of God and the perfect 
attributes bestowed by God. The individual ‘returns to his senses’, ‘surviving’ or 
‘abiding’ with God as he keeps the perfect attributes and as his will is replaced 
with that of God135 – after the experience of ultimate selflessness, the individual 
is ‘reconstituted as a renewed self’. In the words of Abu l-Qasim al-Junayd 
(d.892):  
 
He is himself, after he has not been truly himself. He is present in himself and in 
God after having been present in God and absent in himself. This is because he 
has left the intoxication of God’s overwhelming ghalaba (victory), and comes to 
the clarity of sobriety, and contemplation is once more restored to him so that he 
can put everything in its right place and assess it correctly.136  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
‘Annihilation and Abiding in God’, EI3 (Brill Online, 2008); Ahmet T. Karamustafa, Sufism : The 
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At this point he has become God’s instrument on earth, a guide to others. As is 
stated in an oft-quoted ḥadīth qudsī:137 
 
My servant continues to draw near to Me with supererogatory works until I love 
him. When I love him I am his hearing with which he hears, his seeing with which 
he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks. Where 
he to ask of Me, I would surely give to him, and where he to ask Me for refuge, I 
would surely grant him it.138 
 
Abu Hamid al-Ghazali saw maḥabba as based on ma‛rifa and noted that 
the two increase in proportion to each other.139 Ma‛rifa is ‘knowledge that is not 
reached by discursive reason but is a higher understanding of the divine mystery’ 
as ‘the faithful sees through God’s light, the gnostic sees through God’.140 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr writes that in Sufism, maḥabba and ma‛rifa always go 
together,141 and Schimmel also discusses their relation as the last stations of the 
Path. Sometimes they are considered complementary, and sometimes one is 
though to lead to the other, as n the words of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali: ‘Love 
without gnosis is impossible – one can only loves what one knows.’142 The lover’s 
worst fear is to be separated from the Beloved, and he does everything to draw 
near to Him. For all orthodox Muslims love for God means obedience, but a Sufi 
goes further: driven by love, he walks the Sufi Path until he constantly 
remembers and completely surrenders to the Beloved, and reaches ‘qualification 
                                                  
137 A ḥadīth qudsī is an account of speech by God (as opposed to an account of speech by the 
Prophet or one of his Companions). Like the Qur’an it might come through Gabriel, but can also 
come through another medium, such as ilhām (inspiration) or in a dream. J. Robson, ‘Ḥadīt̲h̲ 
Ḳudsī’, EI2 (Brill Online, 2012). 
138 Ḥadīth qudsī related by Bukhari, quoted in Waley, ‘Contemplative Disciplines in Early Persian 
Sufism’, 503. 
139 Lewisohn, ‘Sufism’s Religion of Love’, 170. 
140 Abu Nasr al-Sarraj, Kitāb al-Luma’ fi’t-Taṣawwuf, ed. Reynold A. Nicholson (Leiden & London, 
1914), quoted in Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 130. 
141 Hossein Nasr, ‘God’, 321. 
142 Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Iḥyā ‘Ulūm al-Dīn vol.4 (Cairo: Bulaq, 1872-3), 254, quoted in 
Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 130. 
 66
with God’s attributes’: ‘Love is the annihilation of the lover in His attributes and 
the confirmation of the Beloved in His essence.’143 
As Sufi scholars developed the descriptions of the Path and the concepts 
of fanā’ and baqā, the concepts of fanā’ fi-l-rasūl (annihilation in the Prophet) and 
fanā’ fi-l-shaykh (annihilation in the shaykh) were also developed as more 
accessible ‘preliminary goals’ for those on the earlier stages of the Path. By 
focusing on the shaykh, the follower submits his will and identifies completely 
with him.144 Hoffman points out that this is rarely discussed among contemporary 
Sufis, as this shift from fanā’ in God to fanā’ in the shaykh is commonly seen by 
Muslims and academics as a sign of decline of classical Sufism. She continues 
that the actual experience of believers who are part of this system is of course 
very different as it may be seen ‘as allowing those of lesser rank to participate in 
an experience that would otherwise be unattainable’, thus making God’s graces 
more widely available, and making it a genuine aspect of contemporary Sufi 
spirituality.145 
Hoffman argues that fanā’ can be seen in terms of spiritual connection, as 
‘an intense spiritual and emotional identification that leads to a merging of the 
boundaries of two personalities.’ It can also be experienced among Sufis with 
their spiritual brethren, as ‘[s]ome Sufis say that in love they are able to 
transcend the boundaries of their own individuality, to touch each other’s spirits in 
such a manner that they deny their own separate identities’. In the Egyptian 
cases Hoffman describes, this is referred to using the concept ‘tawḥīd’, as ‘this 
annihilation of the ego leads not only to a great aloneness with God (...) but also 
to an appreciation of the common existence that these annihilated souls in God 
have with each other.’ This understanding of love and spiritual connection points 
to the communal nature of Sufism, which is mainly experienced during communal 
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dhikr and during festivals dedicated to the Prophet, the ahl al-bayt146 and the 
awliyā, on both the spiritual and the social level.147 
There is a continuum between the figure of the Sufi shaykh as spiritual 
master, the awliyā, and the saints that are venerated throughout the Muslim 
world.148 Theosophical understandings of wilāya are often connected to local 
ideas on sainthood in a ‘multi-layered process of sanctification’ in which 
theosophical ideas are connected to hagiographies, shrines, pilgrimages, and the 
belief in miracles,149 (although they are not always completely understood).150 
The walī is close to God and thus His friend, His protégé, and an intermediary 
and patron for those who follow him. While ideas on the awliyā’ go back to the 
ninth century, it is mainly al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi (d. 907-912), al-Hujwiri and Ibn 
Arabi who developed theories on the hierarchy of awliyā’, the khatm al- awliyā’ 
(Seal of the Awliyā’), the quṭb and al-insān al-kāmil (the Perfect Man).151 The 
awliyā’ are considered to hold the universe together by providing a connection 
between the world of the Creator and the creation, channelling divine energy into 
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the cosmos, and providing a continuing access to divine mercy.152 Or, to use 
anthropological vocabulary: ‘A sufi pir, like the Prophet, maintains a state of 
permanent liminality between heaven and earth, which gives him, like other 
permanently liminal individuals, supernatural powers.’153 This combined with pre-
Islamic beliefs regarding saints and the power and grace that can be found at 
their tombs due to their continuing spiritual presence. When a Sufi shaykh died, 
therefore, the devotion of his followers often turned to his tomb, around which a 
shrine cult often developed. People also often believed that his power could be 
transferred through his bloodline, and his descendants often played an important 
role in the development of this shrine.154 
Pnina Werbner writes that ‘Sufism as a discursive formation encapsulates 
an integrated set of assumptions about saintly world renunciation, spiritual 
authority and closeness to God, which travel globally and are widely shared 
across the Islamic world’. This ‘deep structural logic’ holds that the renunciation 
of the world (asceticism) leads to divine love and intimacy with God, which 
bestows ‘divine hidden knowledge’ and the ability to transform the world on the 
saint, showing ‘the hegemony of spiritual authority over temporal power and 
authority.’ These general Sufi ideas on wilāya are a ‘determinative symbolic 
force’ that interacts with local environments, through ‘its concrete localisation and 
embodiment in myths and effective demonstrations of power, morality, and 
social-cum-material investments.’ Because one of the most common 
assumptions about a saint’s character is his uniqueness, this overarching 
discursive formation creates a large degree of heterogeneity within the Sufi 
tradition.155 
We have discussed some of the elements on which the Sufi discursive 
tradition is based, in addition to the Qur’an and Hadith, the central elements of 
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the Islamic tradition. Different clusters of elements combine to form different Sufi 
groups and movements, which can be seen as parallel traditions. The selection 
and interpretation of these elements is done by the custodians of the tradition, 
usually the Sufi masters, who transmit these elements to their followers through 
discursive and disciplinary means, encouraging devotional, social, and political 
behaviour based on them, as the followers embody Sufi values and correct 
behaviour through ādāb, framing ‘the production of Sufi identities and their public 
expression as forms of moral performance,’ 156 rendering the Sufi tradition into a 
‘normative discourse through a most complex procedure of dissemination.’157  
The main element around which the Sufi tradition has historically revolved 
is thus the relationship between shaykh and disciple. Ernst defines the Sufi 
tradition as ‘a teaching of ethical and spiritual ideals, which has been historically 
embodied in lineages of teachers who held prominent positions in Muslim 
societies.’158 Green sees Sufism as having a ‘quintessentially relational profile’, 
the central relation being that between master and disciple as the master teaches 
and guides the disciple and holds the ṭarīqa together, while the followers enable 
the master to enact these functions and pass on the elements of tradition.159 
Rather than focusing on Sufism as Islamic Mysticism that is unconnected to the 
social world, or as a purely social phenomenon that is exclusively organised in 
ṭuruq, we should therefore focus on this relationship between shaykh and 
follower and the transmission of religious knowledge, modes of behaviour, and 
spiritual experiences that happens through these relationships and within the 
communities that are based on them. 
The authority of a Sufi shaykh often extends beyond the immediate circle 
of disciples as his spiritual power often ensures his social, economic and political 
power in wider society (see paragraph 1.4). Guidance can be given to any 
person in society who asks for it, but is done most effectively through the process 
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of initiation into the ṭarīqa whereby a person dedicates him/herself to the shaykh 
fully. In the Sufi tradition (and in Islamic culture in general), the oath of allegiance 
is called bay‛a. It is the acceptance that the person to whom allegiance is 
promised derives his authority from God (either due to his spiritual power or 
based on a political doctrine), and it is therefore an oath of adherence to this 
person’s teachings and/or a promise of obedience. The pledge of new Muslims to 
the Prophet (mentioned in Sūrat al-Fatḥ 48:10, also known as the Āyat al-Bay’a) 
is the prototype on which both bay‛a to the ruler and to a Sufi shaykh are 
modelled.160 Paulo Pinto notes that it is after initiation that a disciple commits 
him/herself completely to the disciplinary mechanisms ‘inscribed in the teachings, 
ritual performances, mystical exercises and bodily ordeals’ in order to ‘embody 
the symbolic, practical and normative framework of Sufism as a set of bodily 
capacities and moral dispositions’ that give them a framework in which to 
understand and enact their mystical experiences and steer the disciple’s social 
behaviour.161 
Pinto shows that different ways of transmission lead to different 
relationships between shaykh and follower, and to different relationships among 
the followers themselves. Pinto sees a difference between a ṭarīqa’s collective 
rituals such as collective dhikr, which can be practiced by both initiates and by 
non-initiated followers and which allows them ‘various degrees of socialization 
into the symbolic and experiential universe’ of the ṭarīqa, and the more 
individualized process of initiation which allows them to develop an individualized 
religious self through a personalized wird and subjective mystical experiences.162 
Based on his fieldwork in Aleppo, he argues that while collective rituals on the 
one hand foster an egalitarian atmosphere based on collective experiences, they 
can also promote a subtle hierarchization as the mystical experiences expressed 
during collective rituals can be used to evaluate the spiritual level of the disciples 
and to create a hierarchy based on these levels. In such cases, ‘the body is both 
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the main focus of the disciplinary dimension of the Sufi ritual and a performative 
arena for the communication of mystical experiences and the affirmation and 
classification of Sufi subjectivities.’163 Collective rituals are not the only setting in 
which mystical states are evaluated, however – as we have seen, spiritual states 
(aḥwāl) should be expressed in deeds (‛amal), and their evaluation can therefore 
also happen in different settings, such as study groups and social interactions, 
where knowledge and ādāb are factors to rank the disciples.164 He further notes 
that study groups in which knowledge is discursively transmitted, lead to ‘the 
homogeneous distribution of doctrinal categories and religious knowledge’, 
creating shared doctrinal understandings and a moral community that has 
egalitarian properties. Pinto argues that this tends to encourage reflexivity, which 
leads to objectification and a clearer definition of the tradition.165 Personal 
instruction, e.g. in the form of personalized disciplinary practices such as a 
personalized wird, on the other hand, provides the disciple with ‘a reflexive arena 
in which he/she can gradually fashion an individualised religious subjectivity’ and 
in which the master/disciple relationship is inscribed ‘in the process of 
subjectification fostered by mystical initiation’, reinforcing the hierarchical links 
that connect the shaykh with each of his disciples.166 
While Pinto pays a lot of attention to hierarchies within Syrian Sufi 
communities, Hoffman points to the communal character of the Sufi experience 
she witnessed in the Egyptian context, where Sufis refer to their relationship as 
tawḥīd. The question whether a particular community is characterized by an 
egalitarian mode of interaction, or whether it operates as an explicit or implicit 
hierarchy, and how this relates to the process of tarbiya, the process of 
transmission of the tradition through doctrinal lessons and spiritual exercises, is a 
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relevant one. This approach shows how we can begin to understand the 
functioning of a Sufi community by analysing the relationship between a shaykh 
and his disciples, and how this impacts on the formation of social attitudes within 
the community and outside it. It further raises the question how this dynamic 
would work in a translocal ṭarīqa, where the members of the community do not 
have a regular interaction with their shaykh. 
Pinto refers to the process of spiritual education that follows the initiation 
as tarbiya.167 It is important to note that the word tarbiya generally refers to the 
broader concept of upbringing, training, education and raising of children in 
general,168 not just to the more narrow meaning of spiritual education following a 
voluntary initiation. Indeed in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya the term is used in its 
broader meaning. As we shall see, in their case this reflects a different approach 
to spiritual education and to initiation than Pinto noted in his fieldwork in Aleppo. 
As the ṭarīqa is institutionalized on kinship lines and the followers’ children are 
born into the community and exposed to the teachings and practices of the ṭarīqa 
from a young age, and as there is no individualized instruction, the mubāya’a has 
a less pronounced role. This shall be further discussed in chapters 6 and 10. 
 
 
1.3 Authority as a Relationship 
 
The classic sociological understanding of authority is based on Max Weber’s 
(1864-1920) Idealtype categorization of rational bureaucratic authority, irrational 
conservative traditional authority and irrational transformative charismatic 
authority.169 Weber saw tradition as ‘conservative, predictable, and oriented 
towards mechanical reproduction of itself’.170 The definition of ‘tradition’ sketched 
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above however understands ‘tradition’ as both dynamic and rational. In this 
understanding, all ‘patterns of authority’ are embedded in a particular tradition 
and are rational when perceived from within their own framework. The focus on 
the transmission of tradition as a process in which authority is sustained or 
contested points us to the relational character of authority. 
As opposed to conservative ‘tradition’, Weber posited disruptive 
‘charisma’: 
 
a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered 
extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman or at least 
specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible 
to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and 
on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a “leader.”171 
 
Weber saw charisma as a personal magnetism based on a person’s 
capacity ‘to have a direct connection with supernatural or sacred power’.172 Peter 
Berger sees the charismatic as a ‘breaking through’ of the transcendent into the 
everyday historical reality, in a specific person or place.173 Charles Lindholm 
understands this as an extraordinary quality to experience and display intense 
emotions as the charismatic has an ‘enhanced expressiveness’ and appears ‘to 
exist in an altered and intensified state of consciousness that is outside of 
mundane patterning, and that is more potent than ordinary emotional life.’174 
Weber saw charisma as ‘revolutionary and creative, occurring in times of 
social crisis’ that could overthrow the status quo, ‘a negating, emotionally 
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intense, undercutting force which “is opposed to all institutional routines, those of 
tradition and those subject to rational management”’ with no ‘fixed lines of 
authority’.175 Weber saw pure charismatic authority as creative, disruptive and 
transitory, challenging established traditional or rational authority, disappearing 
as soon as the charismatic movement is institutionalized and the pure charisma 
of the charismatic moment becomes ‘secondary charisma’.  
Inherent in Weber’s conceptualisation of charisma, however, is the idea 
that charisma ultimately derives from the people who ascribe it and not from the 
individual who is perceived to be charismatic – which logically means that it is 
part of society, part of culture, part of tradition. While in common parlance it has 
come to refer to an attribute of personality, Weber already pointed out that an 
individual’s charisma has to be ‘recognized by those to whom he feels he has 
been sent’.176 It ‘needs to be perceived, invested with meaning, and acted upon 
by significant others: those who respond to this charismatic appeal’.177 As 
Thomas O’Dea (1915-1974) notes: 
 
The new doctrines proclaimed by a charismatic leader or by his missionizing 
followers are in fact a complex mixture of the new and old. Unless they found 
people’s minds in some measure prepared, they would not gather converts. But 
at the same time they proclaim something new, or something old in a new way. 
In this way they are able to appeal to those who are seeing for new values.178 
 
Therefore the strict distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘secondary’ charisma is 
problematic, as is the idea that charisma is anti-traditional or revolutionary, as 
‘many types of charisma actually seem to be integral parts of institutionalized and 
traditional social orders.’179 
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Martin Riesebrodt (1948-2014) points out that Weber did not adequately 
define and systematise his concept of charisma, which led to this confusion. 
Weber’s sources – Rudolf Sohm’s (1841-1917) work on ecclesiastical law and 
the British anthropological debate on magic and religion focussing on mana and 
similar terms – treated charisma as part of the status quo, and in most of 
Weber’s work this same attitude can be perceived implicitly, despite his explicit 
statement that charisma is anti-traditional and revolutionary.180 This is why many 
researchers interpret charisma as a tool of the status quo, connected to the 
‘centre’ or ‘sacred’ in the Durkheimian sense, or the ‘holy’ as understood by 
Rudolf Otto (1869-1937).181 For example, while Shils discusses charisma in 
Weberian terms, in his framework charisma operates as another tool of selection 
and interpretation which transforms tradition.182 Similarly, Riesebrodt points out 
that in The Construction of Society (1972), Shils sees charisma as ‘the main 
ordering tool of the centre’. Following Durkheim and Otto, he sees it as ‘the 
mystifying quality of all kinds of power, authority, and social order’.183  
In line with this thought, many writers have pointed to the similarities 
between Weber’s distinction between charisma and tradition on the one hand, 
and Victor Turner’s (1920-1983) communitas and structure on the other.184 
Applying Arnold van Gennep’s (1873-1957) three-stage theory of rites of 
passage to pilgrimages, Turner distinguishes between communitas as an 
egalitarian liminal state, and ‘structure’ as the hierarchical structure of society. 
Like charisma, communitas also at first sight seems to challenge the status quo, 
but more often than not after inverting tradition temporarily in the liminal phase, 
confirms it after reintegration into society. Communitas ‘represents a charismatic 
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but nevertheless highly institutionalized transitional stage through which a 
traditionalist society reproduces itself.’185 Similarly, many ‘charismatic 
movements’ have been ‘rituals of rebellion’ rather than revolutions changing the 
status quo.186  
Therefore, Lindholm argues that charisma has to be attributed according 
to the expectancies of a certain culture regarding the manifestation of 
extraordinary power, such as personality traits, the fulfilment of a journey (in the 
physical or spiritual sense), or the articulation of a vision. He notes that charisma 
is not an innate quality but that the leader needs to prove and perform his 
charisma: ‘the leader’s sacredness exists if followers believe in and experience 
its existence.’ It is thus ‘a relationship in which leader, follower, and 
circumstances fatefully intertwine.’187 
According to Weber, charismatic authority has to be routinized and 
institutionalised in order for the movement to continue after the charismatic 
leader’s death. Weber described this ‘routinization’ (Veralltäglichung) as follows: 
 
a result of the process whereby either the prophet himself or his disciples secure 
the permanence of his preaching and the congregation’s distribution of grace, 
hence insuring the economic existence of the enterprise and those who man it, 
and thereby monopolizing as well the privileges reserved for those charged with 
religious functions. (…) Once a religious community has become established it 
feels a need to set itself apart from alien competing doctrines and to maintain its 
superiority in propaganda, all of which tends to the emphasis upon differential 
doctrines.188 
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Thus, the movement transforms into a traditional or bureaucratic movement as 
the successors of the charismatic leader become traditional authority figures or 
the leaders of a bureaucratic organisation.189 According to Weber, this includes a 
move from primary charisma to secondary, institutionalised charisma which has 
lost its unpredictability and revolutionary character, but has taken a role in social 
control, ‘the reinforcement of society’s norms and its structures of authority.’ It 
thus remains an essential legitimating element in an institutionalised movement: 
it ‘is this charismatic element, carried over into established social structures, 
which becomes the basis for the legitimation of established authority’.190  
 Berger – who sees charisma as the ‘breaking through’ of the sacred into 
everyday reality – analysed the legitimating function of religion extensively in The 
Sacred Canopy (1967), which complements Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s 
The Social Construction of Reality (1966). Berger and Luckmann argue that man 
and society shape each other in a dialectic between ideas (both every-day and 
theoretical) and social structure, constructing a ‘world’ or ‘universe’ which is 
experienced as objective reality, and ultimately legitimated by an all-
encompassing ‘symbolic universe’ that integrates all aspects of society – all its 
sectors, roles, and experiences, in past, present, and future. According to this 
approach, this ‘reality’ can be challenged by ‘marginal situations’, such as death 
or disaster, and intrusions from ‘alternative realities’, such as dreams and 
imagination, which might break through the precarious order of the ‘universe’ by 
suggesting alternatives, and create chaos. Such experiences can be integrated 
in ‘everyday reality’ as ‘finite provinces of meaning’ or ‘enclaves within the 
paramount reality marked by circumscribed meanings and modes of experience’. 
These experiences are made meaningful in everyday terms by referring to 
aesthetic or religious frames of reference, and act to reinforce the primacy of the 
‘everyday reality’. Through references to the ‘sacred’ these experiences are 
incorporated in the ‘symbolic universe’ and serve to strengthen it. By providing 
meaning to people, religion is thus a major legitimatory tool for social structure – 
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similarly, social structure carries religion. The institutionalisations of such 
moments in which ‘the sacred breaks through’ are therefore essential in the 
legitimation of a society’s structure and worldview.191  
Berger and Luckmann distinguish three dialectical moments in the process 
of institutionalisation of social reality: the first is externalisation, in which the 
human being pours meaning into reality, thus shaping society. This is followed by 
objectification, ‘the process by which the externalized products of human activity 
attain the character of objectivity’192 as society comes to be seen as the natural 
order of things, rather than a human product or projection. Finally, this objectified 
reality is internalized through the process of socialisation:  
 
The individual not only learns the objectivated meanings but identifies with and is 
shaped by them. He draws them into himself and makes them his meanings. He 
becomes not only one who possesses these meanings, but one who represents 
and expresses them.193 
 
Berger and Luckmann point out that that the objective character of ‘reality’ and 
society alone is not enough for people to identify with it – it needs to speak to 
them and provide them with meaning, in other words, integrate those challenges 
they face so it becomes part of their subjective experience.194 Socialisation, 
reality-maintenance and reality-confirmation happen through social interaction 
within specific institutions and in dialogue with significant others with whom the 
individual develops strong affective relationships and who occupy specific 
institutionalised roles – usually, primary socialisation happens in the family and is 
done by the parents.195 The importance of other people in the family and 
community for this process is stressed, as they are the ones who define the roles 
the individual is socialized into:  
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Subjective identity and subjective reality are produced in the same dialectic 
(here, in the etymologically literal sense) between the individual and those 
significant others who are in charge of his socialization. (…) the individual 
becomes that which he is addresses as by others. (…) the individual 
appropriates the world in conversation with others and, furthermore, (…) both 
identity and world remain real to him only as long as he can continue the 
conversation.196 
 
This point is especially relevant in the case of conversion. Conversion can 
come in different forms and is classified by Marta Dominguez Diaz as conversion 
proper (‘changing from one religious tradition to another’), reversion (those who 
were born in a religious tradition and after a period of inactivity return to practice), 
and reaffiliation (‘changing from one group to another within a tradition’). To this 
Lewis Rambo and Charles Farhadian add ‘the intensifying of religious beliefs and 
practices.’197 Julianne Hazen notes that conversion is mainly an ‘ongoing process 
that takes place in the socio-cultural context of life’, sometimes including an 
‘extraordinary transformational element’.198 Berger and Luckmann treat 
conversion as resocialisation, which aims to mirror the primary socialisation in 
encouraging an affective relationship and emotional dependence on the 
significant other who has the role of guide or mediator into the new ‘reality’, in 
addition to the cognitive focus on this new ‘reality’.199 Also in certain situations of 
secondary socialisation which require a high degree of immersion such an 
emotional bond is important. Religious reaffiliation falls in this category; it is the 
immersion in a ‘sub-world’, a ‘partial reality in contrast to the “base-world” 
acquired in primary socialization’, during which new content is superimposed 
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upon an already present reality.200 As Berger and Luckmann point out: ‘A 
religious experience in itself is nothing, ‘it is only within the religious community 
(…) that the conversion can be effectively maintained as plausible.’201 
 The cultivation of roles, and the behaviour and values related to them, is 
one of the most essential aspects of the socialisation process. The institution ‘is 
embodied in individual experience by means of roles’ as people participate in the 
social world and experience it through the roles they perform, making it 
subjectively real. The roles people are socialized to take up place them in the 
social structure, ‘the entire institutional nexus of conduct’, and in doing so they 
shape this structure at the same time as it shapes them.202 Some roles represent 
the entire social and symbolic system, such as the divine monarch who is seen to 
embody the ultimate values of society and provide a direct link to the sacred, 
rooting the social structure in the sacred cosmos and time and lifting it ‘above 
human, historical contingencies’. Berger gives the example of the institution of 
divine kingship - through socialisation, both ‘the man in the street’ and the king 
himself cannot conceive of an alternative reality in which he might not be the 
king.203 
Berger points to the role of ritual in ‘reminding’ people of their tradition and 
the ideas and institutions that are part of it through actions and formulae.204 
O’Dea also sees ritual as an act in which the relationship to the sacred and to the 
community is re-affirmed as ‘relationships of fellowship, and of leader and 
followers, are acted out, reasserted, and strengthened’ and as the individual is 
provided with strength and comfort.205 
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Adherence to this system is ensured through the socialisation process, but 
it is never complete and the social structure and symbolic universe are always 
open to tension and challenge. Through legitimation the social order is justified 
and explained in a cognitive and normative way,206 providing order and 
integration of experiences, including these in other realities, establishing the 
paramount reality as the first, establishing ‘the primacy in the hierarchy of human 
experience’.207 Social control seeks to contain individual or group resistance 
within tolerable limits, and strategies such as therapy, negation or integration can 
be used to deal with deviances. If all else fails, the use of sanctions and force 
might be employed.208 For most people, the social structure and its legitimation 
will be so convincing that this is not necessary, especially when religion is 
involved: ‘the fundamental coerciveness of society lies not in its machineries of 
social control, but in its power to constitute and to impose itself as reality.’209 
Weber saw this institutionalisation and routinization of charisma as a move 
from ‘sect’ – a religious group characterized by voluntary association and a 
charismatic leader – to ‘church’, a religious group one is generally born into, a 
normative order that executes hierocratic authority (exercised through the 
granting or withholding of grace) in which charisma is attached to ‘office’.210 The 
distinction between ‘sect’ and ‘church’ was developed by later sociologists into a 
sociological classification of religious groups, with the main distinction between 
‘sect’ and ‘church’ being their affirming or rejecting attitude to society as sects 
came to be seen as world-rejecting secessionist protest movements and 
churches as world-affirming institutions, often connected with political power.211 
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Berger, however, proposes to define ‘sect’ and ‘church’ not in terms of their 
organisational mode or their relationship to society, but their relationship to the 
sacred: he sees a ‘sect’ as ‘a religious grouping based on the belief that the spirit 
is immediately present’, and the ‘church’ as ‘a religious grouping based on the 
belief that the spirit is remote’ and which therefore requires mediation to access 
the spirit and achieve a ‘religious experience’.212 He therefore also sees 
institutionalisation as a move from sect to church in the sense that access to the 
sacred becomes mediated. In order to control the potentially disruptive 
charismatic experience, the charismatic is routinized and limited to specified 
times and places:  
 
Religious institutions assign the potentially disruptive manifestations of the other 
reality (as opposed to the reality of the ordinary, everyday world) to carefully 
circumscribed times and places in society. They domesticate the ecstasies, 
channel them into socially acceptable and useful activity (such as moral 
conduct), and even manage to convert the religious definition of reality into 
legitimations of the sociopolitical order.213 
 
 The taming of the charismatic is never absolute, however. New 
‘manifestations of the sacred’, ‘charismatic moments’, and ‘religious experiences’ 
can happen either within or outside the institution of the ‘church’, creating a new 
system of relations built on such experiences. This might be incorporated in the 
larger ‘church’, or might lead to secession – and in due time again to 
institutionalisation. This is the eternal dynamic of sect formation and 
institutionalisation.214 
O’Dea has discussed the process of institutionalisation extensively. He 
notes that it is not only the containment of charisma and the transformation of the 
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mode of authority and organisation – it also encompasses the elaboration and 
stabilization of religious ideas, beliefs, and practices.215 The unpredictability of 
the ‘charismatic moment’ in which the transcendent breaks through into everyday 
life (which he calls the ‘religious experience’) and the reactions to this moment 
are institutionalised in stable and established forms. This is never truly stable, 
however: ‘There is a constant or recurring tension between the forces which work 
for stability, even at the risk of distortion, and the forces which work for a truer 
realization of the initial charismatic moment.’216 Because it is the ‘symbolic and 
organizational embodiment of the experience of the ultimate in less-than-ultimate 
forms and the concomitant embodiment of the sacred in profane structures’, or in 
Berger’s words, the translation of the transcendent into the immanent,217 it poses 
several dilemmas:218  
1. The dilemma of mixed motivation: during the charismatic moment, the 
overwhelming motivation of the followers is to follow the charismatic 
leader. As the movement becomes institutionalised, however, and 
acquires material assets and social prestige from which those invested 
in the system can partake, it also elicits other kinds of motivation such 
as the attainment of status, prestige, security, etc., which might 
strengthen motivation over-all by mobilizing both self-interested and 
object-interested elements of motivation, but might also lead to 
tensions as those types of motivation are espoused by different 
factions. Self-interested motivation might become more predominant 
among those with an emotional, social and/or material stake in the 
institution, leading to goal displacement, which might trigger a protest 
movement of those who still adhere to the original ideals. As O’Dea 
points out, this tension might already be present during the original 
charismatic moment, but will more easily be overshadowed by the 
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attraction of the charismatic – it therefore seems to be a shift in 
degree, rather than a clear difference, between the original charismatic 
moment and later institutionalisation.219 
2. The symbolic dilemma: as the reactions to and expressions of the 
original religious experience become routinized into symbols (words, 
gestures, acts, images, sounds, etc.), these cease to be merely 
reactions, but they also become re-presentations of the ‘charismatic 
moment’ in which emotions and attitudes are elicited and group 
solidarity is reinforced – they become ‘an objective reality imposing its 
own patterns upon the participants’ and the medium for sharing and 
communicating and form ‘the basis for socializing the religious 
response’, but if they cease to speak to the participants, the symbols 
become empty and alienate the participants.220 
3. The dilemma of administrative order: while an effective organisation 
obviously strenghtens the movement, over- bureaucratisation leads to 
inefficiency. This is connected to the first point – as people become 
invested in the status quo by depending on the organisational structure 
with its social and economic aspects, they will be hesitant to change it 
as this would threaten their status, security and self-validation. In 
extreme cases, maintenance of the organisational structure becomes 
the primary goal, which often implies a high degree of conservatism.221 
4. The dilemma of delimitation: to affect people’s lives and influence their 
behaviour, the message and practices of the religious movement need 
to be concretized and translated into everyday terms. In addition to 
this, its doctrines and moral rules must be defined to be protected. This 
might lead to the loss of the original extraordinary element and to a 
doctrinal and legal structure which only the elite can understand, all of 
which might lead to alienation.222  
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5. The dilemma of power: while the first generation of a movement exists 
completely of converts, the next generations will increasingly consist of 
those born in the group. Socialisation and education might substitute 
for the dramatic conversion (or prepare for such a dramatic moment of 
‘turning’), but it might also lead to a lessening of the primary zeal. If the 
group acquires social power, the conformity of the believers becomes 
socially relevant, and social or even political power might be used to 
keep people within the fold.223 
In line with our understanding of charisma as part of a dynamic tradition, it 
is important to note that some of these developments might already occur during 
the lifetime of the charismatic leader. As the message is spread to a wide base of 
followers in order that it influences their social behaviour, it is inevitably 
translated to their concrete contexts. The organisational development of the 
movement is often already started by the charismatic founder, and mixed 
motivation can be present among the first leaders and followers.224 The relation 
between the original ‘charismatic moment’ and its subsequent institutionalisation 
therefore should be seen as a continuum rather than a stark distinction. 
The linearity of early theories of charisma and routinization have therefore 
been challenged and it has been argued they should be replaced by a cyclical 
pattern.225 We have already seen that theories of ‘sect formation’ point to the 
circular nature of sectarianism and routinization. For example, Pnina Werbner 
builds on Richard Werbner’s work on the waxing and waning of regional cults, 226 
analysing Sufi movements as regional cults which spread from a sacred centre in 
predictable patterns wherever emissaries settle, and establish branches that 
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remain connected to the sacred centre through participation in the annual 
festival.227 She argues that such cults ‘wax’ and expand under charismatic 
leadership and ‘wane’ when this charisma becomes routinized and the 
movement becomes institutionalised, until a new charismatic leader rises.228 
Geaves has challenged Pnina Werbner’s model in the contemporary 
context, noting that migration to Britain transforms this pattern (see paragraph 
1.5.3).229 On a more general level, scholars have argued that institutionalisation 
does not necessarily lead to the decline of a movement or the lessening of 
charisma. As we have seen above, Berger and Luckmann argue that 
institutionalisation maintains ‘reality’ and social structure without diluting its 
meaningful character. Rather than the start of a process of decay and stagnation, 
they see transmission to a new generation as the completion of the initial process 
of world construction: ‘only with the appearance of a new generation can one 
properly speak of a social world.’230 O’Dea noted that goal displacement might go 
together with protest from those who persist in their adherence to the original 
message,231 rituals might re-create the original experience by eliciting emotions 
                                                  
227 Pnina Werbner, ‘Stamping the Earth with the Name of Allah: Zikr and the Sacralizing of Space 
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and attitudes, re-affirming ties to the leader and the community,232 and 
bureaucratisation does not necessarily lead to an organisation without spirit as 
‘order’ can also be seen as a manifestation of the divine.233 
Scholars of Sufism have pointed out that the assumption that 
institutionalisation brings a lessening of charismatic authority does not hold true 
for many Sufi movements due to the ‘existing template for sainthood’ in Sufi 
tradition234 (see paragraph 1.2) which is thoroughly pervaded by the notion that 
one can see the divine in everything and by the embodiment of the sacred in the 
spiritual master, which can be manifested in many ways, such as knowledge, 
piety, karāmāt,235 social success, and the manifestation of baraka.236 As O’Dea 
pointed out, institutionalised rituals not only serve to express a reaction to the 
‘charismatic moment’ but also serve to re-present it and elicit emotions and 
attitudes that allow to recreate the ‘charismatic moment’, in addition to enhancing 
group solidarity based on this experience of the charismatic.237 As we have seen 
in paragraph 1.2, all of this happens in collective dhikr as part of the path that is 
walked under guidance of the shaykh. ‘Charisma here, while thoroughly personal 
and primary, is also thoroughly structured and systematic.’238  
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Pinto argues that the use of Weber’s theories on charisma and 
‘routinization of charisma’ in the study of Sufi sainthood tends to lead to a focus 
on the concept of baraka as a synonym of ‘charisma’, without paying sufficient 
attention to additional bases of authority deriving from the Islamic tradition such 
as șalāḥ (piety/virtue, discussed extensively by Cornell),239 and the notion of 
wilāya. The authority of a Sufi shaykh can be simultaneously charismatic and 
legitimized through his connection to the doctrinal and ritual traditions of Sufism. 
Even when he has inherited his authority, he still has to prove his baraka in order 
for the community to accept him by performing ‘powers and qualities that are 
culturally linked to the notion of baraka’. Hoffman also points out that  
 
[a]lthough the Sufi definition of sainthood may depend mainly on inner, and 
deeply personal, spiritual attributes and an attitude of separation from the world, 
the average person knows a saint by his or her capability to work miracles, 
dispense blessing, and function in an intercessory capacity for those in need.240 
  
She further quotes Gilsenan in saying that sainthood is ‘bound up, not with vague 
ideas of other-worldly holiness, but with the capacity for significant action in the 
world’.241 As Lindholm noted, charisma needs to be proved and performed.242 
The form which this performance takes, depends on the cultural context and the 
audience’s expectancies. It could for example take the form of the performance 
of piety and justice, or of miracles.243 Therefore, Pinto argues, ‘[t]he performative 
character of the shaykh's authority calls for a better conceptualisation and 
contextualisation of baraka as a constitutive element of disciplines of power in 
contemporary Sufism.’244 
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Pinto uses Asad’s model of the transmission of tradition and disciplinary 
mechanisms (which he refers to as the process of initiation, or tarbiya) to analyse 
the character of the relationships within the Sufi group (as discussed in 
paragraph 1.2), noting that charisma has to be enacted in the group, and that 
different enactment leads to ‘divergent configurations of religiosity, community, 
and religious subjectivities within the normative framework of a shared Sufi 
tradition’.245 This means that ‘charismatic forms of authority coexist, transform, 
and subvert bureaucratic or traditional power structures and forms of 
organization within the Sufi communities.’246 This comes close to the focus 
Berger and Luckmann place on the role of socialisation in world-maintenance 
and the possibility to maintain the original meanings within the institution.247 
A particularly interesting example of the maintenance of charisma in a 
traditional Sufi ṭarīqa is provided by Ahmed and Von Oppen, who analyse the 
Saba Ishrin pilgrimage on Ngazidja/Grande Comore and in Tanzania, the main 
annual ceremony of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in East Africa.248 The ceremony 
commemorates the death of Shaykh Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Ma’ruf (1852-
1904) on the 27th day of the Islamic month Jumada al-Thani (hence the name 
‘Saba Ishrin’, which means 27 in Arabic), who spread the ṭarīqa in the region and 
is buried in Moroni.249 Before the 1990s all followers on Ngazidja/Grande Comore 
gathered at the zāwiya in Moroni where Shaykh Ma’ruf is buried, until the leaders 
decided it became too crowded and they should celebrate at their own zawāya. 
Ahmed and Von Oppen point out that is not an indication of decentralisation, but 
rather of the vitality and the flexibility of the ṭarīqa and the strength of its 
cohesion, re-affirmed by the shared temporality of the celebrations.250 
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In Tanzania, this celebration is combined with the commemoration of the 
death of Shaykh Hussein (d.1971), who spread the ṭarīqa in Tanzania and who is 
buried in Kilwa-Pande. It has been transformed into the month-long Saba Ishrin 
‘caravan’, performed since 2002. Shaykh Hussein had travelled along Tanzania’s 
coast to spread the ṭarīqa but was based in a cluster of zawāya in the southeast 
region of Tanzania (Kilwa-Kisiwani, Kilwa-Pande and Songomnara). Most 
members of the community, including Shaykh Hussein’s son and successor 
Shaykh Nuruddin, migrated to Dar al-Salam, and Shaykh Hussein’s zāwiya is 
now empty. The annual Saba Ishrin caravan, a month-long communal pilgrimage 
from Dar al-Salam to Mohoro, Kilwa-Panda, the Mafia Islands, and back to Dar 
al-Salam, visits many places connected to the ṭarīqa and holds commemoration 
celebrations there, providing the opportunity to simultaneously reconnect to the 
roots of the ṭarīqa and of the community and re-enact the travels of 
ShaykhHussein, thus connecting the zawāya and followers across space and 
time.  
Based on Turner’s concepts of ‘structure’ and ‘communitas’, Ahmed and 
Von Oppen see this innovative pilgrimage caravan as a successful attempt to 
‘inject the structure (here the stable or stabilised tariqa) with Utopian ideas from 
the origins of the tariqa (i.e., the communitas period) which, at the same time, are 
adapted to a modern context’, combining various layers of remembrance and 
translocality. Such an innovation can break the cycle of ‘waxing and waning’ as 
the Shaykh – son of the previous charismatic Shaykh and thus an example of 
routanization – maintains the original charisma as it is recreated every time the 
community meets, and in particular during the Saba Ishrin pilgrimage. The 
spiritual and social cohesion of the community and their devotion to the previous 
and current leaders of the ṭarīqa is thus maintained as the ṭarīqa ‘continuously re-
articulates itself in both local and global contexts.’251 
This draws our attention to the relationship between charisma and 
innovation. The attempt to concretize the charismatic message and its rules by 
clearly defining them and translating them into everyday terms does not 
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necessarily lead to the loss of the extra-ordinary charismatic element (O’Dea’s 
fifth dilemma), but might enhance its charisma by allowing it to continue to speak 
to the believers and prevent alienation (O’Dea’s second dilemma).252 For 
example, R. Werbner notes that ‘innovation itself becomes a proof of spiritual 
grace’ as innovation and adaptation to the situation and experiences of the 
followers lead to their identification with the spiritual leader and the attribution of 
charisma. Even Pnina Werbner herself notes that actual travel and the 
sacralizing of space is an important aspect of a shaykh’s authority.253 We might 
thus turn her argument on its head and say that it is not charisma that allows for 
expansion, but expansion that provides charisma. Seen from this angle, 
charisma is that aspect of tradition which allows it to renew itself in every 
generation, to speak to new issues – not necessarily the irrational revolutionary 
force that Weber saw (although it can also be that), but the force that allows for 
the innovation that is necessary for followers to stay connected. 
Based on his research of the historical development of the Ahmadiyya 
ṭarīqa, Mark Sedgwick suggests a cyclical model that is based less on the notion 
of charisma, but rather on the notion of re-invention of the tradition, noting the 
different bases of authority that can lie at the base of such re-inventing figures. 
The Ahmadiyya’s doctrinal and practical teachings and organisational forms are 
very diverse and its routine is periodically disrupted by an innovator – who bases 
his innovative authority on charisma, or scholarship, or both – making its centres 
and periphery continuously shift. Sedgwick notes that the one constant factor in 
this process of re-invention of tradition and innovation, is the ‘limiting 
expectations of the shaykh’s followers’, as their ideas on sanctity, piety, and the 
Sufi path are very influential and remain remarkably constant.254 
Simon Stjernholm also points to the influence the followers can have on 
their shaykh, which he sees as ‘a complex interaction where ongoing 
negotiations concerning the content and form of the ṭarīqa’s activities 
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continuously take place.’255 Referring to Alberto Melucci he argues that collective 
identity is ‘an interactive process consisting of shared cognitive definitions, active 
relationships and emotional investments’ in which each participant has a role to 
play. In his research on the Naqshbandiyya-Haqqaniyya, he points out that its 
publications – while transmitting the teachings of Shaykh Nazim – are edited, 
distributed, and discussed by the followers, who thus are also responsible for 
meaning and significance in community. By recounting their visits to the Shaykh 
they participate in the manufacture of tradition. Most tellingly, Stjernholm relates 
an incident in which Hisham Kabbani, who acts as the leading Shaykh Nazim’s 
representative but whose authority is not unanimously accepted, was silenced by 
his audience during an event of the ṭarīqa in London. Stjernholm points out that 
as Kabbani’s responsibility has grown, ‘so has the negotiating aspect of the 
relation between shaykh and murids in London’.256 As such, it is not only leaders, 
but also the followers who participate in the definition of the movement, and an 
analysis of a religious movement should focus on the relationships in which 
meaning is negotiated.257  
The mechanism through which charisma is attributed is thus a dynamic 
interaction between leader and follower, which Lindholm explains on a 
psychological level:258  
 
Charisma is, above all, a relationship, a mutual mingling of inner selves of leader 
and follower. Therefore, it follows that if the charismatic is able to compel, the 
follower has a matching capacity for being compelled, and we need to consider 
what makes up the personality configuration of the follower, as well as that of the 
leader, if we are to understand charisma.259 
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In addition to this, we have to take into account that this relationship takes 
place within a particular time and space and is therefore anchored in a particular 
society and all the ideas, values and institutions it has inherited from the past. 
Therefore, the elements which lead to the attribution of charisma are bound by 
culture: the transcendent values embodied by the charismatic, and the signs by 
which people recognize this embodiment, depend on the tradition in which the 
charismatic appears.260  
Lincoln argues that ‘authority’ should be seen as a relationship, the 
capacity for ‘authoritative speech’, a speech act that is accepted by its audience 
by virtue of the speaker and his or her office, which operates within a certain 
discourse. He distinguishes between epistemic and executive authority – in other 
words between those who are ‘an authority’ and those who are in a position of 
authority – but also notes that these categories can complement each other and 
that by focussing on both categories’ ‘capacity to produce consequential speech’ 
this distinction can be transcended. Lincoln stresses that in order for speech to 
be authoritative it has to be ‘the right speech and delivery’, delivered by the right 
person (either due to personal characteristics or by virtue of his/her office), at the 
right time and place, with the right ‘staging and props’, and the message has to 
be judged ‘right’ by the audience – that is, it has to appeal to the audience’s 
historically and culturally conditioned ideas of right and wrong.261 Essential here 
is the role of the audience, as we have just seen in the examples given by 
                                                                                                                                                   
process that takes place over time and in a specific context. His analysis is mainly centred on a 
psychoanalytical approach to all these factors, which is not the approach I intend to follow as it is 
practically not feasible but mainly as I find it morally problematic. Another problem with this work 
is his choice of case studies. He illustrates the negative consequences of charisma in thorough 
psycho-analytic discussions of Hitler and the Nazis, Charles Manson and the Family, and Jim 
Jones and the Peoples Temple. To show that ‘charisma’ can also work as an integrating force he 
concludes with an anthropological chapter on ‘shamanism’, heaping together comments on 
shamanistic systems from many times and places as expressions of ‘paradigmatic archaic 
religion’ in ‘pre-modern, primitive, less complex’ societies, followed by a succinct deeper 
discussion of the !Kung Bushmen of the Kalahari. The difference in approach between Western 
and non-Western societies is scholarly unsound and denigrating to these religious systems. In 
addition to this, the choice of case studies gives the impression that there is no space for positive, 
integrative charisma in the contemporary Western world. 
260 Werbner, Pilgrims of Love, 25, 82. 
261 Lincoln, Authority, 1–4, 11, 168. 
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Sedgwick and Stjernholm. Especially Kabbani’s silencing by his audience is a 
very explicit example of how the enactment of authority as a speech act on a 
stage can be denied by the audience, and hence of the influence the audience 
can have on the authoritative leader’s message.262 
We shall discuss all these conditions with regards to Sufi leaders in the 
next paragraph, but here it is important to delve deeper into the concept of 
‘speech acts’ in a religious milieu where relationships and communications are 
not only located in ‘everyday reality’ but also in spiritual, experiential, meta-
empirical reality – as the followers of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya say, in the 
zāwiya of the heart. These communications are very real for the followers and 
imbued with meaning, and for the interpretive social scientist therefore have to be 
taken into account. They cannot be empirically observed, but can be analysed in 
so far as they are given meaning and acted upon in the empirically observable 
everyday reality.263 
Islamic tradition as a whole is full of instances of spiritual communication, 
most notably visions, such as dreams, appearances of light, or apparitions. In 
fact, the Qur’an, the word of God, was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in a 
series of visions.264 The Prophet’s mi‛rāj265 ‘was seen to epitomise the notion of 
the vision as a genuine revelation from God, as a true epistemic rupture (or fatḥ, 
literally an ‘opening’) of everyday reality.’266 Dreams ‘are believed to be windows 
                                                  
262 Stjernholm, ‘A Translocal Sufi Movement’, 91–93; Stjernholm, ‘What is the Naqshbandi-
Haqqani Tariqa?’, 210. 
263 This is not to say these experiences themselves are not valuable and worthy of study, only 
that it is impossible for a social scientist to study them as they are not empirically observable. 
Following Berger and Smart, I here take a ‘methodologically agnostic’ approach which brackets 
such unempirical occurrences. For a more thorough discussion of my attitude towards the role of 
the transcendent in social research, see chapter 2.1. 
264 Nile Green, ‘The Religious and Cultural Roles of Dreams and Visions in Islam’, Journal of the 
Royal Asiatic Society 13, no. 3 (2003): 289; Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern 
Egypt, 124–131, 134–145, 213–218. 
265 The mi‛rāj is the Prophet Muhammad's ascension to heaven, based on Sūrat al-Takwīr 81:19-
25 and Sūrat al-Najm 53:1-21, often celebrated in Islamic communities. Sufis see it as a 
metaphor for each person's spiritual journey. In Islamic tradition it is connected to the Prophet’s 
night journey (isrā‛) from Mecca to 'the furthest mosque', which came to be defined as al-Aqsa 
mosque in Jerusalem, from which the mi‛rāj is believed to have taken place. 
266 Green, ‘Dreams and Visions in Islam’, 293; Michael Anthony Sells, ed., Early Islamic 
Mysticism: Sufi, Qurʼan, Miʻraj, Poetic and Theological Writings (New York: Paulist Press, 1996), 
47–56, 242. 
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into the spiritual realm and to provide insights that would otherwise be 
unavailable.’267 This is supported by the Qur’an as visions and dreams of the 
Prophet Muhammad and other prophets are mentioned (especially the story of 
Joseph), and it is written that ‘in the sleeping state, the spirits of the living and the 
dead are together in the divine presence’ (Sūrat al-Zumar 39:42)). The Prophet 
legitimized dream-visions believers have of him: ‘Whoever has seen me has 
seen me truly, and Satan cannot take my form.’268 In the Islamic tradition, this 
attitude to dreams was further developed in literature on dream interpretation and 
in oral tradition. In Sufi tradition, accounts of visions and dreams abound (e.g. the 
visions of Bayezid Bistami (804-874), Rabia al-Adawiyya (713-801), Sahl al-
Tustari (818-896), al-Tirmidhi, Ruzbihan Baqli, and Shah Wali Allah (1703-
1762)); Umar Suhrawardi (d.1234), Ibn Arabi, and Abd al-Aziz al-Dabbagh (1679-
1719) wrote theories about the nature of dreams.269  
Dreams have always been taken seriously and have played an important 
role in Muslim societies. Dreams form important parts of the narratives 
establishing the Islamization of places270 and the legitimacy of kings271 and saints 
Saints often claimed to have been initiated not by an earthly master but through 
dreams and visions of the Prophet, al-Khidr, or an important walī. This is called 
an uwaysī initiation.272 In addition to this, Sufi shaykhs derive functional authority 
                                                  
267 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 213–214. 
268 Ḥadīth from Bukhari’s Saḥīḥ, quoted by Green, ‘Dreams and Visions in Islam’, 291. 
269 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 214; Green, ‘Dreams and Visions in 
Islam.’  
270 Patrick Franke discusses the role of appearances and dream visions of al-Khidr in the 
Islamization of places, for example in the Ottoman legend that the Prophet Khidr guided the 
Byzantine Emperor Justinian to build the Hagia Sofia in Constantinople as part of the debate 
whether the Ottomans had the right to take over the heritage of the Byzantine Empire. Patrick 
Franke, ‘Khidr in Istanbul: Observations on the Symbolic Construction of Sacred Spaces in 
Traditional Islam’, in On Archaeology of Sainthood, ed. Stauth, 40–45. 
271 Green for example mentions the dreams of Shaykh Safı-al-Din of Ardabil (d.1334), which 
became an important feature of Safavid historiography as his dreams encoded ‘political claims to 
legitimate rule into signs of divine blessing and approval’. Green, ‘Dreams and Visions in Islam’, 
303. 
272 An uwaysī initiation is an initiation by the spirit of a physically absent or deceased person, 
often the Prophet or al-Khidr. The term derives from Uways al-Qarani (d.657) who was instructed 
by the Prophet Muhammad without ever having physically met him. It enables a Sufi to claim 
initiation without submitting himself to a master, but places him within institutional Sufism as well. 
J. Baldick, ‘Uwaysiyya’, EI2 X 958; Green, ‘Dreams and Visions in Islam’, 299–301. See 
paragraph 1.4. 
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from the interpretation of the dreams of others, and their own visions and dreams 
are considered to be a kind of revelation in its own right.273 Particularly relevant is 
the practice of istikhāra, ‘Islamic dream incubation practice’, ‘an approved form of 
seeking guidance through dreams’. One prays the istikhāra prayer, after which 
one goes to sleep and expects the answer will be provided in a dream (although 
daytime guidance also happens in some cases).274 It is said in several hadiths 
that the Prophet Mohammed taught his companions istikhāra and the detail of 
the istikhāra prayer and recommended it to them.275 While dreaming and 
istikhāra are thus part of the general Islamic tradition and Muslim imagination, the 
actual dreaming practice is culturally informed as dreams and visions are 
simultaneously culturally embedded in a shared Islamic symbolic universe and in 
those of the cultures with which the dreamer is familiar.276 Additionally, the 
practice of guidance following the istikhāra prayer varies, and the decisive 
authority of interpreting dreams differs, as do the issues for which istikhāra is 
sought (such as health, marriage, sorcery).277 In this milieu, visionary 
experiences are promoted and through the recounting of visionary narratives ‘a 
blueprint’ is created ‘that might recur in the novice’s own visionary life’, linking 
vision and narrative, imagination and tradition, connecting ‘Muslims’ inner and 
outer worlds as an interrelated process of embodied well-being’.278 
While we cannot access the subjective dreaming experience empirically, 
the analysis of such acts of spiritual communication can and should be taken into 
consideration when discussing the relation of a spiritual master and his disciple. 
The way in which the experience is induced (e.g. prayer or meditation), with 
whom it is discussed, how it is narrated and interpreted, and who are the actors 
involved in the process and what are their roles, are very relevant questions. 
                                                  
273 Green, ‘Dreams and Visions in Islam’, 305, 309–311. 
274 Iain Edgar and David Henig, ‘Istikhara: The Guidance and Practice of Islamic Dream 
Incubation Through Ethnographic Comparison’, History & Anthropology 21, no. 3 (2010): 251–62; 
Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 214–215; Green, ‘Dreams and Visions in 
Islam’, 307–308. 
275 Edgar and Henig, ‘Istikhara’, 252. 
276 Ibid., 251–252; Green, ‘Dreams and Visions in Islam’, 288. 
277 Edgar and Henig, ‘Istikhara’, 252–253. 
278 Green, ‘Dreams and Visions in Islam’, 305; Edgar and Henig, ‘Istikhara’, 251–252. 
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While ‘the stage of the speech act’ is to be found on the spiritual level and 
therefore not empirically accessible to the researcher, the other factors involved 
in the analysis of authoritative speech acts are still relevant: it has to be delivered 
by the right person at the right moment, and the message has to be judged ‘right’ 
by the audience, appealing to the audience’s historically and culturally 
conditioned ideas of right and wrong. 
As we have seen in paragraph 1.2, the practising of the Sufi Path involves 
the development of a spiritual connection between master and disciple and 
among disciples, leading to a strong social and affective communal bond, ‘an 
intense spiritual and emotional identification that leads to a merging of the 
boundaries of two personalities.’279 Because of this spiritual connection the 
disciples believe that the shaykh’s instruction can happen even when there is a 
geographical distance, through autosuggestion and visions.280 It is accepted that 
when a follower engages in the awrād the shaykh has set for him/her, s/he will 
develop this spiritual connection and open him/herself for visions of the shaykh 
through which guidance can take place.281 While the exact nature of this bond 
and communication is beyond our reach, we can say that due to the strong 
process of tarbiya, which we can understand as socialisation, a strong intellectual 
and affective attachment is created to the ṭarīqa’s symbolic universe and its 
plausibility structure. 
Eickelman and Piscatori identify three interconnected levels of analysis of 
authority as a relationship: the ideological – which they understand as the 
apparent embodiment of the moral order and representation of ‘symbolic 
reference points of society’; the locational – as authority is partly defined by one’s 
relation to competing figures of authority; and the functional, which derives from 
the performance of particular functions. Here Eickelman and Piscatori point to the 
circular logic of authority, as figures of authority are allowed to fulfil certain 
                                                  
279 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 63–64, 140, 188–195, 203–205. 
280 Ibid., 215–216. 
281 An example is given in Ibid., 142. 
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functions, such as offering guidance and delimiting proper ideas and practice, 
from which they in turn derive more authority.282  
 
 
1.4 Authority in Sufi Movements 
 
1.4.1 Bases of Authority in Islam 
 
The classic sociological concepts ‘tradition’ and ‘charisma’ have been redefined 
to focus on the relationships inherent in authority as people submit to someone’s 
authority when he or she provides a link to the transcendent or sacred, to the 
source of ultimate authority in their particular society. The ultimate value and 
authority in Islam is obviously God, who has made Himself known through 
various Prophets throughout history, but most notably through the Prophet 
Muhammad in seventh-century Arabia. As such, Muhammad serves as the 
‘symbolic personal centre’ of Islam. Muslim authority – in whatever field and form 
– therefore derives from God, through the Prophet Muhammad. In order for a 
person to claim authority in an Islamic society, s/he has to prove a link to the 
symbolic centre, i.e. the Prophet.283 The main question when discussing authority 
in Islam therefore is, what is a valid connection to the Prophet, and who can 
claim this? The answers to this question differ according to time and place 
throughout Islamic history. 
Eickelman and Piscatori consider ‘Muslim politics’ to be  
 
the competition and contest over both the interpretation of symbols and control of 
the institutions, formal and informal, that produce and sustain them. Politics is 
thus a struggle over people’s imaginations – habits of the mind, the heart, and of 
public space that help shape people’s ideas of the common good – just as much 
as it is a struggle for control over groups, institutions, states, and resources. (...) 
                                                  
282 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 58–59. 
283 Arthur F. Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet: The Indian Naqshbandiyya and the Rise of the 
Mediating Sufi Shaykh (Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 13–26. 
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The interpretation of symbols is played out against the background of an 
underlying framework that, while subject to contextualized nuances, is common 
to Muslims throughout the world.284 
 
In other words, ‘sacred authority’ is the right to interpret the sacred sources and 
the social, economic and political power that comes with it.285 
Similarly, according to Paul Heck, ‘Sufi authority’ takes place in two realms 
– or as Lincoln would say, on two stages: the spiritual/religious and 
temporal/political. The shaykh’s authority derives from saintly charisma and 
organisational resources; it is institutionalised in the relationship of the Sufi 
master and his initiated disciples and the wider community of followers, ‘an 
extension of the authority of the prophet Muhammad and, through him, of God 
(...) based on the claim of direct transmission, even embodiment, of prophetic 
knowledge’ which is conceived as part of the hierarchy of saints holding the 
cosmos together.286 
Calder distinguishes five epistemological categories or ways to gain 
knowledge of God. According to him, Sunni ‘orthodoxy’ is formed by a balance 
between scripture and community, with the balance tilting towards ‘community’ – 
meaning the community of ‛ulamā’. In Calder’s view, the boundaries of what is 
‘right’ are constantly being redefined by referring to other ways of thinking: gnosis 
(found amongst the Sufis), reason (found among the falsafā’ (philosophers)), and 
charisma (found among the Shi’a).287 Calder sees Sunni Islam as ‘primarily a 
religion of community, scripture and gnosis, marginally of reason, and hardly at 
all of charisma.’ As Calder focusses on the analysis of written texts, it is 
unavoidable that he stresses their importance. When taking a broader view at 
Islamic sources of authority, we notice the importance of charismatic figures such 
as the mujaddidūn (renewers), the mahdī,288 and the awliyā’.289 Also, we should 
                                                  
284 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, xv, 5. 
285 Ibid., chapter 3: ‘Sacred authority in contemporary Muslim societies’ 46–79. 
286 Heck, ‘Introduction’, 8–10. 
287 Calder, ‘The Limits of Islamic Orthodoxy’, 226–227, 231. 
288 ‘The rightly guided one’, an eschatological figure who will come at the end of time and rule for 
a number of years before the Day of Judgment. Throughout Islamic history, the belief in the 
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keep in mind that one shaykh can combine several epistemological categories in 
his background – in fact this was the case during most of Islamic history. Most 
‛ulamā’ – exegetes, theologians, jurists – were also students of Sufi shaykhs 
and/or members of Sufi ṭuruq. Charismatic saints were often educated in one of 
the religious sciences – in fact they usually derived part of their charisma from 
this education. Different groups within society stressed different aspects of one 
and the same person.290  
Historically, there has been a lot of criticism of and opposition to certain 
Sufi ideas, practices, and forms of organisation, both within and outside Sufi 
movements. These dynamics involve many different groups and approaches to 
Islam, and have reached different levels of conflict, from discussions to outright 
persecution and executions. These are ‘crucial forces shaping and coinciding 
with socio-political configurations in the world of Islam while constituting an 
integral part of an ongoing debate inside the Islamic tradition’.291  
Green points out that in early Islam there were many interacting trends 
shaping the young tradition, and Sufism developed in close relation to the other 
religious sciences.292 Discussions among ascetics and lovers of God, and 
accusations from those opposed to them, dealt with ascetic practices and the 
nature of love of and for God. Later, criticism turned on specific practices (such 
as ecstatic dhikr with or without music), Sufi esoteric Qur’anic commentary 
(ta‛wīl), the nature of inspiration and visionary experiences, karāmāt, spiritual 
elitism, and theological concepts such as the nūr muḥammadī and the Perfect 
Man (al-insān al-kāmil).293 Criticism and debate between different trends and 
                                                                                                                                                   
Mahdi has inspired a number of religious and political movements. W. Madelung, ‘Al-Mahdī’, EI2 
V 1230-1238. 
289 DeWeese, ‘Authority’, 37. 
290 See for example Rachida Chih, “Entre Tradition Soufie et Réformisme Musulman: La 
Littérature Hagiographique dans le Soufisme Égyptien Contemporain,” Égypte/Monde Arabe 29 
(1997): 23–36. 
291 Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke, ‘Introduction’, in Islamic Mysticism Contested. Thirteen 
Centuries of Controversies and Polemics, ed. Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke (Leiden: Brill, 
1999), 1. 
292 Green, Sufism, 55. 
293 De Jong and Radtke, ‘Introduction’; Josef van Ess, ‘Sufism and its Opponents. Reflections on 
Topoi, Tribulations, and Transformations’, in Islamic Mysticism Contested, ed. De Jong and 
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approaches, and personal disagreements, were part of the larger Muslim world, 
and this in itself should not be seen as an indication that Sufis were singled out 
as a group.294 There were cases, however, where these dynamics led to outright 
persecutions. Often, these charges were personal matters rather than 
institutionalised persecution of Sufis as a collective,295 as in the case of Mansur 
al-Hallaj (d.922).296 Ibn Arabi has also been subject to endless and fierce 
opposition, most notably regarding his ideas of waḥdat al-wujūd.297 
A major issue of contention is the different epistemological bases of 
knowledge and their relation to religious authority, as this raises the question who 
gets to interpret the sacred sources and the law, and speak for Islam. Due to 
their direct access to divine wisdom, ma‛rifa, Sufi masters can claim to interpret 
Qur’an and Hadith, and base rules of behaviour on these interpretations that 
might compete with the rules and practices prescribed by the ‛ulamā. Ibn Arabi 
took this so far as to say that only kashf (mystical illumination) can truly verify the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Radtke, 22–44; Gerhard Böwering, ‘Early Sufism between Persecution and Heresy’, in Islamic 
Mysticism Contested, ed. De Jong and Radtke, 45–67. 
294 Laury Silvers-Alario, ‘The Teaching Relationship in Early Sufism: A Reassessment of Fritz 
Meier’s Definition of the Shaykh al-Tarbiya and the Shaykh al-Ta’lim’, Muslim World 93, no. 1 
(2003): 69–98. 
295 Böwering, ‘Early Sufism between Persecution and Heresy’, 54–59. Böwering notes that when 
Sufi teachings were confined to Sufi circles they were usually left alone, but when they made 
them public, the public and authorities interfered, which often led to persecutions. He gives the 
examples of Abu Sulayman al-Darani (d.830), Abu Hamza al-Baghdadi (d.882-3), Abu Yazid al-
Bistami (d.874-5), Abu Abdallah al-Husayn b. Bakr al-Subayhi, Abu Bakr al-Wasiti (d.after 932), 
Abu Husayn al-Nuri (d.865), Dhu al-Nun al-Misri (d.859-862), and Abu Sa’id al-Kharraz (d.899) 
who were exiled, Abu Bakr al-Shibli (d.946) who was locked up in an asylum, and Ibn Ata (d.922) 
who was beaten to death. 
296 He is known as a ‘martyr of love’ who was executed for his blasphemous sayings, uttered in a 
state of loving ecstasy – most notably, Anā al-Ḥaqq (I am the Ultimate Truth, i.e. God)’. In the 
words of Schimmel, he is ‘a symbol for both suffering love and unitive experience, but also for a 
lover’s greatest sin: to divulge the secret of his love.’ Ahmet Karamustafa notes his unique mode 
of piety. He was opposed in religious circles for claiming to have reached real union with God, but 
he gained much popular support as he travelled, preached, and performed miracles. In addition to 
this, he engaged in social and political activism against the caliph and viziers, who feared that the 
spiritual revival he preached to the masses, including the ‘secret of personal sanctification’ rather 
than blind acceptance, would undermine the social and political order. His behaviour made him 
enemies in both religious and political circles, and he was imprisoned for ten years until he was 
executed. Massignon and Mason, The Passion of Al-Hallāj; Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of 
Islam, 62–77; Karamustafa, Sufism, 25–26. 
297 De Jong and Radtke, ‘Introduction’, 7–8. His main opponent was Ibn Taymiyya, whose 
criticism is re-used until this day, most notably by the followers of Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab. 
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validity of a ḥadīth,298 not scholarship.299 The Sufis’ inspiration is sometimes seen 
as a continuation of the Prophet’s revelation, and therefore considered superior 
to scriptural knowledge.300 These two approaches could be the centre of an 
intense power struggle, but in other situations were considered complementary 
rather than diametrically opposed. 
The perceived dichotomy between ‛ulamā and ‘marabouts’ (Sufi saints) 
was first discussed by anthropologists in the Moroccan context, and from there 
has had an enormous influence on academic work in the rest of the Islamic 
world. Cornell has argued that the focus on this dichotomy was partly the result 
of the use of Weber’s theories on charisma as this led to an exclusive focus on 
the concept of baraka ‘without its adaptation to the specific dynamics of 
sainthood in Islamic contexts,' and without taking alternative bases of authority 
into account.301 This dichotomy has been challenged by Asad, Cornell, Maribel 
Fierro and others, who have argued that while there has indeed been a lot of 
opposition to Sufism in the history of Morocco, there is no clear essential 
dichotomy between Sufis and scholars. In their contributions to Islamic Mysticism 
Contested, Fierro and Cornell show that opposition to Sufism in Morocco tended 
to focus on Sufi doctrines that posit inspiration and revelation as alternative 
epistemological bases, and on Sufi practices, which their opponents feared might 
replace the established devotional practices and law of the sharia – in other 
                                                  
298 Ḥadīth (pl. aḥādīth) literally means ‘narrative, talk, speech’, used by all Muslims to refer to the 
traditions about the words and deeds of the Prophet, and of his Companions and Successors. It 
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minded urban people. Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam, 6. 
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words, it focused on their position as rivals of authority. Especially during the 
Marinid period, when the ‛ulamā’s epistemological claims and their social position 
were consolidated by the state, institutionalised Sufism was opposed (particularly 
its rural ribāṭ-based manifestation). Opposition to Sufis therefore tended to focus 
on their socio-political rivalry with the ‛ulamā and the state.302 
In Safavid and Qajar Iran, persecutions were very severe. After the 
Safavids established Shi’ism as Iran’s official religion in 1501, the legal scholars 
consolidated their authority and got to define official Shi’ism. With the backing of 
the state, they severely opposed Sunnism, philosophy, and Sufism in its 
institutionalised and theosophical forms (‛irfān (philosophical Gnosticism) and 
ḥikma (theosophical wisdom)).303 Lewisohn’s work on the Nimatullahis in 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century Iran gives a good impression of the severe 
repression the Sufis of Iran suffered.304 
 In India, shrine cults and saint veneration were targeted by modernists 
and neo-fundamentalists in the second half of the nineteenth century,305 as 
Barelwis, Deobandis, and Ahl-i Hadith disagreed on the legitimacy and role of 
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mediation, spiritual hierarchy, and personal charismatic authority.306 Werbner 
discusses the ‘ambivalences of authority in the Barelvi movement’, as she shows 
there is a complex relationship between Barelvi ‛ulamā and Sufi masters. She 
argues that while Sufi masters base their authority on charisma and immediate 
experience, the Barelvi ‛ulamā base theirs on knowledge of the scriptures. Even 
so, they reinforce each other ‘as saint and mosque continue to exist within the 
same movement’ in a ‘symbiotic relationship’: ‘While the maulvi preaches, the pir 
blesses.’307 Geaves points out that this is only valid in the particular case of the 
South Asian Barelvi movement, as the relationship between Sufi and ‛ālim in the 
Deobandi movement is very different as both roles are often combined in one 
person.308 As De Jong and Radtke point out following Bruce Lawrence, there is 
no ‘binary relationship of intrinsic hostility or irreconcilable enmity between Sufis 
and non-Sufis’ in South Asia.309 
 We shall discuss the particulars of our case study in chapters 4 and 8, but 
here it can be noted that in Israel, Palestine and Jordan, the religious 
establishment in general seems to be quite positive towards Sufism. In Jordan, 
the King seeks to be the champion of a general traditional Islam that includes 
and combines scripturalist, legalist and Sufi interpretations of Islam. In 
Jerusalem, Geaves has noted that many ‘ulamā at the Azhar Mosque complex 
are practising Sufis or sympathetic to Sufism. In Jordan and Palestine, opposition 
to Sufism can be found amongst the successful Islamist and Salafi movements 
and their supporters.310 
                                                  
306 De Jong and Radtke, ‘Introduction’, 11–13; Marc Gaborieau, ‘Criticizing the Sufis: The Debate 
in Early-Nineteenth-Century India’, in Islamic Mysticism Contested, ed. De Jong and Radtke, 
452–67; Arthur F. Buehler, ‘Charismatic versus Scriptural Authority: Naqshbandi Response to 
Deniers of Mediational Sufism in British India’, in Islamic Mysticism Contested, ed. De Jong and 
Radtke, 468–91. 
307 Werbner, Pilgrims of Love, 256–258; Pnina Werbner, ‘Du’a: Popular Culture and Powerful 
Blessing at the ’Urs’, in South Asian Sufis: Devotion, Deviation, and Destiny, ed. Clinton Bennett 
and Charles M. Ramsey (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 83–94. 
308 Ron Geaves, ‘The Contested Milieu of Deoband: “Salafis” or “Sufis”?’, in Sufis and Salafis in 
the Contemporary Age, ed. Lloyd Ridgeon (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 191–216. 
309 De Jong and Radtke, ‘Introduction’, 11; Lawrence, ‘Veiled Opposition.’ 
310 Geaves, ‘That Which We Have Forgotten.’ Considering the fact that Jordan still administers 
Jerusalem’s awqāf, including the al-Aqsa Mosque complex, it would be interesting to further 
examine the connections between Islam and Sufism as practised in al-Aqsa, and King Abdullah’s 
project of defining Islam. 
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These are but a few examples of many that show that opposition to 
Sufism cannot be explained by an essential dichotomy between mystical and 
scripturalist / legalist approaches to Islam. As Radtke and De Jong point out, 
there is ‘a considerable fluidity in the divide between Sufism and its opponents’ 
as Sufis were sometimes their own harshest critics, and even incompatible 
interpretations of Islam did not necessarily exclude co-operation, which ‘points to 
the impracticality of a paradigmatic approach based on a presumed existence of 
ulama-Sufi opposition.’311 These debates can often been seen in the light of the 
Islamic discursive tradition which encompasses many conflicting ideas and 
approaches, such as traditionalist, rationalist, emotional ‘sober’ and ‘intoxicated’, 
and elitist and popular, etc. Exterior and interior knowledge might be considered 
complementary approaches that are both subject of extensive debate, or they 
might be seen as absolute opposites in moments of intense conflict and 
persecution. Such moments of conflict should not be seen as manifestations of 
an essential dichotomy, but should be understood in their social, economic and 
political circumstances.312 Generally speaking, Berger points out that ‘there will 
always be a social-structural base for competition between rival definitions of 
reality and (…) the outcome of the rivalry will be affected, if not always 
determined outright, by the development of this base.’313 We should therefore 
see these conflicts in the light of the ‘orthodox discursive tradition’ and Islamic 
contestation: as part of the continuing renewal of Islamic tradition, at the same 
time shaping and adapting to its context. 
This constant reformulation of Islamic orthodoxy points to a paradox at the 
heart of Sunni Islam: on the one hand there is a constant looking back to 
scripture and the earliest believers, but on the other hand it is constantly 
renewing itself.314 Carl Ernst and Bruce Lawrence point out that we find the same 
paradox in Sufism: the textbooks speak of a lost ‘golden age’ which needs to be 
                                                  
311 Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke, ‘Postscript’, in Islamic Mysticism Contested, ed. De 
Jong and Radtke, 757. 
312 De Jong and Radtke, ‘Introduction’, 21; De Jong and Radtke, ‘Postscript’, 757. 
313 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 137–138. 
314 Calder, ‘The Limits of Islamic Orthodoxy’, 231. 
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found, and a tradition which needs to be revived (iḥyā) in every generation.315 
Like every other aspect of Islam, Sufi ideas and practices were constantly 
disputed, and the integrity of individuals was discussed, but the system as a 
whole was seen as an essential part of religion: the dīn316 combined īmān (faith), 
islām (submission, practice),317 and iḥsān (interiorization, worshiping God as if 
you see him), with the latter corresponding to the sphere of the Sufis.318 Notions 
such as ‘renewal’, ‘revival, and ‘reform’ have been an essential part of Muslim 
tradition, and are not new phenomena in the nineteenth century.319 
Discussions and criticism of specific Sufi ideas and practices centred on 
the theory of fanā’ and baqā, the theory of the nūr muḥammadī, and the idea of a 
‘spiritual elite’, which were seen as contrary to Islamic egalitarian values, and 
critics objected to the belief in miracles and the practices that sprung out of the 
visits to the saints’ tombs. Another important aspect of this criticism was that 
Sufis claimed an alternative way of interpreting the Qur’an and the Sunna based 
on their claim to be linked more directly to God than others, which gave them the 
power to shape society and advise the rulers. Radtke and De Jong point out that 
opposition to Sufism should often be seen within its social and political context; it 
was not only an issue of ideology, but also an issue of authority.320 
Arthur Buehler treats all forms of Islamic authority in one framework as he 
identifies four main sources of authority in Islam and shows their overlapping 
nature: 
                                                  
315 For example, such thoughts can be found in the work of al-Hujwiri and Abd al-Karim al-
Qushayri (986-1074). Ernst and Lawrence, Sufi Martyrs of Love, 7; Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, 
and Saints in Modern Egypt, 3. 
316 Dīn is commonly translated as 'religion'. Originally it did not refer to a separate system. Rather, 
it is the obligation mankind has towards God.  
317 Islām literally means ‘submission’, ‘the act of submitting to God (…) accepting personal 
responsibility for standards of action held to have transcendent authority (…) a personal 
acceptance of godly ideals’. It has become the name for ‘the whole social pattern of cult and 
creed’ which grows out of ‘the act of islām of the individual believer’ and the messages of the 
prophets. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 1:72–73. 
318 Ernst and Lawrence, Sufi Martyrs of Love, 7. 
319 William A. Graham, ‘Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation’, Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History – Religion and History 23, no. 3 (1993): 500. 
320 De Jong and Radtke, ‘Introduction’; Bernd Radtke, ‘Kritik am Neo-Sufism’, in Islamic Mysticism 
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- lineage (genealogical and/or spiritual), which is a ‘conduit of spiritual 
energy’ 
- embodiment of the Prophetic Sunna, in other words ‘being a Prophetic 
exemplar’ 
- transmission of religious knowledge 
- spiritual travel, or the ‘transformative spiritual experience’ 
The concept of the lineage is used in many fields of Islamic knowledge. 
William A. Graham discusses the importance of genealogy, of the isnād-
paradigm, and of the Sufi silsila in Muslim societies.321 A Sufi is linked through 
his masters to the Prophet, and the Prophet sends his baraka down to the Sufi 
shaykhs and those with whom he is in contact. Sufis go beyond the simple 
transmission of knowledge: for them it is ‘a heart-to-heart transmission of divine 
grace’ that made disciples feel as if they were in the presence of the Prophet. 322 
Therefore the lineage – the tool of tradition par excellence – has the charismatic 
embedded in it.  
One could see an an uwaysī initiation, the initiation by the spirit of a 
physically absent or deceased person (often the Prophet or al-Khidr),323 as 
subversive in that it enables a charismatic Sufi to claim spiritual power without 
having a shaykh or belonging to a ṭarīqa, in other words, without being part of an 
institution. But in practice, such an initiation is still located in the framework of the 
silsila. Uwaysi initiations are especially common in the Naqshbandiyya,324 and 
Johan ter Haar has argued in the context of this ṭarīqa that an Uwaysi initiation 
and attachment to a shaykh are two sides of the same coin, since what matters is 
the focus (tawajjuh) on the spiritual presence of the shaykh. In fact, he points out 
that an uwaysī initiation is usually complemented by guidance to a living shaykh, 
                                                  
321 The isnād is the chain of transmission guaranteeing the authenticity of a ḥadīth. The silsila is 
the chain of spiritual descent, the chain of initiation, connecting the shaykh of a ṭarīqa to the 
Prophet. Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam.” 
322 Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet, 82. 
323 The term is derived from Uways al-Qarani (d.657) who was instructed by the Prophet 
Muhammad without ever having physically met him. Baldick, ‘Uwaysiyya’; Green, ‘Dreams and 
Visions in Islam’, 299–301. 
324 Baldick, ‘Uwaysiyya.’ 
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but it also sometimes leads to disloyalty.325 Shaykh Muhammad Uthman of the 
Burhaniyya, for example, claimed an uwaysī initiation through visions, 
emphasizing his independence and uniqueness. In addition to this, however, he 
also situated himself in a silsila claiming genealogical and spiritual descent from 
the Prophet and the founders of his ṭarīqa, who he claimed had hidden secret 
texts for him on which he could base his renewal.326 Such a Sufi does place 
himself in the framework of the silsila and institutionalised Sufism by referring to 
his initiation – by the Prophet, Khidr, or another Sufi master – but he also has a 
base of authority that is distinctly personal as he does not simply rely on the 
transmission from history, but he also relies on something in his present, which 
could be characterized as charismatic as it directly connects him to the ultimate 
source of authority.  
Regarding the transmission of knowledge and the embodiment of the 
Prophetic Sunna, anthropologists have come to see the Sufi adāb as central to 
the relationship between a Sufi shaykh and his followers,327 as they are ‘the 
expression of inner qualities of the self’328 and make those that adhere to them 
the ‘living embodiment of the exemplary model of Muhammad’.329 The aḥwāl 
‘must be expressed in deeds and actions (‘amal) in order to be recognized as 
legitimate grounds for the Sufi identity.’330 On the micro-level these practices 
change the immediate social relationships of the practitioner, but on the macro-
level this has the potential to shape the ethics of a whole society. Because of 
this, Sufism is ‘both an underlying conceptual framework and a set of agreed-
upon techniques to verify and confirm it’331 and the ‘embodied quality of 
objects/persons explains the power of signifying practices to reproduce the social 
                                                  
325 Ter Haar, ‘The Importance of the Spiritual Guide in the Naqshbandī Order’, 318–319. 
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order.’332 It ‘creates a framework for public morality through which are built social 
evaluations and expectations.’333 In Heck’s words, Sufism’s ‘twofold conception 
of truth, spiritual and ethical, gives Sufism room to manoeuver vis-à-vis the 
world.’334 
Buehler argues that the main source of authority for Sufis is spiritual travel 
– in other words, it is what makes them Sufis and sets them aside from others. 
This spiritual journey is a duplication of the Prophet’s mi‛rāj, an ‘inner 
transformation and resulting access to spiritual power’. But it is inextricably 
connected to the other sources of authority. For example, by travelling spiritually 
a shaykh follows the spiritual example of the Prophet; it is ‘the inner Sunna’ 
whereas following the Prophet’s behaviour is the ‘outer Sunna.’335 As such the 
shaykh is able to guide the spiritual seeker on his/her own spiritual journey.336 
While Buehler touches on the issue of space when discussing the 
enactment of Sufi authority and the stage upon which this happens (see 
paragraph 1.4.2), he does not include it as a separate source of authority. Kees 
Terlouw discusses the role of space in the creation of charisma, following 
Webers Idealtypes to argue that traditional regimes tend to use places with a link 
to the charismatic past to increase their legitimacy through monuments, heritage 
sites, and places of pilgrimage, whereas bureaucratic regimes tend to focus on 
the future. Of course, in practice these two approaches are often combined.337 
The institutionalisation of Sufism and the establishment of Sufi sacred spaces, 
e.g. in the form of zawāya, led to a marked routinization of charisma. Unlike 
mosques, Sufi zawāya often have a clear connection to the space they 
                                                  
332 Werbner and Basu, ‘The Embodiment of Charisma’, 7. The focus on embodiment is an 
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occupy.338 Their location is not arbitrary as it is connected to a Sufi master and/or 
saint – either because he spent part of his life there, because he is buried there, 
because he appeared in a dream or vision, etc. His spirit is considered to linger 
and to be present and accessible in this particular place. Whereas the mosque 
points people towards the ultimate Islamic sacred centre, Mecca, the presence of 
the saint in whatever form draws the believer’s attention to the centre of this 
space, providing a complementary geographical symbolic centre, constituting a 
direct link to the sacred, ‘a nexus of the earthly and the divine.’339 
 Like mosques, they are places of prayer and devotion, of study and 
learning, with a strong communal character.340 The communal character of the 
zāwiya is often more pronounced as it is the main place where disciples gather 
around their shaykh and where visitors attend from far away. Sometimes this 
happens to such a degree that villages and neighbourhoods spring up around 
them, and their local and regional role can become very large indeed. Hoffman 
argues that this social aspect is seen as connected to the spiritual aspect of the 
zāwiya by  
 
promoting love for the brethren, mutual service for the sake of God, and mutual 
informal exhortation and instruction in the spiritual life. (…) the mystical 
experience itself as best achieved in the communal setting and indeed as partly 
communal in its goal.341 
 
Through collective dhikr ‘[t]heir spirits influence each other and pull each other up 
toward greater heights than they can reach on their own.’ In such occasions, 
there is a confluence of sacred space and sacred time thus flow together.342 
                                                  
338 Joel P. Brereton characterizes mosques as ‘meaningful negation of sacred space’ because 
they deny the localization of divinity. He argues that mosques still classify as ‘sacred space’, 
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Control over such sacred space therefore provides he who controls it with 
a connection to the sacred and/or the past of the community, in addition to 
control over the present community and the sacred space’s material assets and 
position in society. The sacrilisation and maintenance of this sacred space – 
either in its affective or material aspects – can therefore have a profound effect 
on a person’s authority. Pnina Werbner argues that ‘the relation between person, 
body and space is a key to the charisma of a living saint’ and that actual travel 
and the sacralizing of space is just as important to understand a shaykh’s 
authority as the idea of spiritual travel and experience:343 
 
Beyond the transformation of the person, Sufism is a movement in space which 
Islamicizes the universe and transforms it into the space of Allah. This journey, or 
hijra, which evokes the migration of the Prophet to Medina, empowers a saint as 
it empowers the space through which he travels and the place where he 
establishes his lodge. (...) It is the divine transformation in space which is the 
ultimate proof of the divine transformation of the person.344 
 
Through this sacralising of space communal identities are rooted in 
specific localities. As his social function increases, more people tend to attach 
themselves to a shaykh to participate in his connection to the divine without 
actually travelling the spiritual path. The shaykh often becomes the mediator 
between God and the people, through the baraka that flows through him from his 
connection with God and from his connection with earlier shaykhs through his 
initiation.  
As we saw in paragraph 1.2, theosophical understandings of wilāya that 
are known throughout the Muslim world are often connected to local ideas on 
sainthood including hagiographies, shrines, pilgrimages, and the belief in 
                                                  
343 Werbner and Basu, ‘The Embodiment of Charisma’, 13; Werbner, Pilgrims of Love, 50. 
344 Werbner, Pilgrims of Love, 43. In her study of the Naqshbandi Shaykh Zindapir of Ghamkol 
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miracles.345 A Sufi shaykh is often seen as a walī and is thus considered to play a 
part in holding the universe together by providing a connection between the world 
of the Creator and the creation and channeling baraka into the everyday 
reality.346 Or, to use anthropological vocabulary: ‘A sufi pir, like the Prophet, 
maintains a state of permanent liminality between heaven and earth, which gives 
him, like other permanently liminal individuals, supernatural powers.’347  
Vincent Cornell and Scott Kugle seek a way to understand sainthood in 
the Moroccan context that goes beyond the binary opposition between ‛ālim 
(religious scholar) and marabout. Following William James and Reginald Ray, 
Kugle identifies the saint’s separateness – interpreted as self-transcendence – as 
his primary distinguishing characteristic. The sources, or ‘markers’, of this 
distinction are manifold and culturally and historically dependent. By tracing 
these sources or markers, one can construct the relevant paradigm.348 Based on 
the work of sociologists and historians Pierre Delooz, Donald Weinstein and 
Ronald Bell, Cornell advocates the sociological analysis of hagiographies and 
other sources to identify criteria of sainthood and ‘typicality profiles’ or paradigms 
of sainthood.349 These paradigms are socially generated and specific individuals 
are made to fit them as the conduct of the person is selectively perceived and 
remembered:350 ‘Sufis are actual people, whereas sainthood is a remote ideal. 
Saints are those people from among the Sufis who are believed to have 
embodied this ideal.351 Cornell points out that several ‘spheres of sainthood’ co-
existed in pre-modern Morocco as there were varied yet interdependent 
perceptions of the walī Allāh among different types of followers. These different 
spheres came together in the figure of the ultimate saint, the quṭb al-zamān.352 
                                                  
345 Geaves, The Sufis of Britain, 18; Green, Sufism, 72, 92–103. 
346 Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet, 11; Heck, ‘Introduction’, 8–9; Ernst and Lawrence, Sufi 
Martyrs of Love, 13. 
347 Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet, 50. 
348 Kugle, Rebel Between Spirit and Law, 240 note 17. 
349 Cornell, Realm of the Saint, xxxviii. 
350 Ibid., xxxi. 
351 Kugle, Rebel Between Spirit and Law, 29. 
352 The quṭb al-zamān is the ‘axis of the age’, the highest rank of awliyā’, the spiritual centre 
around whom the universe revolves. Cornell, Realm of the Saint, xxxv–xxxvi. 
 113
Hoffman makes the same argument in the Egyptian context, as she 
analyses several types of saint in Egypt and compares them with the Coptic 
Pope Kyrillos VI (1902-1971, pope 1959-1971), and argues that his model of 
sainthood is much the same as that of the Sufi shaykhs, showing the cultural 
character of these models.353 She concludes: ‘Both the illiterate and the 
intellectual shaykhs command great respects among Sufis today, and each 
represents an acceptable model among the models of sainthood.’354 
 A shaykh’s authority is stronger when several sources of authority are 
combined in his person. Because of this, DeWeese points out: Sufi communities 
have  
 
a distinctively expansive approach to religious authority. It is, indeed, in the 
context of the personal and public experience of Sufism that we find the most 
remarkable range of significations of authority [in Islam], and the most dramatic 
extensions of the reach of religious authority into different social venues.355 
 
Buehler discusses the development of Sufism in terms of the development 
of different ‘patterns of Sufi religious authority’ – different types of relationship 
between shaykh and follower – based on different compilations of sources of 
authority: the teaching shaykh (shaykh al-ta‛līm), the directing shaykh (shaykh al-
tarbiya) and the mediating shaykh .356 
                                                  
353 She discusses Shaykh Ahmad Radwan of al-Baghdadi, a village near Luxor (1895-1967), a 
charismatic, humble ascetic and gnostic with occasional ecstatic utterances, a holy man who 
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354 Ibid., 24. 
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356 Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet, xv. He bases his typology partly on the two types of shaykh 
that were discussed in Islamic theology, the shaykh al-ta‛līm and the shaykh al-tarbiya. Ibid., 31. 
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Historically, the teaching shaykh based his authority mainly on the 
transmission of religious knowledge and the instruction in akhlāq, and this 
teaching took place through a loose relationship between pupil and teacher: an 
‘informal guide (…) to an ad-hoc group of students’ who travelled throughout the 
Muslim world to study with several shaykhs. He was the ‘exemplary custodian of 
sacred knowledge’ who instructed both through books and by example. An 
important aspect of this instruction was the many rituals and behavioural rules 
associated with the transmission of knowledge.357 
According to Buehler, the rise of the directing shaykh developed in the 
context of the institutionalization of Sufism. Together with the development of the 
Sufi lodge and the writing of Sufi handbooks, the relationship between the pupil 
and the master became more regulated and the shaykh’s authority became more 
encompassing as he did not just supervise the disciple’s spiritual exercises but 
molded every aspect of the disciple’s character in the struggle to transform the 
nafs.358 The disciple had to obey the shaykh in everything in order to progress on 
the spiritual path, and the shaykh helped him on this path by providing him with 
spiritual energy, both through the lineage in which he was initiated and through 
his own spiritual activities. Initiation became an important element in that 
relationship.359 
In addition to this classical distinction between shaykh al-ta‛līm and shaykh 
al-tarbiya, Buehler posits the type of the mediating shaykh as unconditional love 
for the shaykh became the sole requirement to achieve a connection with God: 
the sheikh mediates and transmits his follower’s needs to the Prophet, who in 
turn mediates between the shaykh and God – other spiritual practices are no 
                                                                                                                                                   
Buehler discusses the views of Ibn Abbad al-Rundi (d.1390) and Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) based 
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desires and causes blameworthy actions and sins. The seeker trains and purifies the nafs until it 
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359 Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet, 29–54. 
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longer necessary.360 Because of the belief in their continuing spiritual presence, 
deceased shaykhs could also fulfil this function. Tomb-shrines became part of 
the religious landscape and hereditary shrine shaykhs became more common. 
The inclusion of other local practices, such as healing practices and the use of 
amulets, further enlarged the basis and scope of authority of the shrine-shaykhs. 
The ṭuruq made Sufism into a mass movement and Sufi leaders into social 
leaders. Trade guilds, urban neighbourhoods, villages and tribes were attached 
to a ṭarīqa and a patron saint, and many political movements had their roots in a 
ṭarīqa (e.g. the Libyan Sanusiyya and the Sudanese Mahdi movement). Sufi 
shaykhs offered their guidance and mediation to wider society, and their zawāya 
and shrines often became wealthy economic hubs. As landowners and 
community leaders they therefore had a large social and often political role.361 
Green distinguishes three interdependent forms of power in the Sufi 
tradition. Discursive power refers to the power to shape behaviour as it provides 
a vocabulary, models of society, and paradigms of behaviour based primarily on 
the Prophetic Sunna. Miraculous power was seen as the ability to perform 
miracles – often in the form of rewards or punishments – due to the walī’s 
closeness to God, and led to social power as people of all ranks tied themselves 
to the saint because of this, which in turn led to economic power in the form of 
zakāa,362 endowments (awqāf), and donations. This social and economic power 
was usually transferred through the same family lineages as the spiritual power, 
strengthening the traditional character of a Sufi community, and making these 
three forms of power ultimately interdependent.363 
 As the ṭuruq developed, the practice of passing the position of shaykh 
from father to son became more common, and was often tied to the notion of 
genealogical descent from the Prophet. This practice is based on the belief that 
the nūr muḥammadī is passed along the line of physical descent, and piety and 
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baraka are transferred with it.364 Hoffman notes that this is a common practice in 
Egypt and is seen as natural, not as a corruption of ‘golden age’ Sufi practices: 
 
It is generally expected that the spiritual secrets of a master will be inherited by 
his son, unless his son exhibits attitudes and behaviour that contradict the Sufi 
way. The inheritance by a son of the office of shaykh is therefore not seen by the 
Sufis as a corruption of a system that ought to be based on spiritual stature, 
unless it leads to wrongful veneration of an unworthy individual or the assignment 
of spiritual leadership to a minor. In most cases, it is seen as an entirely natural 
process that follows the typical flow of the grace of God and is a natural 
extension of the belief that the prophetic light was distributed among his physical 
descendants first, and then among the saints.365 
 
It is important to keep in mind that older modes of authority and organisation 
continued to exist as new ones developed – the emergence of new modes of 
authority and organisation did not lead to the shift of all Sufi groups and 
movements from one mode to another, it merely meant that more options were 
available. Buehler himself notes these are idealtypes that often overlap, with 
different roles often coexisting in the same shaykh.366 In the context of medieval 
Palestine, Daphna Ephrat points out that tarbiya cannot be clearly distinguished 
from ta‛līm.367 Werbner criticizes ‘linear theories of Sufi historical evolution’ such 
as Buehler’s as they ‘mistake a phase in the cycle of a particular regional cult 
with a general historical trend.’368 
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Other studies show that in the contemporary world we see old and new 
forms of shaykhdom combine into new forms of Sufi authority. For example, 
Suha Taji-Farouki’s study of the Beshara movement in the United Kingdom 
shows a new form of the teaching shaykh.369 Similarly, different perceptions of a 
shaykh can exist within one movement. Rachida Chih analysed the 
hagiographies of several recent Khalwati shaykhs in Egypt, and noticed a very 
strong focus on their educational credentials and their connections to al-Azhar. 
When she did fieldwork among the adherents of the ṭarīqa however she found 
they were mainly concerned with the shaykh’s piety and baraka.370 Ron Geaves 
discusses different levels of discipleship which influence how people see the 
shaykh, what they expect from him/her, and how much influence the shaykh can 
exercise over their ideas and behaviour.371 As Werbner points out: ‘In this sense 
it is the disciples who define and determine the nature of the connection between 
saint and follower, as much as the saint him or herself does.’372  
 
 
1.4.2 The Zāwiya as the Stage of Authority 
 
When analysing the relationship between shaykh and follower we have to take 
into account in which context this relationship is enacted and on which ‘stage of 
authority’ the authoritative speech act is performed. We have to take into account 
                                                  
369 Beshara’s leader Bulent Rauf was a teacher and a guide, who saw himself as a messenger, 
not a shaykh. In his words ‘the era of teachers is now over’ and people should be taught by the 
Reality directly. This approach to his role, which came mainly from his understanding of Ibn Arabi, 
influenced the way the movement was organised (in the form of a school) and the way the 
teaching was done there. Suha Taji-Farouki, Beshara and Ibn ’Arabi: A Movement of Sufi 
Spirituality in the Modern World (Oxford: Anqa, 2007), 69–96. 
370 Chih, ‘Entre Tradition Soufie et Réformisme Musulman.’ 
371 Geaves, The Sufis of Britain, 17–18, 76–77. Geaves distinguishes five concentric circles which 
demonstrate levels of allegiance or degrees of belonging, the first three of which consists of those 
followers who have pledged themselves to the shaykh through the oath of allegiance (bai’at). The 
outer circles formed ‘a large amorphous allegiance based on status, emotional loyalty, or 
pragmatic need.’ 
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the locational aspect of authority and see how the Sufi shaykh’s authority relates 
to other figures of authority in society (see paragraph 1.3) 
Buehler understands the place of Sufi communities in society in terms of 
Victor Turner’s ‘structure and anti-structure’ which together form society.373 In his 
analysis, structure, stability and routine are provided by the jurists (fuqahā’, sg. 
faqīh) – concerned with islām, the submission of the body and outer practices 
(‘amal). This legitimizes the status quo and supports political power. The 
idealtype faqīh’s authority to interpret scripture and prescribe religious rules 
comes from his education and his performance of these rules, thus making him a 
Prophetic exemplar. Buehler sees this authority as ‘scripture-centred’. On the 
other hand, Buehler sees ‘anti-structure’ or the transformational process in both 
people and society as the domain of the Sufis, whose ultimate concern is iḥsān. 
Buehler sees them as providing the liminal experience of communitas in the 
charismatic community centred around the Sufi shaykh. The idealtypical Sufi 
shaykh bases his authority on his lineage, his teaching and interpretation of 
scripture, his exemplary behaviour, but most of all on his spiritual travel, his 
‘transformative spiritual experience’, which defines him as a Sufi – as such, his 
authority is ‘person-centred’. In his view, Sufis operate through experience and 
inspiration, thus providing new impulses, but ultimately providing the ‘hidden 
foundation of society’.374  
Lincoln argues that every society incorporates multiple religious forms that 
have different functions in society.375 As the elements of traditions are ambiguous 
and open to multiple interpretations, they could serve both to confirm or 
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challenge the status quo.376 A ‘religion of the status quo’ supports and legitimates 
the hegemonic power’s authority through its organisations and through its 
discourse.377 ‘Religions of resistance’ on the other hand do not accept the 
hegemonic power and resist by altering public discourse rather than attacking the 
hegemonic power openly.378 The protest works on both the levels of doctrine and 
practice: there is a competition over the interpretation of symbols and over the 
control of the institutions that produce and sustain these symbols.379 According to 
Paolo Pinto, Sufism is very well adapted to provide this resistance because of its 
transformation of the public sphere through the ‘continuous production of shared 
normative understandings and practical standards’ and the transformation of the 
individual,380 and ‘by defining how power is to be legitimately claimed and 
exercised.’381 Finally, ‘religions of rebellion’ attack the whole system of the status 
quo. Essential in this regard is the articulation of an alternative ‘theory of political 
legitimation’.382 We should also bear in mind that a religious movement can move 
along this spectrum, and several attitudes can co-exist in the same movement. 
All of this is most visible in the zāwiya, the ultimate Sufi ‘stage of 
authority’. It is the place where the disciples and the shaykh practice together 
and live together, and it is also the place where the individual transformation of 
the Sufi path connects to society and provides the space for either social 
transformation or for the implementation and internalisation of traditional social 
values, supporting the status quo. This often happens concretely through 
patronage links connecting the Sufi institutions to actors holding political power. 
As such, the shaykh is able to perform his mediating function on both a spiritual 
level and a worldly level – all within the Sufi zāwiya.383 
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Throughout Islamic history, shaykhs were often well-respected members 
of society and because of their knowledgeable and ethical image often mediated 
in case of social conflict, either between the people and the rulers or between the 
people themselves. Sufi shaykhs could also act as moral guides to the rulers, 
thus legitimizing the rulers’ position as Islamic rulers. In Sufi ideology the Sufis 
guide individuals – including the ruler – and society in their ethical development. 
In return for this guidance and legitimacy the shaykh received material benefits 
and a political aura, which was the basis for more sociopolitical influence. 
Shaykhs could have extensive wealth, deriving from awqāf (religious 
endowments) or from patronage. Also, they could be ‘assimilated to other 
networks’, e.g tribal, ethnic, or commercial networks, and derive more legitimacy 
and material benefits from these associations. Heck calls this the advisory 
model.384 
 The shaykhs’ authority thus usually bolstered the status quo, but there 
have also been cases where a shaykh functioned as an opposition figure. Lincoln 
points out that ‘direct revelation’ (in his example in the form of prophecy, in the 
case of Sufi shaykhs in the form of divine inspiration and mystical experience) 
can be a form of corrosive discourse in the face of institutionalized power. The 
control of channels of revelation and religious experience is therefore a central 
aspect to the struggle over authority.385 
Some Sufi shaykhs adhered to the idea that Sufis should shun the affairs 
of the world altogether and not associate themselves with rulers in order not to 
defile their spiritual purity. Heck points out that this attitude might enhance their 
charisma as it removes them from the corruption of the world, but could also 
create ‘a spiritual ghetto’.386 We should keep in mind that such an ‘apolitical’ 
stance in fact still positions the shaykh and his followers in a particular political 
position – if not actively supporting the status quo, the absence of opposition 
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means that the status quo is not challenged and thus passively supported. In 
fact, rulers have often been content to discourage active participation in politics, 
or to encourage a form of resistance that does not impact wider society. As 
Werbner points out, ‘the attitudes of Sufis to temporal power and authority are 
highly ambivalent, a mixture of moral superiority and pragmatic accommodation, 
but they are never outside of politics.’387 
We have seen that the rivalry among shaykhs often centred on their 
competing claims for divine knowledge and for the social and political power 
based on this – ‘Muslim politics’ over the right to interpret ideas and symbols. 
The Sufis’ claim to a higher and more certain form of knowledge makes them the 
real ‘heirs to the prophets’, the real spiritual and worldly authority and possibly a 
rival to the worldly leaders on both an organizational and a spiritual/ideological 
level. It gave the Sufis a degree of authority that was distrusted by the non-Sufi 
‘ulamā and by the state, and sometimes led to heavy power struggles with a 
strong ideological component. 
 
 
1.5 Sufism in the Contemporary World 
 
The concept of ‘modernity’ refers to the social and material effects based on 
greater reliance on rationalization, technology, industrialisation, and 
bureaucratization, all of which which developed in the West and spread 
throughout the world in the wake of Western colonialism. The accompanying 
ideology ‘Modernism’ values empirical knowledge, individual freedom and 
autonomy, and ‘progress’ as society moves from tradition, magic and religion to a 
new rationalist worldview and rational-bureaucratic institutions.388 Even though 
the latter assumption has been falsified, we can still say that ‘religion’ has 
developed significantly under influence of and in reaction to both ‘modernity’ and 
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‘modernism’.389 While some individuals and movements have subscribed to 
'modernism', others are intensely critical as they see it lacking in spirituality and 
morality and reform their traditions to challenge this, or establish new religious 
movements. The categories ‘religion’ and ‘spirituality’ have undergone a 
discursive shift as ‘institutionalised religion’ has lost ground to a more 
individualised ‘new spirituality’ (generally associated with the New Age 
movement).390 Fierce discussions have rocked the Islamic tradition whether to 
reject or (selectively) adapt modern technology, institutions, and/or ideas, leading 
to discussions about the definition of Islam itself. The category ‘Sufism’ and Sufi 
ideas, practices, movements, and individuals have not been immune to these 
trends.391 
Despite earlier ideas – influenced by modernization theories and the 
secularisation thesis – that the Sufi ṭuruq were set to decline in the modern world, 
we are witnessing a significant Sufi contribution to the general Islamic 
resurgence since the 1970s. Not only are ‘traditional’ Sufi ṭuruq surviving and 
often even thriving, many other forms of Sufism are attracting members and 
participating in the global struggle to ‘speak for Islam’. In line with the 
rationalizing trend in Modernism, many Sufi ṭuruq redefine their heritage on 
rational terms and reorganise their institutions along rational-bureaucratic lines. 
This can take the form of increased autonomy for their members in terms of 
affiliation, behaviour and interpretation (with space for rational-critical thought), or 
they might re-invent themselves as voluntary associations, business enterprises 
and networks, or political parties.392 A strong trend is the redefinition of Sufism as 
part of Traditional Islam, as the ethical and devotional aspect of Islam that 
connects one to the deeper, inner meaning of the faith, that can be cultivated 
outside of the ṭuruq, without guidance by a master – in some cases going so far 
as rejecting traditional Sufi terms and the word taṣawwuf itself.393 
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Our main concern in this study is how these trends affect Sufi authority? 
Does the rationalisation found in many movements affect the charismatic and 
traditional modes of authority? And how does globalisation affect Sufi 
movements and their modes of organisation and authority, and hence the 
experiences of the followers?  
 
 
1.5.1. Fragmentation of Authority 
 
Lincoln argues that as religious institutions and discourses lost their hegemonic 
position in society due to the proliferation of Enlightenment values, ‘the 
ideological warrants used in support of authority changed – as they have at other 
times in history.’ Because he sees authority as context-specific in any time and 
place, he suggests ‘that authority not only survives such changes, but operates in 
a similar fashion whether it is legitimated through a religious ideology or through 
mystificatory claims of other sorts.’394 
 He refers again to his idea of the ‘stage’ on which acts of authoritative 
speech are performed, arguing that in the modern world there is an increasing 
number of specialized stages that compete amongst each other.395 With the 
inclusion of the Muslim world into the global market, its exposure to European 
technologies and forms of organisation, and its subjection to imperialism and 
colonialism, European ideas also spread through the Muslim world and a number 
of competing ‘stages’ was erected renegotiating boundaries and challenging 
indigenous modes of authority and discourses. On these ‘stages’, different 
‘spokesmen of Islam’ took place who reinterpreted the Islamic symbols, who 
were subject to diverse intellectual and structural influences and spoke within 
diverse frames of reference, the totality of which has been characterized by an 
absence of consensus. Both in the religious and the political field, actors have to 
decide which authority (or authorities) to follow, which to oppose, and why. 
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Eickelman and Piscatori call this the ‘fragmentation of authority’. Thus we see a 
growing diversity of Islamic trends and movements, which are all based on their 
own attitude to knowledge and criteria for investing authority. Even non-religious 
actors and bodies are pressured to participate in these ‘Muslim politics’. As Suha 
Taji-Farouki and Basheer M. Nafi point out, the continued importance of Islam for 
the people forced even the most secular nation-state to participate in this 
competition over the right to interpret Islamic sources and speak for Islam.396 
One new discourse was that of nationalism and the nation-state as a 
source of identity, an idea to consolidate a state, legitimize colonialism, or 
motivate opposition to an outside power. This has left its mark on Muslim thinking 
in many colonial and postcolonial situations, in which religion and nationalism 
became strongly linked because they both refer to aspects of identity: genealogy, 
kinship, ethnicity, history, values, language, etc.397 Sufism – especially in its more 
localized aspects – provided a good meeting point for religion and nationalism.398  
Other discourses are those associated with Islamic reform movements. As 
we have seen in paragraph 1.4, Islamic self-criticism and reform had always 
happened in localized contexts. From the eighteenth century onwards, however, 
it took on a more global character as travel and communication between different 
parts of the Muslim world increased. The level of self-criticism and reform rose as 
the crises facing the Muslim communities intensified in the face of economic 
expansion and colonialism, which were seen as signs of God’s disfavour with the 
corruption of the umma.399 Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988) saw the Sufi reform 
movements that sprang up in this environment as a radical break with the past 
tradition and called it ‘neo-Sufism’, but O’Fahey and Radtke have convincingly 
argued that elements identified with the new movements should be seen as a 
                                                  
396 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 12–13, 69–71, 131–135; Suha Taji-Farouki and 
Basheer M. Nafi, ‘Introduction’, in Islamic Thought in the Twentieth Century, ed. Suha Taji-
Farouki and Basheer M. Nafi (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 5–11. 
397 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 82, 85.  
398 Paulo G. Pinto, “Religions et Religiosité en Syrie,” in La Syrie au Present. Reflets d’une 
Société, ed. B. Dupret et al. (Paris: Sindbad 2007), 351. 
399 Geaves, ‘Charismatic Authority in Islam’, 50–52. 
 125
continuation of the dynamic Islamic tradition.400 Sedgwick showed that the 
concept of the ṭarīqa Muhammadiyya, which is at the centre of this eighteenth-
century wave of reform movements, consisted of several elements that had 
existed separately in the Islamic tradition for several centuries, but were now 
combined for the first time in a loosely connected movement.401 Michael 
Frishkopf sees this development as a re-orientation of Sufi leaders and ṭuruq 
from the local to the global sphere and to the pan-Islamic reformist and revival 
movement that stresses this sphere.402 
As Muslim governments and societies were increasingly influenced and 
controlled by Europe and as an increasing number of Muslim countries were 
subjugated by non-Muslim governments, Muslim intellectuals wrote that the 
Muslim world had become weak and corrupt because Islam had stagnated, and 
that Islam had to be revived in order to restore its ‘golden age’. As reform had 
always been an intrinsic part of Islam, many Muslims sought for renewal within 
the Islamic tradition.403 Others however wanted to break with tradition in the form 
of traditional scholarship and jurisprudence, and ‘purify’ Islam by returning to the 
sources, the Qur’an and the Sunna, the practices of the Prophet and the earliest 
generations of Muslims (the salaf, hence salafiyya, Salafism). Mark Sedgwick 
uses Reinhard Schulze’s dual understanding of the word ‘original’ to illustrate 
that they wanted to go back to the origins of Islam but they also gave a new 
interpretation of these origins and opposed ‘traditional’ authorities.404  
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Scholars debated which elements of the Islamic tradition should be 
maintained and reformed, and how much should be taken from Europe in the 
fields of technology, institutions, and ideas. The main discussion was what 
should be the relation between revelation and reason, and whether society 
should be built on reason or religion.405 The Islamic Modernists were in favour of 
selectively adapting aspects of modernity, but they believed that Islam needed to 
provide the spiritual basis on which these changes should be built. They saw 
Islam as essentially a rational, progressive religion, and reinterpreted the Sharia 
in light of the needs of society and the moral principles and progressive spirit of 
the Qur’an.406 An aspect of this reform was a pan-Islamic drive to strengthen the 
umma through social and doctrinal unity,407 championed by Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani (1839-1897).408 His disciple Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) aimed to 
bring traditional and modern modes of thought together, to root necessary 
modern changes in Islam, ‘to weigh [Islam’s sources] in the scales of human 
reason, and sought to bring different trends within Islam and within Egyptian 
society closer together.409 His disciples took his thought in different directions, 
most notably Rashid Rida, who brought it closer to Hanbali fundamentalism and 
Wahhabism,410 while other disciples of Abduh moved in the direction of 
secularism.411 Others opposed Modernism and its embrace of rationality, 
individual autonomy and progress, and re-affirmed the primacy of revelation over 
reason. Sufis affirmed the possibility of a metaphorical interpretation of the 
Qur’an through ongoing revelations in the form of religious experiences.412 
Others affirmed the absolute authority of the literal interpretation of Qur’an and 
                                                                                                                                                   
Albert H. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983); Mark J. Sedgwick, Sufism: The Essentials (Cairo: American University in 
Cairo Press, 2000), 89–92; Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 34; Weismann, Taste of 
Modernity, 1–2. 
405 Sedgwick, Saints and Sons, 37. 
406 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 6, 422. 
407 Frishkopf, ‘Changing Modalities.’ 
408 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939, 103–129. 
409 Ibid., 136–141; Mark J. Sedgwick, Muhammad Abduh (Oxford: Oneworld, 2010). 
410 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939, 222–244. 
411 Ibid., 162–188, 245–259. 
412 Sedgwick, Saints and Sons, 37. 
 127
Hadith and the desire to build society on the base of these literal 
interpretations.413 
The term ‘Salafism’ has come to denote a ‘frame of mind’, a variety of 
movements that all aim to ‘purify’ Islam from ‘innovations’ but have little else in 
common. The most influential movement of this kind today is Wahhabism, based 
on the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791) and connected 
to the ruling family of Saudi Arabia. Oil wealth served to spread the Wahhabi 
message through modern institutions and modes of communication, with the 
effect that the Wahhabis have become quite successful claiming the right to 
define Islamic orthodoxy. Through their control of mosques, schools and other 
organisations all over the world and their use of the internet many people have 
easy access to Salafi Islam.414 
The terminology used to describe these trends and movements is 
confusing and problematic. The most common label is ‘fundamentalism’, an 
intensely problematic term as it is originally used to denote a specifically 
Christian phenomenon, but also because there is no agreement on its definition 
and it is used to denote a variety of phenomena, e.g. ‘scripturalism’, ‘literalism’, 
‘puritanism’. This trend has been called ‘totalist’ by William E. Shepard and 
‘maximalist’ by Lincoln.415 Most of these phenomena can be found throughout 
Islamic history, even though they have become more predominant during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.416 The difference is that in modern times 
there are so many competing values that the commitment to Islam as a ‘totalist’ 
religion is an option among many and therefore has become more explicit. Many 
‘fundamentalist’ movements are in fact very modern as their explicit aim is to 
break with tradition.417 All these ideologies engage with modernity as they show 
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‘a dialectical relationship to modernity, one that entails not the negation of 
modernity but an attempt to simultaneously abolish, transcend, preserve and 
transform it.’418 In the words of Eickelman and Piscatori, the modern world is 
characterised by conscious reflection on the own culture and religion, and 
through ‘objectification’ Islam has become ‘more self-consciously Islamic’.419  
These Islamic reform movements have also inspired political movements, 
organisations and parties that aim to practise politics based on Islamic values, or 
establish an Islamic state. The Islamist movements first developed in the colonial 
period, and experienced a revival after the Six Day War of 1967 and the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979. Islamism has been defined as ‘movements and ideologies 
drawing on Islamic referents – terms, symbols and events taken from the Islamic 
tradition – in order to articulate a distinctly political agenda’. The methods used 
by Islamist parties differ hugely. Some use grassroots activism to Islamize 
society from below while others resort to violence to achieve their goals. These 
movements do not necessarily break with tradition as they encompass Muslims 
from many different backgrounds with many different orientations.420 
Despite the intensified criticism it has to endure, Sufism has also 
participated in this revivalist atmosphere, both in the form of the traditional ṭuruq 
and in other organisational forms.421 Islamists have often been seen as Sufism’s 
arch-enemies, but some members of ṭuruq participate in Islamist movements, 
some movements are modelled on Sufi organisational modes of leadership and 
mobilization, or refer to Sufi morality as a basis for social and political action, and 
scholars have noted similarities in terms of religious practices that establish 
strong communal bonds.422 On a completely different line of development, some 
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Sufi individuals and movements connect to Western ‘new spirituality’ movements 
based on their shared interest for inner spirituality and embodied spiritual 
experiences. 
 
 
1.5.2 Sufism in Contemporary Societies 
 
As we have discussed in paragraph 1.4.2, throughout Islamic history Sufi ideas, 
practices, and institutional forms have been subject to (self-)criticism, which 
sometimes led to outright opposition and persecution. Involved in such conflicts 
was often a rivalry over epistemological bases of authority in which exoteric 
scholars opposed the esoteric knowledge of Sufis, based on claims of inspiration 
and direct access to the divine, and their resultant authority to interpret the 
sources and the law. Despite these criticisms and conflicts, most agreed that 
religion consists of islām, Īmān and iḥsān, that the inner and outer spheres are 
inseparable and validate each other, and that Sufism is an integral part of 
Islam.423 
In this increasingly fragmented ideological arena of contemporary 
societies, however, the nature of this criticism has changed as the connection 
between Sufism and Islam is questioned. Sufism is criticized because it is 
considered a foreign innovation (bid‛a), because it is considered to keep the 
Muslim world backward and divided, and/or because it is seen to collaborate with 
colonial and post-colonial powers.424 But most importantly, rather than specific 
Sufi practices such as dhikr and samā’, it is now the essence of Sufism that is 
under attack as essentially un-Islamic.425 Especially the relation between master 
and disciple and the value of complete obedience to the shaykh in every aspect 
of life is considered to compromise monotheism and undermine the disciple’s 
individual reason and will, and concrete socio-political roles of Sufi shaykhs are 
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criticized. The possibility of a spiritual connection with people who have passed 
away is considered heretical. On a deeper ontological and epistemological level 
the idea of the experiential basis of knowledge and the possibility of inspiration 
and mediation is challenged.426 
In addition to these Islamic critics, some Sufi movements in the West also 
stress the non-Islamic aspects of Sufism by embracing its universal tendencies, 
and stressing the universal, esoteric and ethical aspects of the Sufi tradition over 
the Islamic devotional and ethical ones.427 This goes back to the early twentieth 
century when Eastern spirituality was embraced as the counterweight to Western 
materialism, and continued in the 1960s and 70s in the context of the counter-
culture’s search for an ‘alternative spirituality’.428 Intensely disillusioned with 
scripture-based traditional religion and its hierarchies, ‘spiritual seekers’ preferred 
‘experience-based, practical and body-related forms of teachings that produce 
immediate results’, seeking for the validation of a spiritual teaching in themselves 
in line with the individualistic character of this religious approach. According to 
Gritt Klinkhammer, this led them to search for charismatic leaders who could 
provide them with these experiences, and who possessed ‘authenticity’ as 
representatives of ‘Eastern spirituality’.429 These universalist Sufi shaykhs and 
movements came to participate in the ‘spiritual, therapeutic and aesthetic market’ 
as the boundaries between spirituality, healing and art started to shift and 
spirituality became commodified in both a metaphoric and a very real sense – the 
best example being the popularity of all things Rumi among spiritual seekers and 
the general public.430 
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Many contemporary Sufis however firmly stress their adherence to the 
Islamic principles of the Qur’an, Sunna and sharia. In addition to their own initial 
responses, the challenge of their critics has led them to interact with the ideas 
circulating in the Islamic and nationalist ideological arena and to further redefine 
their position. The ‘objectification’ mentioned above also happened within 
traditional Islam and Sufism, which became more self-consciously Sufi while at 
the same time stressing that it is the authentic traditional Islam, ‘a brand of Islam 
that acknowledges 1,400 years of tradition as authoritative alongside the 
teachings of Qur’an and Sunna and recognizes the contribution of Sufi 
spirituality, the legal interpretations of the ‘ulamā’ and the four schools of law’,431 
promoting a non-localized, deterritorialised adherence to traditional and Sufi 
values by appealing to tradition and continuity.432 
Under influence of Modernist preferences for institutional and intellectual 
rationality, scripturalism, individualism, and political activism, some Muslim 
intellectuals stress the intellectual, devotional and/or ethical aspects of Sufism as 
opposed to the esoteric aspects. During the Islamic revival of the 1970s and 80s 
this was accompanied by a return to inner spiritual expression, experience and 
embodiment, which created a space for Sufism’s inner search for a heightened 
awareness of the divine.433 
Related to these shifts, new organisational frameworks are developing in 
addition to the traditional ṭuruq. These movements are often developed in local 
communities by new agents, and show new modes of authority and new – often 
flatter – hierarchies, and new ritual forms.434 Berger points out that in 
contemporary pluralist society, the religious arena is dominated by the logics of 
market economics, competition and need for rationalization of socio-religious 
structures, leading to bureaucratization. Bureaucratic religious leaders need 
different skills: Berger says they should be ‘activist, pragmatically oriented, not 
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given to administratively irrelevant reflection, skilled in interpersonal relations, 
“dynamic” and conservative at the same time, and so forth’). In addition to this, 
religious movements need to take their followers’ needs into account, e.g. by 
shifting attention from the public to the private sphere, and focusing on values 
and moral and therapeutic needs rather than supernatural beings and events (as 
people have been influenced by their secularized environment). Berger further 
points out that the symbolic universes and plausibility structures of these 
movements only cover sub-societies, and are therefore more vulnerable and 
need a stronger legitimation (see paragraph 1.3).435 The analysis of the 
socialisation process is therefore essential to understand how such groups 
maintain their ‘reality’ and plausibility structure in this pluralist situation. 
Many Sufi movements have rationalised their institutions – an example of 
which is the Hamidiyya-Shadhiliyya studied by Michael Gilsenan, which 
formalized its structure and wrote explicit rules for its followers.436 Other Sufi 
movements went further and transformed themselves into political parties, 
voluntary associations, or business networks.437 The Iskanderpasha 
Naqshbandiyya movement in Turkey provides us with an example of both 
intellectual and institutional rationalization, combined with traditional and 
charismatic authority. They aim to raise a Muslim avant-garde through their 
educational and business networks (with political ties) and with a strong stress on 
Sufi ethics. The Shaykh and the silsila are their centring principle, but due to the 
circumstances in secularist Turkey have developed a more egalitarian structure, 
as one of their recent leaders was not an Islamic scholar, depended on senior 
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members, and encouraged critical thinking.438 Catharina Raudvere and Ašk Gaši 
show that Bosnian shaykhs in the Swedish Bosniak diaspora communities have 
moved from being local community leaders to facilitators of dhikr as informal 
groups take over their community functions.439 Geaves suggests that the 
activities of Sufi ‘online shaykhs’ (mainly in the Shadhili-Alawi tradition) and 
Muslim intellectuals who are not affiliated to Sufi groups might lead to ‘the 
emergence of a transglobal Sufism that (…) will find tariqa and shaikh/murid 
relations sublimated to serve the cause of ‘traditional Islam.’440 Heck argues that 
increasingly Sufism is being packaged not so much as a ‘network of disciples’ but 
rather as a set of beliefs and practices that constitute normative Islam.441 
Howell and Van Bruinessen both studied the Indonesian situation, where 
in the 1930s the Indonesian Muslim Modernist Hamka (1908-1981) disengaged 
taṣawwuf (understood as ethical cultivation and philosophical reflection), from the 
ṭuruq and redefined Sufism as ‘a body of Muslim knowledge’ with a deeper 
emotional richness and ethical subtlety that can be reached through personal 
study and introspection, without the necessity of a guide and a long spiritual 
path.442 A later generation – which Howell classifies as ‘Neo-Modernism’ or ‘Neo- 
Traditionalism’, but which can also be called ‘Traditional Islam’ – stressed this 
approach to Sufism even more, valuing autonomy, eclecticism and experience. 
This led to the rise of Sufi leaders, teachers and institutions ‘designed to engage 
cosmopolitan Muslims’, which interacted as nodes within a ‘new urban Sufi 
network’ in which people move around with more autonomy: commercial Islamic 
study institutions where Islamic devotional and mystical practices are taught in 
                                                  
438 Brian Silverstein, ‘Sufism and Modernity in Turkey: From the Authenticity of Experience to the 
Practice of Discipline’, in Sufism and the ‘Modern’ in Islam, ed. Howell and Van Bruinessen, 39–
60; Heiko Henkel, ‘One Foot Rooted in Islam, the Other Foot Circling the World. Tradition and 
Engagement in a Turkish Sufi Cemaat’, in Sufism Today, ed. Raudvere and Stenberg, 103–16. 
439 Catharina Raudvere and Ašk Gaši, ‘Home, Nation and Global Islam. Sufi Oriented Activities 
and Community Building among Bosnian Muslims in Southern Sweden’, in Sufis in Western 
Society, ed. Geaves, Dressler, and Klinkhammer(London & New York: Routledge, 2009), 162–79. 
440 Ron Geaves, ‘A Case of Cultural Binary Fission or Transglobal Sufism? The Transmigration of 
Sufism to Britain’, in Sufis in Western Society, ed. Geaves, Dressler, and Klinkhammer, 110. 
441 Heck, ‘The Politics of Sufism’, 15. 
442 Howell and Van Bruinessen, ‘Sufism and the “Modern” in Islam’, 11; Julia Day Howell, 
‘Modernity and Islamic Spirituality in Indonesia’s New Sufi Networks’, in Sufism and the “Modern” 
in Islam, ed. Howell and Van Bruinessen, 218–219; Julia Day Howell, ‘Sufism and the Indonesian 
Islamic Revival’, The Journal of Asian Studies 60, no. 3 (2001): 710–711. 
 134
addition to other Islamic sciences, ‘traditional’ ṭuruq where students are guided 
by their spiritual masters (often reorganised along more formal lines443), and 
‘personal growth’ and New Age movements, reworked as ‘spirituality’ and via 
Sufism incorporated into Islam.444 
 Geaves discussed similar trends regarding the development of Sufism in 
Britain, tracing this development to the arrival of ṭuruq from immigrants’ home 
countries that continue to be organised on ethnic lines and often maintain strong 
ties to the place of origin and its shrine. A good example is that of the Chishtis 
who continue to focus on their shrine in Ajmer through remittances and visits.445 
In the face of challenges by the better organised Deobandis in Britain, by the 
1970s and 80s some Sufi leaders tried to unite under the umbrella of the South 
Asian Barelvi movement, referring to themselves as Ahl as-Sunnat wa-Jama’at, 
claiming to be the true orthodox Islam and focusing on their veneration of the 
Prophet. These endeavours often failed to transcend the ethnic basis of affiliation 
and the strong loyalty to the shaykhs, and were hardly successful in defending 
traditional Islam as a whole,446 but more recently Traditional Islam seems to be 
‘transforming into a coherent movement able to bring together various strands of 
Sufi allegiance.’ Scholars – often converts – challenge criticism of Sufism head-
on by referring to the same primary textual sources as their opponents and 
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spread their work through new networks including educational centres, publishing 
houses, websites, etc. The role of traditional ṭuruq in this movement is subject of 
discussion, as some think allegiance to a ṭarīqa is necessary, while others think it 
is a personal choice, and yet others oppose it altogether.447 
Geaves sought for similar developments in the Muslim quarter of 
Jerusalem’s old city, occupied and annexed by Israel in 1967,448 and found two 
trends that operated independently but both re-defined Sufism as ‛ilm al-tawḥīd: 
 
1. Traditional Sufism re-branded as street ethics (adab) with an emphasis on 
shaykh/murid instruction, dhikr attendance and other traditional practices 
2. Traditional Islam with an implicit Sufi allegiance (tassawuf) (sic) embedded into 
the al-Aqsa mosque complex but with little or no explicit reference to Sufism449 
 
Howell notes that ‘spiritual seekers’ who are more focussed on spiritual 
experiences of the holistic person are challenging rationalist approaches to 
religion all over the world, in all religious traditions.450 Voll sees this renewed 
interest in Sufism as ‘part of a postmaterialist reaction to modernity’ that prefers 
‘spirituality’ and experience over organised religion and its monopoly over 
revelation.451 The incorporation of Sufism as the Islamic manifestation of a 
universal Mysticism in ‘new spirituality’ movements is an extreme example of this 
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trend. This is not the whole story, however, as traditional Sufi ṭuruq and Sufi 
leaders stress the intricate link between Islam and Sufism, and present Sufism as 
part of Traditional Islam. This speaks to the search for a more unified, 
universalized Islam which originated in the anti-imperialist struggle and is still 
relevant in the face of the ongoing marginalization of Muslims in the global 
sphere and in national contexts, and is either seen as the ethical aspect of 
activist movements, and/or as an alternative to the more radical activist radical 
Islamic movements.452 At the same time, it speaks to the search for tradition and 
authenticity, as they provide ‘an understanding of ummah that was more than a 
collectivity across geographical Muslim space but also back through the 
generations, linked by isnad (chains of transmission) to the Prophet himself.’453 
While there are definitely shifts in the orientation of Sufi movements, we 
should note that these are not radical departures from the Sufi tradition, and 
should not be seen as mere apologetic defensive measures, but as part of the 
dynamic Sufi tradition. Such revival movements are characterised by institutional 
and intellectual rationality, an important aspect of which is the members’ 
autonomy, expressed through the development of their rational-critical skills and 
their enactment of personal choice of sources, religious expression, and 
affiliation. It is important to note, however, that this does not necessarily distract 
from the emotional and spiritual experiences that might be reached through these 
affiliations.454 
Most importantly, alternatives continue to exist as less ‘reformist’ Sufis 
battle for the stage. Charismatic leaders continue to extend their influence. In the 
Indonesian context, Van Bruinessen discusses the ‘heterodox living saints’ who 
persuade the public of their spiritual status through antinomian behaviour. They 
became popular in the 1990s, at the height of the rise of ‘orthodox Islam’ 
supported by Suharto’s ‘Islamic turn’. These charismatics did not come from 
Indonesia’s wide range of ‘syncretist’ religious movements as might be 
suspected, but rather from ‘the centre of traditionalist orthodoxy’. Van Bruinessen 
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notes that the most successful religious leaders in the Indonesian context were 
those who had a combination of bureaucratic and charismatic authority – where 
these roles did not coincide, conflicts often followed.455 
Similarly, sacred spaces are not abandoned, as can be seen from the 
example of Pir Wahhab Siddiqi, a Pakistani shaykh from a wealthy family in 
Lahore who migrated to Britain in 1972. He established both a mosque in 
Coventry and a college in Nuneaton which provides both traditional Islamic and 
secular education. When he passed away, his sons initially obtained municipal 
permission to bury him in the mosque, but he was later moved to the grounds of 
the college in a big procession. Geaves sees this as the shift of the ṭarīqa’s 
centre in Britain from the mosque to the school. While the role of the shaykh as 
educator and moral leader is thus stressed in a reformist fashion, the shrine does 
still strengthen this role.456 
This development of the Sufi tradition happens in interaction with the 
global sphere (in which scripturalist revivalism is predominant with its stress on 
the unity of the umma, but the universalist ‘new Sufi spirituality’ is also gaining 
ground), but also with local contexts. In Indonesia, this revival was also 
stimulated by social changes due to Suharto’s New Order that had created a 
religiously committed new Muslim middle class and generated new demands in 
Indonesia’s religious market.457 Geaves seeks an explanation for the revival of 
Sufism in Jerusalem, presented as ‛ilm al-tawḥīd, in the political context of the 
Palestinians, who have suffered from the Israeli occupation for decades and are 
disillusioned with both Fatah’s secularism and Hamas’s political Islam. In this 
context, Sufism can be seen as the less political and more traditional ‘third 
option’.458  
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Heck points out that Sufi ‘reformism’ means ‘a reorientation to the nation-
state’ as ‘[t]raditional patterns continue, only now in a competitive dialogue with 
both secularists and fundamentalists over the nature of the state and the role of 
Sufism in it.’459 Often the pre-modern advisory model remained in effect; as it did 
in British India where the colonial rulers recognized the indigenous leaders, 
among whom were Sufi shaykhs, to mediate between themselves and the 
people.460 In many post-colonial states, there are Sufi movements who support 
the government and bolster the status quo – e.g. Egypt’s Supreme Sufi Council. 
On the other hand, there are many examples of Sufi movements acting as 
religions of resistance or rebellion, to use Lincoln’s terms (see paragraph 1.4.2). 
Some Islamists feel the need for their religious ideology to be rooted in Sufi 
ethics and organisational forms that are adapted to the times.461 For example, 
Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1920s, 
was initiated in the Shadhiliyya-Husafiyya, and he based the organisation of the 
Muslim Brotherhood on the model of Sufi ṭuruq.462  
 Because of their perceived ‘mystical’ approach, with its connotations of 
universality and detachment from the social and political, Sufism is often seen as 
a counterweight to Islamism and Salafism, on both a national and an 
international level. Ernst calls this ‘Sufism and the politics of peace’. Hisham 
Kabbani’s efforts to sponsor ‘Sufi ideology’ through the UK’s Sufi Muslim Council 
(est.2006) move to the international level.463 The Jordanian King Abdullah uses 
similar rhetoric both on a national and international level (see chapter 4). While 
this approach is very popular amongst non-Muslims seeking an ‘alternative Islam’ 
to deal with, these initiatives are less popular in Islamic societies and among 
Muslims in the West, which gives weight to the argument that Sufi ṭuruq 
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cooperate with colonial powers or oppressive regimes. The type of universalized 
‘new spirituality’ of the Sufi movements that tend to participate in these initiatives 
is not very popular among immigrant Muslims, and the notion that this type of 
Sufism can play a role in redefining immigrant Islam therefore seems 
misguided.464 
 The distinction between a religion of resistance and a religion of the status 
quo should be more nuanced, however, and go beyond what normally counts as 
‘politics’. Heck characterizes the Sufi socio-political position as ‘engaged 
distance’ – engaged with society but in principle distant from worldly power, 
enacted through the Sufis’ focus on character formation and providing guidance 
to both individuals and communities. Heck argues that Sufis consider ‘silent 
opposition’ performed in the spiritual realm just as valid and more powerful than 
opposition in the exterior realm, understanding quietism as a method of protest. 
Heck gives the example of Emir Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri (d.1883) who was exiled 
to Damascus after fighting the French in Algeria for almost twenty years and 
spent the rest of his life teaching Ibn Arabi’s thought ‘as a way to prepare 
Muslims intellectually to meet the challenges of European civilization.’465 A recent 
example is that of the Moroccan Shaykh Abd al-Salam Yasin, who stresses the 
need for a shaykh’s guidance to ensure the legitimate use of power and the 
proper spiritual preparation for jihad, and the need to build an alternative society 
through reform of the nafs. Due to his religious charisma he has the power to 
challenge the status quo of Moroccan politics and the legitimacy of the 
monarchy, encouraging ‘engaged distance’ for the sake of reform of society, 
dismissing politics but not the community (umma).466  
  An interesting and well-documented example of all these attitudes is pre-
Revolution Syria.467 Since independence the state has exerted influence over the 
Sufi ṭuruq and zawāya through their control of the awqāf, and under the Ba’th 
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party this evolved to control over the public religious debate on ‘official Islam’ – a 
debate that happened within the parameters set by the Ba’th regime and was 
meant to provide the regime with legitimacy. This debate aims to define which 
traditions ‘will constitute the normative framework of society’, and who will 
interpret and implement them. The limits of the debate are controlled by setting 
the terms of the debate, establishing the issues under discussion, and supporting 
those involved in the debate by tolerating their activities and giving them access 
to the media.468 Participants in this debate were most notably Shaykh Ahmad 
Kuftaru (1912-2004), a Naqshbandi shaykh and the Grand Mufti of Syria from 
1964-2004,469 his disciple and son-in-law and member of parliament Muhammad 
al-Habash (1962),470 and Muhammad Sa’id Ramadan al-Buti (1929-2013).471 
Many of these ‛ulamā’ were from a Kurdish Sufi background and had moved to 
the Syrian cities from Turkey in the 1920s and 30s.472 When the Ba’th regime 
came to power, it was eager to replace the old Sunni religious establishment 
from the notable families with the Arabized Kurdish ‛ulamā’. This gave them an 
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opportunity to participate in society in a way that would have been difficult due to 
their Kurdish background and regime repression.473 This official Islam has 
therefore been described as a reformed, spiritualized and rationalized Kurdish 
Sunni Sufi Islam that is not associated with ṭuruq but is a set of ideas and 
practices enshrined in the holy scriptures.474 
Even though this ‘official Islam’ is negative towards the ṭuruq (al-Buti for 
example strongly opposes them475), some of these participants in the debate 
created extensive networks of disciples and Sufi groups. The most famous is the 
Kuftariyya in Damascus, a branch of the Khalidiyya-Naqshbandiyya, founded by 
Muhammad Amin Kuftaru (1877-1938) who traced his lineage through Isa al-
Kurdi (1831-1912). Upon his death in 1938 the ṭarīqa was taken over by his son 
Ahmad Kuftaru, who turned the small mosque into a large complex with offices, 
class rooms, a library, etc., from which he engaged in education and da‛wa.476 
The mosque also housed the tomb of his father, and he cultivated his memory in 
order to stress that he was from a well-established family.477 Kuftaru was a 
founding member of the League of Muslim Scholars, a member of the majlis al-
iftā’, and since 1964 Grand Mufti of Syria. His Kurdish background and his 
‘newcomer’ status however initially made the Sunni establishment hesitant to 
accept him, and his ties to the Ba’th regime did not help.478 
Weismann stresses that Kuftaru re-interpreted the Sufi tradition in line with 
Traditional Islam, focusing on Qur’an and sharia and the primacy of reason in 
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interpreting them, opposing the madhāhib, together with an emphasis on ethics 
and morality. Kuftaru’s understanding of the brotherhood was inspired by the 
Indian Naqshbandi Hasan al-Nadwi (1914-1999), who called for the replacement 
of traditional Sufi terminology with Qur’anic terminology: he talks about tarbiya 
rūḥiyya (spiritual education), iḥsān (spiritual excellence, being constantly aware 
of God’s presence) and tazkiyat al-nafs (purification of the soul) rather than of 
tașawwuf and ṭarīqa. This was to be done through dhikr (recollection of God’s 
name), moral ascetism and rābiṭa (tying your heart to the shaykh). He also 
opposed Sufis who followed Ibn Arabi. Weismann says Kuftaru downplayed the 
tradition of the Naqshbandiyya to stress his relations with the moderate 
Islamists.479 The break with tradition might not have been as stark as Weismann 
suggests, however, as the Kuftariyya’s organisation can still be considered a 
traditional ṭarīqa, and as he does not break with the silsila (as can be seen from 
the cultivation of his father’s memory).480 
Kuftaru’s focus on da’wa leads to an interesting doctrinal contradiction. On 
the one hand Kuftaru sees Islam as ‘the most final and perfect religion’, while he 
also participates in interreligious dialogue with the argument that all three 
monotheistic faiths are Abrahamic religions and that they are all ‘different 
traditions of the one universal religion’.481 This approach made the Kuftariyya 
very attractive for the regime, as his universalist interpretation included the 
controversial Alawi sect and therefore legitimized Alawite leadership over 
Syria.482 The political stance of the brotherhood is subject of debate. Annabelle 
Böttcher and De Jong see Kuftaru as a tool of the regime, which used it as a 
counterweight to the Naqshbandi shaykhs in Northern Syria and the Kurdish 
areas who had joined the Islamist opposition to the regime,483 specifically Sa’id 
Hawwa, the Muslim Brotherhood ideologue from Hama.484 Leif Stenberg on the 
                                                  
479 Weismann, ‘Sufi Brotherhoods in Syria and Israel’, 312–313; Weismann, ‘Sufi 
Fundamentalism between India and the Middle East’, 117–119. 
480 Stenberg, ‘Naqshbandiyya in Damascus’, 106–114. 
481 Weismann, ‘Sufi Brotherhoods in Syria and Israel’, 314. 
482 Stenberg, ‘Naqshbandiyya in Damascus’, 108. 
483 De Jong, ‘The Naqshbandiyya in Egypt and Syria’, 594–595; Böttcher, Official Sunni and Shi’i 
Islam in Syria. 
484 Weismann, ‘Sufi Brotherhoods in Syria and Israel’, 311. 
 143
other hand sees the relation as a mutual one, from which the regime gained 
Islamic legitimacy and Kuftaru gained the power to influence the political 
leadership (a perfect example of Heck’s advisory model).485 
While some Syrian Sufi shaykhs thus supported the status quo, many 
Arab and Kurdish Sufi shaykhs and their followers had been active in the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood since its beginning in the 1940s and opposed to the Ba’th 
regime and the religious elite associated with them, and participated in the 1982 
Islamist uprising.486 As recently as 2005, the Kurdish Shaykh Ma'shuq al-
Khaznawi was assassinated by the secret service for his anti-regime statements 
and his meetings with the Syrian opposition in exile.487  
Pinto points to the less explicitly political ways of limiting the government’s 
absolute power:  
 
The personally embodied forms of power, justice, and moral authority as 
expressed in the cult of saints and the public activities of the Sufi shaykhs 
challenge the disembodied constructions of power consecrated by the “official” 
religious debate. These foci of embodied power can create alternative arenas for 
the expression of public dissent beyond state control, negotiate the boundaries of 
independence from and compliance with the regime, and enhance the capacity of 
social control through Sufi participation in official networks of clientship.488  
 
In their writings, Sufi leaders such as Abd al-Qadir Isa and Sa’id Hawwa 
supported a more socially engaged Sufism that has a space for the guidance of 
Sufi shaykhs, whose authority derives from and is exercised through their 
knowledge, karāmāt and baraka, an embodied power challenging the ‘“official” 
consensus of power enshrined in the sacred texts’.489 
                                                  
485 Stenberg, ‘Naqshbandiyya in Damascus’, 107; Stenberg, ‘Young, Male and Sufi Muslims in 
the City of Damascus’, 70; Böttcher, Official Sunni and Shi’i Islam in Syria, 15.  
486 Pinto, ‘Sufism and the Political Economy of Morality in Syria’, 122; Christmann, ‘al-Buti’s 
Adaptation of “Mem û Zîn”’, 31. 
487 Pinto, ‘Sufism and the Political Economy of Morality in Syria’, 111 and 133 notes 36 and 37; 
Paulo Pinto, ‘Kurdish Sufi Spaces of Rural-Urban Connection in Northern Syria’, Études Rurales 
186, no. 2 (2010): 153. 
488 Pinto, ‘Sufism and the Political Economy of Morality in Syria’, 124. 
489 Ibid., 114–116. 
 144
By challenging the ways of attributing authority, this is part of the 
competition for the right to define and speak for Islam described as ‘Muslim 
Politics’. Asad argues that those who are most powerful in defining the tradition 
and enforcing behaviour are considered to be the ‘orthodox’, which is ‘a 
normative framework that links conceptually the past and present of religious 
practices through the establishment of power relations with exemplary, 
pedagogical or corrective qualities.’490 Sufi shaykhs and communities can be 
affiliated with this hegemonic interpretation. These hegemonic transmissions are 
hardly ever completely hegemonic, however, as there always tend to be rival 
lines of transmission that define the tradition differently and instil different modes 
of behaviour, leading to ‘various normative codifications of the mystical path’, and 
sometimes shift to outright opposition centred around the shaykh as an 
alternative focus of power with great mobilizing possibilities. The Syrian Sufi 
shaykhs hardly ever use their social and political power to explicitly confront the 
state, but they use it ‘to negotiate the limits of their religious and social autonomy 
in relation to the state’, or to ‘obtain a privileged place in the networks of 
clientship that connect the state to local social groups in Syria.’ Pinto points out 
that they ‘have to manage a delicate balance (…) between worldly subordination 
to the Ba’thist political rule and the absolute mystical power that constitutes their 
religious persona.’491 
Despite these examples, Sufism is commonly seen as apolitical and 
quietist, solely concerned with the spiritual realm (for which it is both praised and 
criticized). Even when a Sufi movement is not participating in the affairs of the 
state at all, we should still consider its political role from the viewpoint of 
Eickelman and Piscatori’s ‘Muslim Politics’. A group that is characterized as 
‘quietist’ – either in the general sense of the word or in the sense of Heck’s 
understanding of spiritual protest – is implicitly participating in politics by not 
challenging the status quo. The understanding that Sufis are ‘quietist’ and 
‘apolitical’ stems from a narrow understanding of the ‘political’, as limited to 
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‘actions within a set structure of politics concerned with states, nations or 
institutions’ and performed by politicians and political parties. As Stjernholm 
points out, following Saba Mahmood and Peter Mandaville: 
 
Social activity, because of its relational qualities, is also political, in that it is an 
ongoing negotiation concerning how, why and where one should act in a certain 
way. This negotiation is not confined to concrete attempts of persuasion (e.g. 
political debates or public demonstrations), but also includes social activities 
involving ethics and attempts to reform the self, engaged as it is in a negotiation 
regarding what ‘the good’ is, and why.492 
 
 Especially in the case of Sufi movements centred around the relationship 
between shaykh and disciple, the transmission of Sufi thought and the cultivation 
of mystical experience affects the social sphere through the cultivation of Sufi 
ethics. The analysis of Sufism as a discursive tradition in which knowledge is 
transmitted and values are embodied through disciplinary practices (see 
paragraph 1.2) proves to be especially useful when looking at the socio-political 
role of a Sufi movement that does not engage in politics directly, but does 
influence the socio-political sphere on the level of moral performances and in the 
field of ‘Muslim politics’. As Pinto points out in the Syrian context: 
  
the ongoing production and affirmation of competing models of social morality 
and self-correctness framed by Islamic values (…) shape the interface between 
Islam and the political processes in Syrian society. The social mobilization of 
both embodied and discursive principles of Sufism, which instruct and guide the 
social actors in correct or appropriate performance in the public sphere, has led 
to their affirmation as a normative framework that competes to define the moral 
order of Syrian society.493 
 
 The discursive transmission of knowledge and the embodiment of morals 
is a social act which happens in the social sphere and should be seen in the 
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context of the struggle for the right to speak for Islam and interpret the sacred 
texts in terms of doctrine and practice which Eickelman and Piscatori call ‘Muslim 
politics’, both within the movement and on the national and global levels.494 No 
religious group that is concerned with the production and transmission of 
knowledge and values, organizes its members and occupies space can be 
termed ‘apolitical’ (see paragraph 1.4.2). Therefore, in order to understand the 
place of Sufi movements in society and in national and global politics, we need to 
look beyond the labels ‘quietist’ and ‘apolitical’ and examine the power structure 
that is at work in a society, and how religious leaders and movements relate to 
this – in Eickelman and Piscatori’s words, we need to examine the locational 
aspect of authority. 
 We have discussed in paragraph 1.2 that the transmission of knowledge in 
the Sufi discursive tradition that happens between shaykh and follower not only 
leads to the transfer of knowledge and the experience of mystical states, but also 
to the embodiment of the ṭarīqa’s norms, and the creation of communities based 
on them. This ‘creates dispositions which produce cumulative social effects 
through their enactment as moral performances.’495 When seeking to understand 
how Sufi movements participate in their societies therefore, one must not only 
look at the religious, social and political leaders and their actions in the socio-
political field, but also at their relationships with their followers and how the 
tradition is transmitted through teaching, devotional practices and the instilment 
of ādāb. The contemporary focus on moral reform found in many Sufi 
movements enhances this aspect of Sufism and its socio-political role. 
 
 
1.5.3 Translocality 
 
Religious movements have always operated on several levels, from the local to 
the translocal and global. With the expansion and strengthening of global 
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political, economic, and communication networks and the increased population 
movement, people and ideas are connected like never before, trying to find ways 
to meaningfully connect the local and the global. Frishkopf sees globalisation as 
‘a global network of political, economic and communication links’, the centres of 
which are situated in the West, ‘the primary beneficiary (in terms of wealth, 
power, or information) of its operations. Outside the West, benefits are skewed 
towards a narrow elite, links are less plentiful, and flows are impeded by state 
control.’496  
Globalisation is the interaction of the global process with local contexts, 
such as the state or the larger diasporic community. In the words of Beyer:  
 
Global religion (…) is globalized only in and as particular variations. It is both 
global and local at the same time; any variation can be global only as a series of 
localized forms. Hence the globalization of religion has taken the form of the 
glocalization of religions; the authentic variations are not only plural, they are 
located both at the centres and at the margins or at neither, irrespective of how 
one conceives these.497 
 
 In today’s globalized world the struggle over the interpretation of Islamic 
symbols happens on an ever larger scale. Salafis are often seen as part of a 
globalized, delocalized, deterritorialised and universal vision of Islam, calling for 
the abandonment of local elements – but it should be stressed that their 
‘universal’ views originate and operate in concrete contexts just as other religious 
movements do.498 Salafis see Sufism as a localized version of Islam which 
incorporated local non-Islamic elements Sufism, such as saint veneration and 
shrine cults – even though Sufism has always had a strong global character as it 
spread along routes of trade and conquest and as Sufi warriors, ascetics, 
scholars and pilgrims have travelled in search of spiritual masters and knowledge 
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and ṭuruq have spread all over the world.499 Nowadays, these traditional 
translocal Sufi networks have been transformed by modern communications and 
global flows of ideas, goods and people, into new modalities of global Sufi 
networking.500 
 Several writers on Islam and Sufism use the concept of 
‘transnationalism’501 to understand contemporary Islamic trends and movements. 
In this study I prefer the term ‘translocal’ as this circumvents the problematic 
terminology surrounding the concepts ‘nation’ and ‘nation-state’ and allows for 
the discussion of different communities both within the same state and outside 
it.502 Mandaville understands the translocal as  
 
an abstract category denoting socio-political interaction which falls between 
bounded communities; that is, translocality is primarily about the ways in which 
people flow through space rather than about how they exist in space. It is 
therefore a quality characterised in terms of movement.503  
 
It is ‘the sum of linkage and connections between places’504 and deals with the 
flows of information, ideas, practices and meanings that makes specific localities 
interdependent and shows us the interconnectedness of what was previously 
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analysed as bounded communities.505 At the same time, we should keep in mind 
that translocality is not necessarily the same as deterritorialisation. We cannot 
lose sight of the specific localities in which these communities are embedded. As 
Raudvere points out, while translocality connects localities physically and 
emotionally, ‘in their memories of the past and their dreams of the future’, it also 
draws attention to the different realities in which they are located, e.g. in terms of 
living conditions and the religious milieu.506 
As Sufi movements reorganize themselves in the modern pluralist context 
(see paragraph 1.5.2), as migrants and refugees encounter new environments, 
and as modern means of organisation and communication tie previously loose 
networks closer together, new forms of Sufi organisation with an even stronger 
translocal character are evolving.507 Pilgrims, migrants and converts connect the 
geographical sacred centre with its periphery and/or establish new sacred 
centres through their travels, communications and relationships, and the flow of 
sacrilised objects,508 leading to new modalities of saint veneration.509 The 
construction and communication of narratives shows a similar flow and 
adherence to both local and translocal levels as narratives explicitly discuss 
these spatial connections and relate to themes that are shared by all adherents 
but articulated in a local vocabulary.510 As we have seen in paragraph 1.5.2, 
some of these movements range ‘across transcultural “world-systems” from the 
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West to Asia and Africa and even beyond the bonds of Muslim communities of 
discourse’.511 This fluidity of people and sacred centres leads to the diminishing 
of the usefulness of traditional centre-periphery models, to the point that ‘the 
meaning of East and West starts to lose its geographical significance’.512 
‘Classical Sufi networking’ overlapped with other webs of relationships, 
such as family and trade, and nowadays we see similar overlapping.513 Sufi 
movements often exist within ethnic and/or religious diasporas.514 Gabriel 
Scheffer defines ‘diaspora’ as  
 
a socio-political formation, created as a result of either voluntary or forced 
migration, whose members regard themselves as of the same ethno-national 
origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one or several host countries. 
Members of such entities maintain regular or occasional contacts with what they 
regard as their homelands.515 
 
Roger Bubaker identifies three elements that characterize a diaspora: a concrete 
dispersion in space, the prevalence of an orientation towards a real or imagined 
homeland and the maintenance of boundaries versus the host society.516 To this 
Werbner adds that diasporas can be understood as ‘aesthetic and/or moral 
communities of co-responsibility’ as many engage in cultural and/or in political 
activism on behalf of co-diasporans within their host societies in order to maintain 
their identification with the diaspora. Through these activities alternative centres 
of diaspora are created in addition to the ‘homeland’. As such ‘global diasporas 
exist through the prism of the local.’517  
Werbner also notes that people can participate in several diasporas at 
once, and shift between them when this suits them. Regarding Pakistani 
immigrants in Britain, Werbner notes that they are part of both the Pakistani 
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diaspora which focuses on the Pakistani homeland, and at the same time of the 
cultural South Asian diaspora and the abstract Islamic diaspora. The latter 
focuses on the deterritorialized umma and therefore does not imply the wish to 
return to a lost homeland. The extent to which a Pakistani British Muslim focuses 
on one or the other depends on many factors and might shift over time as British-
born Pakistani Muslims shift their attention to a less localized, Pakistan and 
shrine-focused Islam and more universal deterritorialized approach to Islam 
(either of a Salafi or a Traditional Islamic variant) that enables them to be British 
Muslims.518 
In addition to this, Sufi movements themselves spread in ways that are 
similar to diasporas. As we have seen in paragraph 1.3, Werbner analyses the 
spread of Sufi movements through the concept of the ‘regional cult’, introduced 
by R. Werbner,519 which spreads in a ‘chaordic way’ similar to diasporas, i.e. 
replicating itself transnationally without a centralising force yet in a predictable 
process, giving the diaspora a feeling of connectedness yet with strong 
autonomy. Sufi movements are thus able to expand across borders, recognizing 
‘regional, national and international extensions while practising locally.’520 
Werbner sees them as sacred networks that focus on a sacred centre from which 
people branch out and either return to the centre regularly, or develop new 
sacred centres. As we have already discussed in paragraph 1.3, in her analysis, 
these movements ‘wax and wane’ as the sacred centre increases or decreases 
in importance, depending on the charisma of the leader associated with it. She 
suggests that ṭuruq are revitalised and new branches appear around old or new 
sacred centres, ‘energized through the emergence of a charismatic saint’, and 
argues that shrines of saints who passed away may ‘remain points of personal 
pilgrimage and seasonal ritual celebrations’, but cannot sustain a large regional 
cult or transnational network.521 According to this model, a truly translocal Sufi 
movement can only be created by a charismatic leader who engages in 
                                                  
518 Werbner, ‘Seekers on the Path’, 129. 
519 Werbner, ‘Introduction.’ 
520 Werbner, ‘The Place Which Is Diaspora’; Werbner, ‘Seekers on the Path.’ 
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proselytizing and who maintains control of the centre and sub-centres – but this 
will decline with the death of the founder ‘into a series of localised traditions 
orbiting around the location of the shrine of the founder after his death.’522 
Geaves challenges Werbner’s model of ‘waxing and waning’ as he notes 
the development of a different pattern in modern Britain as leaders from South 
Asian shrine cults in Britain shift attention away from the shrine in order to 
promote their version of Islam in the British context, encouraging a revival without 
the presence of a charismatic shaykh. This challenges Werbner’s Weberian 
theory of ‘waxing and waning’ in terms of charisma and institutionalisation. These 
revivals should rather be seen as ‘an integral part of Islamicisation processes 
across the Muslim world’, and Geaves suggests approaching them using Asad’s 
model of contestation.523 
Werbner also discusses the issue of shifting centres and multiple-
centredness in diasporas.524 An interesting case of shifting centres is that of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in East Africa, also discussed in paragraph 1.3. These 
Saba Ishrin ceremonies studied by Ahmed and Von Oppen are rooted in the 
ṭarīqa’s history in East Africa and have no counterpart among the followers in the 
Levant, and thus in themselves are an interesting example of the local aspect of 
a translocal ṭarīqa that begs further research into the exact relations between 
these different centres of the ṭarīqa. For the purpose of our argument here, we 
limit ourselves to drawing attention to the comparison of several centres in East 
Africa. In addition to the innovation of the Saba Ishrin Caravan in Tanzania, 
differences between the ceremony in Moroni and Kilwa-Pande include the 
sequential arrangement of the elements, the spatial arrangements, the range of 
social participation (including the role of women), and the degree of emotionality 
– which they see as adaptations of the same ceremony to local contexts that do 
not challenge the translocal connections. Through their adaptation to the different 
cultural contexts and the different socio-economic situations of the followers over 
time, physically manifested in their migration movements and shifting centres, the 
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ṭarīqa’s local leaders manage to maintain the original charisma in spite of the 
ṭarīqa’s routinization and the hereditary (hence traditional) nature of their 
succession. 525 This thus further challenges Werbner’s model as both the ṭarīqa’s 
vitality and the leader’s charisma remain constant. 
 The research into contemporary transnational Sufi ṭuruq has mainly 
focused on research of transnational movements that have their centre in the 
Muslim World and that have branched out to the West through missionary 
movements or migration, or on movements that operate entirely in the West. 
Several typologies of modern Sufi movements in the West have been suggested, 
the most influential being that of Marcia Hermansen. Hermansen’s first category 
consists of ‘transplants’, ṭuruq which maintain their original organisation and 
ethnic make-up in the new environment (referred to by Geaves as ‘cultural binary 
fission’526). Her second category consists of ‘hybrids’. Raudvere sees this 
hybridity happening in ‘innovative border zones (…) where received and 
transmitted ideas merge into ritual practices.’527 Finally Hermansen mentions 
‘perennials’, Sufi ṭuruq that are based on the idea that Sufism is a manifestation 
of perennial philosophy or universal truth, and is therefore not intrinsically 
connected to Islam.528 In a later article she distinguishes between ‘theirs’ and 
‘ours’, which uses an even starker West/non-West dichotomy.529 
 The problem with this classification is first of all that it treats a ṭarīqa as a 
single unit without taking into account local diversity, even though it has been 
shown that different approaches can co-exist within the same ṭarīqa, even within 
local communities.530 Dominguez Diaz further challenges this approach because 
it classifies a ṭarīqa according to its relation to the West, while ‘the processes of 
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religious rerooting are diverse and manifold and cannot be reduced to the 
westernised / unwesternised dyad’.531 In addition to this, it is increasingly hard to 
define what is ‘the West’ and ‘Westernisation’, and the classification is not useful 
in the case of transnational ṭuruq that spread throughout the Muslim world.  
 Stjernholm agrees that an analysis of ‘what larger historical narratives the 
religious agents in a given setting experience and express a degree of resonance 
with’ is a more important factor than geography in classifying a Sufi movement. 
He proposes an analysis that focuses on the individual’s efforts to establish a 
personal connection with a spiritual teacher – such a relationship is intensely 
personal and at the same time situated within a local context and a historical 
tradition. An analysis therefore needs to focus on  
 
activities and narratives of socially situated Sufis, relating these in turn to competing 
conceptualizations of Islamic tradition, to transnational flows of people and 
information, and to the politics of belonging and identity on both individual and 
collective levels.532 
 
Such an analysis can be applied to Sufi movements in all contexts, and is in line 
with the focus on the relationship between shaykh and disciple that we have 
advocated in paragraph 1.2. 
 Stjernholm has researched the Naqshbandiyya-Haqqaniyya, which has 
received a lot of scholarly attention due to the successful and high profile 
promotion of its message and its social accessibility.533 The ṭarīqa has been 
classified as ‘hybrid’, as Tayfun Atay noted significant divisions on ethnic lines 
between followers.534 Stjernholm, however, argues that the ṭarīqa is distinctly 
Islamic in character and that ‘a degree of ethnic division does not exclude ethnic 
mixing’, as he noted both dhikrs organised along ethnic lines and a striking multi-
                                                  
531 Marta Dominguez Diaz, ‘Performance, Belonging and Identity: Ritual Variations in the British 
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ethnic presence in the London Haqqani Islamic Priory and in Shaykh Nazim’s 
home in Cyprus.535 He also discusses the hybrid dhikr that has developed 
recently – while at first they only engaged in the Naqshbandi khatm al-
khwajagan, they now also practice a North-African-style ḥaḍra (a type of 
communal dhikr) and whirling associated with the Mevlevis. Rather than rising 
from postmodern ‘new spiritual’ eclecticism, Stjernholm sees it as an adaptation 
to the diverse cultural milieus of the adherents, and  
 
as resulting from a desire to present a set of ideas and practices as part of a 
generalized, unified ‘Sufism’ in order to counter anti-Sufi sentiments that 
characterize much global Islamic discourse. To the shaykhs, it was apparently 
more important to present Sufism as inclusive and adaptive than to uphold strict 
separation between various turuq and particular ritual practise as exclusively 
‘belonging’ to different spiritual paths. (…) The significant Muslim Other against 
whom identity is shaped is currently not primarily other Sufi turuq; it is Muslims of 
anti-Sufi orientation.536 
 
The unifying impact of the Shaykh’s visits has been commented upon, to 
the point that Jorgen Nielsen, Michael Draper and Galina Yemelianova conclude 
that there is no ṭarīqa without the Shaykh. They argue that the ṭarīqa is 
transnational on the ideal level and local on the social level – according to them, 
the transnational only becomes ‘real’ in the Shaykh.537 Stjernholm, however, has 
shown that the local communities continue to be organised around the Shaykh 
even if he is not physically there, as followers visit him and discuss those visits 
with those who stayed behind, constructing a shared narrative and vocabulary:  
 
The recounting of Shaykh Nazim's sayings is a common practice among the 
attendees, which means that a shared language of symbols, emotionally charged 
phrases and frames of reference is produced. Thus, language use becomes a 
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shared cognitive definition, to cite Melucci, and one aspect of a person’s 
behaviour from which the attendees are able to recognise fellow brothers.538  
 
This approach shows the role of the flow of information and communication 
within and between local communities in creating and maintaining belonging to a 
ṭarīqa, focused on love for the shaykh that is enacted both locally and 
translocally. 
Pinto has shown that the analysis of a Sufi group’s ritual structure can 
help explain the authority of a shaykh and the social structure of his movement 
both in the presence and the absence of a shaykh (see paragraph 1.3).539 
Dominguez Diaz uses a similar approach to analyse the local and translocal 
aspects of the Budshishiyya in Morocco and in Western Europe (France, Spain, 
and the UK), arguing that the variations of the performance of the collective dhikr 
illustrate how a translocal ṭarīqa operates on different levels. 
 The Budshishiyya underwent a major transformation in the 1980s as it 
transformed from a small exclusive group of dedicated disciples in a local zāwiya 
in Madagh, Morocco, to a proselytizing transnational ṭarīqa. The ṭarīqa’s Shaykh, 
Sidi Hamza, continues to live in Madagh, and the ṭarīqa in Europe is led by his 
grandson Sidi Mounir and inspired by Faouzi Skali (anthropologist, director 
general of Spirit of Fes Foundation and Sacred Music festival), the two of which 
act as ‘cultural brokers’ advocating a cosmopolitan form of religious life. 
Dominguez Diaz sees their new way of conceptualizing authority (combining 
informal charisma, embodied saintly power and dialectical persuasion) as one of 
the reasons the ṭarīqa has spread through Europe – she conceptualizes it as a 
shift from baraka to tarbiya. The ṭarīqa in Europe consists of both Moroccan 
migrants, constituting groups of a ‘transplant’ character, and non-Moroccan 
adherents which form the ‘hybrid’ groups, either converts or reaffliates. The 
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diversity of adherents is seen by themselves as a sign of the Shaykh’s 
saintliness.540 
When the ṭarīqa spread, the ritual collective dhikr became more important 
as it took the place of direct relations with the Shaykh: 
 
The personalised method of transmitting knowledge was replaced by a new 
concept of religious instruction, in which the idea of ‘Sidi Hamza’s spiritual love’ 
(mahabba) for his disciples was to acquire the status of a ‘tool’ for knowledge 
acquisition, thus replacing the personal training once imparted by the master. In 
order to feel the sheikh’s love and improve his/her ‘spiritual knowledge’, what the 
devotee had to do was to perform collective wazifat. In this way, religious 
instruction and knowledge were substituted by religious practice, and ritual 
adopted an unprecedented relevance in this religiosity.541  
 
The precise prescription of the formula and its enactment are renewed annually, 
which Dominguez Diaz interprets as both a way to keep the authority of the ṭarīqa 
centralised and to keep the ritual relevant for the followers who might otherwise 
move on to a different ṭarīqa (not an ungrounded fear as the ṭarīqa’s membership 
is very transient542). The enactment is supervised by a muqaddim/a who is 
appointed by the central zāwiya, further centralising authority. On the other hand, 
the ṭarīqa’s leader in Europe has realized that local groups should have space to 
do things their own way, which is indeed seen in the differences among local 
groups in Europe (the group in Birmingham for example, one of the largest in 
Europe, is more ecstatic than the other groups). In this way, the regular ritual 
fosters solidarity with the local group. The annual international meetings, on the 
other hand, foster solidarity and cohesion with the larger ṭarīqa.543 Dominguez 
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Diaz sees this as a successful balance between unity and diversity, the universal 
and the local – recognising the ultimate truth and the sharedness despite 
difference in appearance and performance, ‘creating a transnational network of 
separate small groups in which the sense of solidarity mainly focuses upon 
devotees of the same enclave’.544  
 Rather than a case of shifting centres, Dominguez Diaz sees the 
Budshishiyya as multi-centred as ‘all the branches of an Order exercise a certain 
influence over all the others, so that enclaves become "glocal",’ leading to 
‘characteristic eclectic religiosities typical of a glocalized religious hybridity.545 
 Another interesting example of a multi-centred ṭarīqa is the spread of the 
Burhaniyya, a branch of the Disuqiyya revived by Shaykh Muhammad Uthman 
Abduh al-Burhani (c.1900-1983),546 which spread from Sudan to Egypt and to 
Europe. Frishkopf argues that the Burhaniya appealed to Egyptians because it 
filled a spiritual vacuum that had existed since the defeat of 1967 and the 
subsequent falling from grace of Jamal Naser’s socialist and nationalist ideology, 
the materialism and economic inequality that was the result of Sadat’s policy to 
open up to Western markets, and was an alternative to the Islamist groups that 
were suppressed by Anwar Sadat. He attributes the specific appeal of the 
Burhaniyya to the fact that it combined familiar Egyptian Sufism with exotic 
Sudanese Sufism (which was considered more mystical and pure), and provided 
‘traditional esoteric-ecstatic’ Islam ‘within the legitimizing framework of a modern 
‘international’ religious organization with pan-Islamic potential, as a revivalist 
model for a universal mystical Islam’, stressing adherence to Quran, Sunna and 
sharia, and at the same time to the tradition of Sufism as a path to God through 
the charismatic shaykh.547 The ṭarīqa and the Shaykh were not accepted by all of 
Egyptian society, however. The ṭarīqa’s pan-Islamic potential challenged the 
post-colonial nationalist government.548 As an extremely popular transnational 
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ṭarīqa with a foreign shaykh that was not under control of the national Supreme 
Sufi Council, it challenged the Egyptian government’s control over the Sufi ṭuruq 
and did not fit the ‘official Sufism’ as spread by the SSC and the Azhar ‘ulamā’. It 
most famously clashed with the Supreme Sufi Council when its publication 
Tabri'at al-Dhimma (1974), a compilation of quotes from other Islamic and Sufi 
works, was banned in 1980 – not so much for its contents, which was not 
original, but for publicizing Sufi doctrines that according to the SSC should have 
not be made public.549 
 On an overlaying transnational level, by the 1980s and 90s the Burhaniya 
had begun to spread in the counter-culture ‘new spirituality’ and New Age milieu 
in Europe, particularly in Germany. In this period, the European followers 
developed the ṭarīqa in a perennialist direction, focusing on universal themes of 
mysticism rather than on its Islamic aspects, and male and female followers 
performed ḥaḍra together.550 Because of this, the image and role of the Shaykh 
was different for the European followers as it conformed more to Western 
expectations of ‘a compassionate, but distant, wise spiritual master’.551  
 When Shaykh Muhammad Uthman’s son Shaykh Ibrahim took over in 
1983, the different approaches drew closer together. Shaykh Ibrahim visited 
Germany more often, which led to a stronger influence and stronger adherence 
to the sharia – for example, women and men started to do ḥaḍra separately. At 
the end of his life he ordered that women were no longer allowed to participate in 
the ḥaḍra. While first they saw ḥaḍra as a way to reach a ‘physical and spiritual 
opening of a transcendental realm within or outside the self’ that enabled them to 
attain charisma themselves, now they have shifted their focus from their own 
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embodied charisma to the charismatic Shaykh, in which they participate through 
the ḥaḍra. Klinkhammer characterizes this as ‘traditionalizing spirituality’.552  
The ṭarīqa is multi-ethnic, but the Sudanese are considered to be closest 
to the spiritual source and therefore assume positions of authority. Søren 
Christian Lassen argues that while spiritual and religious authority lies with the 
Sudanese, organisational and practical matters are dealt with by the Germans.553 
The European followers provide access to opportunities for further dissemination 
of the ṭarīqa by benefiting from ‘a high degree of organizational and religious 
freedom, as well as ready access to globally dominant political and economic 
centers and a global communications network.’554 Lassen argues that this 
balance might be challenged in future as the younger German generation might 
seek positions of authority.555 For now, however, authority is still firmly tied to the 
connection to the ‘authentic tradition’ and ‘spiritual source’ of Sudanese Sufi 
Islam that is embodied by the family of the founding Shaykh, and in a lesser 
manner by all his fellow Sudanese – pointing to the central role of the centre in 
Sudan.556 
 Beyer argues that religious movements  
 
are no longer regional affairs with a core region as centre of authenticity and 
authority, but have become multi-centred, and their claims of authority no longer 
depend on geographic location or concentration of adherents or longevity of 
existence.557  
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While the first part of this statement rings true, the three examples examined 
above challenge this claim, as the claims of authority of their leaders are still 
connected to the original centres – Sudan, Morocco, Cyprus – as abodes of the 
living shaykh or as the authentic spiritual source. Through the spread and 
development of narrative and ritual symbolic structures, local communities are 
connected to these centres and position themselves in relation to them and to 
each other. 
What we have seen in our discussion of the development of the Islamic 
revival movement and of ‘Traditional Islam’ (see paragraph 1.5.2), is a trend 
towards deterritorialisation and individualism as the roles of space and shaykh 
are redefined. As we have seen in the British context, the displacement of 
migration specifically leads people to embrace deterritorialisation, and this is 
specifically the case in the situation of refugees whose ties with their homelands 
have been completely disrupted. The displaced focus more on theological 
notions and rituals that are not tied to one particular place,558 ‘an imagined or 
symbolic unity built around shared meanings (...) a purely symbolic notion of 
locality’.559 This can lead to the decline of the importance of Sufi leaders, but one 
can also say that Sufi leaders are well placed to provide this focus: 
 
The saint as charismatic fulfils the highest ideals of a society while at the same 
time appearing unique and beyond society. This effect of power is so compelling 
for followers that they believe him to reach into their minds, souls and hearts 
wherever they are, transcending physical obstacles of space and geographical 
distance.560 
 
On the other hand, the trend of shifting centres and multi-centredness in diaspora 
movements, might strengthen the shift towards individuality and ‘decentring of 
authority’, a looser organisational structure, a large role for modern modes of 
communication, and a stronger focus on the community rather than the shaykh 
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(see paragraph 1.5.2).561 We have also seen examples in which translocal Sufi 
movements maintain the centrality of their shaykh (and his shrine) and balance 
the local and translocal through the development of narrative and ritual symbolic 
structures. 
 Clearly the authority of a Sufi leader could go both ways, and we need to 
examine individual cases to see what is happening. As we discussed in 
paragraph 1.4.1, a Sufi shaykh’s bases of authority are dependent on different 
levels – local, translocal, global. A shaykh’s spiritual (and sometimes 
genealogical) lineage might connect him to other parts of the Muslim world, and 
his educational credentials often have a regional tinge. On the other hand, the 
shrines of his predecessors, the lodge where he is based, the material resources 
belonging to his family, the shrine and/or the lodge, and the social and political 
ties to followers and rulers, link him to specific localities. Other aspects of his 
authority are tied to his person and understood in local contexts, especially the 
embodiment of transcendent values in ‘ascetic practices and technologies of the 
body.’562 The narratives that support his authority are both translocal and local as 
they are transferred and communicated through travelling followers and in 
sacralized objects. The attribution of charisma and the construction of authority – 
shaped by the values the community attaches to certain elements of authority – 
takes place in a local setting, even if it is influenced by regional or global trends. 
Finally, the ultimate Sufi base of authority – that of spiritual travel and experience 
– is understood to take place both in the spiritual realm and in the body of the 
shaykh, and as such is not tied to any particular place. Even so, images used to 
discuss this spiritual travel can be tied to specific places and thus have an impact 
on material space – the Prophet’s mi‛rāj being the ultimate example of a 
heavenly journey that influenced Islam’s sacred topography, increasing the 
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sacred status of Jerusalem, the Haram Sharif and the sites there: Al-Aqsa 
Mosque, the Dome of the Rock and al-Buraq.563 
Therefore, when the relations between the local and the global and all 
intermediate levels shift, as has happened quite dramatically in the modern world 
in general and for the Palestinians in particular, it is to be expected that the 
authority of the shaykh will be transformed. Especially when the followers of a 
particular Sufi movement are uprooted and start a new life in a different 
environment, one would expect this to influence the authority and role of the 
shaykh in their life and in the movement as a whole. When people need to come 
to terms with their new experiences and reconstruct their identity and their 
community both in relation to their host country and their homeland, one expects 
the role of the leadership to be reconstructed accordingly. On the other hand, if 
the community and the leadership are and remain sufficiently strong, they can 
provide the people with a sense of continuity.564 The strength of this organisation 
depends on the nature of the movement’s institutionalisation and its process of 
socialisation, transmission, and education – in Sufi terminology, its tarbiya. 
We have seen that the Sufi shaykh’s bases of authority have been 
challenged and adapted in response to reformist critique and changing relations 
between the local and the global. The possibility of the spiritual journey leading to 
direct contact with God and the possibility of mediation have been questioned. 
The concept of baraka and its transmission by people, living or dead, is seen as 
bid‛a, leading to a diminished importance of the lineage. The role of the shaykh 
as a teacher and Prophetic exemplar rather than mediator is stressed. Increased 
global migration and communication impact the shaykh’s roles and authority. It 
has therefore been observed that there is more space for individuals in Sufi 
movements to study and interpret scripture, leading to a ‘decentering of 
authority’, a looser organisational structure, a large role for modern modes of 
communication, and a stronger focus on the community rather than the 
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shaykh.565 Therefore this chapter has argued that the role of the followers and 
the relationship between shaykh and follower is crucial when studying 
contemporary Sufi movements and authority, and the next chapter will discuss 
the implications this has for the methodology of this research. 
 
 
 
                                                  
565 See for example Sikand, ‘The Reformist Sufism of the Tablighi Jama’at’, 147–148. 
 165
Chapter 2 
Methodology 
 
 
In the previous chapter we have seen the value of the focus on ‘vernacular 
religion’ and on Sufism as a discursive tradition which is centred on the 
relationship between the shaykh and the follower in which tradition is transmitted. 
This is best researched through anthropological fieldwork focusing on the ‘fully 
embodied, materialized, local and varying practice’ of a religious tradition.1 
 
 
2.1 ‘The Shaykh is always Right’ 
 
As we have discussed, Leonard Primiano sees all religion as ‘vernacular’, but to 
understand the process of individual interpretation, we are better served using 
Bowman’s understanding of three interacting components of religion: official 
religion, religion of the community (which she calls folk religion) and individual 
religion (see pragraph 1.2).2 In the case of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, the 
belief that the Shaykh is always right, and shows his love through his concern 
that they understand and practice their religion correctly, is present among all 
followers. While focusing on ‘vernacular religion’, I therefore use the term ‘official 
narrative’ to denote the teachings of the ṭarīqa as taught by Shaykh Ahmad, and 
will examine how his followers engage with this knowledge – how it is produced, 
transmitted and maintained. 
According to the Shaykh and his followers, the essential teachings and 
practices of the ṭarīqa are not subject to change as they are derived from the 
Qur’an and the Sunna, God’s revelation to the Prophet Muhammad, and are 
therefore considered to be the essential divine truth. The manifestations of these 
                                                  
1 Harvey, ‘Participant Observation’, 217–218; Geaves, ‘The Borders between Religions’, 23; 
Chryssides and Geaves, The Study of Religion, 241–244. 
2 Bowman and Valk, ‘Vernacular Religion’, 4. 
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teachings, practices and powers do change in different times.3 They believe that 
the access followers have to this essence depends on their progress on the path 
and their spiritual relationship with the Shaykh, which in turn depends on their 
individual character and efforts, which leads to different levels of understanding. 
Hence the possibility of a diversity of understandings is part of the teachings of 
the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya – but within limits, as the Shaykh is always right. 
The essential truth that the followers seek through their religious practices can 
only be known in full by the Shaykh. It was pointed out to me repeatedly by 
followers that their knowledge was not perfect, that whatever they told me might 
be wrong, and that my ultimate source and reference should be the Shaykh. 
This is a classical Sufi doctrine according to which a Sufi shaykh is 
attributed absolute authority to guide his followers on the Path.4 As we have seen 
in paragraph 1.2. Sufis say that ‘when someone has no shaykh, Satan becomes 
his shaykh.’ The disciple should be in the hands of his shaykh as in the hands of 
a corpse washer. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali wrote that absolute obedience is 
necessary, even if the shaykh is wrong: ‘Let him know that the advantage he 
gains from the error of his shaykh, if he should err, is greater than the advantage 
he gains from his own rightness, if he should be right.’5 Sufis often refer to the 
Qur’anic story of Moses and ‘one of God’s servants’ (identified with al-Khidr) in 
Sūrat al-Kahf 18:65-82 to illustrate that the gnostic should be obeyed due to his 
superior knowledge of the hidden consequences of acts.6 A spiritual master has 
reached high levels on the Path and as such can see into the heart of hidden 
things (firāsa), including the hearts of his followers, which enables him to teach 
them exactly according to their needs and abilities. Although this is subject of 
discussion, many believe that inspirations and unveilings (ilhām and kashf) come 
                                                  
3 Meeting with Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti and Dr. Ali al-Yashruti on 26-03-2013 at Shaykh 
Ahmad’s office in the zāwiya in Amman. 
4 Geoffroy, ‘S̲h̲ayk̲h̲.’ See especially Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Iḥyā ‛Ulūm al-Dīn (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab 
al-Arabi, n.d.) iii 75-6, and Umar al-Suhrawardi, ‛Awārif al-Ma‛ārif (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, 
1983), 83. 
5 Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 103–104; Geoffroy, ‘S̲h̲ayk̲h̲.’ Schimmel quotes al-
Ghazali from Hamilton A.R. Gibb, Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1949), 150. 
6 Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying, 39–42. 
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from the same source as the sharia and can therefore never contradict it, but that 
it is superior to human reasoning and the human interpretations of sharia in the 
body of jurisprudence (fiqh). Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (1445-1505) for example 
granted the knowledge of the Sufis infallible status and argued it should be given 
recognition in exoteric circles.7 In his Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl (Deliverance from 
Error), Abu Hamid al-Ghazali reaches the conclusion that the knowledge of the 
Sufis is the certain knowledge he was looking for.8 
However, social scientists cannot take for granted that there is such a 
thing as an ‘eternal truth’, nor that one particular group or individual has exclusive 
access to this. Social science is based on an empiricist epistemology and does 
not acknowledge a priori ideas, which makes it possible to study a religious 
group as an open-minded outsider without judging the value of their beliefs and 
practices. The interpretivist approach associated with anthropological methods is 
based on the idea that all truth is socially constructed.9 
This tension is known in religious studies as the insider/outsider debate. It 
is based on the epistemological problem of the possibility to know ‘the other’ and 
his/her meanings, motivations and experiences. When religion is defined by 
either scholars or religious people as pertaining to the transcendental, 
experiential sphere, it becomes unreachable for those who do not participate in 
this experience.10 Therefore, social scientists who base their approach on the 
natural sciences concentrate on empirically observable behaviour with the aim of 
finding general laws of human behaviour, without taking this experiential realm 
into account – thus remaining an outsider. This has been called the ‘positivist’ or 
                                                  
7 Éric Geoffroy, Introduction to Sufism: The Inner Path of Islam, transl. Roger Gaetani 
(Bloomington IN: World Wisdom Inc., 2010), 62–64. 
8 Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl: Erreur et Délivrance, 2nd ed., transl. Farid Jabr 
(Beyrouth: Commission Libanaise pour la Traduction des Chefs d’Oeuvre, 1969). 
9 H. Russell Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods, 
3rd ed. (Walnut Creek CA: AltaMira Press, 2002), 19–23. 
10 Russell Tracey McCutcheon, The Insider/outsider Problem in the Study of Religion: A Reader 
(London etc: Cassell, 1999), 68–69. In the West, this approach was developed by Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (1768-1834). It is also a basic tenet of Sufi writers and practitioners throughout 
the centuries who say that mystical experience and knowledge of the divine cannot be achieved 
through the mind, but only through the soul, which places a complete understanding of the 
experience out of reach for scientific researchers and makes their work superficial and irrelevant 
for the followers themselves. 
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‘reductionist’ approach.11 Other scholars believe in the universal basis of human 
experience and seek ways to participate in the other’s experience, seeking to 
become an insider. This has been called the ‘religionist’, ‘perennialist’, or 
‘empathetic’ approach.12  
In The Sacred Canopy (1967), Berger argues for ‘methodological atheism’ 
as the only way in which religion can be studied empirically, bracketing ‘the 
ultimate status of religious definitions of reality’. He argues that from a 
sociological perspective, religion is a human product or projection, ‘grounded in 
specific infrastructures of human history’. He points out that the question whether 
this is all that religion is cannot be answered sociologically and should therefore 
be bracketed.13 
 
‘Other worlds’ are not empirically available for the purposed of scientific analysis. 
Or, more accurately, they are only available as meaning-enclaves within this 
world, the world of human experience in nature and history. As such, they must 
be analysed as are all other human meanings, that is, as elements of the socially 
constructed world.14 
 
As he reiterates continuously throughout his work, this should not be 
understood as a reductionist point of view. He continuously points to the dialectic 
between ideas and social structure, and between social structure and religion.15 
He also stresses that this does not logically exclude the transcendent as the 
process of externalization in which human beings pour meaning into reality and 
construct society does not say anything about the source of this meaning – an 
atheist might say it springs from the human subconscious, while a believer might 
say it is inspiration from God who works through the human being:  
  
                                                  
11 Ibid., 4–5, 127–128; Hanegraaff, ‘Empirical Method in the Study of Esotericism.’ 
12 McCutcheon, The Insider/outsider Problem in the Study of Religion, 69; Hanegraaff, ‘Empirical 
Method in the Study of Esotericism.’ 
13 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 25–26, note 34, 144–153. 
14 Ibid., 88. Quoted in Ninian Smart, The Science of Religion and the Sociology of Knowledge: 
Some Methodological Questions (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 74–75. 
15 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 42–43. 
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Indeed, if a religious view of the world is posited, the anthropological ground of 
these projections may itself be the reflection of a reality that includes both world 
and man, so that man’s ejaculations of meaning into the universe ultimately point 
to an all-embracing meaning in which he himself is grounded.16 
 
In the words of O’Dea: 
 
As a social science, sociology seeks to understand behavior in terms of natural 
causes and effects. This is not an anti-religious ideological position, since even 
causes beyond nature, if they act upon men, must act though men and the 
nature of men.17 
 
Ninian Smart prefers the term ‘methodological agnosticism’, and also calls 
for epoché (bracketing out truth claims) and aims to describe the ‘diversity, 
similarity and utter complexity’ of beliefs, behaviours and experiences without 
judging the truth claims of the traditions under scrutiny, ‘not to explain this belief 
system as a product of social or economic forces but to take it as a given and to 
understand it from within, all the while suspending critical judgments’.18 Again in 
the words of Berger: ‘The scholar is therefore neither an insider nor an outsider 
but is, instead, in the middle and interested not in determining the truth of 
anyone’s claims but in describing and comparing them accurately.’19 
As Wouter Hanegraaff points out, the methodologically agnostic 
approach20 is often misunderstood by both reductionists and those who follow the 
empathetic approach. The latter tend to see the agnostic approach as 
reductionist because it restricts itself to what can be empirically observed. To this 
he replies:  
 
                                                  
16 Ibid., 146–147. 
17 O’Dea, The Sociology of Religion, 18. 
18 McCutcheon, The Insider/outsider Problem in the Study of Religion, 216–217. 
19 Ibid., 216. 
20 Hanegraaff, who bases his methodological discussion mainly on the work of Jan Platvoet, calls 
this approach ‘empirical’. This is confusing in the context of the concepts we have used so far, 
and I will therefore continue to use the term ‘agnostic’. Hanegraaff, ‘Empirical Method in the Study 
of Esotericism.’ 
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empirical researchers do not limit themselves to the empirical because they wish 
to claim that it is the only reality (privately they may believe the opposite), but 
simply because it is the only one accessible to them for investigation.21 
 
This does not mean that alternative realities do not exist, or are not valuable – it 
simply means that they cannot be researched empirically. Similarly, reductionists 
have criticized the methodological agnosts for not being critical enough of 
religious points of view. Hanegraaff argues that these are misunderstandings of 
the methodological agnostic approach – it aspires to objective knowledge that 
can serve as a ground to inform all actors involved further and improve 
discussions between them. He notes that in order to balance between the 
hermeneutical approach and search for objectivity, the balance between etic and 
emic is essential.22 
In this thesis, we shall be confronted with references to alternative realities 
and experiential realms beyond the empirical, in the forms of dreams, visions, 
and the ‘zāwiya of the heart’ where spiritual relationships, communication and 
education are experienced. As we have already touched upon in paragraph 1.3, 
these experiences are essential for the believer’s understanding of their world 
and cannot be left out of our analysis. I have taken the methodological agnostic 
approach – not commenting on their truth, but discussing the meanings given to 
the phenomena, how they are interpreted and acted upon, and how they impact 
relationships in the empirically observable world. 
George Chryssides argues that emic definitions and the believers’ self-
understanding should be treated as religious and social phenomena, and that 
‘the believer is the final authority when it comes to telling us what he or she 
believes,’ while on the subsequent level of analysis – contextualisation, 
comparison, etc. – it is the scholar who is the authority.23 In distinguishing clearly 
between the descriptive and analytical levels of research, the researcher 
                                                  
21 Ibid., 101–102. 
22 Wouter J. Hanegraaff, New Age Religion and Western Culture: Esotericism in the Mirror of 
Secular Thought (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), 4–6. 
23 Chryssides and Geaves, The Study of Religion, 72–74. 
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becomes a translator from one setting to another, and from one ontological and 
epistemological framework to another. 
In what came to be known as the ‘reflexive turn’, Postmodernist scholars 
argue that a scholar can never transcend his or her own position and should be 
as explicit as possible about it.24 First of all, the notion of ‘reflexivity’ refers to the 
explicit discussion of the personal attributes of the researcher as in participant 
observation and interviews the researcher becomes ‘the instrument for data 
collection and analysis through [his/her] own experience.’25 I am a white woman 
of Dutch nationality, born and raised a Christian. When people asked me about 
my religious background, I called myself a Christian; when pressured further, I 
admitted that I adhere to the values of Christianity, but do not practice regularly. 
Shaykh Ahmad and his followers respected me as a non-Muslim, and although it 
was pointed out to me occasionally that I will never be able to truly understand 
without participating, there was no pressure at all for me to convert and join the 
ṭarīqa. Similarly, my gender was not an issue. Shaykh Ahmad and his followers 
are very clear that women and men are equal and it is very normal for them to 
meet in social gatherings, sit and discuss, and I was very welcome in these 
meetings.26 During my first visit, I was careful not to discuss sensitive religious 
and political issues. During my second visit I gave my opinion when asked, which 
gave me a clearer picture of people’s opinions and gave me a chance to 
challenge my own ideas.27 
To avoid ‘the tendency for the self-absorbed Self to lose sight altogether of 
the culturally different Other’,28 the notion of ‘reflexivity’ goes beyond these 
individual characteristics as it heeds the fact that qualitative research is based on 
                                                  
24 McCutcheon, The Insider/outsider Problem in the Study of Religion, 8–9. 
25 Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology, 270.  
26 For some preliminary observations of the role of gender in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, see 
paragraph 6.3.2. 
27 On this issue, see Delmos J. Jones, ‘Culture Fatigue: The Results of Role-Playing in 
Anthropological Research’, Anthropological Quarterly 46, no. 1 - Ethnographic Fieldwork: A Mirror 
for Self and Culture (1973): 30–37. 
28 Renato Rosaldo, Culture and Truth: the Remaking of Social Analysis (Boston: Beacon Press 
1989), 7, quoted in Margery Wolf, A Thrice-Told Tale: Feminism, Postmodernism, and 
Ethnographic Responsibility (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 131. 
 172
an interaction between researcher and informant. David Hufford’s understanding 
of reflexivity acknowledges this relationship: 
 
Reflexivity is a metaphor from grammar indicating a relationship of identity 
between subject and object, thus meaning the inclusion of the actor (scholar, 
author, observer) in the account of the act and/or its outcomes. In this sense 
reflexivity shows that all knowledge is ‘subjective’.29  
 
Robert Orsi argues that research should acknowledge the ‘intersubjective nature 
of particular social, cultural, and religious identities and indeed of reality itself’, 
and should appreciate that the researcher becomes part of this network of 
connections and that therefore research also has an essentially intersubjective 
nature. ‘Once religion is understood as a web not of meanings but of 
relationships between heaven and earth, then scholars of religion take their place 
as participants in these networks too, together with saints and in the company of 
practitioners.’30 Contemporary scholars are therefore increasingly seen as 
‘partners in communication, participants in a heteroglot dialogue of indefinite 
numbers of voices and points of view.’31 
 Graham Harvey also stresses the relational nature of fieldwork and the 
importance of dialogue and interaction to reach a full understanding of the 
phenomenon under study, and discusses the variety of roles the fieldworker can 
take.32 Based on his research with Maori communities he chooses to understand 
fieldwork as 'methodological guesthood' which he sees as an ‘ethical 
decolonising research method’. He considers this method decolonizing because 
                                                  
29 David J. Hufford, ‘The Scholarly Voice and the Personal Voice: Reflexivity in Belief Studies’, 
Western Folklore 54, no. 1 - Reflexivity and the Study of Belief (1995): 57. 
30 Robert A. Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth. The Religious Worlds People Make and the 
Scholars who Study them (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 2–5. 
31 Bowman and Valk, ‘Vernacular Religion’, 2. 
32 He mentions Claude Lévi-Strauss's bricoleur, Walter Benjamin's flâneur, Gilles Deleuze's 
nomad, Julia Kristeva's foreigner, and roles such as the tourist, child or neophyte. Based on 
performance studies he mentions Douglas Ezzy’s ‘engaged audience’ in which the audience has 
to ‘conspire’ with the performers, and André Droogers ‘methodological ludism’ in which the 
audience joins the performers on the stage, ‘dealing simultaneously with two or even more 
realities.’ He also discusses the parallels between researchers and hunters in Rane Willerslev's 
study on Yukaghir hunters in Siberia. Harvey, ‘Participant Observation’, 224–228. 
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it goes beyond the colonial mindset of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ as it allows hosts and 
guests to think in terms of ‘us’.  
 
This third position that is neither ‘subjective native’ nor ‘objective outsider’ has 
always been a possibility and, indeed, has often been offered. Only the 
compromising entanglement of academia in colonial power dynamics has 
prevented us knowing the full benefits of being guests among or with those we 
research.33  
 
Harvey notes that the particular codes in which this guesthood is enacted are 
specific for each (sub)culture and community.34 
The influence of the researcher goes beyond the ‘observer effect’ as 
everyone involved in the relationship is influenced by the interaction.35 As much 
as they like to portray themselves as objective observers, academics are part of 
society and connected to other social, political and economic actors. Therefore, 
their presence and work influences a community’s operations and place in 
society just as other actors and events in society do, as ‘religions and people are 
continuously adjusting and developing in reaction to their multifaceted contexts 
and wider relationships,’ including those with academics.36 Those with whom we 
interact are of course aware of this dynamic, and might also be consciously 
concerned to present their community at its most advantageous and present the 
ideal rather than the real, either because they think this is what the researcher 
wants to hear and they want to be helpful, or because they experience criticism 
and problems in their society.37 Therefore, not only are codes of guesthood 
culture-specific, they also depend on socio-political considerations. 
                                                  
33 Harvey, ‘Guesthood as Ethical Decolonising Research Method’, 142–143; Harvey, ‘Participant 
Observation’, 227–228. 
34 Harvey, ‘Participant Observation’, 227–228, 233–235. 
35 Harvey, ‘Guesthood as Ethical Decolonising Research Method’, 142–143; Harvey, ‘Participant 
Observation’, 227–228; Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 42. 
36 Harvey, ‘Participant Observation’, 227, 234; Werbner, Pilgrims of Love, 301; Thomas A. 
Tweed, ‘On Moving across: Translocative Religion and the Interpreter’s Position’, Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 70, no. 2 (2002): 253–77. 
37 Chryssides and Geaves, The Study of Religion, 77, 259. 
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The contextualisation of a religious phenomenon, such as a paradigm of 
authority and the social practices related to it, is an essential aspect of the critical 
study of religion but might clash with the interests of the religious group. As 
Bruce Lincoln points out, the reversal of religious discourse is inherent in the 
historical study of religion: 
 
Religion, I submit, is that discourse whose defining characteristic is its desire to 
speak of things eternal and transcendent with an authority equally transcendent 
and eternal. History, in the sharpest possible contrast, is that discourse which 
speaks of things temporal and terrestrial in a human and fallible voice, while 
staking its claim to authority on rigorous critical practice. History of religions is 
thus a discourse that resists and reverses the orientation of that discourse with 
which it concerns itself.38 
  
According to Lincoln, the scholar’s critical task is more important than the 
offense this might cause to believers.39 While this attitude is problematic on a 
personal level when the researcher has undertaken extensive fieldwork and has 
been welcomed and helped by the community, it becomes especially problematic 
when the results of this critical attitude could impact the internal or external 
relations of individuals or of the group as a whole, and the researcher’s impact 
could go beyond the offensive to the outright damaging. The researcher therefore 
has to perform a balancing act that is more nuanced than Lincoln’s thesis calls 
for, ‘working the hyphen’ in the roles the researcher has taken on, ‘always 
acknowledging the roles we inhibit, including what they allow and what they 
deny.’40 
 During my fieldwork in Amman, Acre and Jaffa, I have taken up the role of 
guest-researcher. As I will discuss at length below, the specific hospitality codes 
and socio-political circumstances of these communities indeed influenced my 
                                                  
38 Bruce Lincoln, ‘Theses on Method’, Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 8, no. 3 (1996): 
225. 
39 Ibid., 226–227. 
40 George Kamberelis and Greg Dimitriadis, ‘Focus Groups: Strategic Articulations of Pedagogy, 
Politics, and Inquiry’, in Handbook of Qualitative Research, ed. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. 
Lincoln, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks CA: SAGE Publications, 2005), 904. 
 175
access to people and to information. On the other hand, it made me a bit more of 
an insider and enabled me to get a glimpse of how knowledge is transmitted 
within the community, and gave me the impression that the way my access to 
knowledge was regulated was similar to the way this was done in the community 
in general, albeit to a different degree. 
To represent the believer's point of view as accurately as possible I have 
aimed to let my respondents speak for themselves and to give an account of their 
experiences in their own words, images and categories – without judging on the 
truth of this worldview, but analysing how this worldview influences the concrete 
structure of authority related to the community. This aim, combined with the fact 
that little research has been done on the community, leads to a predominantly 
inductive approach, a ‘pragmatic version of grounded theory’.41 As I did enter the 
field with historical and theoretical knowledge on contemporary Sufism in the 
Levant I did not start from scratch, but did not know what to expect and therefore 
could not prepare detailed research questions. My first fieldwork pointed to the 
importance of the Shaykh and the question of authority. Subsequent reading 
pointed to the need to identify the paradigm(s) of authority for the tradition or 
community under scrutiny and strengthened the need for an inductive approach. 
As my research progressed, three interrelated issues related to the 
question of authority seemed paradoxical and drove the rest of my research. The 
first is that the translocal ṭarīqa explicitly adapts to its local context, but at the 
same time is experienced as centralised – a common issue in translocal ṭuruq. 
Related to this is the potential paradox between fikr and taslīm. We will see that 
these potentially conflicting elements are allowed to co-exist through the mode of 
communication with the Shaykh. The third paradox is that of the significant 
differences in the message communicated to outsiders by the Shaykh (and most 
of his followers in Amman, Acre and Jaffa), and by AKR, the mutawallī of the 
waqf, who presents himself as the representative of the ṭarīqa in Acre. To solve 
this paradox, AKR refers to the same mode of communication that solved the first 
                                                  
41 Rosaline S. Barbour, Doing Focus Groups(Los Angeles CA: Sage Publications, 2007), 120. 
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two paradoxes, but even though the different narratives are allowed to co-exist, 
the paradox does not seem resolved. 
  
 
2.2 Access to the Community 
 
When approaching hierarchical structures, it is usually best to start from the top 
(through ‘gatekeepers’).42 After arriving in Acre, I asked around in the town – 
especially in the mosques – and was put in contact with AKR, the mutawallī al-
waqf, who acts as representative of the ṭarīqa in Acre and who took a lot of time 
to share his understanding of the ideas of the ṭarīqa and invited me to the weekly 
prayer meeting and other events hosted in the zāwiya. In the first stage of my 
research, he was my key informant. When meeting other members of the ṭarīqa I 
realized his interpretation differed substantially from theirs and most of them did 
not accept his role of mediator between the ṭarīqa and outsiders. This divergence 
between key informers and others is a well-known experience in anthropological 
fieldwork.43 
 The hierarchy of knowledge in the ṭarīqa and the belief that the Shaykh is 
always right led to some obstacles as many people did not understand why I was 
interested in talking to them. Harvey points out that this is a normal occurrence 
when undertaking fieldwork in religious communities.44 Potential respondents 
referred me to people higher in the hierarchy: first and foremost the Shaykh, but 
the muqaddamīn45 were also seen as having a thorough understanding of the 
teachings of the ṭarīqa and were more approachable. Similarly, those followers 
who published academic studies on the philosophy of the ṭarīqa were held in high 
                                                  
42 The exception being when there are known factions and entry through one faction might close 
the possibility to talk to other factions. Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology, 336; 
Chryssides and Geaves, The Study of Religion, 263, 267. 
43 Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology, 187–190. 
44 Harvey, ‘Participant Observation’, 234. 
45 The muqaddam is one of the followers of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya who has been 
authorised by the Shaykh to be responsible for his local community and look after the followers 
(see chapter 3) 
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esteem, but at the same time were considered followers who have their own 
interpretations. Finally, there was AKR, to whom several people referred me. 
As Chryssides points out, ‘even when the scholar has been granted 
access, such permission probably does not amount to an authorization to explore 
every aspect of the religious community.’46 Especially in the case of guest-
researchers, the host remains in control over the guest’s degree of access.47 
Regarding the extent and nature of my access to the different local communities, 
I noted strong differences. In Acre, while my initial contacts asked for approval 
from AKR (and presumably from the Shaykh), I was able to meet up with people 
informally and freely within quite a short time – presumably either because it was 
known I had permission or because they had become used to me. Therefore 
most of my data from Acre was gathered during (semi-structured) individual 
interviews. 
My contacts in Acre helped me get in touch with other communities in 
Jaffa, Umm al-Fahm, Nablus and Tubas. Several individuals can be considered 
key informants in this part of my fieldwork, providing me with a lot of information, 
introducing me to other followers, arranging interviews and accompanying me to 
meetings and visits. A marked difference between the different communities was 
perceptible. In Jaffa, after a first formal meeting, meetings were extremely 
informal and if there was any form of approval-seeking, I was not aware of it. I 
visited a lot of people but due to the nature of the visits most information was 
gathered in informal discussions with individuals or in groups. 
In Umm al-Fahm my one and only visit was very formal, after which I was 
not encouraged to return; I had spoken to the muqaddam and that was deemed 
enough. The issues of physical access to the town and a language barrier in the 
form of a particularly difficult accent made me completely dependent on support 
from within the community, and lack of this support made it impossible for me to 
research this community further. In Nablus and Tubas, I encountered a similar 
attitude. While I was hospitably introduced to many members, it was made very 
                                                  
46 Chryssides and Geaves, The Study of Religion, 74. 
47 Harvey, ‘Participant Observation’, 227–228, 233–235. 
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clear I could only take information from the muqaddam. When visiting the weekly 
meeting in Nablus I was allowed to speak to the person who functioned as imam 
in that particular meeting. As was the case in Umm al-Fahm, difficulties of 
physical access made me more dependent on inside assistance, and made it 
impossible for me to arrange informal meetings on my own. 
In Amman the Shaykh assigned two ladies from the Welcome Committee 
to accompany me whenever I visited the zāwiya and to arrange meetings and 
interviews. Meetings were more formal and to the point and always done in a 
group setting. While this complicated the comparative aspect of my research as I 
had initially planned to do individual interviews (as I had done in Acre), these 
group settings led to a new way of exploring my research questions together with 
the respondents as these group interviews acquired characteristics associated 
with focus groups. Because focus groups place great value on the experiences, 
worldview, concepts and categories of the participants, it is a method that 
‘ensures that priority is given to the respondents’ hierarchy of importance, their 
language and concepts, their frameworks for understanding the world,’48 and is 
known to ‘decenter the authority of the researchers’,49 thus further consolidating 
the host’s control over the guest-researcher’s access to information. At the same 
time, this enabled me to receive a glimpse of an insider’s experience of the 
transmission and interpretation of elements of tradition and knowledge. Several 
participants remarked that these group meetings were just like mudhākara50 – in 
this setting, my semi-structural interviews in a group setting had turned into an 
act of participant observation! 
These dynamics controlled my access to information, but I believe they 
were genuine and are used – at a lower level of intensity – to define the 
boundaries for the followers’ discussions as well. These interviews were done in 
settings reminiscent of official religious settings (as they came close to the 
practice of mudhākara), and the consensus achieved on the topics we discussed 
                                                  
48 Jenny Kitzinger, ‘The Methodology of Focus Groups’, Sociology of Health and Illness 16, no. 1 
(1994): 108. 
49 Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, ‘Focus Groups’, 893. 
50 Meaning here the practice of the followers to discuss the Shaykh’s mudhākara and other 
sources, such as sacred scripture, the books of the ṭarīqa and religious poetry. 
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came close to the official narrative as spread by the Shaykh in his mudhākarāt, 
writings, and interactions with the followers. The concern that I ‘got it right’ should 
be seen in the light of the followers’ belief that the Shaykh is the only true source 
of knowledge and the ultimate reference, and it guides all transmission of 
knowledge, and they all wanted to make sure that I would get the best answers 
possible. As we shall see in chapter 7, the followers experience this concern as a 
sign that the Shaykh cares for them, for their education and spiritual progress, 
and the Shaykh’s concern with my work is considered an honour, which I greatly 
appreciate. 
This control over my access to information was palpible in all my 
interactions with the ṭarīqa in Jordan. The Shaykh and the Welcome Committee 
were careful that I would get the right information, to the point that the Shaykh 
offered to check my work. This resulted in eighty pages of comments on my draft, 
sent to me by the anonymous Review Panel in Amman (see paragraph 2.4). The 
image presented to outsiders is a genuine concern as the Shaykh and his 
followers feel the need to protect themselves and their ṭarīqa in an increasingly 
tense environment. The main concern seemed to be that they would be 
portrayed as proper Muslims. In Jordanian society, rumours exist that the ṭarīqa 
engages in transgressions,51 and the Shaykh and followers feel the ṭarīqa has 
been misrepresented by earlier outside researchers.52 Going beyond the issue of 
reputation, in the current religious and political climate in the Levant these 
rumours could have serious consequences for the followers. 
During the research period it seemed that local leaders of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya became more concerned about the image they 
conveyed. Particularly the situation in Syria and the rise of Islamist groups seems 
to have influenced this. I did my fieldwork in the Spring of 2012 (Israel), Spring of 
2013 (Jordan and Israel) and Autumn of 2013 (Jordan). During this whole period 
the region was in turmoil, as Syria was in the throes of a brutal civil war (in which 
                                                  
51 Abu Hanieh, Sufism and Sufi Orders, 140. 
52 Followers told me that he invited Jozef van Ess and Hassan Abu Hanieh after their 
publications. This was confirmed to me by Hassan Abu Hanieh on 28-11-2013. Review Panel, 
‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 31. 
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Islamists grew increasingly powerful) that slowly spilled over into Lebanon. 
Syrian refugees flooded into Jordan and upset the already precarious economic 
situation even more. In the West Bank and Gaza the Israeli occupation continued 
to raise a plethora of issues, the most severe among them the continued attacks 
on Gaza (especially in November 2012), but also continued attacks on civilians, 
maltreatment of prisoners, restriction of movement, dispossessions and house 
demolitions, expansion of the settlements and the building of the Separation 
Wall. In late 2012, Palestine was granted the status of non-member observer 
state in the United Nations after a vote in the General Assembly, and the ‘peace 
process’ was tentatively revived, but these were considered symbolic acts with 
little impact on the ground. Acts of resistance took the form of hunger strikes, 
protest villages, and demonstrations, especially against the attacks on the Gaza 
Strip (most notably in November 2012) and the Prawer Plan (August and 
December 2013). 
I therefore account for the differences in access by referring to the 
different codes of guesthood in these societies in general, to the differing socio-
political circumstances and to the different experiences with previous 
researchers. In Israel and Palestine the relationship was more informal, as I was 
invited to people’s houses for breakfast, lunch, dinner, and coffee in between. In 
Amman the relationship was regulated more strongly: I was always received 
formally in the zāwiya and was only invited to people’s houses in the context of 
pre-arranged interviews and through the mediation of the two ladies of the 
Welcome Committee. The resulting different research settings and research 
methods – while equally valid – provided problems at the data analysis stage. 
We shall discuss the implications of this issue in more detail in paragraphs 2.3.3 
and 2.4. 
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2.3 Data Collection 
 
2.3.1 Written Sources 
 
There is a wealth of written resources that are considered to contain the ‘official 
narrative’ of the ṭarīqa. As this study deals with the lived religion of the followers 
and how this ‘official narrative’ is transmitted and engaged with, and is therefore 
primarily based on anthropological fieldwork, I do not analyse these written 
sources in their own right but use them when the followers refer to them. I fully 
appreciate that a full understanding of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, its concepts, 
its history, and its place in the Sufi tradition requires a thorough analysis of their 
publications and other written materials. My aim for the present study is more 
limited, however, as it focuses on the followers’ contemporary understandings of 
their ṭarīqa, their Shaykh, their concepts and practices, and their history. It does 
not claim to be the final word on this ṭarīqa. As Dominguez Diaz points out, 
textual analysis ‘prioritizes an exploration of the leadership of the Order and its 
"official discourse" over the religious subjectivities of the devotees,’53 while the 
present study aims to prioritize the believers’ views over that of the religious 
leadership. Hopefully, in a future study the two approaches can be combined to 
give a fuller understanding of the ṭarīqa. 
First of all, as Muslims they adhere to the Qur’an and the Sunna. After the 
Qur’an and Sunna, the waẓīfa54 and the wird are the most important texts of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya (see chapter 6 and 10). They are a combination of 
passages from the Qur’an and ad‛iya,55 and as such are treated with the utmost 
respect and veneration, both in spoken and written form. They cannot be treated 
                                                  
53 Dominguez Diaz, ‘Shifting Fieldsites’, 70. 
54 The waẓīfa is a ‘task’, devotional text or litany recited daily by the members of some ṭuruq as 
part of their assignment of daily devotions, and also as part of a ḥaḍra or communal dhikr,’ 
usually consisting of prayers, invocations, and Qur’anic verses. In the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya it 
is the great wird (litany), a combination of Qur’anic texts and prayers which is read twice a day, 
after ṣalāat al-fajr and ṣalāat al-‛ishā’, either individually or in a group (see chapter 6) 
55 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad, 14-10-2013, p.6-11. The Review Panel adds that these 
prayers are a version of the ṣalāa mashishiyya (the prayer of of Ibn Mashish (1140-1227), a 
famous prayer on the Prophet in the Shadhili tradition), and prayers by Muhammad al-Arabi al-
Darqawi (1760-1823). Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 5. 
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and studied as mere written texts – their performance is what conveys their 
meaning, sanctity and power. The right posture is very important when ‘reading 
waẓīfa’ (reciting the waẓīfa) out of respect for the waẓīfa: one has to sit upright, 
both feet on the floor; during some passages the hands are put on the knees with 
the palms facing upwards. Even when only observing, my posture was corrected. 
The booklet used to distribute the waẓīfa is considered a powerful artefact as 
well; for example, I have seen it placed in a baby’s cradle for protection.  
 Other texts related to ceremonial meetings of the Yashrutiyya include the 
mawlid,56 nashīd,57 and other poetry written by prominent followers. Texts related 
to the education of the followers include the mudhākarāt by the Shaykh and texts 
prepared for discussion in study meetings in close collaboration with the Shaykh. 
These texts should also be treated with respect as they contain quotes from the 
Qur’an and sayings from the Shaykh. I was once told off for putting my cup on 
the copy of the study text for that month’s women’s meeting, as it contained 
quotes from the Qur’an and from Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā.58 
The most important books of the Yashrutiyya are the books written by 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s daughter Fatima al-Yashrutiyya (see Introduction). These 
books are considered to be the best sources for the life and teachings of the 
founding Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din al-Yashruti:  
 
She lived with the founder of the ṭarīqa in her childhood as he [Shaykh Ali Nur al-
Din al-Yashruti] was her father. She continued the journey of the ṭarīqa after him; 
and she was closest to the truth and the reality (al-ḥaqīqa wa-l-wāqi‛) of all 
people, and the most worthy (awlāhum) in this delicate task. And she fulfilled this 
in the most perfect way.59 
                                                  
56 The poem read by abnā al-ṭarīqa at the occasion of the mawlid al-nabī, composed by Shaykh 
Abd al-Qadir al-Homsi. The mawlid al-nabī is the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s 
birthday on the 12th of Rabī‛ al-Awwal. It is the biggest celebration for the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya and the occasion for which most followers gather in the zāwiya in Amman. 
57 A nashīd (pl. anashīd) is a poem composed by a follower of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya as a 
result of divine inspiration, chanted during the ḥaḍra and other formal and informal meetings. 
58 Form of address used by abnā al-ṭarīqa to adress the Shaykh and to refer to him. Ḥaḍra is a 
title of respect; Sīdnā is colloquial for sayyidunā, ‘our master’. 
59 Shaykh Ahmad al-Yahruti, Foreword to the 4th edition, Fāṭima al-Yashruṭiyya, Riḥla Ilā Al-Ḥaqq, 
4th ed. (Beirut, 1997), 12. See also Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti, Foreword to the 3rd edition (1990) 
Ibid., 29–30. 
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Other books are written by followers, either by prominent muqaddamīn60 
(e.g. the late nineteenth-century muqaddam of Damascus Mahmoud Abu al-
Shamat) or by followers with an academic background. These are considered 
their personal interpretations, but due to the support of the Shaykh throughout 
the process of writing, editing and publishing, they can be considered part of the 
official narrative. The Shaykh explicitly referred me to them as sources of right 
information on the ṭarīqa. 
I did use written sources produced directly by Shaykh Ahmad, in order to 
understand the Shaykh’s ‘official narrative’: forewords to books published by the 
ṭarīqa written by Shaykh Ahmad, speeches he made during public events, and 
interviews published in local newspapers. Most importantly, Shaykh Ahmad was 
kind enough to respond to my questions in writing. 
 
 
2.3.2 Participant Observation 
 
Participant observation enables us to go beyond the official narrative, to 
understand the local interpretations based on this narrative and the practices 
derived from it. It helps to phrase questions using local concepts and to reduce 
the problem of reactivity. It provides us with a better and more comprehensive 
understanding of what a certain phenomenon means for people, how it is lived 
and experienced: what it means for people to belong to the Yashrutiyya, to follow 
the Shaykh and be part of the community.  
Altogether, I spent around three months based in Acre (February – April 
2012 and April – May 2013), which due to the extreme helpfulness and 
hospitality of the community and the size and character of the town gave me a 
good understanding of the community and its context. It is too short a period 
however to uncover and/or understand sensitive issues related to internal 
                                                  
60 One of abnā al-ṭarīqa who has been appointed by the Shaykh to be responsible for his 
community. 
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frictions and politics. H. Russell Bernard pointed out that it takes a year to grasp 
such issues, if not more.61 I visited Jaffa for a weekend in April 2012 and for a 
week in May 2013, during which time I attended two meetings, visited many 
people and had many informative informal discussions. I also visited Umm al-
Fahm, Tarshiha, Nablus and Tubas on isolated occasions. I spent around three 
months based in Amman (March – April and October – December 2013) where I 
also experienced this helpfulness and hospitality, but due to the size and 
character of the town and the code of hospitality I did not achieve as deep an 
insight into the community as in Acre. All meetings were arranged by two ladies 
who were assigned to look after me and there was little space for informal 
interaction (see paragraph 2.2).  
While on fieldwork I was welcomed in the zāwiya every time there was a 
meeting. There are several types of meetings. 
- Every Thursday evening, there is a meeting in the zāwiya. In small local 
communities such as Acre and Nablus, such a meeting consists of praying 
ṣalāa, reading wazīfa and performing silent dhikr. In larger local 
communities such as Jaffa, this is followed by ḥadra62 and nashīd. In the 
main zāwiya in Amman, this is followed by Shaykh Ahmad’s mudhākara.63 
- Once a month, usually on the first Friday of the month, there is a ḥadra in 
the zāwiya in Acre for all the followers in Israel and their guests. 
- There are regular prayer and study meetings, with different times, places 
and customs in each local community. For example in Amman, there are 
meetings to study Qur’an and to learn nashīd, and a monthly women’s 
meeting. In Zarqa the followers join the ḥadra in Amman and hold their 
own meeting on Sunday evening. In Jaffa, there is a weekly meeting for 
the whole local community to pray ṣalāa, read waẓīfa, discuss a text by 
                                                  
61 Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology, 331. 
62 Ritual in which the followers stand in a circle or in lines holding hands and cite the name Allah 
accompanied by subtle prescribed movements, while some sing nashīd. 
63 Meaning here the Shaykh’s lecture, delivered during the weekly meeting in the zāwiya in 
Amman. In Sufism in general it means spiritual exhortation. Jean-Louis Michon, ‘The Spiritual 
Practices of Sufism’, in Islamic Spirituality: Foundations, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 279–280. 
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the Shaykh (both the text and the discussion are called mudhākara), and 
chant nashīd. 
 
 
2.3.3 Interviews 
 
2.3.3.1 Sampling Strategies 
 
Since the followers believe that there is a clear hierarchy of knowledge, they 
were of the opinion that cultural data provided by expert informants would help 
me most. Due to the hierarchical nature of the ṭarīqa and my entrance via ‘gate-
keepers’, at first I was introduced to the people that were deemed appropriate for 
me to interview: the muqaddamīn and academics. I also received extensive 
written answers to two sets of questions I asked the Shaykh. In places where I 
had more freedom to arrange meetings on my own I had more control over my 
sample, but due to the limits of access described above I could not move beyond 
a combination of convenience and purposive non-probability sampling.64  
In Acre, AKR told me there are five members65 – in line with the custom of 
only counting the male heads of household this turned out to be a community of 
approximately 25 people (women and children included), half of them members 
of an extended family. During my first stay in Acre (February – April 2012) I did 
not conduct any formal interviews other than with AKR (unstructured), but I made 
notes of informal discussions, either afterwards or during the discussions. I 
attended several prayer and study meetings and as people got more used to see 
me and I managed to explain my research better in terms that made sense to 
them, I gained more freedom to meet and interview other people. During my 
second stay in Acre (April – May 2013) I conducted five semi-structured 
                                                  
64 Due to the absence of a public list of members and contact details probability sampling was not 
an option. This is a characteristic of qualitative interviewing. Susan E. Kelly, ‘Qualitative 
Interviewing Techniques and Styles’, in The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Methods in Health 
Research, ed. I.L. Bourgeault, R. de Vries, and R. Dingwall (London: Sage Publications, 2009), 
317. 
65 Interview with AKR at the zāwiya in Acre on 23-02-2012 (unrecorded), hereafter referred to as 
Interview AKR 23-02-2012. 
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interviews with individuals, sometimes accompanied for part of the interview by 
one or more family members. I continued to make notes of informal discussions, 
either afterwards or during the discussions. 
Because of the size of the community, I deem the sample size to be 
representative for the community as a whole. I spoke to the muqaddam and 
AKR, the people that travelled to Amman most often and those people that 
frequented the weekly meetings most often while I was there. Half of the semi-
structured interviews and informal discussions came from the extended family, 
which represents their percentage of the community. My approach of getting to 
know people in prayer meetings and adding an element of snowballing meant 
that those people who were active in the community, close to the Shaykh, 
assertive, and/or regularly attended meetings, are overrepresented in the study. 
This became clearer to me in the course of the fieldwork and I tried to balance it 
by actively searching for people who were less involved, but the bias remained.  
The community in Jaffa consists of around 200 people,66 all of them 
belonging to one family. I conducted one group interview there in 2012. I returned 
to Jaffa for one week in 2013 and met many people with whom I had informal 
discussions, individually or in a group context. Altogether I spoke with ca. 25 
people, some of them more than once. 
In Amman, I visited the zāwiya every Thursday night and spoke to several 
followers at different moments before and after the ḥaḍra67 or during other 
meetings in the zāwiya. I conducted five group interviews in Amman where there 
were between ten and fifteen people present – some of whom participated more 
than others. Some people participated in several meetings. This led me to meet a 
total of ca. 40 people. As there are no statistics for the number of followers in 
Amman and Zarqa, I cannot accurately say how representative the sample size 
is. Every week I counted between 120-150 women attending the ḥaḍra, and I 
                                                  
66 There are around 20-30 heads of family. Adding wives and children, this number will 
approximately reach 200 followers in Jaffa. JA1 in Interview JA1 with twelve followers in Jaffa on 
16-04-2012, hereafter referred to as Interview JA1 16-04-2012. 
67 The ḥaḍra is a ritual in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in which participants stand in a closed 
circle or line holding hands, slightly bending back and forth, and cite the name Allah, often 
accompanied by the singing of nashīd. 
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would estimate the number of attendants at a ḥaḍra between 250-300 followers 
each week. Shaykh Ahmad appointed two ladies who were responsible for me 
and who arranged my meetings. In some cases I asked to meet someone, in 
other cases they decided whom it would be good for me to meet. I told them I 
preferred to meet people from different backgrounds, and was introduced to 
people with different occupations from the middle and higher class. I explained 
that I preferred to do individual interviews but there were always other people 
present – family members and friends. During the first three interviews I tried to 
focus on one or two people in the group, while other people present occasionally 
added their opinions or clarified previously made points. During my final two 
interviews I decided to make the most of this particular research setting as 
people seemed to be more comfortable in this setting (and even saw it as an 
example of mudhākara), as they were very busy and doing individual interviews 
would put a huge strain on their time, and switching to a different interview 
technique halfway through my fieldwork in Jordan seemed to cause more 
methodological problems than solve them. 
I acquired written informed consent from some participants, and oral 
informed consent from others, depending on the preference of the participant or 
the flow of the meeting and/or interview. Everyone I interacted with knew I was a 
researcher and knew the basic focus of my research. I took care to explain my 
research when introducing myself and whenever anyone asked for it. I handed 
out copies of my information sheet, in Arabic and English. I listened to their 
remarks and incorporated these into my questions and analysis as much as 
possible in order to include the followers in the definition of my research question 
and the process of conceptual ordering, using their words as much as possible. 
As described above, all this was limited however due to our fundamentally 
different epistemological frameworks. 
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2.3.3.2 Individual and Group Interviews 
 
My initial plan was to do semi-structured interviews throughout as they are 
efficient and provide ‘reliable, comparable qualitative data’.68 My first set of 
interviews with AKR were indeed semi-structured but bordering on unstructured 
as I aimed to gain a multifaceted introduction to the ṭarīqa from which to develop 
further questions and ideas. For most respondents however, this was not a 
comfortable way of being interviewed, and I had to adapt my interviewing 
techniques. Several respondents preferred not to be recorded. Several 
respondents requested the questions beforehand, ranging from a few days to 
thoroughly prepare their answers to a few minutes to collect their thoughts, to 
ensure I got the best answers. The questions were sometimes shared with a 
larger group of people. In most cases I still managed to ask follow-up questions, 
but in a few instances (as with the answers of the Shaykh) there was no space 
for this. 
For these reasons, in Acre and Jaffa I increasingly depended on informal 
discussions to gather information, especially to collect data on the local and 
individual levels. I went to the prayer meetings and was invited to people’s 
homes, which enabled me to gather information through informal interviewing. 
They all knew me as a researcher and I made notes on the spot. 
In Amman, I conducted group interviews rather than individual interviews, 
which measured group interaction and consensus rather than individual opinions 
or the proportion of the opinions held among the subgroup, placing the individual 
and his or her opinions in a collective and ‘accessing cultural frameworks’.69 
Focus groups generate emic data by offering ‘access to tacit, uncodified and 
experiential knowledge’ and enabling the contextualisation and categorisation of 
data in the interviewees’ own framework,70 providing ‘insight into the operation of 
group/social processes in the articulation of knowledge (e.g. through the 
                                                  
68 Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology, 205. 
69 Barbour, Doing Focus Groups, 107; Alan Johnson, ‘“It”s Good to Talk’: The Focus Group and 
the Sociological Imagination’, Sociological Review 44 (1996): 517–36. 
70 Johnson, ‘It’s Good to Talk’’, 521. 
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examination of what information is censured or muted within the group).’71 Group 
interviews and focus groups explicitly use the group interaction as research data, 
focussing on similarities and differences in perceptions and how these are 
employed when negotiating group consensus.72 These differences can be made 
explicit through a discussion, or remain implicit in modes of communication, e.g. 
which questions are asked, which arguments are used, which sources and 
stories are referred to to back up these arguments73 – in our context for example 
miracle stories illustrating the power of the Shaykh and historical stories to stress 
his social role. We should not be concerned with establishing the truth value of a 
story but we should ‘look beneath the content of stories to uncover the functions 
that such storytelling accomplishes for participants.’74 
In group settings, familiarity and hierarchy might lead to some participants 
being more outspoken than others.75 In the case of the group interviews in 
Amman, all participants were invited by the two ladies or by the hosts. As such 
they were very close groups of family members and friends, making the degree 
of familiarity extremely high and the issue of (informal) hierarchy very prominent. 
Within the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, there is space for different opinions and 
attitudes, but it was pointed out to me repeatedly that Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā had taught 
them that the muqaddamīn and those more advanced in years should speak first. 
It happened that a muqaddam or another prominent participant (most notably 
AM1-1 and AM1-3) took on the role of co-moderator or explained someone’s 
answer.76 Those who were considered more advanced spiritually and/or in terms 
of worldly education spoke first and more comfortably, confidently and 
eloquently, which was not conducive for those with other views (which might be 
considered lesser levels of understanding) to speak up. There was a significant 
gender discrepancy as well as women tended to be more shy, although there 
were some women with very outspoken views who did not shy away from a 
                                                  
71 Kitzinger, ‘The Methodology of Focus Groups’, 116. 
72 Ibid., 103. 
73 Ibid., 114.  
74 Barbour, Doing Focus Groups, 34. 
75 Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology, 228. 
76 These are frequent occurences in similar situations. Barbour, Doing Focus Groups, 136. 
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debate.77 Unsurprisingly, this led to a high degree of consensus which was in line 
with the ‘official narrative’. Even so, there were individuals who spoke extensively 
regardless of these limitations, and it hardly ever happened that someone’s 
contribution was contradicted, although a thought was not always followed up on. 
On the other hand, focus groups have the advantage that they are ‘closer 
to ‘real-life’ social setting in which interaction and construction of meaning 
actually takes place.’78 This was certainly the case with the group interviews 
conducted in Amman, as several followers remarked on the similarities between 
the interviews and their mudhākara (see paragraph 2.2). 
 Individual interviews are generally seen as more trustworthy evidence 
than other types of interviews, because the potential problem that respondents 
tell the researcher what they think s/he wants to hear might be exacerbated in 
group settings due to peer pressure.79 Rosaline Barbour however argues that all 
research encounters are artificial in one way or another, and that we should 
‘regard the research encounter itself as a site of “performance” in which we find 
inconsistencies and contradictions. This is only a problem if one views attitudes 
as fixed.’80 Jenny Kitzinger sees these different research encounters as leading 
to different kinds of truth, different kinds of discourse, that are all equally valid in 
their own right.81 
While both interview methods are valid, the comparison of data gathered 
in such dissimilar research settings is complicated and points to a severe 
challenge in undertaking multi-site fieldwork in a transnational ṭarīqa. It is to this 
issue of data analysis that we will now turn. 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
77 For some preliminary observations of the role of gender in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, see 
paragraph 6.3.2. 
78 Barbour, Doing Focus Groups, 46; Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, ‘Focus Groups’, 887; Kitzinger, 
‘The Methodology of Focus Groups’, 105. 
79 Barbour, Doing Focus Groups, 34. 
80 Ibid., 31. 
81 Kitzinger, ‘The Methodology of Focus Groups’, 117. 
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2.4 Data Analysis 
 
When analysing the data, I searched for patterns of relationship, interaction and 
communication to arrive at an underlying paradigm of authority of Shaykh 
Ahmad, and to understand how the three potential paradoxes I had identified are 
resolved in the community. In order to identify these patterns, I used a 
combination of deductive or a priori coding (using codes derived from theory) and 
inductive or in vivo coding (using codes deriving from the texts themselves, 
preferably using the respondents’ own words), starting with general themes 
derived from literature and adding more themes and subthemes as the research 
unfolded.82 I checked which responses and response patterns were most 
frequent in a certain interview, after which I examined the patterns behind these 
frequencies: was this response given by several people or was it always the 
same person? Was a certain response given spontaneously or in reaction to a 
prompt? 
 The analysis of group interviews and interviews in a group setting 
presented specific issues, as the unit of analysis is the group and not the 
individuals within the group. While one should listen to individual voices, one 
should not take them to represent individual views, but always keep in mind in 
which context an opinion was voiced or a story told and how it occurred within 
the exchange of opinions. One also has to take into account the differences 
within and between groups.83 Therefore I kept in mind the general mood of each 
particular group, the particular hierarchy, who was more articulate, confident 
and/or dominant, and who less so. I also checked the reaction of the group to 
particular responses. To what extent did they agree or disagree? Was it deemed 
an important or interesting point and taken up for further discussion? This gave 
me an idea of the consensus of a particular group, which I could then compare to 
other groups. In order to maintain transparency, I have given a summary of the 
                                                  
82 Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology, 464–465; Graham R. Gibbs, Analyzing 
Qualitative Data(Los Angeles CA: Sage Publications, 2007); Barbour, Doing Focus Groups, 119–
120. 
83 Barbour, Doing Focus Groups, 143. 
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discussions on the nature and the role of the Shaykh in chapter 5. To enable the 
followers’ own voices to be heard and to pay attention to the context in which 
views were given, I have included extensive quotes. 
The different research settings and the resulting different methods of 
interviewing and analysing make a comparison between the different 
communities problematic. I account for the differences in access and the 
resulting different research settings by referring to the different codes of 
guesthood in these societies in general, to the differing socio-political 
circumstances and to the different experiences with previous researchers (see 
paragraph 2.2). In addition to these factors that relate to the dynamic between 
host and guest-researcher, the differences also reflect the specific mode of 
interaction of the community and the degree of central control. The particular 
interpretations of some of the ṭarīqa’s values and practices such as hospitality, 
fikr and mudhākara created the boundaries within which I could obtain 
knowledge. These boundaries differed per locality, and influenced my research 
methods in these different localities. These different research settings made it 
difficult to compare between the different research sites and to understand the 
links between them. 
This problem is a little discussed aspect of ‘multi-site ethnography’ of 
translocal movements – discussions of this method tend to focus on the global as 
emerging from the local, and the need to follow connections between localities 
rather than approach them as isolated units.84 In her study of female religious 
identities among the Budshishiyya in several communities in Morocco and 
Western Europe, Dominguez Diaz explicitly undertakes a multi-sited 
ethnography, as she has selected local communities (which she calls ‘enclaves’) 
to understand their connections to the main lodge in Madagh (Morocco) and to 
each other – the study is ‘translocal’ because these relationships and 
‘manifestations of connectedness’ are central to her effort to understand ‘the 
                                                  
84 The seminal article for this approach is George E. Marcus, “Ethnography in/of the World 
System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography,” Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995): 
95–117. See also Mark-Anthony Falzon, ed., Multi-Sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis and 
Locality in Contemporary Research (Farnham etc: Ashgate, 2009). 
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whole picture’.85 While this is indeed a very important point, she does not discuss 
the different research circumstances she most probably encountered during her 
fieldwork and the effect this had on her research and its comparative potential.  
The social codes of different communities might cast the researcher in different 
roles and might produce different relations between researcher and community in 
each locality, which might result in different ways of accessing and interpreting 
information, making comparison and the construction of ‘the whole picture’ 
difficult. Raudvere acknowledges the different characters of separate locations of 
fieldwork, even when they are connected in a translocal network, but does not 
discuss the influence this has on research experiences in these locations.86 
George E. Marcus refers to this problem in his discussion of reflexivity and 
of Haraway’s notion of ‘positioning’87 (even though he speaks more of research 
among different spheres and sectors of the same society, rather than of 
geographically dispersed sites):  
 
In practice, multi-sited fieldwork is thus always conducted with a keen awareness 
of being within the landscape, and as the landscape changes across sites, the 
identity of the ethnographer required renegotiation. Only in the writing of 
ethnography, as an effect of a particular mode of publication itself, is the privilege 
and authority of the anthropologist unambiguously reassumed, even when the 
publication gives an account of the changing identities of the fieldwork in the 
multi-sited field.88 
 
Marcus argues that these difficulties can only be overcome in the process of 
writing and not in the field, and I have therefore chosen to discuss all sites 
separately, structuring my chapters in a way that seemed appropriate for the 
locality without forcing a comparison upon the material. Rather than being 
                                                  
85 Dominguez Diaz, ‘Shifting Fieldsites.’ 
86 Raudvere, ‘Between Home and Home’, 52. 
87 He advocates ‘the qualification or effacement of the traditional privileged self-identification as 
ethnographer that seems inevitable in multi-sited research in favor of a constantly mobile, 
recalibrating practice of positioning in terms of the ethnographer's shifting affinities for, affiliations 
with, as well as alienations from, those with whom he or she interacts at different sites.' Marcus, 
‘The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography’, 112. 
88 Ibid. 
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comparative, the discussions of the different communities complemented each 
other. 
Through this method I have identified the patterns of authority and 
constructed a paradigm of authority as found amongst the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya in Amman, Acre, and Jaffa. While individuals might stress different 
elements of this paradigm (often related to the locality in which they find 
themselves), the overarching paradigm is sufficiently coherent to understand the 
functioning of authority in the translocal ṭariqa and in its local manifestations. 
Following this, I have analysed how the paradigm operates in the different 
contexts, how it is enacted and by whom. I have focused mainly on the internal 
dynamic as it was presented to me by the followers, attempting to verify this by 
discussing the actual practice of the people (an attempt that was limited due to 
my limited access to many parts of the community). Without an historical focus 
we can only speculate how the paradigm and its local manifestations came into 
being, but by taking into account the community’s position in society we can 
make a first attempt at hypothesizing the dynamic behind the development of this 
paradigm.89 
As the Shaykh had repeatedly voiced the wish to read my work before 
submitting it, I sent a draft to my contact person in Amman. This resulted in 
eighty pages of comments, sent to me by the anonymous Review Panel in 
Amman. In the case of typos, historical facts and mistranslations of Arabic 
concepts their help was much appreciated, but their concern for me ‘to get it 
right’ led them to request quite far-going changes. These included changing the 
wording of interview quotes (either to change the respondents’ turn of phrase or 
to change the content of their statement) and deleting large parts of interviews 
and analysis, sometimes even material based on published sources, when these 
were not considered to reflect the ‛aqīda. Their main concern was to help me 
improve my thesis based on their belief that there is only one correct way of 
                                                  
89 In qualitative research, and especially in grounded theory, hypotheses serve to explore 
possible relationships between elements that have come up in the study, ‘a way of postulating the 
relation between different aspects of an analytical framework’. William J. Gibson and Andrew 
Brown, Working with Qualitative Data (London: SAGE, 2009), 139–140. 
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writing about the ṭarīqa, but this clashed with my anthropological aim to focus on 
‘lived religion’ and to give a voice to the followers and their understandings – 
including the differences in opinion and interpretation that I encountered. In such 
cases, I mentioned the Review Panel’s opinion on the subject either in the main 
text or in a footnote so as to make their voice heard, without privileging it over the 
respondent’s, and without changing my wording or analysis. In this I followed the 
advice of Geaves and Chryssides, who write that when believers reject an etic 
definition the scholar can make a note of this, but cannot change the definition.90 
While it is common ethical practice to heed requests from interviewees 
who request their words be deleted or rewritten, it is not common to heed such 
requests from third parties such as the anonymous Review Panel – but not to 
pay their remarks any attention in such cases would not have been acceptable 
either. Thomas A. Tweed, who encountered criticism of his interpretation of 
Santería from several Cuban Catholic priests in the US, advocates the 
incorporation of criticism in footnotes: 
 
It is not unusual to find that those you interpret challenge your interpretations. It 
bothered me, but I did not find it too difficult to resolve. I simply decided to 
include, word for word, the priest’s criticism of my analysis. I did not grant him 
veto power, but I did allow him to dispute my reading, so that readers may 
adjudicate the disagreement between us (even if I inevitably and unintentionally 
privileged my version of the disagreement).91 
 
Therefore in some cases I have taken their comments on board, in others I have 
added their comments in footnotes, and yet other remarks I have not heeded at 
all. Due to the large amount and the nature of some comments, it was imperative 
to be selective.  
In several cases I have used the Review Panel’s comments as additional 
sources of primary information (representing the ‘official narrative’ of the Shaykh 
in Amman) to enhance my analysis, sometimes after requesting further 
                                                  
90 Chryssides and Geaves, The Study of Religion, 72. 
91 Tweed, ‘Translocative Religion and the Interpreter’s Position’, 267. 
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explanations of their comments. This was for example done in my analysis of the 
different attitudes towards the Palestinian religious and national leader Hajj Amin 
al-Hussayni, as the Review Panel’s comments on AKR’s interpretations shed 
further light on both AKR’s attitude towards Palestinian history and its 
consequences for the contemporary ṭarīqa in Israel, and on the ṭarīqa’s socio-
political attitude in Jordan (see paragraph 9.3). Another example is the Review 
Panel’s comment on the attitude I observed towards the mubāya‛a in Acre and 
Jaffa which diverges from that in Amman. The Review Panel tried to explain the 
difference by suggesting a conclusion – which actually makes the divergence 
stand out more clearly (see paragraph 10.2). Finally, the additional interpretation 
they gave of a story about Sīdī Ahmad’s youth shed new light on the story for and 
helped me to take my interpretation further (see paragraph 5.3). 
The most far-reaching comment was that I had misunderstood the role of 
AKR, the mutawallī of the zāwiya in Acre, who acts as representative and 
‘responsible for external relations in Israel and the West’. The latter claim was 
heavily contested by the Review Panel, who stressed that he is not an official 
representative but that he only represents them in matters of waqf and other than 
that is simply one of the followers who represents them ‘on a case by case 
basis’. They said I had given him too much weight in my thesis and requested 
that I delete most of my discussion of his views because they do not reflect the 
‛aqīda. Also, they requested I delete my discussion of the confusion surrounding 
the controversial social projects in Acre – which AKR said he was doing in the 
name of the Shaykh, while Shaykh Ahmad claimed he had never heard of them 
(see paragraph 11.5).  
I decided to refuse the Review Panel’s requestst regarding AKR. No 
matter what might be his mandate from Amman, in Acre he acts as the official 
representative of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Israel, and he is the only person 
most outsiders visiting the zāwiya – students, tourists, and spiritual seekers – 
meet. His views are widespread in the Israeli ‘new spirituality’ milieu among 
those who are interested in Sufism. He is in charge of many social activities in 
the name of the ṭarīqa and therefore has a large role to play in how Israeli society 
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sees the ṭarīqa. Therefore I do not think we can treat his ideas and activities as if 
he were ‘simply another follower’, and I felt it imperative to discuss and 
contextualise his views at length, despite the Review Panel’s opposition. I did 
however heed their request not to refer to him as ‘the representative in Israel’, as 
I had done in the draft I sent them, but changed this to the acronym AKR. This 
way I distance him from the other followers – to whom I refer using a code for 
their location and a personal number – without having to draw attention to the 
ambiguous nature of his claim to be ‘the representative’ every time I refer to him. 
Instead, I can discuss his position properly when it is relevant. The Review 
Panel’s comments have actually enabled me to be much bolder regarding my 
analysis of the role of AKR, as they gave me very explicit material as to which 
aspects of his thought can and cannot be seen to represent the ‘official narrative’ 
of the Shaykh in Amman.  
The interactions we had because of this feedback yet again stressed the 
observations I had made during my fieldwork on the different modes of control of 
a guest’s access to knowledge and of the information that is disseminated 
regarding the ṭarīqa. Their considerable effort in helping me write the best thesis 
possible is tied to the belief that the Shaykh is the only true source of knowledge 
and the ultimate reference who guides all transmission of knowledge. The 
Shaykh’s concern for his followers to have the right information, and in turn their 
concern to help me write the right thesis, is not only an effort in limiting the 
boundaries in which the tradition is transmitted, but is also an indication of their 
helpfulness and hospitality and as such is greatly appreciated.  
Thus we return to the central dilemma: the belief that ‘the Shaykh is 
always right’. Chryssides argues that emic definitions and the believers’ self-
understanding should be treated as religious and social phenomena, and that 
‘the believer is the final authority when it comes to telling us what he or she 
believes,’ while on the subsequent level of analysis – contextualisation, 
comparison, etc. – it is the scholar who is the authority.92 In my dealing with this 
ṭarīqa I have adhered to this principle. When undertaking fieldwork, I have 
                                                  
92 Chryssides and Geaves, The Study of Religion, 72–74. 
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behaved as a guest-researcher within the different codes of guesthood employed 
by the different local communities, and as such my access to knowledge has 
been limited. This I think is an important proof of respect towards those people 
whose universe the anthropologist enters and an unavoidable aspect of 
anthropological fieldwork. When writing, I have sought to show the same respect 
by sharing my draft and not working ‘behind their back’, carefully weighing their 
comments and my response, but ultimately staying true to my role as an 
anthropologist: giving voice to different interpretations of the Shadhuli-Yashruti 
tradition, comparing and contextualizing these, to arrive at a deeper and more 
rounded understanding of the ṭarīqa in its local manifestations and translocal 
connections. To show respect does not equal being censored. I have listened 
respectfully to their views on the world and on my thesis, but have here 
presented my own opinions and conclusions from a methodologically agnostic 
social science perspective. As Hanegraaff points out, the balance between emic 
and etic is essential in this approach.93 I have balanced the emic and the etic to 
the best of my abilities, and appreciate the help and suggestions I have received 
from many quarters, but any fault remains my own. 
 
 
                                                  
93 Hanegraaff, New Age Religion and Western Culture, 4–6. 
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Chapter 3 
Historical Background 
 
 
For all followers, the arrival of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din al-Yashruti in Acre in 1850 – 
which is known as tashrīf – marks the start of their ṭarīqa. This chapter will briefly 
give the background of the Shadhiliyya in North Africa, and an overview of the 
development of Islam in general and Sufism in particular in Palestine to give an 
impression of the situation in which Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din arrived in Acre, and 
with what baggage. Then we shall sketch the history of the ṭarīqa until 1948. To 
understand the broader historical context of the Palestinian people at large we 
shall give a brief overview of their history, and will finish with the history of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in the Levant and the way the ṭarīqa is organised under 
Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti.  
 
 
3.1 The Shadhiliyya 
 
Abu al-Hassan al-Shadhili (ca.1196-1258) was born in northern Morocco and 
studied religious sciences in Fes, after which he travelled east to search for the 
quṭb until one of his masters sent him back to Morocco, where he became the 
only disciple of Abd al-Salam ibn Mashish (d.1228).1 After his Shaykh’s death his 
master’s rank passed to him, and he stated that henceforward the quṭb would 
always be found within the ranks of the Shadhiliyya. He left Fes and settled in 
Shadhila, a village near Kairouan. Many miracles were attributed to him and he 
was considered to be in touch with al-Khaḍr and the Prophet, which brought him 
into conflict with the ‛ulamā’ (religious scholars) of Kairouan. He moved to Egypt, 
                                                  
11 For Abd al-Salam al-Mashish, see R. le Tourneau, “ʿAbd Al-Salām b. Mas̲h̲īs̲h̲,” EI2 I 91. 
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where he died on his way to Mecca. After his death his tomb in Humaythira 
(Upper Egypt) became a centre for pilgrimage and the locus of festivals.2  
Based on al-Shadhili’s teachings (found in letters, litanies, prayers, and 
the writings of his followers3), the Shadhiliyya is considered a ‘moderate’, 
‘orthodox’ brotherhood which places strict importance on the practice of the 
sharia. The message of the Qur’an and Sunna takes precedence over 
inspiration, and the followers are encouraged to participate in social life. 
Abandoning worldly concerns, the struggle against the nafs and acceptance of 
one’s fate are meant to be done within a social framework.4  
The Shadhiliyya is not a centralised ṭarīqa and takes many different forms 
in diverse environments. The ṭarīqa first developed in the urban milieus of Tunis, 
Alexandria and Cairo, and also found appeal in the rural areas of the Maghreb 
and the Nile Valley.5 The Shadhiliyya appealed to people from different social 
classes and could either be allied with the rulers or act as an oppositional force, 
as can be seen by Muhammad Zafir al-Madani’s good relations with Sultan 
Abdulhamid II (r.1876-1917), and his older brother Hamza’s opposition to the 
French conquest of Tunisia.6 The elements of the Shadhili tradition that were 
stressed and developed depended on the context in which a particular sub-
branch developed. It is therefore important to give an impression of the 
environment in which the Shadhiliyya rooted when Ali Nur al-Din al-Yashruti – 
who at that time still considered himself part of the Shadhiliyya-Madaniyya – 
settled in Palestine. 
                                                  
2 P. Lory, ‘Al-S̲h̲ād̲h̲ilī’, EI2 IX 170–172. 
3 Most notably the writings of Ibn Ata Allah al-Iskandari (d.1309). For a bibliography, see G. 
Makdisi, ‘Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh’, EI2 III 722-723. 
4 Lory, ‘Al-S̲h̲ād̲h̲ilī’, 171. 
5 P. Lory, ‘S̲h̲ād̲h̲iliyya’, EI2 IX 172-175. 
6 Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 23–24. The different manifestations of the Shadhiliya in the Maghreb 
are illustrated by Scott Kugle in his account of the milieu of fifteenth-century Fes. He describes 
the ideal of the juridical or usūlī Sufi that developed in the madrasas (patronized by the Berber 
Marinid rulers) and was strongly influenced by the writings and example of Ibn Ata Allah. In the 
same period the local Shadhili Shaykh Muhammad ibn Sulayman al-Jazuli (d.ca.1465) became 
the leader of a revolutionary mass movement which fought the Spanish and Portuguese, aimed to 
reform rural and political life, and became a real threat to the Marinids in the countryside and the 
coastal areas. He presented himself as quṭb al-zamān and as descendent of the Prophet, and 
supported the claim that the political ruler should be a sharīf. After his death he became known as 
Sidi Ben Sliman, one of the seven patron saints of the city of Marrakesh. Kugle, Rebel between 
Spirit and Law, 46–64, 83–84; Lory, “S̲h̲ād̲h̲iliyya,” 172. 
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3.2 Sufism in Palestine pre-1948 
 
Daphna Ephrat stresses the importance of Islamic leaders in the development of 
Palestinian society: they ‘disseminated their traditions, formed communities, and 
helped shape an Islamic society,’ adding to the ‘development of a public space 
around pious and charismatic leaders,’ and ‘imprinting Islam on the human and 
physical environment and in consolidating an Islamic society and space.’7  
Ever since the early days of Islam, when Palestine was conquered by the 
Muslim armies, it became incorporated in the larger cosmopolitan Islamic world. 
The early Islamic world was characterized by religious travellers and Palestine 
occupied an important place in this network. As al-arḍ al-muqaddisa8 – home to 
Jerusalem, the third holy city in Islam (known in Arabic as bayt al-maqdis or al-
Quds) and to the tombs of many Islamic prophets – it attracted many pilgrims 
and wandering scholars, some of whom settled there. They felt that the holiness 
of the place enhanced their spiritual struggle, and they described the Holy Land 
in ascetic terms. A typical asceticism of the frontier flourished in the ribāṭāt on the 
Mediterranean coast where warrior-scholar-ascetics gathered. Other ascetics 
withdrew to the isolated hills of Palestine, settling in Ramla or Nablus.9 In the 
Abbasid period the centre of the empire shifted eastward and Palestine became 
politically and economically marginalised. Jerusalem lost its important political 
and economic status, even though it remained an important religious centre. 
Similarly the other Palestinian towns remained spiritual centres and pilgrimage 
destinations, and in this way remained linked to the larger Islamic world.10 
In this early period the norms of Islam and of Islamic society were still 
taking shape, and the scholar-ascetics (zuhhād muḥaddithūn) – increasingly 
seen as the embodiment of the Prophetic values and as renewers (mujaddidūn) 
of religion – played an important part in shaping the moral and social life of the 
community along the lines of the Qur’an and the Sunna. As we have seen in 
                                                  
7 Ephrat, Spiritual Wayfarers, 1–3. 
8 ‘The Holy Land’, a Qur’anic term which is not clearly defined. 
9 Ephrat, Spiritual Wayfarers, 19–20. 
10 Ibid., 79–80. Important visitors to the Holy Land included Ali al-Hujwiri (ca.990-1077), 
Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058-1111), and Muhyi al-Din ibn Arabi (1165-1240). 
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chapter 1, their training was a combination of doctrinal learning and practice 
which made the shaykh both a teacher and a role model. Sufism was seen more 
as an ethical discipline than a mystical doctrine, and moral behaviour was a more 
important base of authority than spiritual transformation. An important aspect of 
these values was service to others, which led to a strong social activism. The 
need to instil emotional trust led to the rise of the image of the shaykh as a 
paternal guide who loves his followers and knows everything about them, 
including their inner thoughts. These leaders functioned as important role-models 
for the growing Islamic community and ‘objects of pilgrimage’ that ‘were the focus 
of common rituals.’ By the tenth century disciples increasingly sought out these 
leaders to bind themselves to the shaykh in companionship (suḥba) so he might 
teach them how to travel the spiritual Path.11 
Against the background of Abbasid disintegration this relationship became 
more institutionalised. The silsila (and the isnād) – both spiritual and intellectual – 
became more important to legitimize the shaykh’s role as ‘a disseminator of 
righteous Islamic belief and conduct’.12 The institutions with which these shaykhs 
were affiliated – the khanqa, zāwiya and ribāṭ – developed into ‘organized 
systems of affiliation, instruction, and ritual’. In the end it was the person of the 
shaykh that mattered, not the institution with which he was affiliated – but this 
affiliation contributed to his personal appeal.13 
As the Islamic world was ruled by a succession of foreign dynasties, the 
Sufi shaykhs and their institutions provided stability. The many rulers that sought 
to control the region tried to connect to the local population through this network 
of Sufi institutions by sponsoring the building or renovation of mosques, schools, 
lodges and tombs. Through these awqāf they showed their shared adherence to 
Islamic (Sunni) norms and values and aimed to generate the support of the 
religious elite and the favourable opinion of the population.14 They strengthened 
the devotion to the many prophets that were buried in Palestine and 
                                                  
11 Ibid., 31, 35, 51–54, 96–99. 
12 Ibid., 74. 
13 Ibid., 108–110. 
14 Ibid., 78. 
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institutionalised ziyārāt and mawāsim, especially those of Nabi Musa, Nabi 
Ruben and Nabi Saleh.15 
During the Ayyubid and Mamluk periods (from the thirteenth century 
onwards) the ṭuruq expanded around a walī and his or her tomb, linking Sufism 
and local ideas on sanctity and cults of saint veneration as we saw in chapter 1. 
Sufi theosophy gave the theoretical basis for the understanding of the concept of 
wilāya, and local ideas on sainthood provided the values which a Sufi charismatic 
shaykh had to embody and the practices with which he would be approached.16 
Because of their outstanding behaviour, the walī was seen as ‘arbiter of true 
knowledge and proper Islamic conduct’.17 They were patrons and intercessors on 
the social and spiritual levels, fulfilling several social and religious roles in 
different dimensions, appealing to many different people from all social levels 
and backgrounds. The lines between ‘popular’ and ‘official’ or ‘elitist’ religion 
were blurred as the devotion to the awliyā’ for many centuries was the foremost 
aspect of people’s religious identity and practice, and the zāwiya-tomb 
complexes became the physical centre to which this devotion turned and around 
which communities were built, making them the centres of both sacred and 
mundane topography.18  
 Palestine continued to be connected to the larger Muslim world as 
shaykhs of foreign ṭuruq settled in the holy cities. For example, in the fourteenth 
century the Bistamiyya from Eastern Iran established a zāwiya in Jerusalem, 
developed close links with the Salahiyya madrasa and had a plot on al-Mamilla 
                                                  
15 Mahmoud Yazbak, ‘The Muslim Festival of Nabi Rubin in Palestine: From Religious Festival to 
Summer Resort’, Holy Land Studies 10, no. 2 (2011): 172–174. 
16 Ephrat, Spiritual Wayfarers, 7. 
17 Ibid., 142–143, 147. 
18 For the term ‘sacred topography,’ see Yazbak, ‘Nabi Rubin’, 171. Sometimes villages evolved 
around a zāwiya and the Shaykh’s families became important socio-political families. An example 
is the Wafa’i family, whose ancestor Sayyid Badr al-Din Muhammad (d.1253) came from Iraq and 
first settled in Dayr al-Shaykh, but moved to Sharafat when this village became too small for his 
descendants and followers. The tombs and the zāwiya of this family became a centre of 
pilgrimage, described as the pillars (a‛mād) of the holy land and its surroundings.’ Later 
descendants moved to Jerusalem where they established a zāwiya near the Bab al-Nazir leading 
to the Haram al-Sharif. Another example is that of Shihab al-Din Abu Abbas Ahmad – Abu Thawr 
– who was a ‘pious warrior’ who fought with Salah al-Din. The latter established a waqf for him in 
a Christian village that thus became Islamized and came to be known as Dayr Abu Thawr. His 
tomb became a pilgrimage site. Ephrat, Spiritual Wayfarers, 130–131, 147, 156–159, 169. 
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cemetery. The Qadiriyya mainly settled in Jerusalem, Ramla and Hama. Despite 
these links to larger ṭuruq however, Sufism in Palestine had quite an informal 
character as it was heterogeneous, inclusive, and more focussed on the local 
shaykh, his particular method, zāwiya and tomb, than on the translocal ṭarīqa.19 
This state of affairs continued in late-Ottoman Palestine. Many ṭuruq were 
present but the adherents seemed to focus on local shaykhs rather than on the 
translocal ṭuruq. Some shaykhs were initiated into several ṭuruq at the same 
time. If there was a concern for the authenticity of an ijāza20 or silsila, this was 
not reflected in any central organisation on the regional level, as had begun to 
develop in Egypt – although Frederick de Jong notes that there are indications 
that on the local village and town level the mukhtār was involved in certifying 
ijāzāt. Because of his focus on the institutional aspect of Sufism, De Jong 
concludes that the ṭuruq in nineteenth-century Palestine were socially 
insignificant and had few adherents.21 I think this conclusion goes too far, as the 
only thing this shows is that people did not attach great importance to the 
institution and the central organisation of the ṭuruq – it says little about their 
relationship with a living shaykh, which might be important to them as it could be 
that a shaykh’s personal attributes were considered more important than his 
silsila.22 As we have seen in paragraph 1.2, Pinto noted that this is actually a 
common attitude in the Levant.23 
 Mawāsim were the main recorded events during which the ṭuruq 
participated in public life. They are annual religious festivals, usually to mark the 
birth or death of a prophet or saint, consisting of large processions from the 
nearby town to the maqām (shrine), and festivals that lasted for days as people 
                                                  
19 Ephrat, Spiritual Wayfarers, 133–135, 162. 
20 An ijāza is the authorization to transmit a ḥadīth or the teachings of a ṭarīqa, and the document 
given to the authorized person. 
21 De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 155–156, 165–167. 
De Jong notes the presence of several ṭuruq: the Ahmadiyya, Disuqiyya, Rifa’iyya, Qadiriyya, 
Sa’diyya, Yunusiyya, Wafa’iyya, Shadhiliyya-Wafa’iyya, Shadhiliyya-Yashrutiyya, Khalwatiyya-
Sammaniyya, Khalwatiyya-Sawiyya, Naqshbandiyya, Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya, Mawlawiyya. 
According to De Jong the ‘focal points of dervish life in Palestine’ were Hebron, Jerusalem, 
Nablus, Jaffa, Gaza, Acre, Sha’b, Qaryat al-Irab and Dayr al-Asad. 
22 A similar point is made about the Shadhiliyya at large. Lory, ‘S̲h̲ād̲h̲iliyya’, 174. 
23 Pinto, ‘Creativity and Stability in the Making of Sufi Tradition’, 118. 
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camped near the shrine. The most important festival was Nabi Musa. While the 
Bible does not specify where Moses is buried, Muslims have come to believe that 
he is buried in the desert between Jerusalem and Jericho, a belief that became 
entrenched in Ayyubid and Mamluk times due to the rulers’ explicit sponsorship 
of the shrine and festival. During one week in April, people came from all over 
Palestine to camp at the shrine and participate in the ḥaḍrāt of the many ṭuruq 
that were present. The other famous festival was Nabi Ruben to the south of 
Jaffa, which was celebrated for a month in August-September.24 In addition to 
this, the ṭuruq are also recorded to have participated in processions for 
circumcisions, marriages and funerals.25 
According to De Jong, the ṭuruq started to decline from the nineteenth 
century onwards due to secularisation processes and the rise of different 
interpretations of Islam in the Ottoman Empire, accompanied by changes in the 
social order. During Ibrahim Pasha’s agricultural reforms (1831-1840) many 
awqāf were dissolved, impacting the socio-economic power of the zawāya and 
shaykhs. In the Mandate period, these rituals and festivals were incorporated in 
the nationalist struggle. Since the first years of the Mandate period ḥaḍrāt were 
held near the Wailing Wall, which were prohibited in the wake of the Wailing Wall 
crisis of 1929. Grand Mufti Hajj Amin al-Hussayni, who was in charge of the Nabi 
Musa festival, turned it into a Muslim Palestinian nationalist event.26 The mawsim 
of Nabi Rubin also acquired nationalist overtones.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
24 Yazbak, ‘Nabi Rubin’; Salim Tamari, Mountain against the Sea: Essays on Palestinian Society 
and Culture (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2009), 27–31. 
25 De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 151. 
26 Ibid., 155–156, 177–179.  
27 A mawsim is an annual religious festival, usually to mark the birth or death of a prophet or 
saint. Yazbak, ‘Nabi Rubin’, 185. 
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3.3 The Yashrutiyya in Ottoman and Mandate Palestine 
 
3.3.1 Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din al-Yashruti (1794-189928) 
 
Ali Nur al-Din grew up in an affluent sharifian bourgeois family in Bizerte. His 
father was an official, and his mother came from a merchant’s family and was 
well educated. He had contacts with a branch of the Shadhiliyya-Isawiyya but did 
not feel at home there and joined the Shadhili Shaykh Muhammad ibn Hasan ibn 
Hamza Zafir al-Madani (1780-1847) in Misrata. He stayed with his Shaykh for 
thirteen years, alternatively secluding himself (tajrīd) in the zāwiya and 
undertaking proselytizing travels. In this period he also married twice in Bizerte 
and fathered three children (Aisha, Ibrahim and Khojiya).29  
When Shaykh al-Madani died in 1847 his son Muhammad Zafir took over 
the leadership of the ṭarīqa. Ali Nur al-Din also claimed to be his shaykh’s 
successor and left, continuing his earlier travels for three more years.30 En route 
to Jerusalem in 1850 his boat was thrown off course by a storm and he landed 
near the prophet Yunus’s tomb, where he received a vision in which the prophet 
Yunus told him to go to Acre. Another story says he received a vision from the 
prophet Ibrahim while in Mecca.31 After settling in Acre Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din 
began to teach at the Zaytuna Mosque – probably Hadith, Law and Sufi 
theosophy.32 He stressed the importance of education for his family and 
                                                  
28 According to the literature of the ṭarīqa, the founder of the Shadhiliyya-Yashrutiyya was born in 
1794. Van Ess thinks the year 1794 has a strong symbolic meaning, but argues that a date near 
1815 is probably closer to the truth. Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 3. 
29 Ibid., 5–10. 
30 Van Ess points out that Fatima’s account of his travels is confused as she wrote that he 
travelled for fourteen years, but arrived in Palestine in 1850, which would make the journey only 
three years. Van Ess attributes this to Fatima’s ignorance of the year of Shaykh al-Madani’s 
passing. Ibid., 10–12. Sawafta argues that she included the eleven years during which Ali Nur al-
Din travelled before his Shaykh’s passing, making it a total of fourteen years. Sawafta, al-
Madrasa al-Shādhiliyya al-Yashruṭiyya, 222–224. With thanks to the Review Panel for pointing 
this out. 
31 Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 12. 
32 Based on oral information from Fatima al-Yashruiyya, Van Ess writes that he taught Ibn Arabi’s 
Futuhat al-Makkiya. Weismann also argues that the teaching of Ibn Arabi was an important part 
of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s teaching. Ibid., 29, 58; Weismann, Taste of Modernity, 219–224, 252–
255. The Review Panel however states that ‘Ibn Arabi was not given special attention during that 
period.’ Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 6. 
 207
followers, men and women equally. He soon counted many people among his 
followers from all levels of society in the Galilee, in the Biqa’ valley, and in the 
rural areas surrounding Jerusalem and Nablus (especially in the village of 
‘Arraba). The first known ijāza was issued in 1858 to one of his followers to 
spread the ṭarīqa in Gaza (still in the name of the Shadhiliyya-Madaniyya). In 
1862 he built the first zāwiya in Tarshiha.33 
The next episode of the history of the ṭarīqa is shrouded in mystery and 
has been subject of heavy discussions amongst scholars and members of the 
ṭarīqa. In 1864 Ali Nur al-Din was exiled to Rhodes with some of his followers. It 
is unclear why exactly, but it is probable that his success led to accusations from 
those with Salafi leanings, and made the government nervous as other Sufi 
groups had participated in political unrest; most notably Emir Abd al-Qadir al-
Jaza’iri (1808-1883), who had been exiled to Damascus in 1860. The duration of 
Ali Nur al-Din’s exile and the circumstances under which he was released are 
also unclear. Either way, he seems to have returned to Acre in 1868, determined 
to prevent further accusations of antinomianism and political activities.34 
On his return he established the main zāwiya in Acre.35 The ṭarīqa 
continued to spread throughout the Levant and beyond to Istanbul and East 
Africa. In Palestine it was especially strong in the Galilee and in the areas around 
Jerusalem and Nablus, and there were zawāya in Acre, Tarshiha, Haifa, Gaza, 
Beirut, Damascus, Rhodes and Istanbul.36 Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din enjoyed 
patronage at the highest levels of the Ottoman state as he counted officials at the 
Porte, local Ottoman officials, and effendis of Jerusalem among his followers.37 
Most importantly, Ali Rida Pasha, one of the secretaries of Sultan Abdulhamid II, 
                                                  
33 Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 14, 29, 52–58, 69; De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and 
Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 159–160. 
34 Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 18–21; De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-
Century Palestine’, 159.  
35 A copy of the waqfiyya can be found in the University Library of Leiden University, F.Or.A. 
681/1-4. 
36 Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 15; De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century 
Palestine’, 161. De Jong mentions several villages in the Galilee where the majority of the 
inhabitants belonged to the Yashrutiyya, namely Sha’b, ‘Amqa, al-Kabri, Kafr Sumay’, al-Rama, 
and al-Ruways. Ibid., 174. 
37 De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 161–163. 
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was initiated into the order by Mahmoud Abu al-Shamat, the muqaddam of 
Damascus, but the exact relation between Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din and the Sultan 
is unclear.38 
A letter sent by Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din to Abu al-Shamat informs us about 
the difficult circumstances in which he found himself in the 1880s. His rival 
Baha’ullah had left prison in 1877 and had started proselytizing in Acre. His son 
and prospected successor Muhyi al-Din had died at the age of 25, after which he 
sent for his son Ibrahim who had spent all his life in Bizerte and had had little 
contact with the ṭarīqa until that point.39 At the same time – and Josef van Ess 
suspects not coincidentally – he had to deal with a strong schismatic movement 
led by Amin al-Sha’bi, the muqaddam of Sha’b. These Sha’bis showed 
antinomian tendencies (probably based on a less orthodox interpretation of Ibn 
Arabi’s thought) and contested the authority of the Shaykh. Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din 
severed all links with them and stated in no unclear terms that anyone who did 
not adhere to the sharia would be banished from his ṭarīqa, as he adhered ever 
more explicitly to the Shadhili approach of combining Sufism with scripture and 
Sunna, combining spirituality and asceticism while remaining in the world, open 
to relations with all levels of society and people of diverse ethnic and religious 
backgrounds.40 When he passed away he was buried in the mashhad in the 
zāwiya in Acre. Thus during his life the foundation was made for the strong link 
between Shaykh, zāwiya, and community in Acre. 
 
 
 
                                                  
38 Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 22–23. 
39 Van Ess argues that Muhyi al-Din had been Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s prospected successor and 
that he sent for Ibrahim after Muhyi al-Din’s death. Shaykh Ahmad writes that the decision to 
send for Ibrahim had been made before the death of Muhyi al-Din as Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din had 
foreseen his early death. The latter interpretation bolsters Ibrahim’s legitimacy. Interview with 
Shaykh Ahmad, conducted in Beirut in 1999, in Sawafta, al-Madrasa al-Shādhiliyya al-
Yashruṭiyya, 835–842: 842. 
40 Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 26–29, 68–69; De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and 
Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 174; Weismann, Taste of Modernity, 195, 219–224. 
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3.3.2 Shaykh Ibrahim al-Yashruti (1844-192741) 
 
Ibrahim al-Yashruti was born in 1844 in Bizerte and summoned by his father to 
come to Acre in the 1880s. He became shaykh when Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din died 
on 28 January 1899, and continued the work his father started by expanding the 
organisational base of the ṭarīqa.42 He was Shaykh during 28 eventful years, 
during which the Young Turks took power, launched the Ottoman Empire into the 
First World War on the side of the Axis and lost. The Levant was ravaged during 
the war and cut up into different Mandates under British and French rule. The 
Mandate of Palestine faced the additional issue of increased Jewish immigration, 
supported by the British as stated in the Balfour Declaration. Ibrahim had to cope 
with another schism as his muqaddam Abd al-Rahman al-Sharif left the 
Yashrutiyya and adopted a Khalwati lineage.43 Apart from this, not much is 
known about the history of the ṭarīqa in this period. 
 
 
3.3.3 Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi (1900-198044) in Mandate Palestine 
 
Muhammad al-Hadi was born in Acre in 1900 and became shaykh when his 
father Shaykh Ibrahim died in 1927,45 two years before the relative calm of the 
first decade of the Mandate erupted in the Wailing Wall clashes, after which the 
situation in Palestine became increasingly violent. He was probably associated 
with the ‘moderate’ faction opposing the Mufti, but additional historical research is 
                                                  
41 Van Ess, “Die Yašrutiya,” 69; Sawafta, al-Madrasa al-Shādhiliyya al-Yashruṭiyya, 806–807. De 
Jong says he passed away in 1928. De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-
Century Palestine’, 175. 
42 Sawafta, al-Madrasa al-Shādhiliyya al-Yashruṭiyya, 806–807. On the succession of the 
Shaykhs within the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, see paragraph 5.3. 
43 De Jong, “The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine,” 175; De Jong, “Les 
Confréries Mystiques,” 220. For more on this ṭarīqa, see Shaykh Afif ibn Husni al-Din al-Qasemi, 
Aḍwā’ ‛alā al-Ṭarīqa al-Khalwatiyya al-Jāmi‛a al-Raḥmāniyya, 1997; Abu Hanieh, Sufism and Sufi 
Orders, 159–165. 
44 Sawafta, al-Madrasa al-Shādhiliyya al-Yashruṭiyya, 807–808. Van Ess and the Review Panel 
say he was born in 1897. Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 69. Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and 
Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 6. 
45 Sawafta, al-Madrasa al-Shādhiliyya al-Yashruṭiyya, 807–808. On the succession of the 
Shaykhs within the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, see paragraph 5.3. 
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needed (see chapter 9). It is known that preachers linked to the Supreme Muslim 
Council – the Grand Mufti’s main institutional power base – preached against the 
Shadhuliyya, responding to a 1931 letter in al-Hidāya al-Islāmiya which called on 
them to act against the Shadhuliyya.46 The events of 1948 severely affected the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya as many followers fled,47 many properties were lost, 
and Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi fled to Beirut. 
 
 
3.4 The Palestinians after 1948 
 
In 1948, Palestinian society was destroyed. Most Palestinians became refugees 
and continue to live in diaspora. As we have seen in paragraph 1.5.3, a diaspora 
consists of a translocal network of communities of dispersed people who 
consider themselves to belong to the same ethno-national group and who 
orientate themselves towards a real or imagined homeland, acting as ‘aesthetic 
and/or moral communities of co-responsibility’ and maintaining boundaries 
versus the host society.48 
In the words of Rosemary Sayigh, the dispersion of 1948 
 
had both centrifugal and centripetal effects upon Palestinian social 
structure and consciousness. By scattering them and exposing them to 
different political systems and influences, it increased their tendency to 
form small groups and factions. Yet at the same time, it constituted a 
                                                  
46 Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 71. 
47 The Review Panel prefers to use the word ‘left’. In English, the discussion whether the 
Palestinians ‘fled’ or ‘left’, in other words whether they left voluntarily or were forced to leave, is 
an important discussion in the larger discussion of the refugees’ right of return. In Arabic, the 
word used to refer to this event is hijra, the basic meaning of which is ‘migration’. Religiously and 
historically, it refers to the migration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina, which is 
the start of the Islamic calendar, but it is also used for migration in general. The question whether 
the Palestinians were forced to leave or left voluntarily – a topic that has been essential in 
definining Israel’s attitude towards the Palestinian refugees since 1948 – is thus left in the middle. 
48 Raudvere and Stenberg, ‘Translocal Mobility and Traditional Authority’, 3–7; Werbner, ‘The 
Place Which Is Diaspora.’ 
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condition that all suffered from, even if not equally, and against which 
most would ultimately rebel.49 
 
According to Rashid Khalidi, ‘the pull of competing loyalties’ has been very strong 
for Palestinians as there has always been an ‘interplay between the different 
narratives that make up Palestinian history.’ These narratives have been and are 
religious, secular, local, national or supranational, or kinship-related.50 As Khalidi 
points out, ‘the trauma of 1948 reinforced [these] preexisting elements of 
identity.’51 For some, the trauma led to an entrenchment of these old patterns of 
identity and behaviour, while for others it led to a change in these patterns, or an 
attachment to these patterns for different reasons.52  
Contemporary Palestinian identity has thus been formed by the events of 
1948, and has continued to develop within this framework of dispersion and 
marginalization. Other events that have not affected all Palestinians to the same 
degree have nevertheless been etched on the collective consciousness: the 
1967 Six-Day War (resulting in the naksa (setback)), Black September in 1970, 
Land Day in 1976, the Sabra and Shatila massacre in 1982, the Intifadas of 
1987-1993 and 2000-2005 and the attacks on Gaza in 2008-2009, 2012 and 
2014. Continuing Judaization and settlement policies in what became Israel, the 
West Bank and Gaza, have since the 1990s been understood as an ‘ongoing 
nakba’.53 
                                                  
49 Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries (London: Zed Press, 1979), 
101. 
50 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 10–12. 
51 Ibid., 10–12, 22. 
52 Liza Taraki and Rita Giacaman, ‘Modernity Aborted and Reborn. Ways of Being Urban in 
Palestine’, in Living Palestine: Family Survival, Resistance, and Mobility under Occupation, ed. 
Liza Taraki (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006), xxv–xxvi. 
53 K. Luísa Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. The Politics of Identity (London & New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2012), 111; Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, The Palestinian People: A History 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Ilan Pappé, A History of Modern Palestine: 
One Land, Two Peoples, 2nd ed (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); 
Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians. 
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The different positions Palestinians occupy in their host countries54 also 
influence their sense of identity. The situations of the Palestinians in Israel and in 
Jordan shall be discussed in more depth in chapters 4 and 8, but an important 
point should be made here: Both the Israeli and the Jordanian governments are 
concerned to undermine the Palestinian identity and mobilization while only 
partially absorbing them in the economic and political life of society, leaving the 
Palestinians with a ‘complex usage of identity’ as they have to ‘navigate between 
a declarative and a behavioural mode of identity depending on context.’55 
 In research and writing, scholars and activists have mainly focussed on 
either the local issues of Palestinians as minorities in their host countries or on 
the transnational parties and organisations of national liberation. In addition to 
this, there is increasing attention for concrete ties that connect people (other than 
the abstract national one). First of all, there is the simple fact that families are 
dispersed over different countries. This is of course first of all the result of the 
nakba, but additional population movements since have added to this situation, 
due to labour migration, wars within host countries or marriages across borders. 
When possible, people visit relatives and friends. Economic ties also bind people 
together: whenever possible, traders and shoppers will cross the borders; when 
these are closed, trade and visits still happen illegally.56 Palestinian activists and 
artists increasingly work together, which is facilitated and stimulated by the 
internet and social network sites. Last but not least, there is the area of religion, 
by nature a combination of local and translocal elements (see chapter 1). 
This study hopes to add to the understanding of a Sufi ṭarīqa with strong 
roots in Palestine, with many Palestinian followers in all parts of the Palestinian 
diaspora (though it is by no means an exclusively Palestinian membership), and 
sharing in the experience of dispersion and fragmentation of the Palestinian 
people as a whole as the physical link between Shaykh, community, and shrine 
                                                  
54 Kimmerling and Migdal, The Palestinian People, 216–217. 
55 Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians, 116. 
56 For example, Porizet gives an interesting account of the links Naqab Bedouin maintained with 
Bedouin and Palestinians in general in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and how this affected their 
position in Palestinian society as a whole and in these local contexts. Cédric Parizot, ‘Gaza, 
Beersheba, Dhahriyya: Another Approach to the Negev Bedouins in the Israeli-Palestinian 
Space,’ Bulletin du Centre de Recherche Français a Jérusalem, 9 (2001): 98–110. 
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has been disrupted in 1948. Thus it is a unique case study of a translocal Sufi 
movement with additional barriers in the form of obstructions of movement to its 
followers and its Shaykh. Despite these obstructions, the organisation is strongly 
centralised and the followers form a cohesive community with a substantial 
homogeneity of doctrine and practice. 
 
 
3.5 The Yashrutiyya after 1948 
 
3.5.1 The Ṭarīqa from 1948-1980 
 
Like most other Palestinian notables, it is likely that Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi 
left for Beirut in 1947, before the fighting escalated. It is told that he dreamt that 
one of the arches in the zāwiya in Acre fell down and that Shaykh Muhammad al-
Hadi knew that Palestine was going to fall. He preferred to be with his followers 
in Lebanon and left for Beirut. The arch still stands and even though the whole 
zāwiya is being renovated, it is maintained.57 
 Acre fell on 17 May 194858 and by the end of 1948, many of the towns and 
villages in the Galilee in which there had been followers of the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya were taken by the Zionist forces. Most followers became refugees, 
either in the refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria or Jordan, 
or were internally displaced in Israel. The followers in Safad, Tiberias, Jerusalem, 
and in the Galilean villages of Sha’b, Amqa, Kafr Sumay, al-Rama, and al-
Ruways all became refugees.59 The village of al-Kabri near Acre was occupied 
on 21 May 1948 and completely destroyed in revenge for a nearby attack on a 
Jewish convoy and many villagers were killed.60 Tarshiha was bombed on 28 
October 1948 and fell 3 days later. Most of its inhabitants fled to Lebanon, and 
                                                  
57 Informal discussion with AK6 on 06-05-2013. 
58 Mustafa Abbasi, ‘The Fall of Acre in the 1948 War’, Journal of Palestine Studies 39, no. 4 
(2010): 6–27; Ilan Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 100. 
59 De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 179. De Jong 
mentions three other villages that had zawāya that I have not been able to locate: al-Lubtumat, 
Tall al-Rish and Majdal al-Sadiq. 
60 Ibid.; Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, 141. 
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none of the followers remained. The zāwiya was damaged in the bombardment 
and abandoned.61 In Haifa, the two zawāya were lost and only a handful of 
followers remained.62 In Jaffa the zāwiya was lost; many followers fled to Gaza 
but one family remained.63 In Wadi Ara fighting was fierce as it was part of the 
area Israel had claimed in its pact with Jordan, but the Iraqi soldiers stationed 
there refused to give it up. In 1949 the Jordanians handed the area, including its 
original inhabitants, to Israel. There were followers in the villages of Mu’awiya 
and Umm al-Fahm, which became an important Palestinian town and is now a 
major centre of the ṭarīqa in Israel. The village of al-Walaja near Bethlehem 
switched hands several times until it was finally occupied on 21 October 1948 
and completely destroyed. The armistice line was drawn through the village lands 
and some of the villagers resettled on the Jordanian side of the line, but most 
became refugees in the West Bank, Lebanon or Jordan. After 1948 most 
followers in Amman were refugees from al-Walaja.64  
Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi fled to Beirut. There had been followers of 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din in Beirut since the time of the first muqaddam, Mufti 
Mustafa Naja (1853-1932), but in the 1970s Van Ess wrote that the followers 
were mainly Palestinian refugees. Fatima al-Yashrutiyya wrote her books during 
this period in Beirut.65 
Not much is written about the ṭarīqa in Syria in this period. Van Ess, De 
Jong and Weismann focussed on the schism that took place in the Ghuta, where 
muqaddam Abd al-Rahman Abu Risha (d.1977), the nephew of Shaykh 
                                                  
61 Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, 177–178. 
62 De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 179 note 2. Data 
from interviews. 
63 Ibid. Data from interviews. Informal discussion with JA1 on 10-05-2013. 
64 Walid Khalidi, All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel 
in 1948 (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), 321–323; De Jong, ‘The Sufi 
Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 179 note 2. AM1-1 in Interview AM1 with 
three followers in Amman on 12-04-2013, hereafter referred to as Interview AM1. 
65 Van Ess was quite cynical about Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi’s position in Beirut. He wrote that 
the Shaykh lacked spiritual charisma and was more interested in power and in people’s loyalty to 
the ṭarīqa than in their religious practice. According to him, people preferred Fatima and her niece 
Anisa as spiritual leaders. Without references, arguments and examples to back up this 
observation, we should not place too much value in these remarks until more research has been 
done. The devotion to Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi I witnessed particularly in Israel certainly 
contradicts this statement. Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 70, 75–76, 83. 
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Muhammad al-Hadi, became increasingly independent. De Jong, who based his 
findings on oral information of the followers of Shaykh Ahmad in Umm al-Fahm 
and Nablus, wrote that Abu Risha had had few adherents in Palestine (mainly in 
the Nablus region) and that by the 1970s their activities had ceased, ‘thus 
testifying to its insignificance’.66 However, nowadays there are at least two 
shaykhs who trace their lineage to Abd al-Rahman Abu Risha: Shaykh Sidi 
Muhammad Jamal (1935) on the Mount of Olives in East Jerusalem, who 
presents himself as an independent shaykh and hardly mentions his lineage;67 
and Shaykh Abd al-Jalil al-Ansari in Amman who does claim to be a part of the 
Yashrutiyya but who is not accepted as such by Shaykh Ahmad and his 
followers.68 
The followers who stayed in Israel lived under a harsh military regime until 
1966. Even travelling around Israel was difficult for them, and they were isolated 
from their Shaykh and from the followers outside of Israel. In the Gaza Strip, 
administered by Egypt, the pre-1948 communities in Gaza City and in al-Qarara 
were bolstered with refugees from Jaffa and the surrounding villages. 
Before 1948 there had been a few followers in Amman, who had come 
from Lebanon in the 1930s.69 In 1948 many followers fled to Amman, most of 
them from al-Walaja. The West Bank was annexed by Jordan and the 
Palestinians began to look to Amman as their capital, including the followers in 
Bayt Hanina (East Jerusalem), Tubas, Nablus, Tallouza, Bayt Rima, and the new 
Walaja, whose communities had also received many refugees.70 Shaykh 
Muhammad al-Hadi occasionally visited Amman and several places in the West 
Bank, including Jericho, Tubas, and Tallouza. Many followers from the area 
came to Jericho to see him – ‘all of Palestine, from the towns in which we were, 
                                                  
66 Ibid., 83; De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 175. 
67 Interview with a former follower of Shaykh Sidi Muhammad Jamal in Jerusalem on 02-04-2012. 
hereafter referred to as Interview D. See his website, Sidi Muhammad Press, Website of Sidi 
Muhammad Jamal, sufimaster.org, accessed 19-10-2014. For his connection to Abu Risha, see 
shadhilisufiorder.blogspot.nl/p/our-shaykh.html, a website connected to Sidi Muhammad. 
68 Meeting with Shaykh Abd al-Jalil in his home in Amman, June 2011. Informal discussions in 
Acre and Amman. 
69 Abu Hanieh, Sufism and Sufi Orders, 139. 
70 De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 180. 
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they all came out to meet him, it was like a wedding (urs) in the street.’71 In 1960 
Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi’s son Sīdī Ahmad moved to Amman where he 
became responsible for the followers in Jordan and the Gulf. 
In 1967 the West Bank and Gaza Strip were occupied by Israel and many 
Palestinians fled, many for the second time. Many followers of the Yashrutiyya 
fled to Amman and flocked around Sīdī Ahmad, who suddenly became 
responsible for a massively increased community in Amman. While the ṭarīqa is 
still strong in Tubas, in other parts of the West Bank and in Beit Hanina only a 
few followers remain. 
For the followers in Israel, 1967 meant the end of their isolation. Military 
Rule with its restrictions of movement had been lifted in 1966 and contacts with 
followers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the Arab world at large were 
restored. In the late 1960s the zāwiya in Tarshiha was taken back and in 1970 a 
new zāwiya was built in Umm al-Fahm. As it had become possible to send 
money, the first renovations of the takiya72 (1979) and the mashhad (early 1980s) 
in Acre were completed.73 In the 1980s De Jong noted ‘a limited resurgence of 
al-Yashrutiyya in Palestine which may well be a manifestation of a limited revival 
of organized Islamic mysticism in the area in general.’74 As we have seen in 
chapter 1.5, such a Sufi revival was part of the general Islamic revival all over the 
world. We shall discuss in the conclusion if the activities of the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya should indeed be seen as such a revival. 
 
 
3.5.2. Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti (1928) 
 
Shaykh Ahmad al-Hadi al-Yashruti, the oldest son of Sheikh Muhammad al-Hadi, 
was born in the zāwiya in Acre in 1928 and spent his youth in Acre. He had three 
younger brothers – Ibrahim, Salah and Khaled – and a sister, Sukayna. He went 
                                                  
71 AM2-2 in an Interview AM2 with nine followers in Amman on 15-04-2013, hereafter referred to 
as Interview AM2. These visits are also discussed in Interviews AM1, NA1, and TU1. 
72 The takiya is the domed hall in the zāwiya in Acre where most meetings happen. 
73 De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 179. 
74 Ibid., 180. 
 217
to the Firka High School in Acre and kept to himself – a follower who grew up in 
the zāwiya at the same time recalls that while his brothers always came out to 
play, Sīdī Ahmad would keep to his room.75 The whole family left to Beirut in 
1947 and Sīdī Ahmad studied Political and Economic Science at the American 
University of Beirut, from which he graduated in 1950. He then proceeded to 
study Law and Fiqh at the Institute of Higher Arabic Studies at the Arab 
University (where he studied with Azhari teachers such as Shaykh Imam 
Muhammad Abu Zahra, Shaykh Ali al-Khafif, and Shaykh Ali al-Khalaf, among 
others), and Law at the University of Cairo.76 Like the other followers, he was 
also guided by his father on the Path – but because his father had chosen him to 
be the next Shaykh at a young age, he was also prepared for his future role as 
shaykh: the murīd has his sulūk and the Shaykh has his sulūk.77 He was given an 
ijāza by his father– like the muqaddamīn, yet different, since it was known from 
the start that he would be his father’s successor.78  
 He married Bahiya al-Asi, the daughter of a well-off Palestinian family who 
had also fled from Acre in 1948. She was not a follower of the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya. Their oldest son Ali was born in 1956, and they have two more 
children, their son Essam (who lives and works in Beirut) and their daughter 
Sirin.79  
He settled in Amman in 1960, where he practised law as a lawyer in a 
private firm and was reponsible for the Shadhuli-Yashruti community,80 acting as 
his father’s deputy (mustallim) with his father’s blessing to serve the followers in 
Jordan (both East and West Bank), and the Gulf, and from 1960 to 1980 the 
meetings and rituals of the ṭarīqa were held in his residence in al-Weibdeh and in 
two houses of followers.  
Not much is known about his private life and he keeps his views on 
controversial topics such as politics and economics to himself. The official line of 
                                                  
75 Informal discussion with AK3 on 07-08-2015. 
76 Sawafta, al-Madrasa al-Shādhiliyya al-Yashruṭiyya, 811. 
77 ZA1-3 in Interview ZA1. 
78 This ijāza is not published. Informal discussion with AK6 on 07-08-2015. 
79 Informal discussions with AK3 and AK6 on 07-08-2015. 
80 Sawafta, al-Madrasa al-Shādhiliyya al-Yashruṭiyya, 808–809. 
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the ṭarīqa is that they do not engage in politics and that the zāwiya depends 
purely on donations from the followers, and true to this the Shaykh does not 
make any statements on his views on these matters.81  
When his father died in 1980, Sīdī Ahmad became shaykh. He had been 
his father’s deputy since 1960 and all followers accepted him as the successor 
through spontaneous collective agreement (ijmā‛ ‛afawī), and those who were 
present at the funeral of Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi renewed their pledge 
(mubāya‛a) to him (see paragraph 5.3 for a discussion of the succession of the 
Shaykhs). His zāwiya in Amman became the centre of the ṭarīqa. Between 1980 
and 2005 the zāwiya was near the Fourth Circle, and in 2005 the new zāwiya 
near the Eighth Circle was inaugurated – the old zāwiya is now Shaykh Ahmad’s 
house. One of his first acts as shaykh was to go on ḥajj82 accompanied by many 
followers, including ca. forty from Israel.83 He began to republish Fatima al-
Yashrutiyya’s books and other books of the Yashrutiyya. By 1983, De Jong 
remarked that Shaykh Ahmad was revitalizing the ṭarīqa.84 He built several 
zawāya, for example in Lebanon (in Beirut and Kamid al-Lawz) and a new 
zāwiya in Amman.85 
 Shaykh Ahmad also made an effort to reconnect to Acre. In 1981 special 
permits were arranged to rebury his father Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi in the 
zāwiya in Acre, a visit on which many followers from all over the world 
accompanied him. The residents of the zāwiya were requested to leave (with 
compensation if they wished) so large-scale renovations could be undertaken. In 
1996, another journey to Acre was made – which became known as ‘riḥlat al-
                                                  
81 To my knowledge, the one newspaper article and television interview available focus on the 
ṭarīqa and not on his personal life, and he sticks to the official line that they do not talk about 
politics or economics. There are no entries in The International Who’s Who of the Arab World 
(London) and Who’s Who in the Arab World (Beirut: Publitec) dedicated to any member of the 
Yashruti family, nor are there any entries in Arabic bibliographical dictionaries. 
82 The ḥajj is one of the five pillars of Islam, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. It is a duty for every 
Muslim to go on ḥajj at least once in his life, if s/he has the opportunity. 
83 Interview AK3 with a follower in Acre on 03-05-2013 at his home (unrecorded), hereafter 
referred to as Interview AK3. 
84 De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 180. 
85 Sawafta, al-Madrasa al-Shādhiliyya al-Yashruṭiyya, 803. 
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khayr’ – for the centennial of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s passing (according to the 
ḥijrī calendar). He started large-scale renovations of the zāwiya in Acre in 2006. 
 Nowadays followers from all over the world can travel to Jordan, including 
those from the West Bank. For the followers in Gaza travel in general has been 
very difficult, but they manage to go via Egypt, a journey which takes them three 
days. In 1996 after the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, it became easier 
for followers holding Israeli passports to visit the Shaykh in Amman. 
  
 
3.5.3 The Organisation of the Ṭarīqa under Shaykh Ahmad 
 
The Shaykh is the head of the ṭarīqa, but he is assisted in this task by many. In 
his zāwiya in Amman, his son Sīdī Ali assists him, and he has staff and other 
followers who assist him by taking up specific tasks, such as the welcoming of 
guests, the education of followers, or maintenance of the zāwiya . His main 
assistance in Amman and in all other local communities are the muqaddamīn.  
Every local community has a muqaddam who has two tasks: First there is 
the waẓīfa ṭarīqiyya: the muqaddam leads the ḥaḍra (together with the Shaykh if 
he is present) and other meetings, and performs the mubāya‛a. On the other 
hand there is the waẓīfa ijtimā‛iyya: he is in charge of the affairs of the 
community, he visits and communicates with the Shaykh regularly, and he 
receives the Shaykh’s teachings and communicates them to the followers in 
meetings in the zāwiya or in their houses. He connects with ikhwānnā and he 
listens to their problems. When there are big problems he might ask the Shaykh 
for help, but in principle it is his task to mediate and help solve these issues.86 
One follower in Amman described the muqaddam as ‘ayn al-shaykh, the eye of 
the Shaykh, ‘through him he sees the fuqarā’ and the ikhwānnā and their 
problems.’87  
                                                  
86 AM1-1 in Interview AM1; AM2-2 and AM2-1 in Interview AM2. 
87 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
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The role of the muqaddam is officially the same in all communities, but the 
different circumstances of each community influences which of these roles takes 
precedence and how big the role of the muqaddam is in the local community. In 
Amman there are two muqaddamīn because of the immense workload. The 
participation in the ḥaḍra is less important as most of the time the Shaykh and his 
son are present to conduct the ḥaḍra (although they always let the present 
muqaddamīn conduct part of the ḥaḍra). On the other hand, the communal role 
of the muqaddamīn is very big. The community in Amman is large and many 
followers visit from all over the world. In addition, several followers in Amman 
partake in these duties, welcoming visitors and preparing study meetings. In 
communities in Israel and Palestine, the muqaddam’s waẓīfa ṭarīqiyya is more 
pronounced due to the physical absence of the Shaykh.88 
The muqaddam is not considered to have a higher position than the other 
followers: ‘The muqaddam is a beloved brother (...) whom Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā chose to 
serve the fuqarā’.’89 While he is responsible for serving ikhwānnā and 
transmitting the words of the Shaykh, all followers are encouraged to share their 
knowledge in formal and informal ways. ‘We are like bees. Every member helps, 
every member adds something.’90  
When a new muqaddam has to be appointed, usually the followers write to 
the Shaykh to let him know their preferences, and he makes the decision (for an 
example, see the story of the muqaddam in Jaffa in chapter 10). A muqaddam 
remains muqaddam until he passes away – when he has difficulties to do the job 
an assistant might be appointed. Only in Jordan I have heard of cases where a 
                                                  
88 AM2-2 in Interview AM2. As a further example, he noted that the muqaddamīn in the Comoros 
have a very big role, both in terms of devotional and communal leadership, because of the large 
communities and the distance from the Shaykh in Amman. This is confirmed by Ahmed and Von 
Oppen’s research, who do not use the term muqaddam, but refer to them as ‘leader’, shaykh and 
khalīfa (terms which among the Levantine Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya are only used for the current 
head of the ṭarīqa and his designated successor), and (in Tanzania) Shehe Mkuu (head shaykh). 
The founders of the ṭarīqa in the Comoros and Tanzania are buried in their zawāya, and are the 
centre of the celebrations and pilgrimages to commemorate their death – which according to 
Ahmed and Von Oppen are the most important celebrations of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in 
East Africa. For a discussion of these pilgrimages, see paragraphs 1.3 and 1.5. Ahmed and Von 
Oppen, ‘Saba Ishirini’; Ahmed, ‘Un Pèlerinage Maritime.’ 
89 AM2-1 in Interview AM2. 
90 Am1-1 in Interview AM1 
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muqaddam was replaced when he travelled to a different city or country.91 One 
person in Amman pointed out that Shaykh Ahmad preferred a younger person as 
muqaddam, as the world developed it became important to have someone who 
could relate to the younger generations and understood the dynamics of the 
information age.92 All other interviewees said the muqaddam was always an 
older person who had experience and knowledge. All agreed that the most 
important factor was that someone could serve the community and take 
responsibility for ikhwānnā. Being accepted by the rest of society is also 
considered important. More often than not one of the deceased muqaddam’s 
sons was appointed to take over, although this was not mentioned as a 
consideration by any interviewees. 
A few years after 1948 a refugee from al-Walaja became muqaddam in 
Amman and remained muqaddam until he was around 100 years old. The 
borders with Lebanon were open and he regularly travelled to Beirut with other 
followers. During the final fifteen years of his life the Shaykh appointed an 
assistant, but out of respect for the muqaddam he did not appoint someone else 
as muqaddam in his stead. When he passed away in 1987 his grandson was 
appointed muqaddam, and later a second muqaddam was appointed to share 
the immense workload.93  
There has been a muqaddam in Jaffa for as long as there has been a 
community there. When the muqaddam of Acre died in 1973, the community in 
Acre was deemed too small to appoint another muqaddam. The muqaddam of 
Umm al-Fahm, Ibrahim Abu Hashish, became responsible for Acre as well. De 
Jong considered him to be the de facto leader of the Yashrutiyya in Israel in this 
period.94 When he passed away in 1999, Shaykh Ahmad appointed two new 
muqaddamīn: one for Umm al-Fahm, and one for Acre.95 The community in Acre 
counts around 25 followers and is one of the smallest in Israel and Palestine; 
similar communities in Beit Hanina and Nablus do not have a muqaddam 
                                                  
91 Interview with Shaykh Ahmad, al-Urdun, 26-02-1996, p.8-9; Interview ZA1, Interview AM1. 
92 Am1-1 in Interview AM1. 
93 Am1-1 in Interview AM1. 
94 De Jong, ‘Les Confréries Mystiques’, 239 note 73. 
95 Interview AK3. 
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(Nablus, Tallouza and Farrah share one muqaddam who is very old). This is a 
sign that the status of Acre was raised again, probably in preparation for the 
renovations that Shaykh Ahmad was planning for the zāwiya there (see chapter 
11). 
Dominguez Diaz notes that the ritual function of the muqaddamīn in the 
Budshishiyya is mainly to minimise variations and thus safeguard the legitimacy 
of the ritual. As a link between the local community and the central zāwiya in 
Morocco, the muqaddam reinforces the central zāwiya’s authority and 
accommodates the tensions between the central and the local. This is also done 
by the European leaders, who act as ‘cultural brokers’ by providing a link with the 
Shaykh, yet at the same time allowing for local variations.96 We could say the 
same for the muqaddamīn of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in the localities I have 
encountered as they have a regular connection to the Shaykh enabling them to 
transmit his teachings, act as ‘custodians of tradition’, and thus to a degree 
control the transmission of knowledge and minimise variations, yet acting within 
their local contexts. AKR can be seen in a certain way to act as ‘cultural broker’. 
As we shall see in chapters 6 and 10, however, many followers actually 
participate in these mediating functions and the process of transmission of 
knowledge and providing communal guidance is in no way limited to the 
muqaddamīn. 
In addition to this translocal organisational structure of the muqaddamīn, 
there are local administrative structures dealing with the zawāya and other real 
estate properties as appropriate in their local contexts. For example the 
properties in Acre are registered and administered by a ‘board of mutawallīs’ 
headed by a main mutawallī, nominally under the supervision of the sharia court 
(see chapter 8). Van Ess notes that the previous main mutawallī Mahmoud 
Abbasi (son of Ibrahim al-Hashish, then muqaddam of Umm al-Fahm) seemed to 
be the main representative (Hauptrepräsentant) of the ṭarīqa.97 In 1996 he was 
                                                  
96 Dominguez Diaz, ‘Performance, Belonging and Identity’, 234. 
97 De Jong, ‘Les Confréries Mystiques’, 239 note 73; Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 72; Yitzhak Reiter, 
‘The Waqf in Israel since 1965. The Case of Acre Reconsidered’, in Holy Places in the Israeli-
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replaced by AKR, who is responsible for the renovations. In addition to this, he 
acts as representative and undertakes several social projects with a strong 
interfaith character (see chapter 11).98 While he claims to do this in the name of 
the Shaykh, the Review Panel stressed that he is ‘a public relations person (...) in 
the absence of the Sheikh on [a] case by case basis’:99 
 
After consulting with the Sheikh and with AKR himself, it became clear to us that 
AKR has responsibilities that are limited to managing the endowment (Waqf), 
and does not represent the Sheikh nor the Path in other matters.100 
 
 
3.5.4 Abnā al-Ṭarīqa 
 
The followers are referred to as Shadhulis. When they want to be more specific, 
they talk about the ‘ṭarīqa Shadhuliyya Yashrutiyya’ or ‘Yashrutiyya’. The term 
‘Yashrutis’ is reserved for the family of the Shaykh, al-Yashruti. The main 
terminology used by the followers to refer to themselves however is abnā al-
ṭarīqa or ikhwānnā, sometimes fuqarā’ or murīdīn. This indicates that while they 
relate to the Shadhuliyya at large, their main identification is with the community 
of followers, seen as a family, which they consider to be brought together by the 
Shaykh, the ṭarīqa and the lifestyle this entails, all min faḍl Sīdnā.101 
There are no official statistics of the ṭarīqa.102 Firstly, this is due to the fact 
that there are no clear ‘members’ of the ṭarīqa. Officially, the mubāya‛a is 
considered the distinction between those who are considered abnā al-ṭarīqa, and 
the muḥibbīn who like the Shaykh, the ṭarīqa, the people, but do not commit to 
following the rules of the ṭarīqa: ‘They come to the zāwiya and meet (yajlisū) and 
                                                                                                                                                   
Palestinian Conflict: Confrontation and Co-Existence, ed. Marshall J. Breger, Leonard Hammer, 
and Yitzhak Reiter(London: Routledge, 2010), 114, 126 note 42. 
98 Interview with AKR 23-02-2012. 
99 Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-09-2014, 56. 
100 Review Panel, ‘General Comments and Remarks’, 30-09-2014, 3-4. 
101 Min faḍl Sīdnā means ‘from the grace of Sīdnā’, a common expression among followers of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, expressing the conviction that everything good they do or that happens 
to them should be attributed to the Shaykh. 
102 Informal discussion with AM1-1 on 21-11-2013. 
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pray (yuṣallū) and perform dhikr and they go.’103 There are no records of those 
who did mubāya‛a however, and definitely no indications of numbers of muḥibbīn. 
In practice this distinction is also not clear as some who self-identify as followers 
never did mubāya‛a, while others who did mubāya‛a have later disassociated 
themselves from the ṭarīqa.104 
In the 1970s, Van Ess gives the following numbers of followers in Israel 
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: 
 
Israel 1200 
Acre 200 
Tarshiha none 
Shefa ‘Amr 1 family 
Jaffa 300 
Umm al-Fahm 600 
Mu’awiya 50 
Lydda a few 
Ramla a few 
East-Jerusalem 200 
West Bank 700 
Tubas 400 
Nablus 300 
Gaza Strip 500 
 
 
These numbers do not strike me as very accurate. The number of 200 followers 
in Acre seems inflated, as all followers in Acre at the time lived in the zāwiya and 
                                                  
103 Am1-1 in Interview AM1. 
104 For a discussion of the mubāya‛a and its role in the tarbiya of the followers, see chapters 6 
and 10. 
Table 1. Estimated numbers of followers in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 
1972. Source: Van Ess, “Die Yašrutiya,” 72. Data from Erik Cohn and Hermona Grunau, 
Seqer ha-Mi‛ūṭīm be-Yisra'ēl (Overview on the minorities in Israel) (Jerusalem 1972), 42.  
Data collected in 1971 by Erik Cohn and Hermona Grunau. 
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not all residents of the zāwiya were followers; it should also be remembered that 
this is the period where no muqaddam was appointed because the community 
was too small. Around this period the zāwiya in Tarshiha was reclaimed by the 
ṭarīqa and one follower from Acre moved there. Van Ess says that the 500 
followers in the Gaza Strip are probably mainly refugees, but this cannot be true 
as there were communities in Gaza City and in al-Qarara before 1948 that still 
exist today. Other places that had or have followers are Bayt Rima, al-Walajah, 
Bayt Ur, Tallouza and Farrah in the West Bank.105 
AKR estimates that there are now around four million followers world-
wide. This number is impossible to verify, but again seems inflated. According to 
him, there are 5,000 followers in Amman, 200-300 in Israel (mainly in Jaffa and 
Umm al-Fahm), 300 in the West Bank (mainly in Tubas), 30,000 in Syria, 30,000 
in Lebanon, 850,000 in the Americas (mainly Lebanese migrants), some people 
in the Gulf and Europe (mainly Levantine migrant workers) and a staggering 1,5 
million in the Comoros Islands.106 The last figure is impossible, as in July 2013 
the population of the Comoros Islands was estimated at 752,288 people.107 The 
number in Israel seems accurate, as there are ca. 25 followers in Acre, ca. 200 in 
Jaffa,108 and ca. 100 in Umm al-Fahm.109 AKR omitted the followers in Gaza. 
  
In chapter 2 we have discussed the idea that ‘the Shaykh is always right’ and the 
discursive control the Shaykh therefore has over the teachings of the ṭarīqa. We 
have touched upon the ways in which this control is enacted in Amman through 
meetings, hierarchies of speaking, and control over publications. So far we have 
only discussed this in so far as it touched upon my research methods, and we 
shall discuss these dynamics further in the following chapters. In paragraph 3.5, 
                                                  
105 De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 180. Informal 
discussions with followers in Acre and Nablus. 
106 Interview AKR 27-02-2012. 
107 CIA World Factbook Comoros, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/cn.html, accessed 09-10-2013. 
108 There are around 20-30 heads of family. Adding wives and children, this number will 
approximately reach 200 followers in Jaffa. JA1 in Interview JA1 16-04-2012. 
109 Interview with a follower in Umm al-Fahm on 10-04-2012, hereafter referred to as Interview 
UF1. 
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we have discussed the ṭarīqa’s structure under Shaykh Ahmad and the high level 
of organisational control he has. His main aides are the muqaddamīn. While the 
followers are given the opportunity to voice their opinions and give their 
preferences, the Shaykh appoints the muqaddam – and very often appoints the 
son of the previous muqaddam (even if this person might be hesitant, as we shall 
see in the story of the muqaddam of Jaffa in chapter 10). The Shaykh is further 
helped by other people who take on specific tasks, such as the welcoming of 
guests, the education of followers, or maintenance of the zāwiya. There is thus 
space for ikhwānnā to take up formal or informal roles in the community and to 
have their voice heard – but all within the limits posed by the doctrine that the 
Shaykh is always right.  
This is a very simple and effective administrative structure that ensures 
the Shaykh’s centrality yet also encourages the followers to get involved. The 
adherence to a translocal ṭarīqa representing a universal truth is therefore well 
balanced with the local needs of the community, both through the positions of the 
muqaddamīn and specific ‘cultural brokers’, as we also see in Dominguez Diaz’s 
discussion of the Budshishiyya.110 The local and translocal are also balanced by 
the level of autonomy the followers have in transmitting the tradition, which differs 
per locality, as we shall further examine in the following chapters. There is 
therefore no sign of what O’Dea called the dilemma of administrative order 
characterized by bureaucratization, elaboration and alienation.111  
The Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya is clearly not part of the trend of ‘Sufism 
without a shaykh or ṭarīqa’ discussed in paragraph 1.5. Theirs is in fact quite a 
traditional mode of organisation in Sufi movements, albeit quite centralised. De 
Jong and Weismann note that the ṭarīqa was already quite centralised under the 
founder Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din,112 and this has only increased due to modern 
ease of communication and travel. The nakba led to a forced fragmentation and 
travel between Israel and Jordan is still difficult for many, but the centralised 
                                                  
110 Dominguez Diaz, ‘Performance, Belonging and Identity’, 234. 
111 O’Dea, ‘Sociological Dilemmas’, 80–82. 
112 De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 179–180; 
Weismann, ‘Sufi Brotherhoods in Syria and Israel’, 316. 
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character of the ṭarīqa is slowly being restored to the extent that circumstances 
allow. The absence of statistics further point to a traditional rather than a 
bureaucratic organisation as there is no registered membership, merely a strong 
sense of community. As we shall see in the following chapters, this sense of 
community is attributed to the Shaykh and his spiritual power to instil love in their 
hearts, and therefore has a distinct charismatic aura as well. This continuation of 
charisma in a traditional institution seems to agree with criticism of Weberian 
ideas of ‘routinization of charisma’ and Werbner’s thesis of waxing and waning, 
discussed in paragraphs 1.3 and 1.5.3, which shall be further examined in later 
chapters. 
Based on this preliminary information, how should the ṭarīqa be classified? 
It could be seen as an example of ‘classical Sufi networking’ in which Sufi 
networks overlap with other webs of relationships (see 1.5.3),113 as the local 
communities we have examined exist within the Palestinian diaspora and kinship 
networks. Here it should be noted that while all followers in Jordan, Israel and 
Palestine are Palestinians and more or less connected through family networks, 
the ṭarīqa is much more widespread and also has adherents from different ethnic 
backgrounds. Further research among followers from other backgrounds would 
shed further light on the translocal character of the ṭarīqa, but here we have 
restricted ourself to the analysis of the Palestinian followers of the ṭarīqa in Israel 
and Jordan, which shows us that Hermansen’s classification114 is confusing. The 
community in Jordan is the result of an ethnically homogeneous diasporic 
refugee movement from the original centre to the periphery and should therefore 
be classified as a ‘transplant’, but at the same time is the absolute centre of the 
movement which shifted together with the diaspora. On the other hand, the 
communities in Acre and Jaffa found themself in a ‘Westernized’ society and in 
Hermansen’s classification would therefore be classified as a ‘transplant’, even 
though the followers there are the original inhabitants and they still have the 
original centre of the ṭarīqa, the zāwiya in Acre. AKR’s connection to ‘perennialist’ 
                                                  
113 Hermansen, ‘Global Sufism.’ 
114 Hermansen, ‘In the Garden of American Sufi Movements’; Hermansen, ‘Literary Productions 
of Western Sufi Movements.’ 
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groups further complicates the matter. As suggested in paragraph 1.5.3, 
Stjernholm’s approach115 seems to be more promising in understanding this 
ṭarīqa.  
 As we have seen in chapter 1, to understand a Sufi group we should 
examine the relationship between shaykh and follower, the transmission of 
knowledge, practice, and the cultivation of certain behaviour, and how this is 
placed within a specific historical narrative. We shall now turn to our analysis of 
these matters among the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Amman, the home of 
Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti and the centre of the ṭarīqa. 
                                                  
115 Stjernholm, ‘What is the Naqshbandi-Haqqani Tariqa?’ 
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Chapter 4 
Palestinians and Islam in Jordan 
 
 
The presence of followers of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Jordan started in 
1948 as refugees from al-Walaja and other parts of Palestine fled to Amman. To 
understand the context in which their relationship with the Shaykh and with each 
other should be understood, this chapter will give an overview of the situation of 
the Palestinians in Jordan and of the different Islamic trends that have been 
struggling for the right to interpret Islam, followed by some basic information on 
the Yashrutiyya in Jordan. 
 
 
4.1 Palestinians in Jordan 
 
In 1921, the Emirate of Transjordan was separated from the British Mandate of 
Palestine and handed over to Emir Abdallah, the son of Sharif Husayn al-
Hashemi of Mecca. Emir Abdallah had to build a country from scratch in what 
was mainly desert territory inhabited by nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouin 
tribes who had never been subject to strict government control, some farming 
communities in the Western hills and a few towns, most of them established in 
the late nineteenth century by Circassians and Chechens. Transjordan became 
independent in 1946 with Emir Abdallah as its king.1  
Wiktorowicz shows that in his attempts to forge a cohesive political 
identity, Emir Abdallah focussed on the Bedouin identity and stressed his own 
Bedouin ancestry as part of the tribe of Quraysh and the clan of al-Hashemi, 
which gave him a genealogical link to the Prophet Muhammad. As such his 
ancestors had executed religious and worldly authority as the custodians of the 
                                                  
1 William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 4th ed. (Boulder CO: Westview 
Press, 2009), 213–215; Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan, 82. 
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holy cities of Mecca and Medina from 1201 to 1925. This claim to legitimacy was 
further boosted by his claim to uphold the principles of the sharia in Jordanian 
law and by establishing government bodies that controlled Islam: the Ministry of 
Awqāf and Religious Affairs, the Dār al-Iftā’ (the national institution responsible 
for the issuing of fatwas) and the Department of the Supreme (Islamic) Justice. 
Finally, the government’s responsibility over Islamic sites in Transjordan – and 
since 1948 also over those in Jerusalem and the West Bank – have enabled King 
Abdallah and his descendants to call himself the protector of the holy sites.2 
 This attempt at nation-building was severely disrupted by the influx of a 
large number of Palestinian refugees when Transjordan occupied the West Bank 
in 1948 and annexed it in 1950 (changing its name to Jordan).3 The 
demographics of the country were severely disrupted as 900,000 Palestinians 
joined the 450,000 Jordanians. The Christians and the Muslim elites settled in 
the towns, the rest in the refugee camps in both East Bank and West Bank.4 
According to Gandolfo this was a difficult time of adjustment: During the Mandate 
period many Palestinians had been exposed to concepts of trade unionism and 
democracy and were critical of the monarchy relying on the tribes and the 
military.5 Among the majority Bedouin population of the East Bank on the other 
hand, tribal identity remained strong. Some minorities also constructed 
                                                  
2 Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and State Power in Jordan (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), 50; Abu 
Hanieh, Sufism and Sufi Orders, 11. In Prince Ghazi’s essay The Tribes of Jordan one can see 
how Bedouin and Islamic identity are combined to provide an Eastern Jordanian identity and 
legitimacy for the King: ‘the tribes without their tribalism; the Arabs in the desert, rather than the 
desert in the Arabs – will personify and manifest the very essence of Islamic virtue, as embodied 
super-eminently by the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) himself, this being the ultimate realization of 
harmony between Islam and the Arab tribesman, and the fulfilment of the promise under every 
distant black tent in the deserts of Arabia.’ Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad, The Tribes of Jordan at 
the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century, 1999, 29. 
3 As Avi Shlaim has argued, King Abdullah openly joined the other Arab leaders in opposing the 
partition plan, but negotiated secretly with the Jewish Agency and with the blessing of the British 
over the partition of Mandate Palestine between the Zionists and Jordan. When the Arab armies 
attacked the State of Israel on May 15, 1948, the Jordanian army took control over the West Bank 
and East Jerusalem. Pappé, A History of Modern Palestine, 125. For more information see Avi 
Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of 
Palestine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 
4 Kimmerling and Migdal, The Palestinian People, 217, 222. 
5 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan, 2. 
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themselves as a tribe to be part of this social structure.6 Palestinian refugees 
held on to kinship and old ties of village or neighbourhood as these traditional 
institutions provided a sense of refuge. 7 
The Palestinians received Jordanian nationality and the King tried to 
incorporate them into the state as much as possible without disrupting his power 
base. Gandolfo writes that Amman became Jordan’s capital and the East Bank 
received more government subsidies, while Jerusalem and the West Bank 
dwindled in importance. The highest ranks of government, administration and the 
army remained in the hands of East Bankers, leaving the Palestinians to rise in 
the realms of business and education. The Palestinian notable families that had 
been allied to the Western powers and the Hashemites allied themselves to the 
King soon after 1948 – the Nashashibis for example acknowledged Jordan’s 
annexation of the West Bank in return for high positions in Jordanian society. The 
Palestinians in the refugee camps found themselves in a worse socio-economic 
situation than those living outside. Many Jordanian Palestinians emigrated to find 
work abroad, especially in the oil-rich Gulf countries, and the remittances they 
sent back to Jordan greatly boosted the Jordanian economy.8  
The international political representation of the Palestinians remained in 
the hands of the Arab rulers, but many Palestinians realized they did not have 
the interests of the people at heart and resorted to unorganized groups of 
fadā’iyīn (guerilla fighters) who conducted cross-border raids into Israel, and to 
transnational Arab nationalist and Communist movements and their local parties 
and organizations. King Abdullah’s negotiations with the Zionists and his attitude 
towards Palestine and the Palestinians made him subject to severe criticism and 
led to his assassination in 1951 as he visited the Haram al-Sharif. Under his 
grandson King Hussayn (r.1952-1999) tensions between Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin and East Bankers increased. These tensions exacerbated 
                                                  
6 Ibid., 17, 86. 
7 Ibid., 112; Kimmerling and Migdal, The Palestinian People, 223–224. 
8 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan, 1–41, 160–195. 
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when Jordan lost the West Bank in 1967 and another influx of Palestinian 
refugees settled in the country, many of whom were uprooted a second time.9 
The defeat of the Arab armies and the failure of Arab nationalism 
strengthened the development of Palestinian nationalism as the fadā’iyīn became 
more powerful. A new leadership emerged from the new middle class in the 
diaspora and took over the existing political structures or established new ones. 
Their ideology was mostly secular nationalist and socialist, and their fighters and 
supporters were mainly recruited from the refugee camps.10 Most notably, in 
1969 Yasir Arafat and his organisation Fatah took over leadership of the PLO (an 
umbrella organisation bringing together several resistance organisations) and 
established a state-within-a-state in the refugee camps in Jordan.11 When the 
PFLP (one of the PLO’s organisations) hijacked four civilian airplanes in 
September 1970, King Hussayn confronted the fadā’iyīn in a civil war, and 
expelled the PLO to Lebanon. King Husayn’s rule became increasingly 
authoritarian – mainly through the mukhābarāt (security services) – and by 
propagating ‘a Hashemite-oriented form of Jordanian nationalism’ in which there 
was no space for Palestinian identity and nationalism.12 
After a brief respite in the 1970s due to the booming economy, the First 
Intifada in 1987 again increased tensions as the PLO became strongly based in 
the West Bank. King Hussayn denounced his claim to the West Bank in 1988, 
claiming to support the PLO in their struggle for an independent Palestinian state 
and to act in the Palestinians’ best interests. Gandolfo points out that on the flip 
side however it made personal, professional and commercial connections 
between Palestinians in the West Bank and in Jordan more difficult, and it paved 
the way for the official peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994 and 
                                                  
9 Kimmerling and Migdal, The Palestinian People, 227, 240–241; Gandolfo, Palestinians in 
Jordan, 10–13. 
10 William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian 
Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 3; Sayigh, From Peasants to 
Revolutionaries, 144–187; Kimmerling and Migdal, The Palestinian People, 240–273. 
11 The PLO had been established in 1964 by the Arab League to represent the Palestinians but in 
effect acted as a mouthpiece of the Arab leaders. When it was founded, its members were from 
the traditional notable class, and its first chairman was Ahmad Shuqayri, son of As’ad Shuqayri. 
Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 358–362. 
12 Ibid., 362–363; Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan, 13, 32–35, 95. 
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stronger economic and security relations with Israel and the West, none of which 
have benefited the Palestinians.13 
Under severe economic strain King Hussayn lessened his authoritarian 
rule and in 1989 parliamentary elections took place, in which the Muslim 
Brotherhood won overwhelmingly.14 To counter this political trend the election 
system was reformed to give more weight to the loyal tribal areas. Mukhābarāt 
control was replaced by bureaucratic control and regulations as every political 
party, NGO and social organisation had to register with the government and was 
severely restricted in its operations. Because of this Quintan Wiktorowicz 
characterises Jordan as a ‘facade democracy’ which relies on ‘management 
strategies’ and occasional ‘instruments of repression’ rather than coercive force. 
In his view the Jordanian system of control is not complete nor hegemonic, 
leading to a constant fluctuation in the level of regime control and the possibilities 
to ‘challenge the boundaries of the political.’15 
The economic situation was exacerbated by a third wave of Palestinians 
who had to be incorporated into the Jordanian socio-economic and political 
system during the Gulf War 1990-91 as 300,000 Jordanians – most of them of 
Palestinian origin – were expelled from Kuwayt in a reaction to the PLO’s support 
for Saddam Hussayn.16 
 In 1999 King Abdullah II succeeded his father. He continued to cultivate 
good relations with the US and Israel and mainly undertook neo-liberal economic 
reforms such as extensive privatization and the conclusion of a free trade 
                                                  
13 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan, 21, 36–38. 
14 The Jordanian economy was largely dependent on subsidies, aid and remittances from the oil 
states (mainly Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia), and when throughout the 80s the oil prices 
dropped due to war and political turmoil in the Gulf region, Jordan’s economy experienced a 
severe recession. The government turned to the IMF and imposed austerity measures. Riots in 
the southern loyal regions fed the need for political reform and led to the end of martial law and 
political liberalization. Yann le Troquer and Rozenn Hommery al-Oudat, ‘From Kuwait to Jordan: 
The Palestinians’ Third Exodus’, Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no. 3 (1999): 40; Gandolfo, 
Palestinians in Jordan, 69, 164–167; Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism, 12. 
15 Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism, 12–43. Every NGO has to register with a 
ministry which means it has to limit its activities to what is covered by that particular ministry, 
leading to fragmentation of social activity. ‘Political activities’ (as defined by the state) and 
opposition to the state are not allowed. Self-disciplinary mechanisms are put in place through the 
General Union of Voluntary Societies (GUVS) which acts as an umbrella organisation for NGOs 
and falls under the Ministry of Social Development. 
16 Le Troquer and Hommery al-Oudat, ‘From Kuwait to Jordan.’ 
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agreement with the US and the establishment of Qualified Industrial Zones in 
which Israel and Jordan produce for the US. Gandolfo points out that these 
privatization measures increased the socio-economic gap as the (mainly 
Palestinian) business elites drew closer to the government, and the middle and 
lower classes became poorer.17 Additional economic strain was put on Jordan as 
Iraqi refugees poured in after the American invasion in 2003 and Syrian refugees 
from 2011 onwards – among whom were also Palestinian refugees.18 
Because the identity of individual Palestinians is formed both by their 
collective experiences and by individual socio-economic and cultural 
experiences, identities of Palestinians in Jordan and their manifestations have 
shifted over time.19 Gandolfo argues that nowadays the Palestinian middle class 
who no longer live in the camps are less likely to wish for return to Palestine than 
the Palestinians who live in the refugee camps. They occupy ‘a grey area of 
identity’ as each individual combines his or her Palestinian identity – often 
enacted through kinship relations, an appreciation of a shared history and 
feelings (and sometimes acts) of solidarity with other Palestinians – with an 
attachment to the Jordianian socio-economic system and life-style.20 On the 
other hand, the Palestinians who remained in the camps largely hold on to their 
refugee status and hope to return to Palestine. It has been argued that this 
loyalty to the right of return has made people hesitant to leave the camps in order 
to advance themselves socially and economically, but one could also say that 
their low social and economical status made it impossible for them to move out of 
the camps and led them to hold on to their refugee status even tighter in hope of 
a better future in Palestine.21 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
17 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan, 169. 
18 Ibid., 40–41. 
19 Ibid., 112–118, 160–195. 
20 Ibid., 27, 177–183. 
21 Ibid., 187–195. 
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4.2 Islam in Jordan 
 
With the failure of secular Palestinian nationalism, many Palestinian refugees 
turned to the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi movements. During the 1980s and 
1990s discontent was increasingly articulated and enacted in Islamic terms, and 
Islamic grassroots organisations had more space to develop after the political 
liberalization in 1989. As these movements combined their Islamist agenda with 
support for the Palestinian cause, the connection between identity and religion 
became stronger.22 
The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Jordan in 1945, is considered 
moderate as its criticisms are always aimed at government policies rather than at 
the political structure or the legitimacy of the regime. Wiktorowicz argues that it 
has enjoyed limited government support (though fluctuating over time) as the 
‘loyal opposition’23 and as such developed as the largest and most organized 
social movement in Jordan, focussing on charitable and cultural activities and 
offering grassroots support to those in need, particularly those in the refugee 
camps. The Islamic Action Front, the political wing of the Jordanian Muslim 
Brotherhood established in 1993 has become the largest opposition party.24 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s slow grassroots approach and its operations 
within the framework of the government have led to criticism by other Islamic 
movements who embraced different attitudes towards politics and struggle. 
Several of these movements came from Palestine, such as Hamas, while others 
had links to Salafi groups and the Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Many were influenced by Wahhabism as many Jordanians went to Saudi Arabia 
to study and to work. The 1994 peace treaty with Israel increased their fervour. 
These groups found especially fertile ground in Zarqa, which had absorbed many 
returnees from the Gulf.25 
                                                  
22 Ibid., 197. 
23 Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism, 93. 
24 For an historical overview of the relation between the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Hashemites, see Ibid., 4–5 and chapter 3 Islamic Social Movement Organizations and the Muslim 
Brotherhood 83–110; Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan, 221–222. 
25 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan, 226–232. 
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As bureaucratic regulation limits the space for NGOs and political parties, 
Wiktorowicz argues that most Islamist activity happens through informal social 
networks. The Salafis, who challenge the political structure and the legitimacy of 
the regime (and some of whom resort to violence), are severely limited in their 
opportunities both for ideological and practical reasons and therefore resort to 
informal organisation which is mainly based on traditional social structures such 
as the family and the neighbourhood, embedding ‘collective action in everyday 
interactions’.26 The main social tie is the teacher-student relationship, which links 
network clusters together. Due to the inflexibility of Salafi dogmas and the 
importance of scholarly and personal reputation, disagreements often lead to 
fragmentation in the movement.27 
With the growth of political Islamism and Salafism the king’s traditional 
Islamic authority is questioned. Wiktorowicz sees this as a prime example of 
Eickelman and Piscatori’s understanding of ‘Muslim politics’ (see chapter 1). In 
the contemporary world, the struggle over the interpretation of Islamic symbols 
mainly means that rulers who have based their legitimacy on Islamic credentials 
are being challenged by Islamist groups.28 King Abdullah II attempts to establish 
himself as the spokesperson of ‘moderate Islam’ based on his family’s 
credentials as descendants of the Prophet, custodians of the Holy Places in 
Jerusalem and former custodians of Mecca and Medina. He supports an 
individual, ritualized, nonconfrontational and depoliticized interpretation of Islam 
as opposed to political Islam in all its forms.29 The regime’s approach operates 
both in the national and the international arena as it aims to delegitimize Islamist 
                                                  
26 Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism, 2, 6–9, 15. Wiktorowicz’s work adds to the 
development of Social Movement Theory and its Resource Mobilization approach which is based 
on the idea that ‘movements require resources and organization of some kind to mobilize 
sustained collective action.’ Formal organizations are seen as mechanisms of collective 
empowerment as they link individuals through an organizational structure and provide institutional 
resources. Informal organizations on the other hand are seen as a transitory phase, bound to 
become more institutionalized. Recent studies however, such as the one by Wiktorowicz, show 
that this informal organisation is particularly effective in more repressive political systems and as 
such can be a strategic choice rather than a mere transitory phase. 
27 Ibid., 138–139. 
28 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 4–5; Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic 
Activism, 45–48. 
29 Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism, 77. 
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opposition at home, and acts as an ideological contribution to the US’s ‘War on 
Terror’. 
The main initiative of the king to boost his religious legitimacy and 
participate in this ideological attack on what he calls ‘takfiris’ (those who 
pronounce others to be infidels) is the Amman Message. Without attention for the 
socio-economic and political grievances that underly this trend in Islam, these 
‘radicals’ are portrayed as uneducated ‘misguided fanatics’, killing ‘whenever and 
wherever they can’, implying that proper guidance and education will do the trick 
to strike a blow at their roots. Most importantly, they need to be instilled with the 
proper respect for tradition as taught and transferred by the ‛ulamā’ and 
protected by the royal family.30 The Amman Message claims to constitute ‘a 
definitive demarcation of true Islam in all its forms, and an authoritative 
identification – if not a definition – of orthodoxy in Islam.’ As such, it ‘amounts to a 
historical, universal and unanimous religious and political consensus (ijmā‛31) of 
the Ummah (nation) of Islam in our day, and a consolidation of traditional, 
orthodox Islam’ that has not existed since the Caliphate of Ali ibn Abi Talib. It is 
made clear that only the Hashemites are able to do this: ‘This is in accordance 
with the inherited spiritual and historical responsibility carried by the Hashemite 
monarchy, honored as direct descendants of the Prophet, the Messenger of God 
– peace and blessings upon him – who carried the message.’32 
As Islam is such an important factor in the King’s legitimacy, Islamic 
institutions in Jordan are strongly controlled by the government. Mosques, awqāf, 
zakāa committees, religious courts, religious schools etc. are under government 
control. Imams and preachers performing the khuṭba33 are civil servants 
(although due to a lack of qualified preachers sometimes preachers are 
appointed who are not directly linked to the government). In Wiktorowicz’s view, 
                                                  
30 King Abdullah II of Jordan, Our Last Best Chance: A Story of War and Peace (Penguin, 2011). 
31 Unanimous consensus of the community, one of the bases of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). 
Usually, this means consensus of the ulamā’ (Islamic scholars). 
32 Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad, ‘Introduction to True Islam and the Islamic Consensus on the 
Amman Message’, ammanmessage.com, last accessed 07-05-2014. 
33 The khuṭba is the sermon in the mosque on Friday and during a religious festival. 
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mosques have become a ‘mouthpiece of the state’.34 The government also 
sponsors organisations, people and events to propagate its own understanding 
of Islam. Examples are the Islamic Cultural Centers run by the Ministry of Awqāf, 
NGOs sponsored by members of the royal family,35 and prayer meetings for 
religious occasions (such as Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, Ramadan,36 and Ra’s al-
Sana al-Hijriya) in the King Abdullah Mosque in Abdali. This support of religious 
institutions and public Islamic space underlines the religious legitimacy of the 
regime, while at the same time allowing them to exercise extensive control.37 
Even so, NGOs manage to challenge this government-sponsored Islam. 
Wiktorowicz and Suha Taji-Farouki call for a broader understanding of the term 
‘politics’ to not only include state bodies and political parties but also ‘symbolic 
struggles over the rules that guide everyday life’.38 Even though the government 
controls many aspects of the activities of NGOs, there still exists space within 
them to challenge the status quo. Wiktorowicz and Taji-Farouki argue that: 
 
While Islamic NGOS are ostensibly apolitical development organisations tightly 
regulated by the state, we argue that, because they are contextualised by 
struggles over culture and values, they are inherently political. (...) Rather than 
directly confronting the state or participating in formal politics, Islamic NGOS are 
engaged in social struggle at the level of cultural discourse and values. 39  
 
 
                                                  
34 Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism, 46. 
35 Most notably the Young Muslim Women Association (est. 1972), the Royal Aal al-Bayt 
Institution for Islamic Thought (est. 1980, http://aalalbayt.org/), and the Royal Institute for Inter-
Faith Studies (est. 1994, http://www.riifs.org/). Ibid., 81; Abu Hanieh, Sufism and Sufi Orders, 
205. 
36 For example, through control over khuṭbas and religious programs on television, the ‘discourse 
of Ramadan – the expressed interpretation of Ramadan through both speech and ritual – is 
controlled by the regime, which channels it into ritualism and concern with the hereafter. (...) The 
state sponsors Islam as individual rather than as a framework for social activism.’ On the other 
hand, Islamists focus on concern for equality and justice: ‘It is a time to revolt, whether physically 
or spiritually.’ Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism, 75. 
37 Ibid., 15, 51–70. 
38 Quintan Wiktorowicz and Suha Taji-Farouki, ‘Islamic NGOs and Muslim Politics: A Case from 
Jordan’, Third World Quarterly 21, no. 4 (2000): 687–688. Wiktorowicz and Taji-Farouki stress the 
importance of ‘new social movements’ which deal with ‘issues of identity, culture, and post-
materialism’ and struggle through society and cultural bodies rather than state institutions. 
39 Ibid., 686. 
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4.3 Sufism in Jordan 
 
Hassan Abu Hanieh has written the only study on Sufism in Jordan that is 
translated to English.40 While it is somewhat inconsistent in its conclusions and 
limited to interviews with shaykhs and as such does not give an idea of the 
relations between these shaykhs and their followers, how the followers 
experience their religion, and how far the reach of these shaykhs really goes, it is 
useful to start mapping Sufism in Jordan. 
 The ṭuruq in Jordan have their roots – like its inhabitants – in all corners of 
the Middle East. Some go back to the nineteenth-century settlement of Islamic 
scholars in the area, encouraged by the Ottomans. Some ṭuruq originated in the 
networks connecting Jordan to Syria, such as the Syrian Shaykh Muhammad al-
Hashimi’s branch of the Shadhiliyya-Alawiyya, to which Shaykh Nuh Keller 
belongs. Several ṭuruq were brought to Jordan by Palestinian refugees, such as 
the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, the Khalwatiyya-Rahmaniyya, the Qadiriyya, the 
Rifa’iyya, and the Shadhiliyya-Darqawiyya-Filaliyya. The Kasnazaniyya came 
from Iraq in the 2000s, as the Shaykh and many followers (both Arabs and 
Kurds) fled the war there. There is also a banch of the Naqshbandiyya-
Haqqaniyya, and there are several groups and individuals who are affiliated to 
Sufism outside of the framework of the ṭuruq.41 
Today the ṭuruq seem to play a minor role in contemporary Jordanian 
society. Their numbers have dwindled and they are mainly inward looking.42 Sufi 
leaders engage in educational activities, and Abu Hanieh writes that some ṭuruq 
have established charitable institutions and are experimenting with new media to 
reach out to society.43 A good example is the role Shaykh Nuh Keller has in the 
Traditional Islam network (see paragraph 1.5.2). Abu Hanieh mentions that the 
Khalwatiyya-Rahmaniyya has established several instituttions that include a 
                                                  
40 Abu Hanieh, Sufism and Sufi Orders. 
41 Ibid., 116–122. 
42 Interview with an expert on interfaith dialogue in Jordan on 25-11-2013. 
43 Abu Hanieh, Sufism and Sufi Orders, 14. 
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mosque, an orphanage, and a soup kitchen (but provides no reference).44 Some 
scholars are intellectually interested in Sufism and attend a dhikr occasionally, 
but do not consider themselves active members of a certain ṭarīqa. Very few 
people are actively committed to spreading the Sufi message. In the 
contemporary climate in Jordan in which Islamism and Salafism are growing, all 
aspects of Sufism become less pronounced.45 All accounts of these activities 
however are mainly based on interviews with shaykhs and should be followed up 
by anthropological fieldwork among their followers to see what is happening and 
what this means for the followers and for society at large. 
The royal family are considered practicing Sufis, even though no one 
knows which ṭarīqa they belong to.46 According to Abu Hanieh, Emir Abdallah 
incorporated Sufism into the ideological and organisational state apparatus (as 
did other Arab states) as many official religious posts since the establishment of 
Jordan have been held by people ‘who displayed moderate Sufi tendencies of a 
particularly centrist socio-religious nature.’47 During the 1980s the government 
tried to further incorporate Sufism as a counterweight to the rise of the Islamist 
movements by making several attempts to establish a Higher Council for Sufism. 
This did not succeed – based on Abu Hanieh’s account it seems that the main 
reason was the bickering of the shaykhs and their unwillingness to accept one of 
them as the head of such a council, but there was also the realization that such a 
body would become a tool in the hands of the government.48 
 As we have seen in paragraph 4.2, King Abdullah presents himself as the 
champion of ‘moderate Islam’ in opposition to political Islam in the national and 
international arena of ‘Muslim Politics’. One can find a Sufi streak in initiatives 
like the Amman Message. Prince Ghazi’s book Love in the Holy Qur’an and the 
                                                  
44 Ibid., 162–163. 
45 Interview with an expert on interfaith dialogue in Jordan on 25-11-2013. 
46 Abu Hanieh, Sufism and Sufi Orders, 123. 
47 Ibid., 11. According to Abu Hanieh the Ministry of Awqāf and Religious Affairs has mainly been 
staffed by moderate Islamists, but in 1941 the first Grand Mufti of Jordan, Shaykh Hamza al-
Arabi, was a Sufi, and the Dār al-Iftā’ has mainly been held by Sufis. Also, the supreme judge and 
the muftī of the army have often been a Sufi. He bases this analysis on interviews with Sufi 
shaykhs. Ibid., 186–188. 
48 Abu Hanieh, Sufism and Sufi Orders, 13, 190–194. 
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focus on ‘love’ in A Common Word shows a distinct influence of Sufi thought. 
Sufism is presented as the spiritual part of Islam ‘that intersects with the tenets 
and the fundamentals embraced by all religions.’49 This use of Sufism as a 
religion of love and tolerance in such political projects is widespread (see 
paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2), and can be seen as what Ernst calls ‘Sufism and the 
politics of peace’ (see paragraph 1.5.2). We see these ‘politics of peace’ in 
Jordan on the national and international level, as some of the royal NGOs and 
research centres are committed to spreading what they see as the moderate, 
tolerant version of Islam articulated in these messages. The list of signatories 
shows that these initiatives are supported by political leaders and traditional 
Islamic authorities who support a reformed Islam, for example in Egypt 
Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi (1928-2010, then Grand Imam of al-Azhar), Ali 
Gomaa (1952, Grand Mufti of Egypt), Ahmad al-Tayyib (1946, then President of 
al-Azhar University, now Grand Imam of al-Azhar, from a well-known Sufi family 
in Upper Egypt) and in Syria Ahmad Kuftaro, Muhammad al-Buti, and 
Muhammad Habash (see 1.5.2). It also includes more independent Islamic 
scholars and Sufi leaders, such as Tariq Ramadan (1962), Yusuf Qaradawi 
(1926), Nuh Ha Mim Keller (1954), Muhammad Tahir ul-Qadri (1951, leader of 
Minhaj ul-Quran), and Shaykh Nazim al-Haqqani (1922-2014). The reformist 
approach of Traditional Islam is well represented, and as we have seen, many 
Sufi leaders are included. 
In the twenty-first century, US policy makers also see the benefits of 
sponsoring Sufism to counter ‘radical Islam’, ‘supporting and encouraging the 
building of “moderate Islamic networks” in an attempt to universalize the model of 
tolerant Islamic Sufism.’ These networks consist of research institutes, think 
tanks, Sufi orders and governments cooperating in conferences and studies etc. 
Abu Hanieh sees this as a contemporary manifestation of the old ‘loyalty-
patronage’ model (also discussed by Heck, see paragraph 1.5.2) as Sufi groups 
                                                  
49 Ibid., 9, 205. The official website of the Amman Message, http://www.ammanmessage.com; A 
Common Word, http://www.acommonword.com; Love in the Holy Quran (revised 6th edition 
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bolster the legitimacy of the authorities. Needless to say, some Sufi movements’ 
connection to Western powers discredited Sufism even further in the eyes of 
those opposed to Western influence.50 
Abu Hanieh writes that Jordanian Sufis have never rebelled against the 
government (with the exception of Laith al-Shbeilat, a Sufi who was arrested in 
1992 for opposing the government, but who denied the charges) and that most 
Sufi shaykhs in Jordan support the regime verbally, even though they all claim 
independence of any outside influence. He attributes this to the fact that the Sufis 
adhere to the principle of ‘obedience to the guardian’, and that they accept the 
genealogical legitimacy of the Hashemites and consider them to be Sufis. The 
participation of some Sufi shaykhs in official Islamic occasions hosted by the 
King in his mosque in al-Abdali is an example of this support. Abu Hanieh, 
however, raises the question if this support is genuine, referring to one shaykh he 
interviewed who said that this support is only superficial as the shaykhs oppose 
the regime amongst their followers.51 These comments are of course extremely 
generalizing and need to be verified by additional research in all Jordanian ṭuruq, 
not relying on the words of the shaykhs alone, but taking into account the 
relationship between shaykh and follower.52 In an oppressive state like Jordan, 
the truth of this matter will be difficult to verify by an outsider.  
 Abu Hanieh adds that ‘to date, none of the Sufi orders in Jordan has 
developed a strategy for engaging or participating in political life, or for 
establishing political parties specific to their orders, as their counterparts have 
done in numerous other Arab and Islamic countries.’53 However, as noted for 
example by Lincoln, Heck, Stjernholm and Pinto and in the Jordanian context by 
Wiktorowicz and Taji-Farouki, if we define ‘politics’ as broader than participating 
                                                  
50 Ibid., 13–14, 194–195. 
51 Abu Hanieh, Sufism and Sufi Orders, 201–203. 
52 The Review Panel stresses that ‘[t]his is the opinion of Abu Hanieh. We think that not all 
sheikhs are with the regime or against it, each sheikh bears the responsibility of his own opinion.’ 
Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 8; Review Panel, ‘Response to 
email of October 12’. 
53 Abu Hanieh, Sufism and Sufi Orders, 14. 
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in party politics but include other kinds of social participation54 – especially in a 
situation where almost every kind of social activity is in some way controlled by 
the government – then many Sufi shaykhs and ṭuruq are politically active. 
Especially when we take into consideration Eickelman and Piscatori’s 
understanding of ‘Muslim politics’ as the competition over the interpretation of 
Islam then Sufi shaykhs are definitely involved in ‘Muslim politics’. Before we can 
conclude anything on the matter however, we need to examine the internal 
authority structures of the ṭuruq, as the degree of influence a shaykh has over his 
followers influences their degree of participation in this broader ‘Muslim politics’. 
The attitude of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya shall be examined in chapter 7, and 
the conclusion to Part II. 
 
 
4.4 The Yashrutiyya in Jordan 
 
Before 1948 there was a small community of followers who had come to Jordan 
in the 1930s from Lebanon.55 In 1948 many followers fled to Amman, most of 
them from al-Walaja. As the West Bank was annexed by Jordan, the 
communities in the West Bank also fell under Jordanian rule. Shaykh 
Muhammad al-Hadi visited Amman and Jericho several times and some 
followers visited him in Beirut. In 1960 Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi’s son Sīdī 
Ahmad moved to Amman where he became responsible for the followers in 
Jordan (both East and West Bank) and the Gulf. 
In 1967 the West Bank and Gaza Strip were occupied by Israel and many 
Palestinians fled, many for the second time. Many followers of the Yashrutiyya 
fled to Amman and Zarqa and flocked around Sīdī Ahmad, who suddenly became 
responsible for a massively increased community. His house in al-Weibdeh was 
the centre of the ṭarīqa in Jordan from 1960-1980. When Shaykh Ahmad became 
                                                  
54 See paragraph 1.5.2. Lincoln, ‘Notes towards a Theory of Religion and Revolution’; Heck, 
‘Introduction’; Stjernholm, ‘A Translocal Sufi Movement’, 84; Pinto, ‘Sufism and the Political 
Economy of Morality in Syria’; Wiktorowicz and Taji-Farouki, ‘Islamic NGOs and Muslim Politics’, 
686. 
55 Abu Hanieh, Sufism and Sufi Orders, 139. 
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shaykh, the zāwiya near the Fourth Circle became the international centre of the 
ṭarīqa until 2005. Shaykh Ahmad built a new zāwiya in the neighbourhood of 
Wadi al-Sir, near the Eighth Circle, which was inaugurated in 2005. In Jordan 
most of the followers live in Amman, but there is also a community in Zarqa. 
Especially in earlier years they did not have the possibility to visit the zāwiya in 
Amman often and they were more dependent on themselves, but nowadays the 
followers from Zarqa join the activities in the zāwiya on such a regular basis that 
one can include them in the analysis as part of the community in Amman. 
Nowadays, the community is considered the largest Sufi ṭarīqa in 
Jordan.56 The community is very close, but at the same time aims to participate 
in wider society. Shaykh Ahmad is not involved in the Amman Message, but does 
show his respect for the King by attending religious events hosted by the King in 
his mosque in Abdali, and indirectly supports the King’s interpretation of Islam. In 
the next three chapters, we shall discuss the authority of the Shaykh within the 
ṭarīqa and the place of the ṭarīqa in society and its relationship to the regime. 
 
                                                  
56 Meeting with Hassan Abu Hanieh on 28-11-2013. 
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Chapter 5 
The Shaykh 
 
 
In this chapter, we will discuss the doctrinal and functional aspects of the 
Shaykh’s authority in Amman. We shall first discuss how the idea that ‘all the 
Shaykhs are one’ is understood by the followers in Amman, and what this means 
for their attachment to the previous Shaykhs (especially Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din) 
and the current Shaykh, Shaykh Ahmad. Following from this, we shall discuss 
how they understand the spiritual and physical succession of their Shaykhs, 
particularly the succession of Shaykh Ahmad, and how they see the Shaykh, 
what he means to them and which practical roles they attribute to him. Then we 
shall discuss what are the traditional and charismatic aspects of his authority, 
and what this means for theories of the institutionalisation of charisma. 
 
 
5.1 All the Shaykhs are One 
 
Shaykh Ahmad explains that there is an essence (asās) in the ṭarīqa that is 
unchanging while the forms (shakl) or manifestations change. This essence is 
the spiritual link between past and present. For example, Shaykh Muhammad al-
Hadi dressed according to his time, while Shaykh Ahmad always dresses in a 
suit: dress codes change but the Shaykh is and remains the Shaykh. Similarly, 
books look different in different editions but the content is the same. Also the 
zāwiya changes – the design of the building changes, the social role changes, 
but the religious practices performed in the zāwiya stay the same.1 
 This essence of the ṭarīqa is the ‘aqīda, a concept that is often translated 
into English using the words ‘belief’, ‘creed’, ‘dogma’ or ‘doctrine’. For the 
followers however, it means much more. ‘The ‘aqīda is bigger [than the sharia], it 
                                                  
1 Meeting with Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti and Dr. Ali at the zāwiya in Amman on 26-03-2013. 
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is the umbrella; the ‘aqīda is īmān, and the īmān is in the heart (qalb).’2 It 
encompasses not only their beliefs, but also the rules on which they base their 
life: the sharia, both devotional practices (‘ibādāt) and social rules (mu‘amalāt). 
The ‘aqīda is not just an abstract theoretical concept; it is present in the hearts 
and minds of the followers. When a follower is considered a good follower of the 
Shaykh, he or she is described as ‘having the ‘aqīda inside’. The Shaykh does 
not shy away from theological discussions about the ‘aqīda in his mudhākara, 
and the followers are encouraged to discuss this among themselves.  
 On a theological level, the Shaykh receives and transmits the Islamic 
‘aqīda, believed to be the same ‘aqīda that Muhammad received and 
transmitted.3 It is said to be the unchanging essence of the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya – and in their view, of Islam as a whole. As the Shaykh explained: 
the Islamic ‘aqīda teaches that God is one. The Sufi ‘aqīda teaches that there is a 
special connection between God and the Prophet Muhammad, that God is 
always present (ḥāḍir) and that a person always has a connection (ṣilla) with 
God, whatever he or she is doing. Along with most Sufi orders, the Yashrutiyya 
teaches that Muhammad has a khalīfa (pl. khulafā’, successor), the wārith 
muḥammadī (Muhammadan heir) or the nūr muḥammadī (Muhammadan light) – 
they believe this khalīfa to be the Shaykh of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya.4 
Shaykh Ahmad explains that every human has a link (waṣl) to God, that God 
chooses how to operate that link, and that the Shaykh puts this into practice. As 
such he himself is the link to God. He is the murabbī (educator, pedagogue): he 
raises the followers, like a father raises a child.5  
 The belief that ‘all the Shaykhs are one’ is found among all ikhwānnā. In 
Amman, it is often followed by the expression ‘the ‘aqīda is one,’ which is 
considered to be the explanation. The Shaykhs are considered the same 
                                                  
2 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
3 Shaykh Ahmad’s mudhākara during the meeting in the zāwiya in Amman on Thursday evening 
28-03-13 (unrecorded). 
4 Explanation of Shaykh Ahmad during a semi-informal meeting with Shaykh Ahmad, Dr. Ali, and 
five followers in the zāwiya in Amman, 06-04-2013 (unrecorded). 
5 Meeting with Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti and Dr. Ali at the zāwiya in Amman on 26-03-2013. 
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because they transmit the same ‛aqīda – even more, for the followers they are 
the ‘aqīda: 
 
When I see him I feel in my heart he is my ‛aqīda, what he asks me to do about 
God, how to see God, how to worship our Lord, what the mubāya‛a asks from 
me. I feel him in my heart.6  
 
For the followers, the ‘aqīda is therefore very much alive and present, embodied 
by the Shaykh in its most perfect and complete form. Further explanations stress 
in different combinations that all Shaykhs follow the path of Muhammad, that they 
are the inheritors of Muhammad and that the nūr muḥammadī shines in all of 
them. As we have seen in paragraph 1.4, this is a classical Sufi doctrine 
according to which the nūr muḥammadī is passed on through the awliyā as 
inheritors of the Prophet. For this reason, they consider the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya the mother of the ṭuruq because it embodies the direct message of 
the Prophet Muhammad.7 
As such, for them all the Shaykhs are essentially the same even though 
their outward forms – their bodies – are different. They transfer and embody the 
‛aqīda, the nūr muḥammadī, and because of this they are an extension (imtidād) 
of each other: ‘They are all Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā, there is no difference.’8 
Important to note is that without exception all respondents mean the four 
Shaykhs from the Yashruti family: Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din, Shaykh Ibrahim, 
Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi, and Shaykh Ahmad. The Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya 
was founded by Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din al-Yashruti and his coming to Acre is 
considered the moment when it all began.9 While they respect the previous 
Shadhuli masters – and all Sufi masters for that matter – the Shaykhs they 
spiritually connect to, are these four. Through them, the followers connect to the 
                                                  
6 AM1-3 in Interview AM1. 
7 Women’s meeting at the zāwiya in Amman 30-03-2013. 
8 AM3-2 in Interview AM3 with seven followers in Amman on 16-11-2013, hereafter referred to as 
Interview AM3. 
9 Interview with Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti, al-Urdun, 26-02-1996, p.8-9. 
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Prophet, the Islamic ‘aqīda and the divine light. Through them, they are educated 
in the Islamic ‘aqīda and in the Islamic behaviour and worship. 
 
How I see the Shaykh Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā, so I see the previous Shaykhs. The same 
view (naẓara), one view. Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din, Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ibrahim, 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Muhammad al-Hadi, Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ahmad, together. The same 
view. The ‘aqīda is one. God is one, ‘ibāda (worship) and dhikr is one. The 
tarbiya is one. The goal is one. A religious and a social goal... the same ‘aqīda. 
The axis in place of (qutbe niyābatan ‘an) Sayyidnā Muhammad. The same path, 
the same conduct (sīra), the same Muhammadan path/behaviour (sulūk 
muḥammadī) on which the four Shaykhs of the ṭarīq walked.10 
 
[This relation] is an extension (imtidād) of our relation with Sayyidnā Muhammad 
pbuh. When Sayyidnā Muhammad lived on earth as a man, 1435 years ago – 
until now, we feel that Sayyidnā Muhammad [is] with every one of us. (...) And 
this is an extension of the Muhammadan principle. He did not do anything 
outside of this context ever, it started and it ended with him. This is why we see 
this extension in Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din, then in Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ibrahim, then 
in Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Muhammad al-Hadi, then in Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ahmad – and after a 
long period we will see it in Sīdī Ali and in Sīdī Hadi. It is an interior extension. (...) 
Sayyidnā Muhammad pbuh, we feel him in everything we did and do and Ḥaḍrat 
Sīdnā tells us we need the ta‛līm (teaching) of Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Muhammad pbuh 
who came 1435 years ago. And until now we walk and continue the Noble Qur’an 
and the Sunna of the Prophet and in addition to it the ta‛līm of Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali 
Nur al-Din – we walk and educate (netrabba) accordingly.11 
 
AM3-6 The divine secret (al-sirr al-ilāhi) is transferred from one to one.  
AM1-3: She says she sees no difference between Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā now and Ḥaḍrat 
Sīdnā before, because they are one thing. The main reason is that Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
                                                  
10 ZA1-1 in Interview ZA1. The connection to the Prophet was strongly stressed in this interview, 
especially by ZA1-1, who was the main respondent throughout Interview ZA1. 
11 AM2-3 in Interview ZA1. This answer was given in the context of the discussion of the 
importance of the succession within the family. The connection to the Prophet was strongly 
stressed in this interview. This respondent was also the one who brought up this point in Interview 
AM2 when it had not yet received much attention, which means this answer reflects her individual 
opinion as much as the group consensus of Interview ZA1. 
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is light, Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā is light, Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā is light, she sees Sīdnā Ahmad as 
light and he who was before him as light.12 
 
Therefore we should understand the doctrine ‘all the Shaykhs are one’ as 
‘all the Shaykhs of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya are one’ because all four 
transmit and embody the divine light and the ‘aqīda and teach this to their 
followers, thus exhibiting both traditional and charismatic authority at the same 
time. As we shall see in paragraph 5.4, they are all considered to be spiritually 
present even after their death, especially in the zāwiya in Acre where they are 
buried,13 but the main relationship is with the current Shaykh. Because of this 
focus on the four Yashruti Shaykhs, we will now turn to examine the founding 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din al-Yashruti more closely, referring to the early history of the 
ṭarīqa, but focussing on how this history is interpreted by the followers in Amman.  
 
 
5.2 The Authority of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din 
 
One cannot discuss Shaykh Ahmad’s role without referring to the founding 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din. When I told Shaykh Ahmad I want to focus my research 
on the role of the Shaykh in the ṭarīqa, he said I should first read about Shaykh 
Ali Nur al-Din, then write about how he passed the ṭarīqa on to his son,14 which 
shows how important he is considered to be. Fatima al-Yashrutiyya’s books 
about her father’s life, sayings and karāmāt15 are still read by the followers. 
Therefore, the official narrative of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s life and teachings and 
the follower’s understanding of this narrative is essential when understanding 
                                                  
12 AM3-6 and AM1-3 in Interview AM3. AM1-3 often explained the answers of female 
respondents, sometimes adding new information as she did here. In this case, she referred to the 
theme of light that was discussed earlier in the interview. 
13 For an extensive discussion of the role of the tombs of the previous Shaykhs in Acre, see 
chapter 11. 
14 Shaykh Ahmad during a semi-informal meeting with Shaykh Ahmad, Dr. Ali, and five followers 
in the zāwiya in Amman, 06-04-2013. 
15 Karāma (pl. karāmāt) means ‘dignity’, often translated as ‘miracle’. Muslims distinguish 
between mu‛jizāt, miracles performed by prophets, and karāmāt, performed by other people with 
God’s grace, although this distinction is not always very clear. 
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Shaykh Ahmad’s position. Rather than provide an historical analysis of Shaykh 
Ali Nur al-Din’s authority (which has been done by Van Ess16), I am concerned 
here with the image that the contemporary Shaykh and followers have of their 
founder and his milieu, in other words of the ‘charismatic moment’ in which the 
ṭarīqa originated. 
Shaykh Ahmad says that the ṭarīqa Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya began when 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din arrived in Palestine as he did not want to keep his grace 
(ni‛ma) to himself but wanted to spread it.17 He was  
 
the carrier of the banner of the Muhammadan da‛wa, in a time and condition in 
which the area in which he settled was in real need for someone to bring life and 
Islamic and spiritual vitality among its children, and in their thoughts and hearts 
(af’ida).18 
 
Shaykh Ahmad calls Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din ‘the axis of his time (quṭb zamānihi), 
and the inheritor of the Muhammadan knowledge (wārith al-‛ilm al-
muḥammadī),’19 the perfect guide (al-murshid al-kāmil),20 ‘al-quṭb al-ghawth’, the 
lamp of the sharia and truth (nibrās al-sharī‛a wa-l-ḥaqīqa):’21 
 
He was not just a shaykh, but he was a scholar and a jurisprudent, a murabbī 
and a muwajjih (guide, someone who points you in the right direction), and the 
master of the message (ṣāḥib al-risāla) that he spread among the people, 
following in Muhammad’s perfect footsteps.22 
 
Shaykh Ahmad uses concepts from the Sufi tradition that have been used to 
describe Sufi masters for centuries (see paragraph 1.4), using terminology that 
                                                  
16 Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 46. 
17 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 15-03-2014, p.2, Shaykh Ahmad’s introduction to 
the third edition (1990) of al-Yashruṭiyya, Riḥla ilā al-Ḥaqq, 16.  
18 Shaykh Ahmad’s introduction to Fatima al-Yashrutiyya, Masīratī fī Ṭarīq al-Ḥaqq (Beirut, 1981), 
14. 
19 Shaykh Ahmad’s introduction to the third edition (1990) of al-Yashruṭiyya, Riḥla ilā al-Ḥaqq, 16. 
20 Interview with Shaykh Ahmad, conducted in Beirut in 1999, in Sawafta, al-Madrasa al-
Shādhiliyya al-Yashruṭiyya, 835–842: 841. 
21 Shaykh Ahmad’s introduction to al-Yashruṭiyya, Masīratī fī Ṭarīq al-Ḥaqq, 12. 
22 Shaykh Ahmad’s introduction to the third edition (1990) of al-Yashruṭiyya, Riḥla ilā al-Ḥaqq, 16. 
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points to his connection to the Prophet (inheritor of the Muhammadan 
knowledge, following in Muhammad’s footsteps) and his highest rank among the 
awliyā (quṭb zamānihi, al-quṭb al-ghawth), and at the same time stresses his 
orthodoxy according to the tradition of Sufi scholars, in which sharia and ṭarīqa 
together lead to the ultimate Truth (ḥaqīqa) (see paragraph 1.4). According to this 
description, he spread the message and guided people according to the principle 
that Islam should be a living tradition of inner spirituality and adherence to the 
sharia, a combination of ẓāhir (exterior, material and physical) and bāṭin (interior, 
spiritual), which is presented as a spiritual renewal. The spiritual renewal is an 
important part of this description, reinforced by the image of the Shaykh coming 
from abroad, and gives us a first glimpse of the importance that is attached to 
renewal in this ṭarīqa.  
In his introduction to Mawāhib Al-Ḥaqq, Shaykh Ahmad chose to draw 
specific attention to two karāmāt recorded in the book. Firstly, he shows Shaykh 
Ali Nur al-Din’s high rank and great power through the story that he brought one 
of his followers back from the dead. In his discussion of this story, Shaykh 
Ahmad stresses that the Shaykh – and the awliyā’ and the righteous worshippers 
(‛ibād ṣāliḥūn) in general – are essentially distinct from normal people.23 
Secondly, Shaykh Ahmad stresses his predecessor’s adherence to the sharia as 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din continued to pray ṣalāa and additional prayers standing all 
night despite his extremely old age.24 The choice to mention this particular 
karāma stresses that Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s high spiritual rank did not absolve 
him from adhering to the sharia, as some people have claimed throughout history 
(see paragraph 1.4), but that the two are inseparably connected. 
In an interview, Shaykh Ahmad explains why the succession always 
passes within the Shaykh’s family. He says that some followers have tried to 
‘carry the message’, but the burden was too big to bear. He illustrates this point 
with the story of Shaykh Muhammad al-Sharif al-Maghrebi, a follower who had 
                                                  
23 Shaykh Ahmad’s introduction to the third edition (1997) of Fatima al-Yashrutiyya, Mawāhib al-
Ḥaqq, 3rd ed. (Beirut, 1997), 10. The story referred to can be found in Ibid., 78-79. 
24 Shaykh Ahmad’s introduction to the third edition (1990) of al-Yashruṭiyya, Riḥla ilā al-Ḥaqq, 16. 
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asked Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din if it was possible for a murīd to reach the martaba25 
of the Shaykh. They went for a walk and the Shaykh took wider strides with each 
step until he flew high in the air. The follower also rose up into the air, but could 
not follow his Shaykh, who was soon out of sight. The murīd understood that 
‘whatever his elevation in the divine stages (al-marātib al-illāhiyya), the murīd will 
not reach the maqām of his Shaykh.’ This point is connected to the notion that 
the Shaykh is essentially distinct from normal people. As a point of doctrine, the 
nūr muḥammadī is passed on in the Yashruti family, and the Shaykh is therefore 
always succeeded by his most able son, who has to fulfil certain conditions: he 
has to have something special (khuṣūṣiyya), the ability (al-mukna wa-l-istaṭā‛a), 
aptitude of knowledge and religion (ahliyya ‛ilmiyya wa-dīniyya), receiving 
(talaqqī) from the Shaykh on the exterior and interior level, and preparation of 
nafs and rūḥ. 26  
This idea and practice of hereditary succession, based on the idea that the 
nūr muḥammadi is passed along the line of genealogical descent, has become a 
very common occurrence in contemporary Sufism. While it has been criticized by 
some as a corruption of ‘golden age’ Sufi ideas and practices, it is not seen as 
such by its followers (see paragraph 1.4.1).27 The doctrine that the Shaykh 
always comes from the founding Shaykh’s family is thus a common – if not 
universal – element in the wider Sufi tradition, and is explicitly taught by Shaykh 
Ahmad himself. According to this doctrine, the ability to reach the highest levels 
of the Path is reserved for the Shaykh from the Yashruti family who embodies the 
nūr muḥammadi and is essentially different from the normal followers, ensuring 
that the charismatic connection to the nūr muḥammadi will always be found 
exclusively in the Shaykh, making the follower forever dependent on him to 
                                                  
25 Martaba (pl. marātib) means level, rank, office. In the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya also used to 
refer to spiritual level 
26 Interview with Shaykh Ahmad, conducted in Beirut in 1999, in Sawafta, al-Madrasa al-
Shādhiliyya al-Yashruṭiyya, 835–842: 841. The story can be found in al-Yashruṭiyya, Mawāhib al-
Ḥaqq, 54–55. Fatima al-Yashrutiyya mentions that Shaykh Muhammad al-Sharif was a scholar of 
the sharia, who had fled to Damascus in 1948 and there told the story to another follower, 
Muhammad Ali al-Kurdi. She further gives details that this walk was along the beach, towards the 
tomb of walī Allāh ‛Izz al-Dīn near Acre. 
27 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 87–88, 128–129, 390 note 129. 
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access this force. While Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s charisma is thus institutionalised 
in the traditional model of family inheritance, this doctrine denies the idea of the 
‘drying up’ of charisma, as charisma will always be embodied by the current 
Shaykh. 
Like Shaykh Ahmad, the followers also consider Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din to 
be the founder of the ṭarīqa, and they also consider his arrival in Palestine 
(tashrīf) as the moment when it all began. They believe that he was destined to 
come to Palestine to spread his teaching and to benefit his followers, who were 
similarly destined to be found and taught by the Shaykh. The idea that Shaykh Ali 
Nur al-Din travelled to find his followers is of importance for the followers in 
Amman. Previously people had to travel to find their shaykh– as indeed Shaykh 
Ali Nur al-Din al-Yashruti and before him Muhammad ibn Hamza Zafir al-Madani 
and Abu Hasan al-Shadhili had done – but Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din had come to 
find them.28 On the one hand it shows them the love and care the Shaykh has for 
his followers in the physical and spiritual realms, and on the other hand it makes 
the followers feel they partake in the chosenness of their Shaykh as they 
consider themselves destined to be found by him. Just as the Shaykh is chosen 
before time, they are chosen to be his followers before time. 
In this discussion of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s arrival, little attention is given 
to his youth and to the period he spent with his Shaykh, Shaykh al-Madani, and 
the moment of succession after Shaykh al-Madani passed away. Van Ess points 
to the possibly problematic nature of the succession as Ali Nur al-Din contested 
the succession of Shaykh al-Madani’s son Muhammad Zafir and left Misrata. 
Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi told Van Ess that Shaykh al-Madani’s daughter had 
proclaimed Ali Nur al-Din to be the new quṭb and had sent him East, thus 
legitimizing his claim and his spread of the ṭarīqa in Palestine. Van Ess sees this 
story as a later attempt to legitimize Ali Nur al-Din’s claim.29 Either way, this issue 
does not seem to be of great concern to the followers and does not seem to play 
                                                  
28 Informal discussion with AM2-2 in the zāwiya Amman on 14-11-2013. 
29 Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 10–11. 
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a role in the legitimacy of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din in their eyes, as they focus on his 
arrival in Palestine and his spread of the message from there. 
Nowadays abnā al-ṭarīqa stress Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s role as a teacher 
and role model who taught them to live according to the Book and the Sunna. 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din taught at the Zaytun Mosque in Acre, even though he had 
no particular educational credentials other than his studies with Shaykh al-
Madani. One of the values of the ṭarīqa is that while formal education is 
extremely desirable, it is not that which makes one knowledgeable. This attitude 
is still voiced by followers, as was done for example during a women’s meeting in 
Amman where one of the ladies told the story of a university graduate who had a 
discussion with her father and asked him which university he had attended, even 
though he had not finished high school. They all agreed it is the ṭarīqa which 
taught him, and Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā.30 
The followers believe that Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din called on his followers to 
follow his successors as they followed him, as was illustrated by one of the 
followers through a ḥadīth:31 
 
There is a ḥadīth on Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā the founder, may God sanctify his secret, that 
says: ‘Take our words, [they are] spirit for you. We are continuous.  
(Khudū kalāmnā, rūḥ laykum. Eḥna mustamrīn)’  
Not my word, we... in the process of renewal. The wilāya is renewing 
(mutajaddida) because wilāya is remembered (maḥfūẓa) in the Qur’an:  
‘For the friends of God there will be no fear upon them, nor will they grieve.’32 
 
He explained that Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din not only referred to himself, but also to 
his successors. He connected this to the concept of wilāya, which he reminded 
us is both rooted in the Qur’an and in a continuous process of renewal as it is 
transmitted by Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din and his successors. Again we see the 
                                                  
30 Women’s meeting in the zāwiya in Amman on 30-11-2013. 
31 A ḥadīth (pl. aḥādīth) is a ‘narrative, talk, speech’, used by all Muslims to refer to the traditions 
about the words and deeds of the Prophet, and of his Companions and Successors. The 
followers of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya also use the term to refer to traditions about the words 
and deeds of their Shaykhs, particularly Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din. 
32 AM3-2 in Interview AM3. The Qur’anic quotation can be found in Sūrat Yūnus 10:62. 
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importance attached to the concept of renewal in this ṭarīqa, legitimized by 
referring to the Qur’an and enacted through the wilāya embodied in the 
Shaykhs.33  
The wilāya is transferred from Shaykh to Shaykh and the followers are 
taught anew in every generation by the living Shaykh. In addition to this the 
teachings are transmitted within the community, as membership of the ṭarīqa 
continues mostly within families over generations. Connecting to the history of 
the ṭarīqa and to the earlier Shaykhs, is therefore intertwined with the connection 
to the followers’ own ancestors and personal history, a transhistorical bond which 
is re-enacted in this generation through the bond with the living Shaykh and the 
community: 
 
The Shaykhs that came before the current Shaykh, we heard about them from 
our fathers, because we did not live in the period in which they did. And the abnā 
al-ṭarīqa took teachings (ta‘limāt) and guidance (irshādāt wa-tawjihāt) from the 
previous Shaykhs and transmitted them to us.34 
 
This transhistorical experience, based on traditional kinship lines, enhances the 
followers’ feeling that they participate in the ‘charismatic moment’ through their 
relationship with the living Shaykh and the community. 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din not only shaped the spiritual attitudes and concrete 
practices of his followers, he also shaped the environment in which they could 
form a community. The followers continue to acknowledge that their community 
life is due to their Shaykh, min faḍl Sīdnā (for example, see chapter 10). Most 
concretely, this happened by establishing zawāya.  
The zāwiya in Tarshiha was a villa with private quarters for the Shaykh 
and his family and facilities for the guests, all arranged around a courtyard. When 
walking through the empty rooms one gets an impression of the activity that must 
have happened there. Especially impressive are the two largest halls which 
                                                  
33 AM3-2 in Interview AM3. He did not go deeper into the matter of wilāya and none of the other 
participants took it up. 
34 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
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housed the two kitchens used to prepare the food that was brought in from the 
ṭarīqa’s lands in the Galilee and to cater for all the guests.35 
 
 
 
 
 
The zāwiya in Acre consisted of the house of the Shaykh, the takiya where the 
prayer meetings took place, and the rooms and facilities for the guests and the 
mutajarridīn (followers who live in the zāwiya). Every day people prayed together: 
the ṣalāa five times a day, and the awrād and waẓīfa twice a day. A few evenings 
a week they would perform the collective ḥaḍra after reading the waẓīfa. As 
mentioned there were also study meetings (durus). The mutajarridīn performed 
the household tasks in the zāwiya and everyone lived and ate together. Food 
                                                  
35 Visit to the zāwiya in Tarshiha and interview with two members of the caretaker’s family on 15-
05-2013 (unrecorded), hereafter referred to as Interview TA1. 
Figure 1. The courtyard of the zāwiya in Tarshiha. The door on the left leads to the main kitchen 
which occupies the entire building on that side of the courtyard. The space underneath the arch in 
the back was the summer kitchen. Photo by author, 15-05-2013. 
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was distributed among the poor in the neighbourhood as well. Thus a strong 
community developed around the Shaykh and his house which reached out to 
the neighbourhood. The zāwiya was based financially on the private wealth of the 
Shaykh (acquired through heritage and marriage), the donations from followers 
and the awqāf belonging to the ṭarīqa. These awqāf consisted of land, buildings, 
and the zawāya themselves. The Galilee being an extremely fertile region, the 
returns from the land must have been considerable.36  
Van Ess argues that this community life played a large role in the appeal 
of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s Path as people from all social classes and ethnic 
backgrounds came together in the zāwiya. This was particularly visible and 
experienced emotionally during devotional exercises, as there was no hierarchy 
among the followers when sitting or standing in a circle for the reading of the 
waẓīfa and the performance of the ḥaḍra.37 While Van Ess does not refer to it, 
this understanding fits Buehler’s idea of life in the zāwiya as an example of 
Turner’s communitas and anti-structure (see paragraph 1.4).  
This period is seen by today’s followers as the ‘golden age’ of the ṭarīqa. 
People came from all over the area to visit the Shaykh and participate in life in 
the zāwiya, and the Shaykh, the community and the zāwiya were respected 
throughout the region, enjoying wealth and social prestige due to the Shaykh’s 
spiritual status and his willingness to share this with his followers. It was the 
ultimate ‘charismatic moment’, but the lines between charisma, tradition and 
institutionalisation are blurred. This charismatic moment was firmly rooted in the 
Shadhuli tradition. While nowadays the focus is on the four Yashruti Shaykhs and 
the preceding lineage is downplayed, it is not negated. Also, we see that 
institutionalisation already started in the period of the founding Shaykh, who sent 
disciples to proselytize, and built the zawāya to function as religious and social 
centres, thus constructing a traditional yet strongly centralised ṭarīqa. This further 
                                                  
36 Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 54–58. 
37 Ibid., 58. 
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proves the point discussed in paragraph 1.3.2, that rather than a clear break, 
there is a continuum between charisma and institutionalisation.38 
 A number of followers expressed what Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din means for 
followers today: 
 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din, he is the founder of the ṭarīqa. And the founder of 
the ṭarīqa in my belief didn’t go, he went by the body as the Prophet, but the 
teaching (ta‘līm) of the ṭarīqa is with Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā now. Because I feel that this 
information with Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā and Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā is the same. We ikhwānnā say 
[that] Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā passed away (intaqal), he went to another world. I cannot say 
he died (māt), because in my heart he passed away. (...) We love Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
Ahmad, everybody in ikhwānnā love him, but not in his shape. No no. If I leave 
this country to go anywhere, the same meaning [is] in my heart for Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
because I love him from my heart, not from his appearance. This is the rule in my 
heart for the ṭarīqa. This is my opinion. (...) 
I still feel it now. Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din, I feel him in my heart. Because a 
relationship between a Shaykh and murīd is not his body, it’s from inside, it’s 
from the heart. When I heard about Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din before, I didn’t 
see him but I feel him in my heart, I love him, I feel I love him, because he is my 
Shaykh. And now Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ahmad in my belief he is the Shaykh. I feel him 
as I feel for Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din. The same feeling you know. Because 
the ‘aqīda is one, this is what I feel, this is my opinion. The relationship between 
me and him [is] in my heart. When I see him I feel in my heart he is my ‛aqīda, 
what he asks me to do about God, how to see God, how to worship our Lord, 
what the mubāya‛a asks from me. I feel him in my heart. (...) Of course the 
person is very important for anyone, but the relationship does not depend on 
whether I see the person. The ‛aqīda [is] in my heart.39 
 
This quote illustrates this follower’s belief that the Shaykh not only possesses 
and transmits the ‛aqīda, he actually is the ‛aqīda, as were his predecessors. The 
relationship with the Shaykh and with the ‛aqīda is present in the heart of the 
                                                  
38 Most notably, see Geaves, ‘Charismatic Authority in Islam’, 42, 58. 
39 AM1-3 in Interview AM1. 
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follower and it does not matter if the Shaykh is present or even alive – the 
Shaykh and his message are always a spiritual and emotional presence. 
 Another participant stresses strongly that even as this is so, the 
relationship with the living Shaykh should be the strongest: 
 
AM1-1: Really we love all the Shaykhs in the ṭarīqa. (...) But in our period, we 
turn towards the living Shaykh (tawajjuhnā ittijāh al-shaykh al-ḥayy) (...) We have 
a saying: ‘Take something living from the living.’ Not from one who passed away, 
because the relation between the murīd and the Shaykh is not only information or 
education; there is a relationship between two hearts. Sometimes some people 
received information from the Shaykh or – as our sister said – by way of ilhām 
(divine inspiration). That’s what she wanted to say. (...) So my connection, my 
relationship, [is] direct with the new Shaykh. With the living Shaykh. This is the 
very important thing. 
AM1-3 [agrees with this]: You love everyone but your relationship [is] with the 
Shaykh [who is] alive. 
AM1-1: The relationship is not just education, tarbiya and ta‘līm etc., there is a 
relationship that connects through ilhām (tattaṣil bi-l-ilhām). 
AM1-3: As he said, the relationship between you and the Shaykh Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā, it 
is alive, to feel alive, as madad,40 as ilhām. (...) We cannot forget Acre, never we 
cannot, of course, Acre is the mother zāwiya, and you’ve seen the maqām of 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā in Acre? (...) Of course we ikhwānnā love Acre and everything in 
Acre. But the most important in our life is the relationship between us and Ḥaḍrat 
Sīdnā Ahmad because we believe he is alive. The madad, the ilhām, is from 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā to me.  
AM1-1: You can’t receive madad or something from the past. [It has to be] alive. 
If you love somebody, you love somebody who is a human being. We cannot 
deny our bodies or emotions, so I have somebody else to see him, to sit with 
him, to connect with him. (...) From the physical we deepen to the spiritual. That 
                                                  
40 Madad literally means ‘assistance, protection’, especially the spiritual aid granted by a walī due 
to the his proximity to God which allows him to intercede on behalf of those who place 
themselves under his protection. Rachida Chih, ‘What Is a Sufi Order? Revisiting the Concept 
through a Case Study of the Khalwatiyya in Contemporary Egypt’, in Sufism and the “Modern” in 
Islam, ed. Howell and Van Bruinessen , 29; Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern 
Egypt, 422. In the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya it is used in the sense of spiritual energy, divine 
inspiration. 
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is why we say the stones, or the place, is not the important thing, it is an 
appearance of the Shaykh. (...) So we concentrate on the meaning behind the 
stones. Otherwise we worship stones, if you only concentrate on this ka‘ba or this 
stone. First of all, the spiritual relationship is the most important. This is the 
relationship. We love him and he loves us. In the Holy Qur’an about the Prophet 
Muhammad God says he loves them and they love him. We need love. I didn’t 
see Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din... 
AM1-3: But you love him! 
AM1: I love him, but I need something living for there to be a connection, 
integrated, close connection (tarābuṭ), and an interlocking (tadākhul). Every 
person who believed in Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din and he didn’t or he doesn’t 
believe in Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ahmad it is... 
AM1-3: Not acceptable! 
AM1-1: He makes a big mistake. He stopped in a period. (...) The relationship 
should be modern and renewed.41 
 
This discussion happened in the context of a conversation on the meaning 
of the zāwiya in Acre for the followers, which will be analysed at greater length in 
chapter 11. It shows an important aspect of the ideas on both people and 
buildings in the ṭarīqa, and on the way the world works in general: the distinction 
between the ẓāhir and the bāṭin. While the ẓāhir cannot be neglected it serves as 
a portal to access the bāṭin, which is the true essence and which is what really 
counts. But as people living in the ẓāhir, in the physical world, one has to be a 
part of this physical world. This is why when a follower decides to officially join 
abnā al-ṭarīqa, s/he takes the pledge to the living Shaykh (see paragraph 6.2).42 
Even so, they are still emotionally and spiritually connected to the original 
charismatic moment of the founder as can be seen from their comments on 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din, such as the one above, and in their attitude to the zāwiya, 
which we shall discuss extensively in paragraph 11.1. 
Therefore the current Shaykh is at the same time essentially the same as 
his predecessors – the wārith muḥammadī connecting to the original and 
                                                  
41 AM1-1 and AM1-3 in Interview AM1. 
42 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
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timeless revelation of Muhammad and transmitting the true Islamic ‛aqīda, and 
the nūr muḥammadī – and the contemporary Shaykh adapting the outward forms 
of this ‛aqīda to contemporary society.  
While there was no explicit discussion of the concept of renewal, it was 
omnipresent in the references to renewal, innovation, and the importance of a 
connection to the Shaykh who is alive in this time, and to the dynamic ‘living’ 
nature of the faith. Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s message and charismatic presence 
remain relevant and ‘alive’ through his living successor. The spiritual connection 
remains ‘alive’, and the Shaykh adapts the outward manifestations of this 
spirituality to the physical world. As we shall see, the very act of adaptation leads 
to the followers’ view that this makes the ṭarīqa suitable for the present time, i.e. 
‘modern’, while preserving respect for the tradition and maintaining the spiritual 
depth of the original message, adds to the followers’ understanding of him being 
a holy (muqaddas) person. What O’Dea sees as the ‘dilemma of delimitation’, 
arguing that concretization leads to ossification and literalism,43 in this case is not 
a dilemma at all as concretization and adaptation does not dilute the charismatic 
message, but makes it speak to people and enhances the contemporary leader’s 
charisma and spiritual authority. 
 
 
5.3 The Succession of the Shaykhs 
 
In paragraph 5.2, we have discussed the official doctrine on the hereditary 
succession of the Shaykhs within the Yashruti family. According to the ‛aqīda of 
the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din was essentially different from 
his disciples as he alone embodied the nūr muḥammadī. He passed this on to his 
most able son, whom he appointed based on his ma‛rifa.  
The interpretation of this doctrine was discussed mainly in interviews ZA1 
and AM3. In both interviews, the participants made a distinction between the 
                                                  
43 O’Dea, ‘Sociological Dilemmas’, 82–84. See paragraph 1.3. 
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spiritual and the practical levels of the succession. The starting point is the 
relation between the Shaykhs as discussed in the previous paragraphs. 
The first reaction in Interview ZA1 was that the followers do not know why 
a person becomes the next Shaykh – this question is beyond them. It is related 
to the transmission of the Muhammadan inheritance making the Shaykh the 
inheritor of the Prophet, which shows through his exemplary behaviour: 
 
We do not enter those issues. Of course the level (martaba) of the Shaykhs has 
certain characteristics (muwaṣafāt) that we do not enter. (...) But of course the 
level of the Shaykhs is characterized by the wirātha muḥammadīya 
(Muhammadan inheritance). The descent (nasab) of the Prophet is by way of 
iqtidā’ of Sayyidnā Muhammad (making him into the qudwa, role model). And he 
is behaving according to the Muhammadan sulūk.44 
 
Another participant explained that they believe (bi-l-‛aqīda) that the 
Shaykh is chosen since time immemorial (mundhu ‛ālam al-azal) and that the 
previous Shaykh knows who is thus chosen and will prepare his successor for 
this office (martaba). He is made to ‘carry the charge he is entrusted with (ḥaml 
al-amāna).’ This is where the issue of the succession becomes practical and 
visible to the followers. This preparation is referred to as tarbiya: ‘He educates 
him according to the Muhammadan ‛aqīda, the akhlāq Muḥammadīya, to carry 
the Muhammadan ‛aqīda, and our Lord helps him.’45  
In Interview AM3, the first reaction in this discussion related to the 
practical tarbiya of the Shaykh within the community, among the other murīdīn, 
after which they discussed the spiritual aspects:  
 
The Shaykh is raised (yatarabba) like the murīd is raised. (...) He lives with the 
people (al-qawm), with the fuqarā’, with the murīdīn, he lives like the student of a 
school, like the son of a king or of a minister or a prime minister – there is no 
                                                  
44 ZA1-1 in Interview ZA1. From the very first minute of this interview, the Shaykh has been 
described by this respondent as the niyāba (substitute) of the Prophet Muhammad, so the stress 
on the link with the Prophet in this reply fits the rest of the interview. 
45 AM1-3 in Interview ZA1. 
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difference between them. The education (tadrīs) is one, madad comes to him like 
it comes to that murīd – that means he goes step-by-step in the states of the 
world (aḥwāl al-dunya) and the states of dhawq and of wilāya, he is not suddenly 
a murshid. This situation takes ten years, fifteen years, until the first Shaykh 
passes away, and hands over to the next Shaykh. And he took his place in the 
hearts of the fuqarā’, of the murīdīn, the followers of the ṭarīqa, and he has 
influence, they act with him like they acted with the wārith that was before him. 
From these issues he becomes the Shaykh.46 
 
But more important than this is the deeper question, Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā chooses him, 
not because he knows most or least or because he is the best in anything. Our 
belief is that the nūr muḥammadī transfers from this person, from this image 
(ṣūra) to this image. And we follow the light, we do not follow the person. We love 
them because the light is embodied in them. The body will leave and deteriorate. 
Abu Bakr al-Sadiq said ‘Who worshipped Muhammad – Muhammad has died. 
And who worships God – God is alive, he does not die (man kāna ya‛budu 
Muḥammadan fa-inna Muḥammadan qad māt, u man kāna ya‛budu Allah, fa-inno 
Allah ḥayyan lā yamūt)’ And our Shaykh is living, he does not die (wa eḥna 
shaykhnā ḥayyan lā yamūt). Why? Because we follow the light.47 
 
On first reading, this last statement seems to say that the Shaykh is more 
important than the Prophet Muhammad. On closer reading we see that the most 
important thing is the light, by which is meant the nūr muḥammadī, which existed 
before all the prophets, including before the historical Prophet Muhammad as he 
lived on earth. The Prophet Muhammad was a human being in which shone the 
nūr muḥammadī – similarly, the Shaykh is a human being in which shines the nūr 
muḥammadī. The followers follow the light, focusing ‘on the Shaykh and the 
Prophet, to varying degrees, considering that they are various manifestations 
carrying the same message.’48 They follow the living embodiment of the light in 
this age as this is the path to the light of God – by focussing on this living human 
                                                  
46 AM3-2 in Interview AM3. 
47 AM3-5 in Interview AM3. 
48 Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 13. 
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being and seeing beyond his human form the follower can see the light of 
Muhammad and of God: ‘We always follow the Muhammadan light which is 
embedded in our Shaykh. So, in that sense the Shaykh is always alive.’49 
The choice who will be the next Shaykh is communicated to the followers 
by signs (ishārāt).50 Because of these ishārāt ‘we do not have to talk about who 
will be his khalīfa, we know in our hearts who will be his khalīfa.’51 Regarding the 
succession of Shaykh Ahmad, a lot of weight is placed on the fact that he came 
to Amman in 1960 where he became a deputy (mustallim) of his father and 
looked after ikhwānnā in Jordan (which was still comprised of both East and 
West Bank at the time) and in the Gulf. An older follower said he himself 
witnessed that Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Muhammad al-Hadi had said: ‘Ahmad speaks with 
my tongue (Aḥmad yaḥkī bi-lisānī).’52 This sign was also mentioned in Interview 
AM3, complemented by ‘I placed my trust (thiqqa) in Ahmad.’53 This became 
even more relevant in 1967: 
 
The first and most obvious sign (‛alāma54) was how many ikhwānnā were in 
Jordan as a result of the hijra55 from Palestine to Jordan when Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
Ahmad was based in Jordan. They gathered around him as son of the Shaykh. 
There was a relation with the son of the Shaykh who was based among them 
when they were the largest number who came from Palestine. It was a large 
number, who came from Palestine. (...) This is why Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā [Muhammad] 
al-Hadi blessed this step (bārak hay al-khutwa) in Amman and said about Ḥaḍrat 
Sīdnā Ahmad that ‘he speaks with my tongue, continue with him, there is no 
                                                  
49 Ibid. 
50 For a thorough discussion of the meaning of the concept ishāra in the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya, see paragraph 6.4. 
51 AM3-5 in Interview AM3. 
52 ZA1-2 in Interview ZA1. 
53 AM1-1 in Interview AM3. 
54 The word ‛alāma can also mean reason, but as he uses the word ishāra later for the same 
occurrence, I choose the translation ‘sign’. 
55 The basic meaning of hijra is ‘migration’. Religiously and historically, it refers to the migration of 
the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina, which is the start of the Islamic calendar, but is 
also used for migration in general. The question whether the Palestinians were forced to leave or 
left voluntarily – a topic that has been essential in definining Israel’s attitude towards the 
Palestinian refugees since 1948 – is thus left in the middle. 
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problem that he represents me (yimathilnī)’ (...) And it was natural that there was 
spontaneous collective agreement (ijmā‛ ‛afawī).56 
 
 In addition to the signs that stress the relation between Shaykh Ahmad 
and Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi, there are also signs that stress his pious 
behaviour and his link to the Prophet: a follower who is about the same age as 
Shaykh Ahmad and remembers life in the zāwiya in Acre before 1948 – told a 
story about Shaykh Ahmad when he was around six or seven years old:  
 
One day thousands of ikhwānnā came from Gaza, from the Hawran, from 
Aleppo. All of them slept in the zāwiya. Sīdī Ahmad woke them up and said: 
“Yalla wake up ikhwānnā, go to pray! It is four o’clock in the morning. Yalla go to 
pray, go to pray, go to pray.”57  
 
In the interview in which this story was related, the participants see this as a sign 
that he was chosen to be the next Shaykh because it showed his pious 
behaviour.58 In their comments, the Review Panel add their understanding and 
say that this story shows that he adhered to the sharia from an early age, and 
that he was responsible and cared for the followers.59 These characteristics of 
piety (in the form of adherence to sharia) and a loving responsibility for the 
welfare of the followers are common elements in the view that followers have of 
both Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi and Shaykh Ahmad (see paragraph 5.4), so 
while there is no explicit tie to his father here, the mode of his pious behaviour 
still recalls Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi’s memory and thus shows him to be the 
true successor of his father. Other elements in this story are his young age, 
stressing the notion that he was destined to be the Shaykh from the beginning of 
his life. It furthermore stresses Shaykh Ahmad’s connection to the zāwiya in 
                                                  
56 ZA1-3 in Interview ZA1. One of the bases of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) is ijmā, unanimous 
consensus of the umma (Islamic community). Usually, this means consensus of the ulamā’ 
(Islamic scholars). 
57 ZA1-2 in Interview ZA1. 
58 ZA1-2 and other participants in Interview ZA1. 
59 Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 14. For a discussion of the role 
of the Review Panel in my thesis, see paragraph 2.4. 
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Acre, the sacred centre connecting him to the charismatic moment, as it draws 
attention to the fact that he grew up there. On another level, it portrays the 
zāwiya as the centre of the translocal ṭarīqa, explicitly by mentioning followers 
from all over Greater Syria, but implying a vaster area as Gaza, Aleppo and the 
Hawran are situated to the South, North, and East of Acre, positioning the zāwiya 
at the centre of the ṭarīqa’s translocal expansion, and stressing that Shaykh 
Ahmad’s authority ranges beyond the local community to include the entire 
translocal ṭarīqa.60 
 Today it is very clear that Sīdī Ali is chosen as successor as he helps his 
father in everything and sits next to him during the meetings in the zāwiya. When 
Shaykh Ahmad travels to Beirut, Sīdī Ali takes over the business of the zāwiya 
and leads the ḥaḍra (but does not do mudhākara). The desktops of the 
computers in the zāwiya have a picture of Shaykh Ahmad and Sīdī Ali. And as 
one follower said: ‘At several points we asked Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā a question and he 
would say for example “ask Ali”.’61 Similarly, Sīdī Ali’s son Sīdī Hadi is already 
being prepared to become Shaykh. When he is in Amman, he sits next to his 
father and grandfather during the meetings. In some households his picture is 
already shown next to that of his father and grandfather. I was told Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
[Muhammad] al-Hadi gave a prophecy about Sīdī Hadi when he was born: ‘This 
is the sixth Shaykh.’ One of the participants referred to an episode that had 
happened shortly before the interview when I was introduced by Sīdī Ali to his 
son Sīdī Hadi with the words that he is the future Shaykh of the ṭarīqa.62 
 The followers accept the doctrine and the fact that since the time of 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din the succession has always been within the Yashruti family, 
passed from the Shaykh to his eldest son (see paragraph 5.2). They explain it 
                                                  
60 The speaker mentioned one other place which unfortunately was not audible on the recording 
of the interview. It might have referred to a Western place, but this is speculation. The West could 
also be absent because the ṭarīqa had not yet begun to spread to the Americas, or because the 
image of Acre as a port town was so predominant in the speaker’s image that he did not include 
this diaspora. 
61 AM3-5 in Interview AM3. 
62 AM1-3 in Interview ZA1. In my memory the words he used were ‘This is the future of Sufism,’ to 
which Sīdī Hadi replied: ‘All of Sufism?’ and Sīdī Ali said ‘Well, the ṭarīqa at least.’ This final 
sentence is the one the followers referred to in this example. 
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from a doctrinal perspective by referring to classical Sufi concepts (khatam al-
wilāya, al-irth al-muḥammadī) and applying them to the Yashruti family:  
 
And this house of Yashruti, founded by Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din, is the Seal of 
the Sainthood (khatam al-wilāya). Muhammad pbuh is the Seal of Prophethood 
(...) and Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din, may God sanctify his secret, is the khatam 
al-wilāya. And this thing is tied with the people of God (ahl Allah). As a state is 
tied with the president, we are tied with al-Haqq (the Truth, meaning God). And 
al-Haqq is the one who distributes the trust among her keepers (aṣḥābihā). And 
he favours whomever he wants with his mercy (raḥma). God has chosen Adam 
and Nuha and the family of Ibrahim, and the family of Imran from among all the 
people. And this family [al-Yashruti], God conferred distinction upon them 
(ikhtassaha). The Ḥadra Muḥammadīya conferred distinction upon them to be 
part of this list [of prophets] to carry the Muhammadan heritage (al-irth al-
Muḥammadī).63 
 
In addition to this doctrinal explanation, the followers also argue that the concrete 
preparation and the education in the community plays an important role: 
 
You believe that this Shaykh directs you with a strong spiritual connection. You 
are tied to everything in him, including his son, the one who is prepared! From 
the founding of the ṭarīqa it has been the habit that there was a son of the 
Shaykh who was prepared. (...) When the son of Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din was 
grown up, he came from his land and accompanied him in this martaba, and he 
ascended (nizel) among ikhwānnā to live with them until he drank the whole 
ṭarīqa completely.64 And after that there was a unanimous consensus (ijmā’ 
ḍimnī) (...) that we find as a result of the strong spiritual connection (irtibāt). This 
pulls us (bijitnā) even to his son. Even to the son of the Shaykh who is still a 
child, we are tied in a connection which has a part of the holiness (naw‛an min al-
qudsiya). This is what we have inherited and what we believe in. (...) This relation 
                                                  
63 AM3-2 in Interview AM3. 
64 To this the Review Panel adds: ‘He lived at the zāwiya as one of the followers, as one of the 
mutajarridīn, and he stayed like this until he was ready to assume his responsibilities as a 
Sheikh.’ Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 14. 
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is historical, spiritual, just like our fathers and grandfathers before us, we are a 
ṭarīqa.65 
 
The love for and connection with the current Shaykh extends to his family 
because they share part of his holiness. This is why his son is the right choice to 
take over the ṭarīqa. For this participant, an important part of the preparation of 
the future Shaykh is his experience with the community. This ties the issue of the 
succession more strongly to the historical and social experience of the 
community, which he also refers to in the final sentence. It is the way it has 
always been since the founding of the ṭarīqa – this is how the Shaykhs chose and 
prepared their successors, and this is how the previous followers, his ancestors, 
accepted it. This attitude is an excellent example of institutionalisation of 
charisma along traditional lines, both in the sense that the position of Shaykh is 
hereditary, and in the sense that the acceptance of this position is transmitted in 
the family. 
 Another follower takes an even more worldly approach to the issue of the 
role of the family in the succession: Something precious needs to be kept within 
the family and just like any other inheritance, the Shaykh will pass it on to his son 
– the oldest son if he is suitable, otherwise a younger one. ‘Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
[Muhammad] al-Hadi saw in his oldest son Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ahmad the adequacy 
(kifāya) and the qualifications (kafā’a)’ and handed him the heritage of the 
Shaykh.’66 
 This respondent means to explain what for him is a spiritual truth in 
worldly terms, but inadvertently draws attention to the fact that the inheritance 
also includes material assets. The implication of this is different in all local 
contexts in which the ṭarīqa and the Yashruti family have properties. In Ottoman 
and Mandate Palestine, the ṭarīqa’s and the family’s properties were registered 
as awqāf, meaning that they would pass within the family regardless of what 
would happen to the spiritual authority of the inheritor. We see a similar situation 
in Jordan, where the zāwiya is registered as the private property of the Shaykh, 
                                                  
65 ZA1-3 in Interview ZA1. 
66 AM1-3 in Interview AM3. 
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and will pass to his son. It was stressed to me that it should pass specifically to 
the son who becomes the next Shaykh – whether it is actually registered like this 
is a moot point, since by the time the zāwiya was registered, it was already 
generally accepted that Sīdī Ali and Sīdī Hadi, both the eldest son, will succeed. 
In both the Palestinian and the Jordanian contexts, this arrangement gives the 
Shaykhs s a material base from which to enact their role of religious leaders and 
implement their ideals, e.g. to host, feed, educate, publish, build and renovate 
zawāya, etc., strengthening their ‘functional authority’ which derives from the 
performance of particular functions (again, pointing to the circular nature of 
authority noted by Eickelman and Piscatori).67 Furthermore, it allows them to do 
so with minimal outside interference, providing them with space to practice what 
Heck calls ‘engaged distance’.68 Control over the assets of religious movements 
in the form of awqāf is a great concern of centralising governments, as we saw in 
the Ottoman Empire and in many colonial and post-colonial states, including 
Syria and Israel,69 and the family’s continued control over the ṭarīqa’s assets 
therefore strengthens both their position, and that of the ṭarīqa. This strengthens 
the followers’ belief that the Yashruti family, the ṭarīqa and the community of 
ikhwānnā belong together, and they trust that the Shaykh’s management of the 
ṭarīqa’s financial flows is for the benefit of the community.70 
The actual ceremony of the succession is very sober. After the funerary 
rites are finished, those ikhwānnā who are present convene as representatives of 
all ikhwānnā all over the world and decide who they want to be their next 
Shaykh.71 This happens through ‘spontaneous collective agreement’ – one 
follower compared this process to the election of Abu Bakr as khalīfa because 
everyone agreed how much the Prophet loved him. Due to the communications 
                                                  
67 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 58–59. See paragraph 1.3. 
68 Heck, ‘Introduction’, 3–4. See paragraph 1.5.2. 
69 For Syria, see paragraph 1.5.2, for Israel, see paragraph 8.2.2. 
70 How this arrangement works out in practice is impossible to analyse, as access to the financial 
accounts of the ṭarīqa and the Yashruti family are not available for a researcher. Since my 
concern is the image the followers have of the Shaykh and his family and they do not have insight 
into these figures either, I do not deem this a shortcoming in my research. 
71 Interview ZA1, Interview with Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti in al-Urdun, 26-02-1996, p.8-9. 
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by way of ishāra (sign)72 and the preparations that already took place during the 
previous Shaykh’s life, this is not a real decision, but more an affirmation that 
indeed they want the appointed Shaykh. This process is called mubāya‛a, which 
implies that this is a kind of renewal of the initial mubāya‛a every murīd has taken 
and which has to be done to the living Shaykh. 
 As we have seen, apart from the spiritual aspect which is related to the 
essence of the Shaykh and is beyond the full comprehension of ikhwānnā but 
must simply be accepted as part of the ‛aqīda, for most participants the practical 
aspect of the succession comes down to tarbiya of the outer form and behaviour 
of the chosen successor. The Shaykh raises his successor and communicates 
his choice to the followers through signs – in fact, the preparation of the Shaykh 
is itself a string of signs. This tarbiya takes place within the family and the 
community at large as the future Shaykh lives among them, and works for them 
together with his father. The Shaykh prepares his successor, and ikhwānnā raise 
their children to accept this:  
 
ZA1-4: Our children know that after Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā will come his son, Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
Ahmad or Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali or Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Hadi. This ṭarīqa is in the form of 
wirātha and tarbiya. There is no one for example [who says] I raise my son to be 
Shaykh. Something like that does not happen. The tarbiya is the basis (asas) that 
ikhwānnā and the son of the faqīr is a faqīr. And of course Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā is one of 
the mashyakha of the ṭarīq who is qualified. 
ZA1-3: The murīd has his sulūk and the Shaykh has his sulūk.73 
 
 We have thus examined how the followers’ belief that the successor has 
to be the most able son of the Shaykh is transmitted discursively through the 
teachings of the Shaykh and the experience of the community, and comes to be 
                                                  
72 In the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, the Shaykh communicates with his followers spiritually through 
signs. These range from ‘allusions’ in the classical Sufi sense to quite explicit speech acts and 
gestures and everyday occurrences, which are all to be interpreted according to the follower’s 
spiritual level and in community to receive guidance from the Shaykh. For a discussion of the 
concept ishāra in the Sufi tradition in general, and in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in particular, 
see chapters 6 and 10. 
73 ZA1-4 and ZA1-3 in Interview ZA1. 
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seen by the followers ‘as an entirely natural process that follows the typical flow 
of the grace of God’, as Hoffman argues regarding the same practice in 
contemporary Egyptian Sufism.74 The doctrine that the Shaykh always comes 
from the Yashruti family is thus a common – if not universal – element in the 
wider Sufi tradition, and explicitly taught by the Shaykh himself. According to this 
doctrine, the ability to reach the highest levels of the Path is reserved for the 
Shaykh from the Yashruti family who embodies the nūr muḥammadi and is 
essentially different from the normal followers, ensuring that the charismatic 
connection to the nūr muḥammadi will always be found exclusively in the 
Shaykh, making the follower forever dependent on him to access this force. 
While Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s charisma is thus institutionalised in the traditional 
model of family inheritance, this doctrine denies the idea of the ‘drying up’ of 
charisma, as charisma will always be embodied by the current Shaykh.  
Once a follower has completely internalized the ṭarīqa’s teachings and the 
community’s attitude, and has become cognitively and emotionally convinced of 
the Shaykh’s charisma and superior spiritual rank and knowledge, this explicit 
teaching will ensure that s/he does not accept anyone but the son of the Shaykh 
as the new Shaykh – the ‘most able one’, as chosen by the Shaykh himself 
through his superior knowledge of what is hidden from normal human beings. 
Through the process of tarbiya, pedagogy, or in more sociological terms, 
socialisation, the followers come to see the Shaykh as the only possible leader 
and his teachings as the ultimate truth, giving the symbolic universe and its 
structure of authority a strong air of objectivity and facticity. They thus accept the 
Shaykh and his decisions for their community without question.  
Berger points to the importance of the internalisation of ‘roles’ in the 
socialisation process, as the social universe is continuously re-enected through 
the performance of embodied roles – through these roles, people participate in 
the social order, making it subjectively real and experiencing its power over them. 
Some roles represent the symbolic system as a whole and those embodying that 
                                                  
74 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 128–129. See paragraph 1.4.1. 
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role are seen to embody the entire social and symbolic system. When this 
symbolic system is connected to the sacred, such a role gives the system an 
aura of existence that transcends everyday reality.75 A similar process is clearly 
at work in the maintenance of the hereditary succession of the Shaykhs of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya – both Shaykh and followers simply cannot imagine an 
alternative reality in which an ordinary follower would reach the level of shaykh 
and take over leadership of the ṭarīqa. 
The anthropological focus on the followers’ point of view obscures the 
actual decision making process that led to the succession of Shaykh Ahmad. 
Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi left no records of this process, and followers will give 
an answer based on their belief: ‘because he is the Shaykh and he knew’. We 
are therefore left to guess his reasons for adhering to this custom of choosing the 
oldest son. I think it reasonable to assume that he himself adhered to this custom 
because of the socialisation he received into the ṭarīqa and into his specific role, 
internalizing these doctrines and expectations: ‘The murīd has his sulūk and the 
Shaykh has his sulūk.’76 
The succession of Shaykh Ahmad was uncontested. He has no rivals for 
his authority, although an earlier schism still reverberates. Abd al-Rahman Abu 
Risha, nephew of Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi and muqaddam in the Ghuta in 
Syria, did not accept Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi’s authority. He initiated Shaykh 
Abd al-Jalil al-Ansari who also lives in Amman and claims to be a shaykh of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, a claim which is not accepted by Shaykh Ahmad and 
his followers.77 It is unclear what this schism was based on, which part of Shaykh 
Muhammad al-Hadi’s authority was rejected and which alternative modes of 
authority were employed to justify it. In the local communities I visited, a 
schismatic muqaddam would be unthinkable, for the reasons discussed above. A 
muqaddam, while being appointed by the Shaykh and having received an ijāza, 
                                                  
75 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 33–34, 91–92. 
76 ZA1-4 and ZA1-3 in Interview ZA1. Why Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi decided that Ahmad was 
indeed the most able of his four sons, is also lost in history. The youngest, Khaled, became a 
well-known politician and died in Beirut in 1970 under suspicious circumstances. The other two 
sons, Ibrahim and Salah, are not active in the ṭarīqa, although they do visit followers from time to 
time. 
77 Informal discussions with followers in Amman and Acre. 
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is considered one of ikhwānnā and is respected for his role in the community, but 
has not necessarily reached high spiritual levels. The Shaykh’s successor, who is 
called khalīfa and who acts as the Shaykh’s deputy, is considered not only his 
genealogical but his spiritual heir, to whom the nūr muḥammadī will pass on his 
father’s death. These are two completely different lines within the ṭarīqa’s 
organisation. 
 Considering the social prestige, material assets and socio-political power 
that go with the succession, it is beneficial for the family from a socio-political 
point of view to keep the shaykhdom within the family – but this goes together 
with a responsibility to use this power for the good of the community. The love 
and care that the followers experience from both Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi and 
Shaykh Ahmad are part of their base of legitimacy, as we shall discuss more 
extensively in the next paragraph, and they are thus expected to use the material 
assets and socio-political power for the good of the ṭarīqa. In addition to the 
functional authority provided by the material assets and social prestige, the 
zāwiya in Acre provides them with charismatic authority, which we shall discuss 
in chapter 11. 
 
 
5.4 The Role of the Shaykh 
 
We have now discussed the Shaykh’s doctrinal authority, the beliefs that underly 
the authority of the Shaykh, as he is connected to the nūr muḥammadī and the 
‛aqīda as a direct manifestation and through the spiritual and biological 
connection to Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din, and through him to the Prophet. But how is 
this authority envisaged on a more practical level? Which roles does the Shaykh 
take on, and which are attributed to him? Because these interviews were done in 
a group setting, we shall discuss each interview separately so we can appreciate 
the different focuses of the groups. 
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Interview AM1 
 
In this interview, the role of the Shaykh as a teacher is stressed. He is seen as a 
mu‛allim (teacher) and murabbī who teaches and transfers teachings, and he is 
the murshid guiding the followers to God. He is the qudwa (role model) who 
teaches the akhlāq through his example. The ta‛līm he transfers is the same as 
that of his predecessors: it is the ‛aqīda. The mabādi’ (principles) stay the same 
but the waṣā’il (tools, mediums) change according to the times. 
This understanding is mentioned in the first part of the interview when 
discussing a different topic:  
 
AM1-1: And who teaches us (‛allamnā) all these things? The Shaykh. Ḥaḍrat 
Sīdnā the Shaykh is the one who cultivates (yazra‛) this ‛aqīda and this love in 
our hearts. 
AM1-3: He raises us (yurabbīnā). Because we ikhwānnā see Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
always, how he is, [his] treatment of all the people [in] all the world, and he 
teaches us how to grow good manners in ourself. How? Because we watch 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā, what he is doing. And you see every time and we learn everything 
from Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā, because he is the first one in the ṭarīqa to give us the 
manners.78  
 
Shaykh Ahmad ‘concentrated on the ta‛līm of the Shaykh his father, and the 
teaching of the Shaykhs who came before him. He concentrated for more than 
half a century on the tarbiya of abnā al-ṭarīqa al-Shadhuliya.’79 
In response to the direct question ‘how do you see the Shaykh?’ the 
answer is the following: ‘The Shaykh is my murshid, he guides me, and I take 
directions and teachings (atalaqa al-tawjīhāt wa-ta‛līmāt) from the Shaykh.’80 
When AM1-2 brings up the point that there is qudsiyya (holiness) in the 
Shaykh, AM1-1 develops this line of thought by explaining this holiness from a 
social point of view: 
                                                  
78 AM1-1 and AM1-3 in Interview AM1. 
79 AM1-3 in Interview AM1. 
80 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
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Because the person who guides you towards God – and when you have ten 
thousand or one hundred thousand or more of people who follow this person and 
his teachings have an effect on these people to be good people, a good citizen 
(muwāṭin sāliḥ), a good person. (...) And if there is a certain person who can lead 
you (yaqūdak) and guide you (yurshudak) to be a righteous person, to be 
righteous in society and towards your family and your neighbours, then he has all 
sanctification (taqdīs) and appreciation (taqdīr) and respect (iḥtirām).81 
 
When discussing their first impression of the Shaykh more emotional 
language is used. AM1-2 does not come from a family that belongs to the ṭarīqa, 
but married someone from ikhwānnā. When she first saw the Shaykh, she felt: 
‘He is not a normal person. There is something about him. And this thing touched 
me in my heart. And then I read the waẓīfa and went to the zāwiya.’82 
AM1-1 and AM1-3 grew up in the West Bank in the 1950s and 60s and 
therefore did not have extensive contact with the Shaykh. 
 
The first time I saw him was when Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Muhammad al-Hadi came to 
Jordan when I was 6 or 7 years. My grandfather (...) took me to sit with the 
Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi and I found [he had] sympathy for me. I was a child 
and he gave me a charge. I loved him from that time. He took care of me, he 
treated me as mature, so I loved that Shaykh from that time.83 
 
In this account, love for the Shaykh comes from the feeling that the Shaykh cares 
for the follower and looks after him. Also important for this follower is the feeling 
that he was respected and taken seriously even though he was still a young 
child. This feeling of being respected no matter what someone’s age or position 
is a very important value among ikhwānnā. They stress their equality amongst 
each other because they are all brothers and sisters in ‘faith and ‛aqīda’,84 no 
matter their gender, age, social background, etc. AM1-1 continues to describe 
                                                  
81 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
82 AM1-2 in Interview AM1. 
83 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
84 Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-09-2014, 15. 
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that an older man from the ṭarīqa invited him to his home and treated him as 
mature when he was in his teens, and how he appreciated this gesture (see 
paragraph 6.3.2). This follower feels both looked after and respected by his 
Shaykh and his community. 
 AM1-2 refers extensively to the community aspect of this experience: 
 
When he was in Lebanon he came to Jordan, everyone of ikhwānnā here was 
very happy when he heard that Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā was coming to Jordan and they 
were waiting for this moment to see the Shaykh. We were maybe 4 or 5 years old 
but from the beginning – I am speaking for myself – I feel something very great – 
very very great, inside. (...) This was the first time maybe to everybody here 
because Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā honoured (tusharraf) to come from Lebanon to Jordan, 
every ikhwānnā big and old and young [came] to see Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā because we 
believe in Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā and you see ikhwānnā, how we love Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā.85 
 
The importance of this love is expressed throughout the interview:  
 
AM1-1: Maḥabba (love) is the centre, everything revolves around maḥabba. The 
ṭarīqa teaches (btrabbī) maḥabba. 
AM1-3: This is the Shaykh who taught us, how to love the people, how to deal 
with the people. (...) This is the ethics that Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā needs ikhwānnā to be.86 
 
The stress in this interview is on the role of the Shaykh as a teacher. The 
participants love him and this is why they follow him and his teaching. First they 
mainly discuss the teaching as akhlāq; as he embodies the ‛aqīda, he can be the 
qudwa who teaches by example. When the Shaykh is not present, he transfers 
his knowledge on the physical plane through the muqaddam or other followers, 
through letters or technology. The ‛aqīda is also transferred through the spiritual 
relationship between the hearts of the Shaykh and the followers, by way of ilhām 
                                                  
85 AM1-2 in Interview AM1. 
86 AM1-1 and AM1-3 in Interview AM1. 
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or madad or mawārid,87 transferring the ‛aqīda directly into the heart of the 
follower. Typical in this interview is that there is no mention of the nūr 
muḥammadī and the Shaykh as the wārith Muḥammadī. The importance of 
adhering to the five pillars of Islam is stressed, but there is little explicit 
discussion of the link of the Shaykh with the Prophet Muhammad. This is not to 
say that these interviewees do not value these concepts, as can be seen by their 
statements in later interviews.  
 
 
Interview AM2 
 
Throughout this interview, the stress falls on roles related to education and 
guidance: the Shaykh is the mu‛allim, the murshid, the muwajjih, the ustādh 
(teacher), the dalīl (guide). The Shaykh teaches as a qudwa and by 
communication – by physical communication in the mudhākara and by spiritual 
communication known as ‛ilm al-ishāra (knowledge of the sign) (see paragraph 
6.4). He guides the followers to know God88 and guides them to do well in all 
aspects of life: ‘directly to the good, in everything, whether meeting God, or 
dealing with people, or how to deal with yourself.’89 
Like in Interview AM1, most of those present grew up in the West Bank in 
the 1950s and 60s and they saw Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi for the first time 
when he visited Jericho in the 60s: 
 
When he visited Jericho in Palestine, I was 17-18 years old and I had heard of 
the Shaykh and seen pictures of the Shaykh, but I did not know who the Shaykh 
was, and what he looked like. And when I saw him and the way he was dressed 
it was – from the outside (ẓāhir) you would say a normal person. But you feel that 
your heart beats heavily when you look at his face, it will seem that there is a 
halo of light evolving him, but you cannot perceive it with your eyes – you 
                                                  
87 Mawārid (sg. mawrid) are sources and resources, source of knowledge and spirituality, spiritual 
knowledge. 
88 AM2-5 in Interview AM2. 
89 AM2-2 in Interview AM2. 
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perceive it with your heart. This was the first time, and the body of the human 
being was trembling (ra‛sha) for the vision of the Shaykh.90 
 
Another follower was a child on this occasion and did not understand what he 
saw, but says his views developed when he moved to Amman and he came to 
understand that ‘there is a secret (sirr), there is something that distinguishes 
(bimayyiz) this person, he is different from a normal person.’91 
These answers refer to the traditional distinction between the ẓāhir and 
the bāṭin, and are related to the idea that the Shaykh seems a normal person but 
when you look closer and get to know him better he is something special. Similar 
stories can be found in Mawahib al-Ḥaqq.92 It is a very personal experience but 
told in a known format – maybe even experienced because of its known format 
as Katz pointed out (see chapter 1).93 
It is mentioned that everyone sees the Shaykh differently depending on 
their spiritual level, but some participants became upset when I asked for their 
opinions and they stress all their opinions are the same: ‘Our words are not going 
to differ much from the words of ikhwānnā, because we were all raised in almost 
the same tarbiya, with the same principles.’ Even so, those who said this then 
continued to raise new points, such as stressing the connection between the 
Shaykh and the Prophet: ‘We see in them the true (saḥīḥ) Islam that springs from 
the message of Sayyid Muhammad based on the Qur’an and the Sunna of 
Sayyidnā Muhammad, in them the wirātha muḥammadīya is completed.’94 
Another participant says that the Shaykh is ‘all our essence (kull duwitnā)’, 
stressing the strong internal connection she feels with the Shaykh. Another 
participant exclaimed: ‘Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā, the light of my eyes!’ People laugh when 
she says this, but AM1-3 explains that the answer is very right and should be 
                                                  
90 AM2-1 in Interview AM2. 
91 AM2-2 said something similar in a later informal discussion with eight followers on 18-06-2013. 
92 al-Yashruṭiyya, Mawāhib al-Ḥaqq, 37–38, 118–119. 
93 Katz, ‘Language, Epistemology and Mysticism’; Katz, ‘The “Conservative” Character of Mystical 
Experience’. 
94 AM2-3 in Interview AM2. 
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taken seriously, because ‘he shows us (biwaḍḍiḥ ilna) the way (ṭarīq), and we 
see better.’95 
Finally, a participant takes up these themes of nūr and wārith muḥammadī 
that were mentioned once before at the very beginning and not discussed further. 
He ties them all together, placing the ṭarīqa in the Sufi tradition while doing so 
and stressing how important it is for the ṭarīqa to be accepted in society as it 
makes Islam more acceptable in society. 
 
If I want to accept Islam in this age, I don’t accept it in the old way, I have to 
accept it by way of Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā. First of all because he is the wārith 
Muḥammadī; second because he gave us Islam in a contemporary way [so] that 
we can live our life with ikhwānnā, in a social and spiritual way. Before a 
mutaṣawwif went to live in the mountain or in the wood to practice dhikr. When 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din came, he brought the ṭarīqa into society. It is better. 
Maybe if we had lived in those times it would have been different.96  
 
In this interview there is a strong stress on the role of the Shaykh as a teacher 
and guide, but the discussion deals more with the issue of developing a deeper 
insight into the essential reality of the Shaykh and of the world, than with the 
akhlāq. The theme of light is strong throughout the interview and towards the end 
the link with the Prophet Muhammad is stressed, both with the Prophet as a 
human being and with the more abstract wirātha muḥammadīya and the nūr 
muḥammadī. The last speaker stressed the importance of the renewal of Islam 
so that it continues to speak to people and fulfils their social and spiritual needs. 
 
 
Interview ZA1  
 
In this interview, again the role of the Shaykh as teacher is stressed, but there is 
more discussion of his relation to the Prophet and to the cultivation of ādāb than 
                                                  
95 AM1-3, AM2-4, and AM2-5 in Interview AM2. 
96 AM1-2 in Interview AM2. 
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in other interviews. ZA1-1 sees the Shaykh as the niyāba (representation, 
replacement) of Sayyidnā Muhammad and as such as the qudwa, the Prophetic 
examplar. ‘Also, there is love between him and me, as a result of the ādāb. “And 
all of Islam is ādāb and akhlāq,” as are the other revealed religions.’ In this final 
sentence and throughout the interview, he stresses that all of this is found in 
Islam and is according to Islam: ‘alḥamdulillah we benefit from Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā as 
he opens our eyes to the ṭarīqa, the Sufi effort, according to the Islamic dīn.’97  
A large part of this interview is dedicated to the succession of the Shaykhs 
, both on the spiritual and practical level (a distinction they make themselves) 
which has been discussed previously. The choice for the successor is based on 
his connection to the Prophet as the Shaykh’s essence is part of the 
Muhammadan inheritance and as he shows the Muhammadan behaviour (see 
paragraph 5.3). 
Also in this interview, the role of the Shaykh as a teacher and a guide is 
stressed: ‘And the relation with the Shaykh, in our view, is tarbiya. Tarbiya to us 
and everyone.’ The link of the Shaykh with the Prophet Muhammad in every 
possible way is presented as the most important aspect of the Shaykh. His 
behaviour, his teaching, and his spiritual genealogy in the form of the wirātha 
muḥammadiya are considered of the utmost importance, and when discussing 
the spiritual side of his succession, the only reference is to his Muhammadan 
qualities. Several participants talk about their love for the family and the ṭarīqa 
from a socio-historical point of view and this is accepted by the group but not 
taken up in the most of the conversation. 
 
 
Interview AM3 
 
The discussion starts with AM3-1 stressing the connection between the Shaykh’s 
link to the Prophet Muhammad and his teaching role: 
 
                                                  
97 ZA1-1 in Interview ZA1. 
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Our relation with the Shaykh is a relation based on the ‛aqīda, and we consider 
him from the Muhammadan inheritance, following the path of Muhammad (‛ala al-
ṭarīq al-Muḥammadī). He teaches ikhwānnā that with which Sayyidnā 
Muhammad came, and there is a continuation.98  
 
He gives the word to AM3-2, who stresses the need to love the Shaykh in 
order to truly know him. Several participants continue to stress the dual nature of 
the Shaykh: he is a man (bashar) but also something deeper:99 
 
The Shaykh has two images. (...) The exterior picture (al-ẓāhiriya), the physical, 
when you visit the Shaykh or sit in front of him, in the zāwiya or any other place, 
this is the exterior image from which we learn the akhlāq and the praiseworthy 
qualities (awṣāf ḥamīda). And there is an inner image, it remains with the murīd 
wherever he goes.100 
 
This dual nature is also expressed through a common expression which is 
used later in the interview when one of the followers discusses Shaykh Ali Nur al-
Din’s health: ‘Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā was ẓāhir al-‘amr – he was living in a coastal area 
and he got asthma ẓāhiriyan.’101 The expression ‘ẓāhir al-‘amr’ is used when the 
followers want to refer to the exterior aspect of the Shaykh (his human form) as 
opposed to the internal spiritual (bāṭin) matters related to the Shaykh – in this 
case because they refer to his health.102 Again this expression shows how they 
consider the Shaykh to embody the divine ‘amr (order) in a human body. 
 Another follower gives the conversation a new turn by stating that he is 
attracted by the light embodied by the Shaykh: 
 
                                                  
98 AM3-1 in Interview AM3. 
99 AM3-2, AM1-1, AM3-3, AM3-5 in Interview AM3. 
100 AM3-2 in Interview AM3. 
101 AM3-5 in Interview AM3. 
102 Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 17. It is a combination of the 
concept ‘amr,’ which is used to refer to the order from God – and in a wider sense to something 
holy which comes from God – and the concept ‘ẓāhir,’ which is a common Sufi term which refers 
to the exterior, the form, and in this case refers to the human form of the Shaykh. Informal 
discussion with a former follower in Acre on 15-09-2013. 
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When we see Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā we feel comfort (rāḥa). Anyone who wants to see 
something comforting is attracted (binjadheb) by this comforting thing. We feel 
that Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā is a magnet. He attracts us to something more – more – above 
feelings. There is a realm inside feelings, you feel that this human being attracts 
you to it as if he has high energy – we use the concept ‘nūr’. The light – a large 
part of the light – is present in a big quantity. (...) As soon as you see him this 
thing in your heart attracts you (bishiddak). And as soon as you speak with him 
you will feel more comfortable. As soon as there is a connection (tawāṣul) in the 
middle between you and him, you will feel more comfort and connection (rāḥa 
wa-tawāṣul).103  
 
He continued to stress that in order to truly see the Shaykh one has to ‘become 
more active with God’ and activate the eye of the heart. 
 
Everyone sees according to his point of view. You maybe do not see. And our 
brother sees something else than I see. Every one of us feels with the Shaykh 
according to the experience he lived in the ṭarīqa. (...) Everybody sees Ḥaḍrat 
Sīdnā according to the depth of his view (ru’ya, naẓara). One of ikhwānnā sees 
Sīdnā as a normal shaykh: ‘Hello Shaykh, how are you?’ He prays, he fasts, etc. 
Someone else sees him as slightly more than a shaykh, for example like a walī 
from awliyā Allah whom God has given big energy. Another sees him slightly 
bigger, and everyone sees him according to the strength of his naẓar. (...) The 
eye of the heart (...) is the eye with which we can see the Shaykh. And we say as 
mutaṣawwifīn that we have an active heart, and in this activity we can see our 
Shaykh. Whenever one becomes more active with God, the light increases for 
him.104 
 
Everyone will thus see the Shaykh based on the spiritual level that he or she has 
attained, and because of this diverse opinions are accepted by some 
participants, while others stress that everyone has the same view. 
                                                  
103 AM3-3 in Interview AM3. 
104 AM3-3 in Interview AM3. 
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 A participant who came in late explains that he who wants to deepen his 
religious experience and go from islām to īmān and iḥsān needs a ṭarīqa and a 
teacher (ustādh) to show him the path because there is not much written about 
this aspect of religion. This is why God sent the prophets, and when the 
prophethood ended, the awliyā’. 
 
AM3-5: And we see in Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā a perfect walī for the messages of all the 
anbiyā’ (prophets), not just Sayyidnā Muhammad. (...) And our view is that he 
perfects the nūr muḥammadī, that he is the light that our Lord subhanuhu wa-
ta‛ala placed in the anbiyā’ (prophets) until Muhammad. And he is our 
continuation (istimrār) of that light.  
AM1-1: Inheritor (wārith). 
AM3-5: The wārith muḥammadī connects us to this goal. And he is the wārith 
muḥammadī, he is the walī, he is the ustādh, he is the murshid for us, who takes 
us in either hand and takes us from the sharia to the ḥaqīqa, and thus we reach 
God faster. 
 
 This dual nature of the Shaykh is a recurrent theme in this interview, and 
the need to develop the relationship with the Shaykh to see his deeper meaning 
and his light is an important topic for most participants. In this sense he is 
described as teacher and guide through his sayings and example. Some try to 
bring the discussion back to the practical implications of this for the follower in 
the form of ‛ibādāt, but the interest of the most outspoken interviewees lies with 
the understanding of this deeper meaning. The link to the Prophet Muhammad is 
very strong in this interview. 
 
 
Interview AM4 
 
In this interview the main theme is maḥabba: ‘The ṭarīqa is love for the Shaykh, 
and that’s all. Whatever else comes later. Beyond that is supererogatory 
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(nawāfil).’105 This love leads them to follow his example and teachings and 
guidance. 
The first question – how do you see the Shaykh? – is answered by all 
participants in turn. The first says that the Shaykh is the wārith muḥammadī and 
represents the nūr muḥammadī, which means  
 
all of him – his essence (dhāt) and characteristics (ṣiffāt) – are the same 
characteristics of the Prophet pbuh. This we believe. Because the Prophet as a 
human being (in his human form) passed to the highest Friend (rafīq). But what 
remained? The light remained. And the light does not end and does not die and 
is irrefutable. This we believe. That he is wārith and represents (yumaththil) the 
nūr muḥammadī for us.106 
 
AM4-3 explains this further by referring to the ḥadīth ‘the ‛ulamā’ are the 
inheritors of the anbiyā’,’ but quickly takes the answer in a different direction by 
stressing the Shaykh’s role as a guide to God as a great murabbī and ustādh and 
a qudwa, guiding the disciple through akhlāq to the light of inner knowledge: 
 
They inherit the ‛ilm (knowledge), he told you light – the light is the light of 
ma‛rifa, inner ‛ilm ladunnī.107 And we believe the Shaykh is a magnificent (jalīl) 
Shaykh or a spiritual master. He leads us – he reveals us to ourselves. And as a 
first step we learn the akhlāq from him. Me personally, I became a member 
because I wanted to have revelations (kushūf) and know God. In the beginning 
that was the case, but later I realized I wanted to know the Path to become a 
better person. I became a member of the Path to be a much better human being 
(insān afḍal). Because in the Noble Qur’an God, the Glorified and Exalted, says 
in many verses that God loves the righteous (muttaqīn), ‘God loves the ṣādiqīn.’ 
And whenever I purify myself I become closer to God. (...) There is no reaching 
                                                  
105 AM4-1 in Interview AM4 with nine followers in Amman on 23-11-2013, hereafter referred to as 
Interview AM4. 
106 AM4-4 in Interview AM4. 
107 Ilm ladunnī is knowledge that is with and from God, granted by an act of divine grace. Both are 
often translated as ‘gnosis’. Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 193. 
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God but through God. I cannot reach God in my own way [points to his head]. He 
brings us there now, he takes me by my hand, he brings me there.108 
 
 AM4-5 describes Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā as murshid, ‘I see him as al-amān wa-l-
āmin (both a feeling of security and a place that is secure), I see him as 
contentment (qana‛a) and goodness (jayda), I see all things beautiful in him.’109 
AM4-1 stresses that it is a matter of belief and that you get from the 
Shaykh what you see in him. If you want to receive something from Ḥaḍrat 
Sīdnā, you have to love him, be humble and believe that he has something to 
give, ‘you have to believe that he knows, that he has a higher rank. If you are 
equal you don’t get anything from him.’ He uses the story of Musa and al-Khidr in 
Sūrat al-Kahf 18:65-66 – well known among Sufis and often employed for the 
same purpose – to illustrate that you have to accept the Shaykh’s authority and 
go to him humbly.110 
 AM4-2 exclaims enthusiastically ‘I see Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā as everything. He is 
the basis, he is life.’ AM1-3 explains this short statement by adding the element 
of tarbiya: ‘She says that he is everything in the world, he is the one who 
educates us (rabbīnā) he is the one who acts for us (biya‛melnā), he is the one 
who teaches us (bi‛allimnā).111 
 AM4-6 stresses the diverse opinions people have of the Shaykh based on 
their spiritual development, but how they are all based on one thing:  
 
                                                  
108 AM4-3 in Interview AM4. To this the Review Panel adds: ‘There is no reaching God but with 
God’s will. I cannot reach God in my own way. I need help and guidance.’ Review Panel, 
‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 17. 
109 AM4-5 in Interview AM4. 
110 AM4-1 in Interview AM4. AM4-7 also stressed this humility. In the story referred to here, ‘one 
of our servants, to whom we had granted compassion and whom we had taught the special 
knowledge (‛ilm ladunnī)’ orders Musa to obey him without question and orders him to do three 
things that go against the sharia, because due to his superior spiritual knowledge he sees the 
hidden consequences of things. In the Sufi tradition this spiritual teacher became known as al-
Khidr, ‘the Green One’, an immortal prophet who continues to appear and initiate people in ‛ilm 
ladunnī. In Sufi understandings of this Qur’anic passage, the prophet Musa symbolizes the 
exterior law, while al-Khidr symbolizes the interior spiritual truths. See Sells, Early Islamic 
Mysticism, 39–41. See paragraph 1.2. 
111 AM4-2 in Interview AM4. 
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The Shaykh, the murshid, the master, ṣāḥeb al-waqt, it all aims in one thing: 
love. We love our Shaykh. And we take from him tangible and intangible beliefs. 
We don’t imitate or copy blindly, we follow his good behaviour, we follow his good 
attitude, internally and externally.112 
 
 AM4-7 says that Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā’s goal is to make you know God, and that 
you will get rewards in the form of mu‛jizāt and karamāt – he stresses that each 
member of ikhwānnā can give at least ten pages of mu‛jizāt that happened to him 
or her ‘min riḍā Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā (because Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā is pleased with you)’ or by 
following the signs (ishārāt) of Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā.113 Again AM4-1 stresses that if you 
believe, you receive things through his guidance, and you will see the deeper 
meaning behind things. This happens through madad.114 
 Led by AM4-1 they sing a verse of nashīd to illustrate this, and explain it:  
 
 Anta wajdī wa-ḥayātī ya ‛Alī / Anta sirr Allāh dhū al-faḍl al-jalīl 
Ashraqat shams al-kamāl bi-l-wujūd / Ḥayyat min nūrihā ahl al-shuhūd 
Kull man dhāqa ma‛anāhā ya‛ūd rūḥ quds ba‛da dhāk al-haykal 
Qarrabatnī ba‛da bu‛dī bi-l-manā / ‛Arrafatnī ba‛da jahlī man ānā 
Ashhadatnī dār ‛Akkā wa-Minā / wa-banayta fī ṭūr Sīnā manzilī 
 
You are my ecstacy and my life, O Ali  
You are God’s secret who has the majestic grace 
The sun of perfection has risen in the existence 
She greeted the people of witnessing with her light 
Everyone who tastes her meanings  
Returns as a holy spirit after being that skeleton 
After I was far she brought me close through fate  
After my ignorance she made me know who I am 
She made me witness the abode of Acre and Mina 
And you built my house on Mount Sinai 
                                                  
112 AM4-6 in Interview AM4. 
113 AM4-7 in Interview AM4. In general, Muslims distinguish between mu‛jizāt, miracles performed 
by prophets, and karāmāt, performed by other people with God’s grace, although this distinction 
is not always very clear as can be seen in this case. 
114 AM4-1 in Interview AM4. 
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AM4-1: ‘Anta wajdī wa-ḥayātī yā ‛Alī’ – Ali is Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din, the first 
Shaykh. You are my love and you are my life. You are God’s secret, you are 
God’s hidden secret. (...) When I came to know you, I came to know his Acre (...) 
I started to know the real things – deeper into things. That’s when I believed in 
you and I fell in love with you. (...) [Acre] made me see – bear witness. 
AM4-4: You bear witness of God. You don’t see God, you bear witness in your 
heart. 
AM4-1: From the darkness it made me know who I am.115 
 
In this nashīd we see the attitude that the Shaykh is everything, as some 
followers exclaim when they are lost for words. The Shaykh is the wajd – the joy 
and core of existence, giving a strong feeling of existence and ecstacy – and the 
life of the follower. The Shaykh is God’s hidden secret, but he can be known and 
his message can be known as he manifested in the world like the sun rises – a 
symbol of the divine light and of the spiritual renewal that the Shaykh brings the 
followers and society at large, to which Shaykh Ahmad also referred in his 
description of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din (see paragraph 5.2). In this nashīd, Mina 
symbolizes the revelation of the Qur’an to the Prophet Muhammad and the start 
of the spread of his new religion, and Acre symbolizes the Shaykh’s embodiment 
of the same Islamic revelation and the start of the spread of his message.  
The word ‘dār’ might also refer to the role of the descendants of the 
Prophet and the Shaykh in the transmission of the revelation. In classical Arabic, 
the word ‘dār’, ‘abode’, has a locational connotation, meaning region, house (the 
physical structure of a residence), and home,116 from which derives the 
vernacular meaning of ‘family’. The connection of the revelation to the 
descendents of the Prophet and specifically of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din is thus 
strengthened. By knowing the Shaykh and his message the followers can see 
‘deeper into things’ and participate in the religious experience: Mount Sinai 
                                                  
115 AM4-1 and AM4-4 in Interview AM4. This nashīd was probably written in the time of Shaykh 
Ali Nur al-Din. It appears in a handwritten collection of anāshīd that was compiled at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, kindly shown to me by the muqaddam of Acre. 
116 Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, 3rd ed.  
290 
 
symbolizes the religious experience and the revelation of God to Moses – the 
use of the word ‘manzil’ for ‘house’ here also has the connotation of a spiritual 
stage equivalent to the word maqām.117 Moses’s experience is not of the same 
intensity as the revelation to the Prophet and his spiritual status is not of the 
same rank, however, as the Prophet saw into the essence of God, whereas 
Moses did not, and his understanding was limited in comparison to that of the 
archtype Sufi, al-Khidr.118 Just as Moses needs al-Khidr to guide him, so the 
followers need the Shaykh. They can witness the ‘house’, the experience and 
revelation of the Prophet and of the Shaykh from the outside, but they can enter 
the ‘house’ of Moses. The idea that the Shaykh is essentially different from the 
followers, and that they can never reach his level (see paragraph 5.2) but can 
reach a deeper vision of the Islamic revelation, is thus confirmed in this nashīd. 
 An hour into the interview someone else comes in who gives the 
discussion a new turn by giving his view of the Shaykh: 
 
Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din who founded the ṭarīqa said ‘all of me is Muhammadan (anā 
kullī Muḥammadī)’ because he embodied the ta‛līm of Islam that came with 
Muhammad pbuh, as it is, in every detail. (...) We as abnā al-ṭarīqa love Sīdnā 
Muhammad. And in our Shaykhs we see how he behaves, how Sīdnā 
Muhammad behaved. I love to see Sīdnā Muhammad in this age, how he would 
behave. And I almost feel that my Shaykh behaves as if Sīdnā Muhammad lives 
today. He embodies the true Islam. The balanced, moderate and tolerant (al- 
mu‛tadil wa-l-wasaṭī wa-mutasāmiḥ)... And our ṭarīqa embodies Islam in the new 
age, the true Islam.119 
 
Again we see the element of renewal through love and good behaviour in the 
footsteps of Muhammad. AM4-1 agrees and stresses the connection to 
Muhammad even more: ‘As we say, we love God in Muhammad and we love 
                                                  
117 Elisséef, ‘Manzil.’ 
118 Sells, Early Islamic Mysticism, 39–42. 
119 AM4-8 in Interview AM4. 
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Muhammad in Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā... and we love Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā in us.’ Later AM4-7 also 
adds: ‘He also loves us.’120 
AM4-7 continues a story he had told me during an earlier meeting121 when 
he said his wife and her relatives had made him love the Shaykh when they lived 
in the Gulf because she loved the Shaykh so much and talked about him all the 
time. When he said he joined the Yashrutiyya through his wife, she exclaimed 
‘No, through Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā!’ and he added ‘Yes, and through Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā.’ He 
saw the Shaykh for the first time when he and his wife were sitting in a bakery in 
Amman and ‘suddenly her face lit up like a thousand torches were shining on it,’ 
because the Shaykh had come in. When he walked out again Shaykh Ahmad 
looked at him and... [lost for words he made a movement with his arms along his 
body as if he dropped everything]. Back in the Gulf he lost his voice and while 
praying he asked Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā to give his voice back, and the next morning he 
prayed in such a booming voice that it scared him and he prayed the rest of the 
prayer in silence. Then he decided to go to Amman to see the Shaykh.  
 
I came here, but he was not here. I had to wait until he came and I went to the 
zāwiya, it was full of ikhwānnā. They were chanting nashīd. My wife’s brother 
introduced me to the Shaykh. (...) When I came to him I was full with love for him. 
I sang the nashīd there which I always treasure and cherish with my life. It says 
“Mā ahlā yawman... [he starts crying]... 
 
Mā ahlā yawman kāna fīhī liqā’u / wa-l-nāsu bayna mukabbirīn wa-muhallilīn  
Ya ka‛batan ḥajjat lahā arwāhuna / min qabli ṭīnati Adam mutabatili 
 
What a beautiful day that I saw him, I met him. And everybody was chanting 
Allahu akbar, Allah Allah Allah. Ya ka‛batan – the ka‛ba is in Mecca,122 but he is 
our goal which our spirits visit. Before Adam – our spirits dwelt together before 
                                                  
120 AM4-1, AM4-3 and AM4-7 in Interview AM4. 
121 Semi-formal meeting with Shaykh Ahmad, Dr. Ali, and seven followers in the zāwiya in 
Amman on 28-03-2013. 
122 The ka‛ba is the most sacred place in Islam, the centre of the mosque of Mecca (al-Masjid al-
Haram), the qibla (direction which Muslims face when praying ṣalāa), and around which pilgrims 
circumambulate when on ḥajj and ‛umra. 
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Adam was born. And now I come to see him in person, in flesh and blood. My 
spirit was longing for him from eternity, and that moment was the culmination of 
my love and communication (AM4-7: and belief) when spirits meet together.123 
 
He again points to the equation of the Shaykh and the zāwiya – here the zāwiya 
in Amman – with Mecca, and the ongoing religious experience of the revelation 
that is accessible through the Shaykh. He also refers to the moment before time 
in which the spirits came together and accepted God as their Lord, which is 
recreated in the highest spiritual experience of fanā’, here presented as fanā’ in 
the Shaykh – through love and spiritual communication.124 
Another follower tells us that when he was living in the Gulf he was 
desperately seeking for God in a state of deep despair, and when he met AM4-1 
who told him about the Shaykh in Amman, he decided he wanted to visit him. 
 
The night before I went, I felt something strange. I felt a strong maḥabba before 
seeing the Shaykh. The love I felt in the beginning was of a special kind... [he 
cannot find the right word and the others give suggestions until he goes for] 
elevated (sharaf). I was amazed by myself, what is happening? (...) I wanted to 
cry and I had not even seen the Shaykh yet. He [AM4-7] did not tell me anything 
about him ever, but I heard several recordings of nashīd and ḥaḍra, love (hiyām, 
maḥabba) happened to me.125  
 
He wanted to meet the Shaykh and he travelled to Amman, mentioning that a 
previous visit had been very difficult because the airport officials wanted to check 
his papers and his bags, whereas this visit was very easy. 
 
God, the Glorified and Exalted, bears witness that God made things easy. It was 
as if this Shaykh had baraka, grace. And I went to Amman, I met Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
for the first time. And I was filled with longing (mutashawwaq) that I saw him. (...) 
                                                  
123 AM4-1 in Interview AM4. 
124 Lings, ‘The Koranic Origins of Sufism’, 5–9; Lewisohn, ‘Sufism’s Religion of Love’, 150–151, 
158. See paragraph 1.2. 
125 AM4-3 in Interview AM4. 
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We sat together for two hours (...) and I told him my whole life story, the positive 
and the negative.126 
 
In this story there is the main element of love which precedes everything else 
and is the main drive for the follower. But there are more elements to consider. 
He portrayed the love as coming suddenly, miraculously, but he was prepared to 
love the Shaykh through the strong attachment that he felt towards the members 
of ikhwānnā he had already met and the nashīd he had heard (see also chapter 
6). Secondly, the fact that the Shaykh takes an active interest in his followers and 
guests is a recurrent element in the followers’ descriptions, which they value 
deeply. In this story, he took care of his follower both miraculously, by easing his 
way in the face of the airport officials, and concretely, by sitting down with him 
and listening to him. 
 In this interview the focus is on how much the followers love the Shaykh. 
But between the lines we can also hear the conviction that the Shaykh loves 
them as well and takes care of them. This attitude can also be seen in other 
interviews in Amman (e.g. compare AM1-1’s account of his first meeting with 
Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi in Interview AM1) and is even more pronounced in 
Acre. Throughout this interview the idea is articulated that love comes first, 
inspiration comes first, and this pushes you to act and develop your relationship 
with the Shaykh. This decides how you look at him and what you get from him 
and will push you further on the path. While there is the notion to return to the 
Qur’an to look for teachings and the idea that the Shaykh acts as ‘Muhammad in 
our age,’ the stress is on the role of love for the Shaykh and within the 
community. The anashīd sung refer to higher spiritual states which further 
strengthen attitudes to authority described in earlier paragraphs, but this is not 
taken up by the respondents, apart from a comment referring to the spiritual unity 
and communication between Shaykh and follower. 
 
 
                                                  
126 AM4-3 in Interview AM4. 
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Informal Discussions and Observations 
 
While the idea of the Shaykh as a father is not articulated in any of the 
interviews, this is mentioned in more informal settings. In one of my last visits to 
the zāwiya during my first period of fieldwork, one of the ladies said she and 
many other followers see him as a father, because he cares for then and is so 
involved in their development, and she thought the reason so many people have 
the determination to study more is because of his encouragement. He always 
encourages them to continue to develop themselves, like a parent who wants his 
children to do well.127 Another female follower told me on a different occasion 
that the Shaykh stimulates them to study, to keep developing themselves. When 
someone graduates, he prays a du‛ā’ that they will continue studying.128 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
In chapters 2 and 3 we have noted that the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya is a strongly 
centralised movement that is both doctrinally and organisationally revolving 
around the Shaykh. In this chapter we have examined the ideological and 
functional authority of the Shaykh (and its circular logic) and we have analysed 
on which elements the Shaykh’s authority is based. First of all, the basic doctrine 
that ‘all the Shaykhs are one’ is adhered to by all followers. The words and 
images used to explain this statement were recurring combinations of elements 
and concepts that derived from one body of thought, a paradigm or pattern of 
authority. Followers subscribe to all these elements but have their own individual 
focus and articulate their beliefs and emotions using different elements 
depending on their own focus and on the context of their speech. 
                                                  
127 Informal discussion with one of the followers in the zāwiya in Amman before the ḥaḍra on 18-
04-2013. 
128 Informal discussion with one of the followers in the zāwiya in Amman before the ḥaḍra on 11-
04-2013. 
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 In Amman, the most important element in the paradigm of authority is the 
doctrine that the Shaykh’s position is based on the concepts of the ‛aqīda and the 
nūr muḥammadī. The embodiment of this spiritual essence is what makes him 
the inheritor of Muhammad and places him in a spiritual genealogy of 
Muhammadan inheritors that have embodied this light throughout history: the 
anbiyā and awliyā and finally the Yashruti family. This connection to the nūr 
muḥammadī makes them essentially different from the normal followers, who can 
only participate in this light through the Shaykh. 
This is at the same time a traditional and a charismatic image of the 
Shaykh. The Shaykh both transmits the ‛aqīda and the nūr muḥammadī – a 
traditional image – and he is the ‛aqīda and the nūr muḥammadī – a charismatic 
image. We could say that the traditional image equals the physical body of the 
Shaykh, his ẓāhirī image, and that the charismatic image equals his spiritual 
form, his hidden bāṭinī image, but making too stark a distinction would 
misrepresent the beliefs and experiences of the followers, who believe that both 
exist at the same time and who strive to know the Shaykh in both forms. The one 
cannot exist without the other. 
The Shaykh’s authority is institutionalised on kinship lines through the 
doctrine that the next Shaykh will always be the son of the current Shaykh – a 
doctrine that is common in contemporary Sufism. The followers believe that the 
current Shaykh knows who has been chosen to be the next Shaykh – knowledge 
that is hidden from the followers – and communicates this choice through ishārāt. 
The actual behaviour of the next Shaykh can also be seen as a sign, as it shows 
he follows the Muhammadan Path and reminds them of his predecessors, and 
makes it clear he is to be the next Shaykh. The tarbiya of the Shaykh happens 
within the concrete community and social context of the ṭarīqa and the followers 
connect to this as they are involved in it as witnesses. Similarly they connect to 
the previous Shaykhs as their ancestors witnessed the same process with the 
previous Shaykhs. The ‛aqīda is thus transmitted both spiritually and discursively 
from Shaykh to his son who will be the next Shaykh, a process that is paralleled 
by the followers who transmit their adherence to the Shaykh and his teachings 
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within the community. These parallel processes of tarbiya create the setting in 
which the Shaykh can teach and guide the followers, and the followers can 
participate in the Shaykh’s charisma. 
 This institutionalisation and routinization of the founding Shaykh’s 
charisma on traditional kinship lines does not mean that the founding Shaykh’s 
charisma is lessened. The followers are convinced intellectually and emotionally 
that they can and do participate in this light of God. The relation between the 
heart of the Shaykh and their own which allows the Shaykh to inspire them with 
the ‛aqīda ties them to the Shaykh and makes them participants in his light. This 
does not absolve them from the duty to do ‛ibādāt – it affects their interior soul, 
not their exterior human form. This is a state that has also been described by the 
word ‘fanā’,’but this is not a concept that was used by the followers unless I 
explicitly asked about it. 
 This belief that the current Shaykh embodies the ultimate value of their 
religious community and can connect them to it, and the continued love and 
devotion he inspires, shows that Weber’s idea of ‘routinization of charisma’ 
needs revising, a point which is also made by scholars studying contemporary 
Sufism such as Lindholm and Pinto.129 They argue that the ‘charismatic moment’ 
can happen within a Sufi ṭarīqa, invoked through attitudes and practices, and is 
still considered by believers to be the absolute ‘breaking through’ of the 
transcendent, the ultimate religious experience. As Lindholm puts it: ‘Charisma 
here, while thoroughly personal and primary, is also thoroughly structured and 
systematic.’130 
We can see this in Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s time, as he acted within the 
centuries-old tradition of Sufism, its ideas, practices, and institutions, and was 
also considered charismatic. While his coming to Palestine is considered the 
founding moment of the ṭarīqa and there is relatively little attention to the tradition 
before it, this tradition is in no way completely negated. The ṭarīqa was modelled 
                                                  
129 Pinto, ‘Performing Baraka’, 196; Lindholm, ‘Introduction’, 9. See paragraph 1.3. 
130 Lindholm, ‘Introduction’, 24–25. 
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on the Sufi ‘existing template for sainthood’131 and organisational model of the 
ṭarīqa – if more centralised than was common in the pre-modern world.  
Geaves notes that the institutionalisation process often already starts in 
the charismatic moment.132 In order to ensure the survival of his message and of 
his charismatic authority with its spiritual and material power within his family, 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din began to proselytize, build a zawāya, and train his son, 
whom he had asked to come from Tunesia for this purpose, to be his successor. 
Thus the original charisma of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din has been institutionalised in 
the traditional model of kinship succession, sometimes presented as succession 
through appointment and signs (three options that Lindholm presents as 
separate,133 but that here co-exist) ensuring the continuation of the religious 
experience for the followers, and securing the ‘distribution of grace’, the social 
prestige and the material assets, within the family. As Weber pointed out, this 
monopolizes the ‘privileges reserved for those charged with religious 
functions’,134 but it also transmits the responsibilities that come with them as they 
are expected of the Shaykh as bases of his authority.  
One of these responsibilities is to inspire spiritual renewal: through the 
institutionalisation of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s charisma on traditional genealogical 
lines, the followers continue to participate in this charisma through his spiritual 
and genealogical successors. His message of spiritual renewal is continued as 
adaptation to society, and continues to add to the Shaykh’s charisma. The 
coming of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din al-Yashruti to Palestine is seen as historical 
evidence of the spiritual truth that the Shaykh came to the murīdīn, rather than 
the other way round. Historically, murīdīn went in search for a spiritual master 
and travelled the known world to find their one master – Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din 
broke this pattern and came in search for them. This communicates a sense that 
the followers are chosen as well, just as the Shaykh is. It is also seen as an 
example of his care for his followers and the efforts he is willing to make for their 
                                                  
131 Ibid., 24. See paragraph 1.3. 
132 Geaves, ‘Charismatic Authority in Islam’, 42, 58. See paragraph 1.3. 
133 Lindholm, ‘Introduction’, 9–10. 
134 Weber, The Sociology of Religion, quoted in Sedgwick, Saints and Sons, 1. 
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spiritual welfare, attesting to the greatness of the Shaykh. The encouragement of 
Shaykh Ahmad and Sīdī Ali towards all their followers to develop themselves on 
both a spiritual and a mundane level is also seen as a manifestation of this care 
for them, and as an illustration of the importance the ṭarīqa attaches to the 
participation in society. As one follower puts it, the Shaykh wants them to be 
good people and good citizens. The coming of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din to Palestine 
strengthens the image of him as a spiritual renewer, and is considered to 
continue in the current Shaykh who aims to adapt the ṭarīqa to his time. 
This innovative role taken by the Shaykh points to the circular nature of 
functional authority that Eickelman and Piscatori noted, as the Shaykh’s strong 
position due to his receiving of the spiritual and material heritage of his 
predecessors allows him to be innovative, which in turn strengthens his 
charismatic authority as he complies with the followers’ expectations and ensures 
that the ṭarīqa’s symbolic universe continues to speak to them. 
The stress on renewal shows the degree to which they value adaptation to 
society. According to O’Dea’s ‘five dilemmas’, such adaptation might lead to the 
‘dilemma of delimitation’, but we see here that this is actually seen as one of the 
most valued aspects of the ṭarīqa and of the Shaykh, and is experienced as a 
way for the religious experience to break into everyday life, rather than a dilluting 
of the charismatic message. The ‘symbolic and organizational embodiment of the 
experience of the ultimate in less-than-ultimate forms and the concomitant 
embodiment of the sacred in profane structures’135 is not considered a 
diminishing of the grace, but an enhancement as it offers all followers a way to 
access to this grace. Here the ‘routinization of charisma’ does not limit the 
religious experience of the ‘charismatic moment’, the ‘breaking through’ of the 
transcendent, but rather gives the Shaykh the platform to teach the followers to 
see it in everyday life beyond the bounds of what has come to be narrowly 
defined as ‘religion’ (an attitude we shall discuss further in the following chapter). 
Werbner’s idea that expansion can only happen because of a shaykh’s 
charisma is shown to be more complicated: in this case innovation and charisma 
                                                  
135 O’Dea, ‘Sociological Dilemmas’; O’Dea, The Sociology of Religion, 90–98. 
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strengthen each other, and a charismatic shaykh may well be seen charismatic 
because he is expanding and innovating. Werbner herself inadvertently points to 
this as she argues that in the case of Zindapir and his khalīfa Sufi Sahib travel 
and sacrilizing of space provides them with charisma.136  
We have seen in paragraph 1.3 that charisma is not an inherent personal 
attribute, but has to be performed and ‘recognized’ by people based on culturally 
specific characteristics. In the case of Shaykh Ahmad, his followers see him as 
charismatic because of the support given to him by his predecessor, his lineage, 
his pious and charitable behaviour in line with what is expected of him based on 
the example of his predecessor, including his visible care for the spiritual and 
social wellbeing of the community, and a feeling of love and awe that is cultivated 
in the follower by his or her loved ones, often from a very early age. They 
consider him to provide them with an emotional connection to the essence of 
their religion, and to their own history as well: the ‘charismatic moment’ of the 
revelation of the Prophet embodied in the Shaykh. 
The followers in Jordan mainly see the Shaykh’s practical role as that of 
teacher and guide, teaching the ‛aqīda through his sayings and through his 
example, making him the supreme qudwa. The view of the Shaykh as a father 
who cares about the development of his children did not come up during official 
interviews, but was communicated to me in more informal settings. In other 
words: the authority bestowed upon the Shaykh because of his relationship to 
Muhammad, from both a ẓāhir and a bāṭin perspective, is exercised within the 
community through his role as a caring teacher and guide.  
The comments on the importance of tarbiya in the acceptance of the 
succession remind us of Berger and Luckmann’s argument of the importance of 
the internalisation of ‘roles’ in the socialisation process as the social universe is 
continuously re-enected through the performance of these roles. Through the 
process of tarbiya both Shaykh and followers are prepared for the roles they play 
in the community to the point where they internalize these roles and through 
                                                  
136 Werbner, Pilgrims of Love, 43–47, 73–81; Werbner and Basu, ‘The Embodiment of Charisma’, 
13. 
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them the social order, giving it an air of objective reality, of the ‘natural order of 
things’ as willed by God.137 Through the enactment of these roles of Shaykh and 
follower, the symbolic universe and its social structure are maintained and 
endowed with facticity. Pinto points to the usefulness of Asad’s model of the 
transmission of tradition and disciplinary mechanisms to analyse the character of 
relationships within the Sufi group, noting that charisma has to be enacted in the 
group, and different enactment leads to ‘divergent configurations of religiosity, 
community, and religious subjectivities within the normative framework of a 
shared Sufi tradition’. Different systems of tarbiya, similarly, lead to different 
relationships between shaykh and disciple, and between disciples themselves.138 
We therefore turn to the analysis of this tarbiya, the transmission of social 
and spiritual attitudes and values through discursive means and disciplinary 
practices. This transmission happens all the time in everyday life, but specifically 
amongst the followers in their houses and in the zāwiya. The practice of the 
ṭarīqa and the places where this happens are intrinsically linked to the experience 
of the followers’ relationship with the Shaykh, as the authority of the Shaykh is 
enacted through them, especially in his role as a teacher and a guide. The next 
chapters examine the practical aspects of the Shaykh’s authority: how are the 
roles we have found in this chapter enacted by the Shaykh, or to turn the 
question around: how are they attributed to him? Which processes and dynamics 
are at play here?
                                                  
137 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 33–34. 
138 Pinto, ‘Knowledge and Miracles’, 73. See paragraph 1.2. 
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Chapter 6 
Tarbiya in Amman 
 
 
This chapter examines the practical aspects of the Shaykh’s authority: how does 
the Shaykh enact his roles, or to turn the question around: how are they 
attributed to him? How is the paradigm of authority in this ṭarīqa maintained? We 
have seen that the Shaykh is envisaged as a caring teacher – how is this role 
enacted? How is the relationship between the Shaykh and the follower 
developed, and what is the role of the community and the individual in this 
process? In other words, which processes and dynamics of education and 
communication are at play here as the tradition is transmitted through discursive 
and disciplinary means in the process of tarbiya?  
 
Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti describes the development of the relation between 
him and his followers as follows: 
 
The murīd develops his spiritual relation with the Shaykh in the ṭarīqa through 
commitment to the teachings and guidance (ta‛līmāt wa-tawjihāt) of the Shaykh 
that he receives from him directly (mubāsharatan) or that were provided by the 
guidance (tawjihāt) of the founder of the ṭarīqa, may God be pleased with him, 
that are present in the books of Sittī Fatima al-Yashrutiyya, may God have mercy 
on her (...) and that are transmitted orally by the abnā al-ṭarīqa and that 
concentrate on the adherence to the performance of the ‘ibādāt of the sharia in 
their spiritual dimensions, in its form and meaning (shaklan wa-maḍmūnan), and 
the commitment to the Islamic akhlāq, and the Sufi ādāb. And this commitment to 
worship (iltizām ta‛abbudī) develops the spiritual relation of the murīd with his 
Shaykh in the ṭarīqa; it provides the murīd with a deep vision of the heart towards 
the ‘ibādāt (ru’ya qalbiya ‛amīqa li-l-‛ibādāt), it illuminates (yakshifu) for him the 
Shaykh’s spiritual position (makāna1) in his capacity of the wārith muḥammadī, 
                                                  
1 Also translated as place, location, situation, office, authority, rank. 
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which means [he has] the clear Muhammadan teachings and rules (al- ta‛ālīm wa 
al-aḥkām al-muḥammadīya al-ṣarīḥa) (...) 
The murīd connects (yatawāṣil) with his Shaykh by way of his commitment to the 
orders (awāmir) and the teachings of the Shaykh, and making him his role model 
(iqtidā’ bihi), and God will disclose meanings through the senses (ma‛ānī 
dhawqiyya) to the heart of this murīd, so he will reach a state of spiritual 
witnessing of his Shaykh (ḥāla mushāhada rūḥiya li-shaykhihi), going beyond the 
corporeal human reality. Just as the murīd connects with his Shaykh through 
undertaking a ziyāra2 to his Shaykh (sa‛y li-ziyāra) and stand in his presence3 to 
receive tarbiya through his good example (bi-l-qudwa al-ḥusna) and the taking 
over (iqtibās) of the positive characteristics (ṣiffāt), this also happens through the 
muqaddamīn (...) or through his brothers who possess hearts full with the 
knowledge of God and his Prophet (al-qulūb al-‛amira bi-ma‛rifat Allah wa-
rasūlihi).4 
 
We can see from this quote that while the murīd should first of all turn to the 
Shaykh, the muqaddamīn and the other murīdīn also transmit the teachings. The 
stress is on adherence to the sharia, and the performance of ‘ibādāt and of 
proper akhlāq and ādāb enables the follower to develop an inner understanding 
of the true spiritual nature of the Shaykh in his capacity of the wārith 
muḥammadī. In this chapter we will see how this happens in practice within the 
community. 
 
 
6.1 Cultivating Attitudes 
 
As we have seen, the Shaykh is the one who directs the followers on this path, 
who teaches them ‘through his action and sayings (af‛āluhu wa aqwāluhu)’ just 
                                                  
2 A ziyāra is a visit; in the Sufi context pilgrimage to a shaykh, tomb or shrine. 
3 The expression used is ‘bayna īdayhu,’ lit. ‘between his hands.’ This expression implies that the 
person is of a very high rank. 
4 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 15-03-2014, p. 1-2. 
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as the Prophet Muhammad did. How does a follower obtain these teachings? 
One of the followers in Amman summarizes the process: 
 
The human being has to go to the teacher so he can learn from him. (...) We 
have to stay connected to him, we see how he practices his daily life, how he 
deals with things, how he behaves, and he is a qudwa for us. And we learn from 
his actions and sayings (af‛āluhu wa aqwāluhu). In this way we learn from him. 
And every person who stays close to the Shaykh will be more informed. 
He who does not have the opportunity to be close to the Shaykh is close to 
ikhwānnā, who are always connected to him and he learns from ikhwānnā, 
because every one of ikhwānnā teaches the other, they work together, we learn 
from each other. 
After a period of time there will be a spiritual relation between you and the 
Shaykh. The relation will be more spiritual than physical (ẓāhiriyya) (...) First of all 
we feel our Shaykh, he feels us, and the spiritual connection is more than the 
material connection. When he looks at us, or when we look at him, or we think 
about him, ilhām will come.5 Furthermore, this connection (ittiṣāl) with the Shaykh 
is both material and spiritual.6 
 
The Shaykh teaches through his actions and words. The actions are what makes 
him the qudwa as the followers see how he behaves and interacts with people 
and they try to follow his behaviour and this way learn akhlāq.7 He is considered 
to walk the Muhammadan path, embody the Muhammadan ethics – some say it 
is as if the Prophet Muhammad is alive and they can see how he acts in the 
contemporary world. 
The Shaykh’s words are heard once a week during his mudhākara in the 
zāwiya, but everything he says outside of this context is also discussed among 
ikhwānnā as part of his teachings, in addition to the teachings of the previous 
Shaykhs, mainly the founder Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din through the books of his 
                                                  
5 In the words of the Review Panel: ‘He is the source of ilhām for us.’ Review Panel, ‘Detailed 
Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 19. 
6 AM3-5 in Interview AM3. 
7 E.g. AM1-3 in Interview AM1, AM1-3 and AM3-2 in Interview AM3. 
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daughter Fatima al-Yashrutiya, but also their teachings and actions as 
transferred orally among ikhwānnā. 
The discussion among ikhwānnā is also called mudhākara as they 
remember the Shaykh’s words and actions in order to understand the deeper 
meanings and the practical lessons they can take from them for their life and 
spiritual development. It is essential, as this quote shows: ikhwānnā always 
discuss issues of the ṭarīqa, and mainly the teachings and person of the Shaykh. 
When one or all of the followers in a certain community do not have physical 
access to the Shaykh, their pool of knowledge about the Shaykh and the ṭarīqa is 
an officially sanctified substitute: ‘There is a ḥadīth for Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-
Din, that if you cannot meet with the Shaykh, meet with your brother and he gives 
you as if you take from the Shaykh.’8 
This is of course extremely relevant for the followers living outside of 
Jordan, but also for those who do live in places frequently visited by the Shaykh, 
as these interactions among ikhwānnā form the backdrop to an important part of 
their life from the moment they are born. This is the way in which roles and 
attitudes are internalized which enable them to see the Shaykh in all the ways we 
have seen in the previous chapter, and that make them see him as a teacher. 
This is where the elements of tradition related to his authority are transmitted and 
engaged with, where his words and actions are interpreted and added to the 
stock of tradition. 
 This is true for those who are raised among ikhwānnā and for most of 
those who join the ṭarīqa later in life in what can be seen as a ‘conversion’ or 
‘reaffiliation’.9 There are a few conversion stories told about others that lack this 
element of communal preparation – for example, a Cypriot woman saw the 
                                                  
8 AM4-7 in Interview AM4. 
9 While conversion is the changing from one religious tradition to another, reaffiliation entails 
changing from one group to another within a tradition. The latter is more relevant here as they 
were born and raised as Muslims and now join a particular Islamic sub-group, immerging 
themselves into a ‘sub-world’ within the larger reality which they internalised during the process of 
primary socialisation. I continue to use the word ‘conversion’, however, as this is the word they 
themselves use. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 157–166; Hazen, 
‘Conversion Narratives among the Alami and Rifa’i Tariqa in Britain’, 151; Dominguez Diaz, ‘The 
One or the Many?’, 120–121. See paragraph 1.3. 
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Shaykh in a dream and travelled to find him and join the ṭarīqa – but all converts I 
spoke to stressed that they came to love the Shaykh through their spouses or 
friends, seeing their love and hearing about the Shaykh from them – even though 
they consider this min faḍl Sīdnā. In Interview AM4 we have come across the 
conversion story of a follower who learnt to love the Shaykh through his wife: 
When he said he joined the Yashrutiyya through his wife, she exclaimed ‘No, 
through Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā!’ and he added ‘Yes, and through Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā’. Another 
convert was put in touch with the Shaykh through a dear friend (see paragraph 
5.4 Interview AM4). 
 Mostly the concrete teaching happens first within the family and then 
within the community (which overlap). This is where the attitudes are formed that 
enable the followers to learn from the Shaykh: the wish to belong to the 
community and to connect to and learn from the Shaykh. This is where the 
worldview is developed which places the Shaykh at the centre and where the 
particular mechanisms of interpreting words and events in the community and the 
world at large are put into place. This is where they assume the role of ibn al-
ṭarīqa, follower of Shaykh Ahmad. This process is referred to as tarbiya. 
 
My parents took me to the zāwiya, they took me to meetings of ikhwānnā, in 
these meetings I heard waẓīfa, I read the wird, the dhikr. When I grew up I 
started to watch my parents and my brothers and the whole of my family, what 
they do. (...) I became convinced, and I started to do it and I became a member 
and I grew up (nasha’t) in the ṭarīqa. This was my tarbiya since I was small. I 
witnessed it with my eyes, then I practiced these things. (...) And from here we 
also raise our children, the same sulūk. We make them listen when they are 
small, and they observe and read, then they visit the Shaykh and observe the 
Shaykh and respect the Shaykh and treasure the Shaykh.10 
 
ZA1-4: The ṭarīqa is based on tarbiya and legacy (wirātha), it means that our 
small children when they see us go to the zāwiya they go with us, they will be 
from ikhwānnā, fuqarā’, we will all be ikhwānnā. (...) And the same thing for 
                                                  
10 AM2-1 in Interview AM2. 
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example, our children know that after Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā will come his son, Ḥaḍrat 
Sīdnā Ahmad or Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali or Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Hadi. (...) There is no one for 
example [who says] I raise my son to be Shaykh. Something like that does not 
happen. The tarbiya is the basis (asas) that the son of the faqīr is a faqīr. And of 
course Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā is one of the mashyakha of the ṭarīq who is qualified. 
ZA1-3: The murīd has his sulūk and the Shaykh has his sulūk.11 
 
Ikhwānnā as a whole are considered to be one family and they are all 
involved in this communal tarbiya to educate themselves and each other. During 
one of the monthly women’s meetings, the ladies mentioned this communal 
tarbiya several times. One of the teenage girls said ‘It is not just your father and 
mother who raise you, we raise ourselves, and then we raise each other.’ 
Another girl said it is important to respect your elders and take their advice. She 
also said that ‘we are a group, we complete each other.’12 One example of this 
communal tarbiya is given by a follower who grew up in a family of ikhwānnā but 
who was very sceptical. He read philosophy and was influenced by ideas that 
Sufism was strange to Islam. His family was not well educated and could not help 
him with his doubts, but some of his friends from ikhwānnā with whom he went to 
high school and university did. They made him understand, they brought him 
closer to the ṭarīqa and made him see it was part of Islam. Even though it 
remained difficult to combine his beliefs with his philosophical thoughts,  
 
AM2-2: Reading helped me, ikhwānnā helped me, and most of all dhikr helped 
me. 
AM2-6: And the mudhākarāt among ikhwānnā. 
AM2-2: The mudhākarāt and the mudhākarāt of Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā also (...) made 
things much easier for me.13 
 
The zāwiya is another primary place where ikhwānnā are educated. 
Shaykh Ahmad stresses the importance of exposing children to the ṭarīqa from 
                                                  
11 ZA1-4 and ZA1-3 in Interview ZA1. 
12 Women’s meeting in the zāwiya in Amman on 30-03-2013. 
13 AM2-2 and AM2-6 in Interview AM2. 
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the earliest age and has dedicated a room in the zāwiya for this very purpose: a 
nursery where the youngest children can be taken during the meeting, equipped 
with video screens on which the meeting is shown, to ensure exposure to the 
happenings from the earliest age. As soon as they are old enough to act 
appropriately, their mothers are encouraged to take them to meetings, both the 
prayer meetings on Thursday night and study meetings, and to let them 
participate in the rituals. The Shaykh also encourages followers to discuss 
matters related to the ṭarīqa among themselves. In the next chapter we will 
discuss in more detail what role the zāwiya plays in the tarbiya of the followers. 
 Finally, there is the spiritual connection which dwarves the physical 
connection, and which is the ultimate means of communication between Shaykh 
and murīd, rather than the personal physical communication: 
  
He helps me through his madad. Directly and indirectly. (...) It is not necessary 
for me to sit with Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā because there are those who are instructed by 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā who do not see him. You have other means of communication 
between the murīd and the Shaykh. And these are known in all Sufi ṭuruq. For 
example through dhikr, through dream visions.14  
 
Several respondents stress that this relationship has to begin with the murīd, who 
has to be open, prepared, awake, ready to receive the communications of the 
Shaykh.15 The murīd has to have the right attitude: 
 
It’s a matter of belief. If you believe in him as a teacher of physics, you get 
physics from him. If you believe in him as a lawyer, or a judge, you get this from 
him. If you believe that he is a messenger (rasūl) who gives you spiritual 
knowledge, you get spiritual knowledge from him. (...) There is a ḥadīth about 
Sayyidnā Muhammad pbuh, he said: ‘If you believe in a stone, you will benefit 
                                                  
14 AM4-4 in Interview AM4. 
15 AM4-1 and AM4-4 in Interview AM4. 
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from that stone.’ Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā commented on that, he said ‘it’s not the stone that 
benefits you, it’s your belief.’ You get the benefit because of your belief.16 
 
First of all one has to accept that the Shaykh has something to give, and 
you have to be humble enough to receive it: ‘You have to love him. And you have 
to believe that he knows, that he has a higher rank. If you are equal you don’t get 
anything from him.’17 Then you have to develop the ability to understand the 
words and actions of the Shaykh through moral and spiritual practice. Everyone 
will understand the Shaykh’s words and actions differently, depending on his/her 
spiritual level: 
 
Everybody gets something other than what other people get. That’s up to the 
level in which they are. [There is] a story which says [that] one man was selling 
wild za’atar (thyme) outside: ‘Ya za‛tar barri!’ People at different levels in the 
ṭarīqa, one of them he heard it: (?) ‘Work, you get my (...) rewards.’ The second 
one, at the higher level, he said ‘Sā‛atha sawfa tara birri,’ ‘In a few minutes you 
will see my rewards’. The third one heard it ‘Issa law tara birri,’ ‘had you seen my 
rewards, you would be rushing into things.’ So we get from the Shaykh as much 
as we believe in him, and (...) our spiritual level. (...) First you got to love him, and 
believe that he has got something to give.18 
 
All of this points to the parallels between the ṭarīqa’s system of tarbiya and 
Berger and Luckmann’s ideas on socialisation.19 We have seen that socialisation 
happens first of all through interaction with significant others, and secondly with 
the larger community. This is the same in cases of ‘conversion’ or ‘reaffiliation’, 
where we see the same pattern of socialisation through significant others and the 
                                                  
16 AM4-1 in Interview AM4. Shaykh Ahmad also discusses this ḥadīth in his interview with al-
Urdun, 26-02-1996, p.8-9. 
17 AM4-1 in Interview AM4. In the words of the Review Panel: ’If you think that you are on the 
same level with him, then you will not be able to gain knowledge and guidance from him.’ Review 
Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 20. 
18 AM4-1 in Interview AM4. 
19 See paragraph 1.3 
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larger community.20 The role of the community in the socialisation process, which 
is an ongoing process of world-maintenance as challenges to the individual’s 
belief structure arise and need to be incorporated in the worldview, is clear, as it 
is referred to explicitly and seen from the account of AM2-2 who was helped by 
the mudhākara of ikhwānnā to overcome his doubts. Finally, the internalisation of 
the roles of follower and Shaykh and the relationships between them is an 
essential part of this process of tarbiya. When these basic attitudes have been 
established, the travelling of the Path can be taken to the next level. 
 
 
6.2 Joining the Ṭarīqa 
 
Most followers in Amman are born and raised in the ṭarīqa, but this does not 
mean they are automatically considered abnā al-ṭarīqa. They do mubāya‛a to 
pledge allegiance to the Shaykh and the ṭarīqa. In Amman and Zarqa it is 
stressed that not everyone is allowed to do mubāya‛a and that the muqaddam 
makes sure the person is a good Muslim and a good person before he allows 
him or her to do the mubāya‛a. Being from a family that is from ikhwānnā is not 
enough, the criterium is that the follower is a good person, with good behaviour, 
and mature. ‘Before he is one of abnā al-ṭarīqa he has to be a human being, he 
has to have humanity, love human beings, not just focus on the members of the 
ṭarīqa.’21  
When someone has the appropriate age, he goes to the Shaykh or 
muqaddam and asks to be part of the ṭarīqa. The muqaddam decides whether 
the applicant is a good person based on his own knowledge and by asking family 
and friends.  
 
You know that abnā al-ṭarīqa, we know each other, the families. (...) And abnā al-
ṭarīqa raise their children, the right tarbiya of the ṭarīqa (...) And the Shaykh or the 
                                                  
20 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 176–178; Berger, The Sacred 
Canopy, 41–42, 91–92, 157–166. See paragraph 1.3. 
21 AM1-1 and AM1-3 agree on this in Interview AM1. 
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muqaddam [knows] through his ma‛rifa because of our family relations how the 
person is, how his behaviour is.’22 
 
The mubāya‛a23 is considered to be a practice that goes back to the 
Prophet’s time and that is mentioned in the Qur’an in the Āyat al-Mubāya‛a (Sūrat 
al-Fatḥ 48:10, more commonly known as Āyat al-Bay‛a). The Shaykh or the 
muqaddam takes the murīd’s hand, says ‘Bismillāh (in the name of God)’ and 
asks him/her: ‘I am taking from you the pledge of allegiance to Ḥaḍrat Sayyidunā 
and to the ṭarīqa Shadhuliyya-Yashruṭiyya, where my Shaykh and your Shaykh 
(in this time) is Ḥaḍrat Sayyidunā Ahmad al-Hadi al-Yashruti. Do you want to 
pledge? (Hal tubāya‛a?),’ to which the murīd replies ‘yes.’ After this the Shaykh or 
muqaddam asks him/her to ask God for forgiveness and to repent from all his/her 
past sins and disobediences and to return to God with a sound immaculate heart, 
so s/he can start the journey on the path with a clean heart. The murīd repeats 
‘astaghfir Allāh al-aẓīm (I ask for God’s forgiveness)’ three times, after which the 
Shaykh or muqaddam recites the Āyat al-Mubāya‛a: 
 
Those who have pledged allegiance to you, O Prophet, have pledged allegiance 
to God. God’s hand is over their hands. So, the one who will break his pledge will 
break it at his own peril, and the one who will keep his pledge that he has made 
with God, shall soon be given a great reward by Him.24 
 
Then the Shaykh or muqaddam commands the murīd to fear (yataqqi) and 
obey God, and to adhere to the rules of the sharia and the ṭarīqa. He instructs the 
murīd on his or her duties. These duties are first of all to be a good Muslim by 
adhering to the five pillars of Islam25 and practicing the aḥkām al-sharī‛a (rules of 
                                                  
22 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
23 This description of the mubāya‛a is based on several slightly different versions given by AM1-1 
and AM1-3 during Interview AM1, by Shaykh Ahmad in an interview given in Beirut in 1999, in 
Sawafta, al-Madrasa al-Shādhiliyya al-Yashruṭiyya, 835–842: 836, and on the description given 
by the Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 20-22. 
24 The translation of Sūrat al-Fatḥ 48:10 as given by the Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and 
Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 21-22. 
25 Also known as arkān al-islām (pillars of Islam): Shahāda (declaring the creed: I believe there is 
no God but God, and that Muhammad is his prophet), ṣalāa (the Islamic prayer which is prayed 
311 
 
the sharia). Second there are the aḥkām al-ṭarīqa (rules of the ṭarīqa) – 
maḥabba, dhikr, fikr, and taslīm,26 which include the practices which are specific 
for the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya: reading the ṭarīqa’s awrād twice a day (after 
ṣalāat al-fajr and ṣalāat al-maghrib), reading the ṭarīqa’s waẓīfa twice a day (after 
ṣalāat al-fajr and ṣalāat al-‛ishā’), to practice dhikr when s/he has time to do so, 
and to come to the zāwiya to practice the ḥaḍra. And finally one has to be a good 
person. Then the Shaykh or the muqaddam prays du‛ā’ that God will be good to 
the follower. One follower also mentioned that they pledge to obey the Shaykh.27 
Another muqaddam also stresses the importance of knowing the sharia:  
 
He has to be polite, he has to pray, he has to fast. (...) All of the pillars of Islam, 
and read the waẓīfa, commit to the dīn. A person who does not pray, we do not 
give the mubāya‛a! I ask the question what are the pillars of Islam, what do you 
know about ikhwānnā, what do you know about the zāwiya, [they are] questions 
so the muqaddam knows that the person is committed. We do not have 
something outside the sharia, this is not performed in the ṭarīqa, and the person 
who does not commit does not deserve the mubāya‛a.28 
 
 While one person tells me spontaneously how the mubāya‛a was a life-
changing experience for him, all participants emphasize that it is only one step on 
the Path, ‘the first step of their journey to become close to God in the Ṭarīqa.’29 
 
AM2-2: I did the mubāya‛a when I was one year old. [Laughter] Because 
personally I feel that my life began in this taking of the mubāya‛a. Of course I was 
in my twenties. (...) Really, it was a divergence in my life, a different level 
(marḥal), but the mubāya‛a is not everything in the ṭarīqa. 
                                                                                                                                                   
five times a day), zakāa (charity), ṣawm (fasting during the month Ramaḍān) and ḥajj (the annual 
pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina during the month Dhū al-Ḥijja, the last month of the Islamic year. 
It is a duty for every Muslim to go on ḥajj at least once in his life, if s/he has the ability and 
opportunity). 
26 This was stressed to me by most respondents who discussed the mubāya‛a, but the Review 
Panel requested I omit this sentence. Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-
2014, 21. 
27 AM2-1 in Interview AM2. 
28 ZA1-1 in Interview ZA1. 
29 Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 22. 
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AM1-3: It is just the beginning.30 
 
It is important to note that the mubāya‛a is the pledge to fully adhere to the 
ṭarīqa’s rules and rituals, but that the rules and rituals themselves do not change 
after the mubāya‛a. There is no personalized aspect to the initiation, as is 
common in many Sufi movements.31 The Shaykh is considered to teach each 
follower according to his or her abilities, but this seems to relate more to issues 
of communication (see paragraph 6.4) than to the assignment of personal 
practices. Children who are too young to do mubāya‛a and adults who chose for 
whatever reason not to commit themselves fully can still perform the same 
rituals. There is no personalized wird, and there are no ascending degrees of 
initiation in the ṭarīqa with corresponding levels of dhikr. Someone who is very 
advanced on the path (as judged by his behaviour) can ask permission to do a 
different dhikr, but this seems to be extremely rare (see paragraph 6.3.3). Most 
followers therefore perform the same devotional practices, both before and after 
mubāya‛a.  
While there is a clear idea of ‘progress on the Path’ and the development 
of the spiritual relationship with the Shaykh and deepening of spiritual 
understanding, hardly any mention was made to me of clearly defined stages on 
the path. This correlates to the absence of different levels of initiation and 
personalized dhikr, but there do seem to be better defined ideas on this issue 
than was communicated to me during the interviews. During a speech in 
Lebanon in 1998, Shaykh Ahmad mentioned the four arkān (maḥabba, dhikr, fikr 
and taslīm), after which he mentioned four marātib: maḥabba , murāqaba, 
mushāhada, and fanā’.32 In an interview a year later, however, he stressed that 
there are not many marātib and maqāmāt and he discusses the importance of 
‛ibādāt and dhikr until one burns the veils of the material senses and reaches 
                                                  
30 AM2-2 and AM1-3 in Interview AM2. 
31 Lewisohn, ‘Sulūk’; Pinto, ‘The Anthropologist and the Initiated’, 465. See paragraph 1.2. 
32 Speech given by Shaykh Ahmad at the opening of the zāwiya in Khalda, Beirut, on 13-07-1998, 
in Sawafta, al-Madrasa al-Shādhiliyya al-Yashruṭiyya, 829–831. 
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transparency (shafāfa),33 and finally one enjoys the graces and lights of God 
directly.34 During a televised interview in 2014, Shaykh Ahmad stated that the 
goal of the Path is ‘values’ (qiyām).35 
During an interview in Amman one of the followers mentioned this 
‘transparency’, but was quickly interrupted by AM1-3 who stressed that they 
reach this through ‛ibādāt.36 This might point to a conscious silence on the topic 
as the Shaykh and the other ‘custodians of tradition’ want to stress their 
adherence to the sharia and the importance of the‛ibādāt. It is also possible that 
while all followers accept the possibility of these higher levels, it is not a concrete 
issue for most of them as they do not know who has reached these levels, and it 
is therefore not an actual part of their experience and their relationship with the 
Shaykh and each other. Whether there is an actual historical shift in the 
conceptual approach to the spiritual development and its goal needs to be 
subject of further research. 
 
 
6.3 The Pillars of the Ṭarīqa 
 
Shaykh Ahmad writes that the goal of the ṭarīqa is to reach knowledge of God (al-
wuṣūl ila ma‛rifat Allah) and to connect (yarbuṭ) people to God.37 Everything on 
the path is undertaken with this aim. The first commitment is to follow the sharia 
like the other Muslims. Specific for the ṭarīqa are the four pillars: maḥabba, dhikr, 
fikr, and taslīm. All the pillars of the ṭarīqa are for the benefit of the followers – 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din insisted on them because he wanted to spread his grace 
(ni‛ma) among all people.38 
                                                  
33 Transparency, the ability to see beyond the physical limits and into the hearts of people. 
Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 221–222. 
34 Interview with Shaykh Ahmad, conducted in Beirut in 1999, in Sawafta, al-Madrasa al-
Shādhiliyya al-Yashruṭiyya, 835–842: 835–836. 
35 Interview by Akram Khuzam with Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti, ‘al-Ṣūfiyya fi-l-Urdun, al-ṭarīqa al-
Shādhuliyya al-Yashruṭiyya’, Hikāyāt ma’a Akram Khuzam, al-Hurra Channel, published online on 
07-10-2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vztFKBoM0jA, accessed on 15-01-2015. 
36 Interview AM3.  
37 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 14-10-2013, p.3 
38 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 14-10-2013, p.1-2 
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6.3.1 Sharia 
 
Shaykh Ahmad refers to a saying by Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din: ‘Improve your 
exteriors (ẓawāhirkum) and leave the interiors (bawāṭin) to me.’ Shaykh Ahmad 
explains that the murīd has to improve his outer states (aḥwāl al-ẓāhir) before he 
can acquire the inner ranks (marātib al-bāṭin). He quotes Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din: 
‘the ṭarīqa is the Qur’an and the Sunna’ and ‘every rule of the sharia has a 
treasure of the Truth beneath it and this treasure cannot be achieved except 
through the mastery of the rule of the sharia.’39 Adherence to the rules of the 
sharia is thus presented as an essential part of the ṭarīqa and the first 
commitment the murīd submits to when doing mubāya‛a. 
The importance of adhering to the sharia and to be a good Muslim is 
stressed explicitly, repeatedly, sometimes even heatedly, while others do not 
mention it as much because it is considered self-evident. Some continue to 
explain that they consider the sharia to include both ‛ibādāt (practices of worship) 
and mu‛āmalāt (communal and social interactions): religion is not just something 
that is between you and God, but it has to direct all of your behaviour towards 
society. ‘The ‛ibādāt for taṣawwuf is not just prayer and fasting and ḥajj.40 If you 
go to school, if you raise your children, it is ‛ibāda. If you help other people, if you 
do good things to the human beings.’41 ‘The pillars [of Islam] alone are not 
enough, you have to build on them, you need mu‛āmalāt, you need to deal with 
people (ta‛āmalāt), ṣillat al-raḥm, relation of a brother with his brother, your 
relations with your neighbour, all the Islamic ta‛āmalāt.’42 
But the sharia is not a static list of rules which one can simply follow. The 
sharia, God’s divine law, is revealed in the Qur’an, but the Qur’an is not a 
straightforward systematized book of law. It is up to the believers to interpret the 
Qur’an, with the help of additional information found in the Sunna, the example of 
                                                  
39 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 14-10-2013, p.1. References to Fatima al-
Yashrutiyya, Nafaḥāt al-Ḥaqq, 4th ed. (Beirut, 1997), 57, 77. 
40 The ḥajj is one of the five pillars of Islam, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. It is a duty for every 
Muslim to go on ḥajj at least once in his life, if s/he has the opportunity. 
41 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
42 ZA1-1 in Interview ZA1. 
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the Prophet. In Islamic history, the interpretation of the sacred sources has been 
done by scholars, and the resultant jurisprudence is called fiqh. Several schools 
of law (madhāhib, sg. madhhab) exist alongside each other with slightly differing 
interpretations. The result is a wide variety of theological and legal positions in a 
dynamic discursive tradition that is known as ‘orthodox’ and is now defended as 
Traditional Islam.43 Nowadays there are many movements that question this 
centuries-old discursive tradition and the authority of the madhāhib, and seek to 
go back to the first sources and reinterpret them according to their ideologies. 
This competition over the interpretation of the sacred texts and law and the 
authority to prescribe correct behaviour is what Eickelman and Piscatori call the 
realm of ‘Muslim politics’, and is a very real struggle in Jordan.44 
Therefore, the remark that the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya follow the Qur’an 
and the Sunna and adheres to the sharia places them explicitly in the discursive 
Islamic tradition of religious practice and scholarship, but does not tell us much 
about their actual ideas and practices. In discussing the authority within the 
ṭarīqa, the relevant questions are: who decides what is the correct knowledge 
and behaviour, and how is it transferred?  
When discussing beliefs and practices that characterize the Yashrutiyya – 
in other words, which differentiates them from other Muslims – the answer is 
clear: it is the Shaykh who knows the ‛aqīda and who therefore has the 
knowledge and prescribes the practices, through his teachings and examples 
which are mediated by the community. But who sets the tone for those issues 
that relate to Muslims in general? Followers point to general Muslim authorities in 
Jordanian society: 
 
We believe that Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā the Shaykh is murshid or dalīl – like a normal (‛ādī) 
Muslim wants to know what is ḥalāl or ḥarām, he looks at the muftī45 or the 
shaykh on television, Qaradawi etc. Of course, for us the murshid, the dalīl, the 
                                                  
43 See paragraphs 1.2 and 1.5. 
44 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 4–5; Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic 
Activism, 45–48. See paragraphs 1.4 and 4.2. 
45 The muftī is a scholar qualified to deliver fatwas, official legal opinions (in the text, I have used 
the anglicized plural muftīs rather than the Arabic muftūn). 
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marja‛, is the Shaykh. He directs us in the dīn and the sharia and taṣawwuf, with 
the simple difference that we do not ask him about issues of the sharia like ḥalāl 
and ḥarām, that can be found in books, we [are concerned with] internal issues 
(umūr bāṭiniyya), until he guides us to the nūr muḥammadī.46 
 
We are Muslims, and the principles of Islam are clear. (...) We are talking about 
knowledge. Where is our knowledge registered? (...) We learn from both sides, 
we take knowledge (ma‛rifa) from recorded sources of information (...) and from 
the sayings of the knowledgeable people, asḥāb al-ma‛rifa in the school. (...) It is 
our culture as Muslims. We learn when we are children, from our parents.47 
 
These answers suggest they take their knowledge and behaviour on 
general Muslim issues from their surrounding society. This is connected with their 
wish to participate in society and be accepted by society. They see this as part of 
their spiritual development. Proper exterior behaviour in accordance with the 
sharia – in terms of ‛ibādāt and mu‛āmalāt – is not just considered a first step 
after which one progresses to deeper meanings, it should develop together with 
your spiritual development. The constant interplay between the outer and inner is 
considered the proper way to develop spiritually. Your inner states have to show 
in your behaviour: ‘I have a ṭarīqa inside me. (...) I have to show in all my 
behaviour with our ikhwānnā, with common people, and with Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā. 
Respect and love to everybody. If it doesn’t show, there is no ṭarīqa.’48 This is a 
common Sufi approach, as Pinto for example writes that ādāb are ‘the 
expression of inner qualities of the self’.49 This stance is also motivated by a 
desire to show the value of their ṭarīqa and to be an example for society, an 
attitude that is omnipresent among Sufi ṭuruq throughout history, and that has 
often led to their large socio-political roles in shaping their environment. We saw 
this for example in Ephrat’s discussion of the role of Sufism in shaping medieval 
                                                  
46 AM2-2 in Interview AM2. 
47 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
48 AM4-1 in Interview AM4. 
49 Pinto, ‘Sufism and the Political Economy of Morality in Syria’, 125. 
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Palestinian society,50 and in the contemporary Sufi milieu in Aleppo.51 Such an 
attitude can of course at the same time be seen as a defensive mechanism in a 
situation in which Sufism is often regarded with suspicion. Whatever the 
motivation for this desire to be accepted (most probably a mix of these elements) 
leads to an interplay between the ṭarīqa and society at large in defining the 
specific interpretation of sharia and proper behaviour.  
In Jordanian society the interpretation of texts and law is highly contested, 
but the references made in these answers – to books, scholars (asḥāb al-
ma‛rifa), schools, culture – seem to point towards the more traditional attitude 
controlled by the king and ‛ulamā’ and transmitted along these channels. As we 
have seen in chapter 4, this attitude is positive towards Sufism, and thus allows 
them to be accepted as both orthodox Muslims and explicit Sufis in the Islamic 
tradition. When asked, they say they follow the Hanafi madhhab. Typically, when 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din came to Palestine, he switched from the Maliki madhhab, 
which is predominant in North Africa, to the Hanafi madhhab, which was the 
madhhab supported by the Ottomans and is widespread in the Levant.52 This 
affiliation is not stressed, however – the fact that they stand within the orthodox 
Islamic tradition and follow the sharia is what is important for them, not which 
specific school they follow. 
These rules from larger society are mediated by the community and are 
discussed by the Shaykh and among ikhwānnā to ensure they fit their ‛aqīda. For 
example, one of the monthly women’s meetings discussed akhlāq and sulūk, in 
which an important point was that behaviour reflects both your inner thoughts, 
and the group you belong to.53 Thus they negotiate what they learn about their 
faith and the sharia from outside sources by discussing it in their community in 
the context of the Shadhili-Yashruti tradition and the teachings of Shaykh Ahmad. 
                                                  
50 Ephrat, Spiritual Wayfarers, 1–3. See paragraph 3.2. 
51 Pinto, ‘Performing Baraka’; Pinto, ‘Sufism and the Political Economy of Morality in Syria.’ See 
paragraph 1.5. 
52 Informal discussion with AK3 on 07-08-2015. 
53 Women’s meeting 30-03-2013 and its discussion. AM1-3 referred to this discussion in Interview 
AM2. 
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The ‛aqīda can thus be seen as their final reference point, and the final authority 
of interpretation is returned to the community and the Shaykh. 
In addition to adhering to the sharia as defined through the interplay 
between ṭarīqa and society, the followers rely on their Shaykh for their spiritual 
development. Returning once more to the ḥadīth of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din 
referred to by Shaykh Ahmad at the beginning of this paragraph (‘improve your 
exteriors (ẓawāhirkum) and leave the interiors (bawāṭin) to me’), the second part 
relates to the relation with the Shaykh:  
 
Regarding the bāṭin and its reconstruction (ta‛mīr), its control is not entrusted to 
the murīd because it is outside his will (irāda). Meant by ‘the reconstruction of the 
bāṭin’ is knowledge of God (ma‛rifat Allāh) through inspiration (madad) that fills 
the hearts with īmān (faith), and the murīd derives this from the ṣāḥib al-waqt 
(master of time), the Shaykh of the ṭarīqa, who for his part is provided by the 
source of the ‛aqīda, Sayyidnā Muhammad pbuh.54 
 
This shows that the followers have to work hard to improve their behaviour in this 
world, but at the same time rely on the Shaykh and on God to go further on the 
path to knowledge of God, ma‛rifat Allāh.55 
 
 
6.3.2 Maḥabba 
 
The first pillar and basis of the ṭarīqa is maḥabba, it is the axis (quṭb) around 
which the other pillars circle; ‘the ṭarīqa is love, and truthfulness, and 
remembering the secrets of God (al-ṭarīqa maḥabba, wa-sidq, wa-hifẓ asrār 
Allah).’ First of all it is spiritual love that should focus on God and strive towards 
the goal of reaching him.56 The followers add that this is the basis because once 
one loves God one will see Him everywhere and will love everyone and 
                                                  
54 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 15-03-2014, p.2. 
55 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 14-10-2013, p.11 
56 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 14-10-2013, p.2-3. References from al-
Yashrutiyya, Nafaḥāt al-Ḥaqq, 58, 64. 
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everything as part of His creation. The love for all ikhwānnā and all people 
derives from this.57 This is an old theme in Sufism (see paragraph 1.2) which is 
approached, interpreted, and expressed in a myriad of ways.58 The love 
experienced and cultivated by the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya is a ‘sober’ love for 
God that extends to all of His creation and motivates one to live according to His 
will and adhere to the sharia and the rules of the ṭarīqa. It is not considered a 
manifestation of Universal Love. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, no matter how the followers see 
the Shaykh, the main thing is that they love him, which is what leads them to 
follow his teachings and example and practice their religion by adhering to the 
sharia, practice their rituals, and cultivate ādāb.59 This love for God and the 
Shaykh extends to ikhwānnā and is a strong binding force in the community: ‘The 
love of the Shaykh brings everything. To love – this is ‛aqīda. If you love the head 
of the ‛aqīda (ra’s al-‛aqīda), you will love everything that follows the ‛aqīda.’60 
This love for the Shaykh unites the followers as ikhwānnā.61 
Ikhwānnā form a very strong community. When they travel and go on ḥajj 
they always stay at each other’s house:  
 
The relations between abnā al-ṭarīqa go beyond the place of Zarqa or Amman. 
The day that I visit Beirut or I go to Mecca for ‛umra,62 ikhwānnā abnā al-ṭarīqa 
receive us. (...) This is the relation and this characterizes us. (...) Because of (min 
faḍl) the zāwiya in Acre, the foundation (asīs). Because of the ṭarīqa, the Shaykh 
of the ṭarīqa.63 
 
                                                  
57 Informal discussion with AM2-2 and AM5 in the zāwiya on 24-10-2013, discussing the written 
answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 14-10-2013. 
58 Lewisohn, ‘Sufism’s Religion of Love.’ See paragraph 1.2. 
59 E.g. AM4-6 in Interview AM4, AM1-2 in Interview AM1. 
60 AM4-3 in Interview AM4. 
61 Informal discussion with AM1-1 in the zāwiya in Amman before the ḥaḍra on 10-10-2013. 
62 ‛Umra is the pilgrimage to Mecca that can be undertaken at any time during the year. 
63 ZA1-1 in Interview ZA1. This comment was made in a discussion about their connection to the 
zāwiya in Acre and their journeys to Acre and Mecca. The respondent seems to want to indicate 
that the community goes beyond specific locations, and that particular circumstances of these 
connections and journeys are shaped by the community that exists because of the founding 
moment and what came of this, the ṭarīqa and the Shaykh. 
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They have stuck together through severe upheavals. In 1948, and again in 1967, 
many followers fled to Jordan and united there again as ikhwānnā. ‘The people of 
Gaza, the people of al-Walaja, the people of Aleppo, the people of Jerusalem, 
they all came here and knew each other, because our ṭarīqa united us.’64 This 
pure love enables the equality with which they deal with each other – diverse 
ethnicities, men and women, old and young people – they all value each other as 
brothers and sisters in ‘faith and ‛aqīda’65 and are proud of this diversity: ‘The 
racial diversity (tanāwa‛a ‛arqī) is the reason for the continuation of the ṭarīq.’66 
 These statements of gender equality should be understood in their social 
context, and in line with their desire to be an active and respected part of society 
– which as we have seen in the previous paragraph, includes an interaction with 
society’s rules, negotiated within the community. Dominguez Diaz found a similar 
attitude in her translocal research of the Budshishiyya, as attitudes to are 
dependent on both the ṭarīqa’s doctrines and on local codes of morality.67 As a 
sub-social group which is open to society at large, it is unavoidable that their 
attitude to gender is influenced by both the ṭarīqa’s teachings and society’s 
attitudes as people participate and are socialized in both. The followers in 
Amman seem to adhere to similar values regarding sexuality and family as the 
rest of Jordanian society, but are more open for social interaction among the 
sexes and the value of education and employment for women. Most women I 
spoke to are in charge of household chores in addition to the studies they pursue 
or the job they have. During my group interviews, women tended to be quieter 
than men (see paragraph 2.3.3.2). This was not because their opinion is not 
valued, but because they were shy and not used the speaking in a large group, 
while the men tended to be more comfortable in voicing their opinions and 
making themselves heard. Some of the women were very outspoken, however, 
and play important roles in the community together with the men, such as the 
                                                  
64 ZA1-2 in Interview ZA1. The inclusion of Aleppo is peculiar, as no refugees went from Aleppo 
to Amman in this period. It might be another symbolic use of the location to refer to the North, 
implicating that followers flocked to Amman from all directions. 
65 Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 15. 
66 ZA1-1 in Interview ZA1. 
67 Dominguez Diaz, ‘Shifting Fieldsites’, 70. 
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receiving of guests and the education of ikhwānnā, and throughout the interviews 
encouraged the women to speak.  
We see quite distinct attitudes in different local communities. To take the 
example of the hijāb, the Shaykh has given his female followers the freedom to 
decide whether they want to wear it or not: 
 
Shaykh Ahmad: From our point of view, the limit (al-ḥadd) is modesty 
(ikhtishām), and then she performs her role in life. (…) You forbade the women to 
go out. Why? You have to let her wear … 
Akram Khuzam: niqāb  
Shaykh Ahmad: … certain clothes. Why? 
Akhram Khuzam: You are against it? 
Shaykh Ahmad: I am not against it, but I do not encourage those things. She is 
free.68 
  
Most women in Amman seem to only wear hijāb when they go to the zāwiya, 
while women in Umm al-Fahm always wear hijāb, and it is a major issue of 
discussion in Jaffa (see paragraph 10.3). We therefore cannot classify the ṭarīqa 
as a whole, or even its local communities, as ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’. It should 
be noted that the issue of feminism, gender roles and sexuality within this ṭarīqa 
is not the subject of my research, so these remarks should be taken as initial 
observations, to be verified by further research.  
Several women have important roles in the community – one of them for 
example is ‘responsible for khawātnā’ and seems to act like a muqaddam in his 
social – if not his ritual – role. There is no equivalent to the female muqaddamāt 
that Dominguez Diaz encountered during her research on the Budshishiyya. In 
their case, the female local leaders were appointed because the gender 
segregation among these groups was immensely strict - a woman who had been 
a member for several months did not yet know any of the male members. In 
order for the women to participate in the ṭarīqa at all, they needed their own 
                                                  
68 Interview by Akram Khuzam with Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti. 
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leadership.69 In the case of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, the relations are so 
open that a male muqaddam can serve the female followers just as well as the 
men – only during devotional practices they are separated, but due to the setting 
of these rituals (described in chapter 7) they can still see or hear the men and 
thus do not need someone to separately guide their ḥaḍra. 
Ceremonial meetings in the zāwiya are separated along gender lines – 
men and women pray, read waẓīfa and perform ḥaḍra separately – but socially 
they sit together, visit each other and discuss as equals. Men and women shake 
each other’s hands, because ‘we are clean inside so it does not matter if you 
shake our hands.’70 Similarly, worldly hierarchy does not play a role in the ṭarīqa. 
‘One of ikhwānnā was president of the Comoros Islands, but when he comes to 
the zāwiya you would not know that he is a president.’71 Old and young are 
equally respected. As we have seen in paragraph 5.4, this is why AM1-1 loved 
Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi when he saw him as a child: ‘He took care of me, he 
treated me as mature, so I loved that Shaykh from that time.’ He continues: 
 
AM1-1: Maḥabba is the centre, everything turns around maḥabba. The ṭarīqa 
raises (btrabbi) to love, to love the people. I remember when I used to live in the 
West Bank of Jordan, when I came to Amman and met with ikhwānnā, how they 
welcomed me. Women and men. How they treated me. I was maybe 14 or 15 
years old, and one time I remember that an old man from our ikhwānnā came to 
the house where I was at the time and he invited me to lunch. [All participants 
stress the surprise he felt] He was round 90 years old! I didn’t know him. He took 
me, he said ‘I will take you to my home, I want to take lunch with you’ and I went 
to his small home and he said to me ‘sit down’ and he went to the kitchen and 
broke two eggs and sardines. 
AM1-3: That means not a big lunch, anything from the kitchen because... 
AM1-1: His wife had died. And he came and he treated me as... 
AM1-3: He prepared the lunch for him, he was 90 and he was 15, it’s nice! 
                                                  
69 Dominguez Diaz, ‘Performance, Belonging and Identity’; Dominguez Diaz, ‘The One or the 
Many?’ 
70 AM1-3 in Interview AM1. 
71 Informal discussion with AM2-6 on 21-11-2013. 
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AM1-1: And the treatment... When you looked at his face, a beautiful old man he 
was. 
AM1-3: And this treatment, he remembers this now, because he feels it inside. 
And he taught it to his children and ikhwānnā. This is the tarbiya to the ṭarīqa. (...) 
This is the Shaykh who teaches us, how to love the people, how to deal with the 
people. (...) These are the akhlāq that Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā needs ikhwānnā to be [sic].72 
 
This equality is symbolized by their traditional manner of greeting. They 
kiss each other’s hands, sometimes at the same time, or one after the other. 
Shaykh Ahmad explains that this is a traditional greeting from the Maghreb and 
shows mutual respect.73 One follower explains the greeting in a different way: 
they do not really kiss each other’s hands but smell them, as the aṭr muḥammadī 
(Muhammadan perfume) has been present in their hands since they held the 
hand of the Shaykh or the muqaddam during the mubāya‛a.74 These days this is 
not done any more as the Shaykh has stressed that it is not part of the ṭarīqa’s 
teachings, and has abolished it for hygienic reasons. They are supposed to 
shake each other’s hands.75 
This love extends to the whole world. Loving God makes them love each 
other and the whole universe in a pure way, and participate in society while 
maintaining their values. 
 
Because we believe [that] everything [is] from God. He is One, as Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
said. Many things you’ll see but God [is] one. (...) And I have to respect 
everything, because [of] the relationship between me and between God. I believe 
in God, and my belief lets me treat everyone with respect, polite, because this is 
from God.76 
 
                                                  
72 AM1-1 and AM1-3 in Interview AM1. 
73 He noted that it is a shame that this traditional way of greeting and showing respect to the 
elderly is declining, and values King Hussayn for maintaining the custom by publicly showing 
respect to his mother in this way. ‘And we should follow his example, because he is our king and 
our leader (akbar).’ Interview with Shaykh Ahmad, al-Urdun, 26-02-1996, p.8-9. 
74 Informal discussion with AM2-2 on 18-06-2013. 
75 Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 24; Informal communications 
with followers in Amman and Acre.  
76 AM1-3 in Interview AM1. 
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From this point our ṭarīqa is moderate (wasaṭiyya). (...) [There is] no extremity in 
our ‛aqīda, al-Shadhuliyya al-Yashrutiyya. We love all people, all the world, we 
look at the world as a unit, one unit, so we have to be integrated with this 
existence. (...) And all these things, who taught them to us? The Shaykh. Ḥaḍrat 
Sīdnā the Shaykh is the one who cultivates this ‛aqīda and this maḥabba in our 
hearts. (...) We do not live in a shell (mutqawqa’īn), we are children of the society 
(abnā al-mujtama‛), and children of the ṭarīqa (abnā al-ṭarīqa).77 
 
Even though they extend their love to all of creation, this does not mean that they 
thereby transcend the boundaries of religion in a universal ‘Religion of Love’. 
Rather, this love inspires them to follow the Shaykh, adhere to the sharia, and 
practice dhikr, fikr and taslīm, and participate in society. 
 
 
6.3.3 Dhikr 
 
Dhikr (remembrance) as the second pillar of the ṭarīqa refers to all practices in 
which the followers remember God. As such it encompasses ṣalāa, du‛ā’, 
recitation of the Qur’an, reciting the awrād, reading waẓīfa, and several kinds of 
dhikr and ḥaḍra.78 They are all regularly practiced – for example during the 
weekly prayer meeting on Thursday night – and complement each other, and 
therefore are all considered an important part of the ṭarīqa. Several followers say 
that these principles are in harmony with and should be connected with the 
aḥkām al-sharī‛a (rules of the sharia) – the waẓīfa should be performed after the 
ṣalāa for example.79 As in Sufism in general, an important aspect of the 
performance of these contemplative practices in Sufism is ādāb, the cultivation of 
the right behaviour and attitude during these rituals. Correct ādāb is both the 
prerequisite to undertake the journey on the spiritual path, and the goal. It 
                                                  
77 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. The image of the shell can also be found in Shaykh Ahmad’s 
introduction to the third edition of Riḥla ilā al-Ḥaqq: ‘It is not right that all of taṣawwuf is zuhd 
(ascetism) and qawqa‛a (shells), and flight from life.’ al-Yashrutiyya, Riḥla iIā al-Ḥaqq, 22. 
78 Informal discussion with AM2-2 and AM5 in the zāwiya on 24-10-2013. 
79 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
325 
 
encompasses the embodiment of Sufi values and the performance of the spiritual 
states (see paragraph 1.2).80 
Dhikr is the most important and well-known contemplative Sufi practice, 
that is done in many forms, in which the believer remembers God and is 
remembered by God in return. It is a method of spiritual development through the 
remembrance of God and purification of the heart, at first performed by the 
tongue until it pervades the entire being of the believer, ‘an inward journey of 
unforgetting.’81 It can be a methodical and repeated invocation of a prescribed 
formula, alone or in a group, accompanied by gestures and symbols or sitting 
still, or it can be seen as a mental state of constant focus of God, all done with 
the correct ādāb.82  
The followers see dhikr as the main way to express and cultivate their love 
for God and for the Shaykh, to develop their spiritual relationship with the 
Shaykh, and to help them progress on the path. It is thus the first step to 
undertake when one wants to open oneself for the Shaykh’s teaching on the 
spiritual level to progress on the Path towards spiritual knowledge. While this 
practice brings the individual’s soul closer to the Shaykh and to God, the practice 
is preferably done in a communal setting until one reaches higher levels of 
iḥṣān.83 This way both the physical and the spiritual connection between all 
participants is enhanced at the same time. 
Guidance, in the form of authorization (idhn) and instruction (talqīn) 
provided by the spiritual master is an important aspect of many practices of 
dhikr.84 In many ṭuruq, the disciple is taught a personalized wird by his/her 
shaykh. Through the advice based on their scriptural and/or spiritual knowledge, 
Sufi shaykhs provide ‘individualized mechanisms of moral discipline.’ Also, often 
with every spiritual level reached the shaykh will give the disciple a new wird.85 In 
the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, this is not the case. People can participate in all 
                                                  
80 Gabrieli, ‘Adab’; Waley, ‘Contemplative Disciplines in Early Persian Sufism’, 503, 532–534. 
81 See paragraph 1.2 
82 Waley, ‘Contemplative Disciplines in Early Persian Sufism.’ 
83 ZA1-1 in Interview ZA1, AM1-2 in Interview AM1. 
84 Waley, ‘Contemplative Disciplines in Early Persian Sufism’, 526–529; Gardet, ‘D̲h̲ikr’; Denny, 
‘Wird’; Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 132–133; Lewisohn, ‘Sulūk.’ 
85 Pinto, ‘Sufism and the Political Economy of Morality in Syria’, 116. 
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forms of dhikr without being initiated, and the mubāya‛a changes the level of 
commitment to the disciplinary mechanisms, not the actual practices. All 
followers recite the same wird, before and after mubāya‛a, and there are no 
different levels or forms of dhikr corresponding to different degrees of initiation. 
The only exception, which seems to be quite rare, is the practice of dhikr bi-ism 
al-madd (described below) for which authorization (idhn) is required from either 
the Shaykh or the muqaddam. Like the other forms of dhikr, it is not personalized 
or secret. 
In the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, a combination of silent and loud, 
collective and individual contemplative practices are engaged in (some of which, 
somewhat confusingly, are also referred to as dhikr).  
 
* Waẓīfa 
The waẓīfa is the greatest wird (al-wird al-akbar), the most important 
contemplative practice in the ṭarīqa. It is a combination of Qur’anic texts and 
prayers and is read twice a day, after ṣalāat al-fajr and after ṣalāat al-‛ishā’, 
either individually or in a group. When in a group, the followers sit in a circle. The 
right posture is very important when ‘reading waẓīfa’ (reciting the waẓīfa) out of 
respect for the waẓīfa: one has to sit upright, both feet on the floor; during some 
passages the hands are put on the knees with the palms facing upwards. Even 
when only observing, my posture was corrected.86 In the family people often read 
the waẓīfa together in the evening, but in the morning everyone fits it into his or 
her morning schedule. 
 
* Wird 
The wird is a litany, ‘a unit of dhikr constructed to contain certain patterns of 
knowledge and self awakening’.87 The wird is read after ṣalāat al-fajr and ṣalāat 
                                                  
86 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad, 14-10-2013, p.6-11. The Review Panel adds that these 
prayers are a version of the ṣalāa mashishiyya (the prayer of of Ibn Mashish, a famous prayer on 
the Prophet in the Shadhili tradition), and prayers by Muhammad al-Arabi al-Darqawi.Review 
Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 5. 
87 Review Panel, ‘Arabic terms’, 06-08-2014. See also Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 60. 
327 
 
al-maghreb, using a masbaḥa (string of prayer beads). Most followers use a 
black masbaḥa that was given to them by the Shaykh. 
- 100 times ‘Astaghfir Allāh al-aẓīm alladhi lā illāha ila huwa al-ḥayy al-
quyūm wa atūb ilayhi’ (‘I ask forgiveness from the mighty God, there is no 
God but Him, the Living the Everlasting, and I repent towards him’); 
- 100 times ‘Allahuma ṣallī ‛alā sayyidinā Muhammad al-nabīyi al-ummī wa-
‛alā ālihi wa-sāḥibihi wa-sallim’ (‘God, pray on sayyidinā Muhammad, the 
prophet of the nations88 and on his family and his companions and greet 
him’); 
- 100 times ‘lā illāha ilā Allāh’ (‘there is no God but God,’ the first part of the 
shahāda); 
- Once ‘Muḥammad rasūl Allāh’ (‘Muhammad is the Prophet of God’, the 
second part of the shahāda. This is considered the seal of the wird, just as 
Muhammad is the Seal of the Prophets).89 
 
* Ḥaḍra 
Ḥaḍra literally means presence, and refers to the believer’s being in the presence 
of God during the ritual. It is a common Sufi term for a weekly collective dhikr. 
Also in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, ḥaḍra is a communal ritual in which 
different formulas are recited standing and holding hands in closed circles or 
lines, slightly bending back and forth, often combined with the chanting of nashīd. 
In the middle of the men’s circle is the person leading the ḥaḍra, the Shaykh or 
the muqaddam. During the first set, the name ‘Allāh’ is repeated in a certain 
rhythm while the followers bend forward and backward slightly. During the 
second and third set, the word ‘hu’ is repeated, creating a rhythm to which some 
of the participants chant nashīd. During the second set, the followers continue to 
bend forward and backward; during the third set, the followers bounce on their 
                                                  
88 Most Muslims understand ‘al-nabīyi al-ummī’ as ‘the illiterate prophet’, but some scholars argue 
that the phrase means ‘the prophet of the nations’ and that the Prophet Muhammad was not 
illiterate. Shaykh Ahmad prefers the latter interpretation. Informal discussion with AK6 on 07-05-
2013. 
89 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
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toes along with the rhythm.90 For a more thorough description of a ḥaḍra in the 
zāwiya in Amman, see paragraphs 7.2.1 and 7.2.2. 
 
* Silent Dhikr with Short Vowels (dhikr bi-ism al-qaṣr)91 
The followers are encouraged to remember God by continuously performing 
dhikr bi-ism al-qaṣr, by repeating the name ‘Allāh Allāh Allāh’ (with short vowels) 
in their hearts, i.e. silently. This should be done particularly twice a day, after 
ṣalāat al-fajr and ṣalāat al-‛ishā’, and during meetings there is space for this 
dhikr, but followers are also encouraged to practice this throughout the day. 
  
When I am working the Shaykh Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā taught us to say everytime ‘Allah 
Allah’, in stead of [gossiping about other people]. Because Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā he 
needs us to be always with God, to say ‘Allāh Allāh Allāh Allāh...’92 
 
* Loud Dhikr with Long Vowels (dhikr bi-ism al-madd) 
Followers who are very advanced on the path can ask for permission to perform 
dhikr bi-ism al-madd, in which the name of God is said more slowly and with the 
second syllable extended. The followers know about this practice but it is unclear 
how many people do it and how often. As it is considered very powerful, followers 
have to treat it with great care. The revelations that might be bestowed upon the 
person who does this type of dhikr might be too much for him or her to handle, 
therefore permission is needed before undertaking this dhikr. Permission has to 
be asked from the muqaddam, who either has the previous permission from the 
Shaykh to decide, or who has to ask the Shaykh’s permission for each individual 
case. The muqaddam bases his decision on the behaviour of the people and 
their truthfullness (sidq) – as we have seen, someone’s interior states and outer 
                                                  
90 Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 60–65. 
91 The distinction between dhikr bi-ism al-qaṣr and dhikr bi-ism al-madd calls into mind the 
common Sufi distinction between dhikr that is performed aloud (jalī) or silently (khafī), but these 
terms are not used in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya. Gardet, ‘D̲h̲ikr.’ Van Ess actually does call it 
dhikr al-khafī. Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 65–67. 
92 AM1-3 in Interview AM1.  
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behaviour are two sides of the same coin, and one can judge someone’s spiritual 
progress by one’s outer behaviour.93 
 
We thus see that the second pillar of dhikr encompasses an extensive 
combination of devotional and contemplative practices that followers of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya embark upon. Apart from the dhikr bi-ism al-madd they 
are all the same for all followers and available to all followers, whether they did 
mubāya‛a or not. This way, the collective nature of dhikr is stressed, whether it is 
done communally or individually. 
 
 
6.3.4 Fikr 
 
In the Sufi tradition, fikr or tafakkur94 is complementary95 to dhikr. Al-Ghazali 
distinguished between meditative reflections and more intellectual types of 
thought,96 and in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya we see a similar spectrum of 
approaches to fikr. The followers are encouraged to perform deep contemplative 
thinking, to educate themselves and discuss among themselves to improve their 
understanding, both on the spiritual and rational level. Their practice of ta’ammul 
is an example of the meditative approach to fikr as it is meditative contemplation 
of creation. On the other side of the spectrum, we can find the Shaykh’s 
encouragement for followers to pursue a worldly education, which is also seen as 
fikr. The Shaykh encourages them to study all possible topics. During a women’s 
meeting in which the topic of ‛ilm is discussed, one of the ladies tells the group 
that her father had left school early, but when he was older he discussed religion 
                                                  
93 Interview ZA1. 
94 The two are used interchangeably. In this thesis I have chosen to use the word fikr, as this is 
the word that is used by the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya. 
95 The term is muqābal. some translate this as ‘opposite’, but Waley points out it is rather 
complementary to dhikr, as reflection performed with the right attitude ‘brings to the heart a 
knowledge which transforms it and heightens the consciousness and spiritualizes the action of 
the seeker’. Gardet, ‘D̲h̲ikr’; Waley, ‘Contemplative Disciplines in Early Persian Sufism’, 541–55. 
See paragraph 1.2. 
96 Waley, ‘Contemplative Disciplines in Early Persian Sufism’, 541–547. 
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with a university graduate who thought her father had also attended university. 
This was min faḍl al-ṭarīqa, and min faḍl Sīdnā, because her father had learnt 
through the ṭarīqa.97 Later another lady adds: ‘When we learn ‛ilm al-bāṭin 
(knowledge of the spiritual), we will also understand ‛ilm al-ẓāhir (knowledge of 
the material), even if we don’t go to school.’98 
Each week after the ḥaḍra the Shaykh discusses an aspect of the waẓīfa, 
often using references to the news or science to make his point. The Shaykh 
encourages the followers to discuss each week’s mudhākara – a practice which 
is also called mudhākara because they remember what the Shaykh said and 
discuss their understandings.99  
 
There is a ḥadīth for Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din, that if you cannot meet with the 
Shaykh, meet with your brother and he gives you as if you take from the 
Shaykh.100 
 
There is another ḥadīth: ‘Gather together and discuss matters, he will give you 
that madad.’101 
 
During one of the group interviews this matter is discussed extensively. 
The participants are mainly invited by the host, and from the way they interact 
and the stories they tell it is clear that they spend a lot of time talking together, 
doing mudhākara. They say that as a group they complete each other. ‘I am not 
perfect by myself. But as we are sitting now all together, we integrate with each 
other to become almost perfect.’102 They stress the importance to see the 
positive in each other:  
 
Our Shaykh told us this: ‘See your brother, look at his positiveness (ijābiyatuh).’ 
                                                  
97 Women’s meeting in the zāwiya in Amman on 30-11-2013. 
98 Women’s meeting in the zāwiya in Amman on 30-11-2013. 
99 Informal discussion before Interview AM2. 
100 AM4-7 in Interview AM4. 
101 AM4-4 in Interview AM4. 
102 AM4-3 in Interview AM4. 
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He said about himself: ‘I see ikhwānnā, I see the positive things; I do not look at 
the negativeness of our brother.’103  
 
In these study meetings and mudhākarāt the Qur’an and Hadith are used 
as references, as are the books of the ṭarīqa. ‘The book – the words of Ḥaḍrat 
Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din and Sīdī Ahmad, they all tell us how we should look at the 
Shaykh in order to get something from him. It’s dictated there.’104 As an example, 
AM4-7 discussed how he used Nafaḥāt al-Ḥaqq in his own spiritual education: 
‘There is a ḥadīth for Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din, which says that who wants to 
educate (yurabbī) himself on the Path, he has to read Sūrat Yūsuf.’ After 
pondering this, he understood that it represents the ṭarīqa as Yaqub represents 
the Shaykh and his sons the murīdīn, and they should be like Sīdnā Yusuf or 
Sīdnā Binyamin and be both good outside and inside. He also describes how 
they used the book in a meeting for young men. In this particular meeting they 
discussed addiction, and he used a ḥadīth from Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā to stress his points: 
‘the true believer next to God is the one who rules his nafs / himself’ – when I can 
control my nafs I will not become addicted.’ ‘If you take Nafaḥāt al-Ḥaqq, it will 
explain exactly how the Shaykh is keen (ḥarīs) for ikhwānnā and keen to teach 
akhlāq to ikhwānnā.’105 
The followers believe that the Shaykh transfers the teachings and the 
orders of God (ta‛līmāt wa-awāmir Allāh) – therefore any quest for the truth, 
either through contemplative or rational means, will inevitably bring them to him. 
While contemplative practices such as ta’ammul easily fit in this religious 
framework, combining rational thinking and critical thought with the religious 
tradition might prove more of a challenge (as was illustrated by AM2-2 who 
struggled for years to combine his study of philosophy with his adherence to the 
ṭarīqa, see paragraph 5.4, Interview AM2). No matter how much they debate and 
discuss, the final word is always for the Shaykh – he is the ultimate source and 
reference. 
                                                  
103 AM4-3 in Interview AM4. 
104 AM4-1 in Interview AM4. 
105 AM4-7 in Interview AM4. 
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6.3.5 Taslīm 
 
The fourth pillar is taslīm (submission to God). Shaykh Ahmad explains that there 
are two aspects to taslīm: accepting that there is only one Creator and that He is 
the one who rules his creation and his creatures. The distinction between Creator 
and creature will always remain intact – as such you have to accept anything that 
befalls you. This acceptance does not mean people are humiliated before God, 
but rather that they should let go and be calm.  
 
The master (ṣāḥib) of this ṭarīqa did not want hardship (ta‛ab) for his children, but 
he wanted to provide them with ease of heart (rāḥat al-qalb), and every issue or 
matter or problem that befalls any murīd in this ṭarīqa – it gives comfort to this 
faqīr to follow the principle of taslīm and to consider the issue (‘amr) to come from 
God, the Glorified and Exalted. At first when a misfortune befalls him he will 
grieve and be hurt, but when he returns to the idea of taslīm he relaxes.106 
 
 In his capacity of wārith muḥammadī, the Shaykh transfers the teachings 
and the orders of God (ta‛līmāt wa-awāmir Allāh). Therefore ‘taslīm to the 
Shaykh’s words means taslīm to God’s will: commitment to the ādāb and aḥkām 
(rules) of the honourable sharia and the dhawqiyāt of Sufism’ that are reflected in 
the Shaykh’s teachings.107 In the words of a follower: 
  
Taslīm is taken from the word islām: ‘Sallim amrak ilā Allāh subḥān wa-ta‛āla 
(surrender your amr (sovereign command) to God, the Glorified and Exalted).’108 
And for us taslīm is the fourth pillar of the ṭarīqa Shadhuliya-Yashrutiyya, to 
surrender your amr to your Shaykh. Whatever the Shaykh says you have to 
believe in it and accept (tusallim) it without discussion because he does not say 
anything but... There is nothing for you but benefit for you and for the others. 
                                                  
106 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 14-10-2013, p.5-6 
107 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 15-03-2014, p.3 
108 Islām, sallim, and taslīm all come from the root s-l-m, the basic meaning of which relates to 
wholeness, peace, safety, and submission. Islām hence means ‘submission (to the will of God)’. 
Sallim is the imperative of the Form II verb sallama, which means to submit, surrender, resign, 
accept, and in this case: to commit one’s cause to God, to resign to the will of God, to surrender 
to God in all your actions. Taslīm is the maṣdar (verbal noun) of the same Form II verb sallama. 
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From here comes ‘surrender your amr to God, surrender your amr to your 
Shaykh,’ because your Shaykh knows your heart (muṭṭali‛ ‛ala qalbak) and the 
hearts of the others better than any other person.109 
 
 The point of taslīm to the Shaykh is not picked up further in this interview 
and the discussion continues on taslīm to God. They use an allegory comparing 
the believers to a house of which God is the owner (ṣāḥib al-bayt) who does with 
his property as he wishes,110 which is a verse from the Qur’an that can also be 
found in the waẓīfa, and that had been discussed in the Shaykh’s mudhākara the 
previous week.111 This is an interesting example of how the followers transfer the 
ideas and concepts they have received in the mudhākara of the Shaykh by using 
them in discussions amongst themselves, and how tradition is continuously 
transmitted and rethought. The relevant point here, however, is that the followers 
in the mubāya‛a pledge themselves to surrender themselves completely to God 
and to the wārith muḥammadī, their Shaykh. This is where we should place the 
classical Sufi notion of complete obedience to the shaykh, the conviction that ‘the 
Shaykh is always right’ (see paragraph 2.1). Because they believe that the 
Shaykh has access to the teachings and will of God, because they believe he 
loves them and takes care of them, and because they love him above all else, 
submission to him is the most logical thing in the world. As AM2-1 said above: 
‘There is nothing for you but benefit for you and for the others’. 
 
 
6.4 Modes of Communication 
 
We have seen that the meanings of fikr in this ṭarīqa are quite diverse, ranging 
from contemplative meditation to rational study and critical thinking. In some of 
these forms, there might be a clash with taslīm. When fikr is understood as 
contemplative thinking and when knowledge is sought in the epistemological 
                                                  
109 AM2-1 in Interview AM2. Later in this interview, when discussing the mubāya‛a, this follower 
also says he pledged to obey and love the Shaykh. See paragraph 6.2. 
110 AM2-3 in Interview AM2. 
111 Rabb hādhā al-bayt in Sūrat al-Quraysh 106:3, waẓīfa p.16. 
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sphere of ineffable experience beyond reason, there is no problem. There is also 
no problem when rational critical thinking confirms the teachings and orders of 
the Shaykh and the ṭarīqa. But when an individual exercises individual reasoning 
and disagrees with a certain teaching, practice, or order, this might create a 
paradox between fikr and taslīm. On the one hand the value of education and 
free discussion gives followers a lot of space – but on the other hand taslīm is 
interpreted as accepting what the Shaykh says and obeying him in everything. 
Some participants are hesitant to accept the idea that there might be different 
opinions among them,112 but others do acknowledge this plurality and take or 
give freedom to speak. Either way, it is stressed to me extensively that these 
personal opinions are nothing more than personal opinions – the absolute truth 
can only be taken from the Shaykh. 
 Werbner notes that this submission is experienced as empowering 
because the saint is seen as a transcendent spiritual individual, negating his 
material individuality.113 This is not the case for the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, 
who do not negate the Shaykh’s materiality, but acknowledge the combination of 
transcendence and materiality. The process in which this image is constructed – 
the process of tarbiya – is illuminating in understanding the empowering aspect 
of submission more thoroughly. Asad also took this approach, as he argued in 
his study of Christian monasticism that disciplinary practices ‘explicitly create (...) 
createm through a program of communal living, the will to obey’, making 
obedience into a virtue, rather than simply a loss of will.114 
  This potential paradox does not seem to be realized often. This is due to 
the mode of communication of the Shaykh. He is considered to always give the 
right answer, and he defines the boundaries within which the followers can 
exercise fikr,115 but he hardly ever gives his answer in a direct way, leaving it to 
his followers to interpret what he meant. They believe that the more they practise 
                                                  
112 Especially AM2-3 in Interview AM2. 
113 Werbner, Pilgrims of Love, 134–136. 
114 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 125–126. 
115 Written answers of the Shaykh 15-03-2014, p.3. 
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and the higher their development on the spiritual path, the better they will be able 
to distinguish the signs the Shaykh gives them and understand his meaning. 
 First of all, the followers believe that they can ask their Shaykh anything 
related to material issues and he will give them advice.116 But in practice, there 
are too many followers for the Shaykh to be able to deal with all their questions, 
and for this reason in issues of direct communication the muqaddam plays a 
large role.117 The muqaddam is responsible for the people in his community and 
when there are problems he can either help them himself or ask the Shaykh for 
advice. The Shaykh sits with him frequently in order to give him instructions and 
guidance. When he has something to ask he will go to the Shaykh or his son, 
‘and put the issue between his hands and ask them to advise me how to behave, 
how to work on this issue.’118 
In the times of Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi, the muqaddam and the older 
ikhwānnā visited the Shaykh in Beirut and listened to him and took the 
knowledge back to Amman, and sometimes Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi visited 
Jordan. He also communicated via letters. In addition to this the presence of Sīdī 
Ahmad from 1960 onwards gave ikhwānnā in Jordan the opportunity to learn 
from him. Nowadays, such connections are much easier due to faster travel and 
modern communication technology. Shaykh Ahmad and Sīdī Ali record the 
mawlid, the ḥaḍra and other meetings to send them to other followers through 
the internet or on a DVD.  
 
Because Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā always will follow up ikhwānnā. Wherever he is, in Beirut, 
in Jordan. Now Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ahmad is in Jordan, but he follows up all ikhwānnā 
in all the world. Maybe by letters, maybe through the muqaddam, maybe through 
ikhwānnā, because all ikhwānnā only take everything about the ṭarīqa from 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā.119  
  
                                                  
116 E.g. AM1-1 and AM2-6 in Interview AM3. 
117 AM1-1 in Interview AM3. 
118 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
119 AM1-3 in Interview AM1. 
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There are many followers who transfer information in this direct way in 
addition to the muqaddam. They spread the teachings of the Shaykh through 
meetings (ijtimā‛āt or mudhākarāt) in the zāwiya or in people’s homes, learning 
from the transferred teachings (ta‛līmāt wa-irshādāt wa-tawjīhāt wa-ta‛ālīm) of the 
previous Shaykhs through the books and the stories of other ikhwānnā – in other 
words by engaging with the tradition.120 
In line with the basic Sufi distinction between the exterior (ẓāhir) and the 
interior (bāṭin), the Shaykh is considered to have two aspects (see chapter 5) and 
consequently two ways of interacting and communicating with him.121 
 
There is a ḥadīth on Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din the founder, it is that the Shaykh 
has two images (ṣūratān). The exterior image (ṣūra ẓāhiriyya), the physical, 
when we visit the Shaykh or sit in front of him, in the zāwiya, wherever – this is 
the exterior image for you, we learn the akhlāq and the best qualities from the 
Shaykh.  
And there is an inner image (ṣūra bāṭiniyya), it remains with the murīd wherever 
he goes. If he is in Brazil, in Canada, or anywhere, there is a picture, an inner 
picture, with him. And when there is this picture in his heart the faqīr, or the 
murīd, is not able or does not dare to do any sin (ma‛ṣiya) or transgression 
(mukhālafa) because he sees that God is watching him there.122 (...) There is a 
connection (ittiṣāl) through the ‛ibādāt, and especially the dhikr as our brother 
said, dhikr Allah and the ‛ibāda creates spiritual status for the faqīr. (...) And 
because of the intensity of the connection and the nearness (qurb) between the 
two there will be ilhām as our brother said between the Shaykh and the murīd, 
and tawāṣul. There is a physical connection because of the tarbiy, the education, 
because of love, the akhlāq and the treatment (mu‛āmala) that you see with the 
                                                  
120 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
121 AM3-4 and AM1-3 in Interview AM3. 
122 In the words of the Review Panel: ‘The murīd visualizes his Sheikh with him, and when that 
happens, then the murīd feels connected with God through his Sheikh, which makes him watch 
his behaviours closely and stay away from doing sins or transgressions because he feels that 
God is watching him all the time.’ Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 
27. 
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Shaykh; and there is the spiritual connection, and this is the image of the Shaykh 
that stays with the faqīr wherever he goes.123  
 
There are two ways of dealing (ta‛āmul) with the Shaykh. Dealing with him by 
speech (lisān), for example if we have a problem or if I want to consult his 
opinion, for example my son wants to study abroad, or I want to set up a 
business, or something like that. These are exterior issues (umūr ẓāhiriyya). 
Maybe the Shaykh directs (yuwajjih) me in them.  
But mainly, the relation between us is not this. It is deeper than this. He shows us 
(yudillna) how to walk / proceed (kīf nimshī), how to go our way / where to turn 
(kīf nitwajjah), how to do dhikr, how to worship, and things like this. And also he 
has two ways to connect with us. He directs us (biwajjihnā) in the weekly lesson 
(dars), or if you have a personal connection (‛alāqa shakhsiyya) with him you can 
sit with him or you talk with him how to go on the right path regarding ‛ibāda, or 
behaviour (taṣarruf), akhlāq, mu‛āmalāt, the way every murīd has to behave.124 
 
The material connection (tawāṣul) is through the visit (ziyāra), the waẓīfa, the 
ḥaḍra, listening to the mudhākara. The spiritual connection (ittiṣāl) is through the 
dhikr. (...) Who is your teacher who teaches you? Your Shaykh. And whenever 
you remember him he is with you. He feels you that you do dhikr and there is 
tawāṣul between you.125 
 
Just as one’s vision of the Shaykh is influenced by one’s progress on the spiritual 
path, the mode of communication depends on the spiritual level of the follower: 
those followers who are on a lower spiritual level take information through 
speech (kalām). Those who have a higher level work with signs – ishārāt (sg. 
ishāra).126  
                                                  
123 AM1-1 in Interview AM3. In this quote, the Review Panel prefers to use the word murīd in 
stead of faqīr because the latter is on a higher level. Review Panel, ‘Response to email of 
October 12’. 
124 AM2-2 in Interview AM2. 
125 AM3-5 in Interview AM3. 
126 AM2-2 in Interview AM2. 
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The term ishāra originally meant sign, gesture, indication, and was used as a 
non-verbal tool of communication.127 Its Islamic usage is related to Qur’anic 
exegesis.128 Ja’far al-Sadiq (d.765) distinguished four levels of meaning in the 
Qur’an: 
- ibāra, the ‘statement set down’, which was the most explicit outer (ẓāhir) 
meaning for the benefit of the common people (awāmm) 
- ishāra, the ‘implied purport’, which was the deeper inner (bāṭin) meaning 
for those with spiritual understanding (khawāṣṣ) 
- latā’if, the ‘hidden meanings’, only accessible to the awliyā’ 
- ḥaqā’iq, the ‘exalted spiritual doctrines’, known only to the prophets.129 
The act of interpreting the signs found in the Qur’an on the level of ishāra 
is known as ta’wīl, which literally means ‘returning to its origin or source’ as the 
signs are restored to their true and original meanings. This is not simply an 
intellectual endeavour, but it is to be accompanied by a similar ‘returning’ of the 
soul: the soul cannot restore, return the text to its truth, unless it too returns to its 
truth.’130 
The interpretation of signs is a process that engages the entire soul, a 
spiritual realization of the meanings in the Qur’an that can be achieved by 
traveling the Sufi Path,131 until the Sufi has reached the levels of fanā’ and 
baqā.132 As we have seen in paragraph 1.2, this is the annihilation from a specific 
mode of lower consciousness and the simultaneous subsistence through a 
specific mode of higher consciousness, in which the Real’s self-disclosures in all 
things are unveiled (kashf).133 For those who see with the inner eyes, ta’wīl goes 
beyond the Qur’an: the whole of the cosmos is pervaded by the Divine’s self-
disclosures, by signs that point to their Divine origin. Both the everyday reality 
and alternative realities (dreams, imaginations, etc.) are ‘symbolic 
                                                  
127 P. Nwyia, ‘Is̲h̲āra’, EI2 IV 113-114. 
128 Ibid.; Lutz Berger, ‘Allusion (in Ṣūfism)’, EI3 (Brill Online, 2012). 
129 Henry Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993), 6. 
130 Henry Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), 
28–35. 
131 I. Poonawala, ‘Taʾwīl’, EI2 X 390-392. 
132 Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, 8. 
133 Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 59–62; Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 321–324. 
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representations of Reality’. Toshihiko Izutsu speaks of ‘the symbolic structure of 
the world’ as in this body of thought everything can assume a symbolic character, 
‘an event occurring in so-called “reality” is a symbol for an event corresponding to 
it in the higher plane of the Images’.134 
All these signs need to be perceived and interpreted; in order to do so, the 
believer needs to ‘cultivate the ability for seeing things symbolically’, to ‘remove 
the material veil to reveal the realities that lie beyond’ by practising the Path and 
achieving an inner transformation.135 In order to then express the visions and 
experiences, ordinary language is not sufficient – the unveilings can only be 
referred to by signs of their own. These ‘allusions’ are more than symbolical use 
of language, they are a way to approximate the description of the ineffable 
experience, ‘the language which effects the maximum reduction of the distance 
between the saying and what is said.’ There is an unbreakable connection 
between symbol and symbolized: 
 
The symbol is not an artificially constructed sign; it flowers in the soul 
spontaneously to announce something that cannot be expressed otherwise; it is 
the unique expression of the thing symbolized as of a reality that thus becomes 
transparent to the soul, but which in itself transcends all expression.136 
 
In this sense, ishāra is the opposite of ‘ibāra’, ‘knowledge acquired by 
natural means’ which can adequately be expressed in words. As Paul Nwyia puts 
it, in such an experience ‘[t]he bonds of natural knowledge are burst, and man 
reaches a new world in which concepts and words cannot be applied’ and it 
cannot be grasped or expressed discursively. The use of language to get as 
close to the experience as possible paradoxically draws up the veils between this 
world and the world of the experience, and makes the language 
incomprehensible to anyone who has not had a similar experience, enhancing its 
                                                  
134 Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, 7–15. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, 30–31. 
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esoteric character.137 It takes on the character of a hidden jargon, only 
understandable by those who have been through a similar experience.138  
The only being that can truly see both aspects of the Divine at once, the 
transcendent and the immanent, is al-insān al-kāmil, the Perfect Man, who sees 
the flow of the Divine through all the planes. Izutsu notes that ‘Ibn Arabi’s 
philosophy is, in brief, a theoretic description of the entire world of Being as it is 
reflected in the eye of the Perfect Man.’139 As fascinating as this is, this is not the 
question that concerns us here. Rather than seek insight into the religious 
experience of those highest on the Path who claim such exalted interpretations 
and visions in the states of fanā’ and baqā, we are interested in the experience of 
those who have not (yet) reached those levels – how is it experienced among the 
followers in everyday life. 
Signs to the Divine need to be perceived, attributed with meaning, and 
interpreted, using allusive language which acts as a sign of its own. This is most 
clear in the Qur’an: ‘Instead of seeking a secret in or under the text, we must 
regard the text itself as the secret.’140 Events, actions and sayings in the 
everyday world thus become signs by using a different way of looking at the 
world, a religious vision that is the result of a long period of spiritual training to 
purify the inner senses and see self-disclosures of the Real everywhere with the 
eye of the heart. These signs might be spontaneous or evoked,141 as in the case 
of istikhāra. They might not be intended as signs by the actors involved in the 
actual creation of the event, action, or saying. Thus Ibn Arabi said: ‘an “allusion” 
only takes place through the intention of the one who alludes, not in respect of 
that to which the allusion is made.’ He explains this to exoteric scholars by giving 
the examples of ‘good omens’: they are not intended, but only interpreted as 
such.142 
                                                  
137 Nwyia, ‘Is̲h̲āra’; Berger, ‘Allusion (in Ṣūfism).’ 
138 Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 249. 
139 Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, 19. 
140 Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, 33. 
141 Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, 27. 
142 Muhyi al-Din ibn Arabi, Futuḥāt al-Makkiyya I 279.7, quoted in Chittick, The Sufi Path of 
Knowledge, 249–250. 
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For those who look at the world in this way, these signs point to a different 
reality, but they also have a role to play in this world – God has to be known both 
as transcendence and immanence.143 Berger and Luckmann see language as a 
symbol system which can connect different spheres of reality – the everyday 
reality and meta-empirical or experiential dimensions – but is always rooted in 
everyday reality, thus ‘grounding’ the experience in the everyday reality, ‘bringing 
it back’, translating and transposing it, enclosing it and turning it into an ‘enclave’ 
within the paramount reality:  
 
Language is capable not only of constructing symbols that are highly abstracted 
from everyday experience, but also of ‘bringing back’ these symbols and 
appresenting them as objectively real elements in everyday life. In this manner, 
symbolism and symbolic language become essential constituents of the reality of 
everyday life and of the common-sense apprehension of this reality.144  
 
This way, language assists in integrating subjective experiences from 
different levels of reality and incorporating them in the believer’s symbolic 
universe, thus strengthening this universe. Berger and Luckmann argue that this 
re-establishes the paramount status of everyday reality, making it the primary 
reality.145 The Sufi symbolic universe denies this paramountcy as God is 
considered the ultimate reality – but the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya (and many 
other ṭuruq) acknowledge that life has to be lived in this world and therefore – 
while not explicitly granting everyday life paramount status – it does acknowledge 
the need to act within it. Through these signs, everyday reality is connected to 
the higher realms. Eliade notes that ‘for those who have a religious experience all 
nature is capable of revealing itself as cosmic sacrality. The cosmos in its entirety 
can become a hierophany.’146  
True to their belief that God is visible in all of His creation, for ikhwānnā no 
everyday occurrence is too mundane to perceive a sign in it. In Fatima al-
                                                  
143 Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, 16; Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 69–72. 
144 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 39, 54–55. 
145 Berger and Luckmann 55, 115-116 
146 Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, 12–14. 
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Yashrutiyya’s Nafaḥāt al-Ḥaqq, we encounter ishāra in the sense of both allusive 
language and interpretation: she defines ‘ilm al-ishāra as ‘knowledge of the 
unveilings (mukāshafāt) and the stages (manāzilāt), because the language of 
ibāra is inadequate for the visions (mushāhadāt) of the hearts and the unveilings 
of the secrets’.147 In the same discussion, she includes the ḥadīth ‘Every āya 
(Qur’anic verse) has an exterior (ẓahr) and an interior (baṭn)’.148  
What we see among ikhwānnā is that this concept in its interpretive mode 
is applied to the full range of human communication – not only mystical allusive 
language that is knowingly produced to express ineffable mystical experiences, 
but also everyday expressions and non-verbal signs (one of the original 
meanings of ishāra). At the highest level of knowledge – ḥaqq al-yaqīn, acquired 
through fanā’ in God,149 the spiritual relationship has reached such a level that 
the Sufi can experience the deepest meaning of the ishārāt. But those who have 
not reached this level do not completely miss the meaning of the ishāra – they 
simply interpret it on a different level. Therefore, everyone’s interpretation is 
theoretically justified – ‘there is no wrong way to look at the Shaykh’.150 
 Among the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, then, the term is used in all these 
ways. Due to their practicing of the Path they are trained to see signs in both the 
everyday world and in alternative realities (dreams, visions, etc.) that point to the 
Divine, and that are a communication of their Shaykh. Sometimes the sign is 
quite explicit – even for someone who is not initiated it is easy to understand that 
Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi’s words ‘Ahmad speaks with my tongue’, seen by 
ikhwānnā as an ishāra, mean that he represents him and should be his 
successor. In other cases, the meanings might be more hidden, and one needs 
to have a higher level on the Path to discern the sign and understand its 
meaning. On this higher level we see the allusive meaning of ishāra, as the 
                                                  
147 al-Yashrutiyya, Nafaḥāt Al-Ḥaqq, 30–31. 
148 Ibid., 31. The ḥadīth is taken from al-Suyuti, Ta’yīd al-Ḥaqīqa al-‘aliya. 
149 Fatima al-Yashrutiyya, in her introduction to Nafaḥāt al-Ḥaqq, writes about the Sufis’ three 
levels of knowledge. The first is ‘ilm al-yaqīn (knowledge of the certain), knowledge which 
requires proof. Then follows ‘ayn al-yaqīn (source or eye of the certain), based on vision 
(mushāhada) and unveiling (mukāshafa), followed by ḥaqq al-yaqīn (truth of the certain), acquired 
through fanā’ of the worshipper in God. al-Yashrutiyya, Nafaḥāt al-Ḥaqq, 31 
150 Informal discussion with JA5 on 13-05-2013. 
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Shaykh communicates spiritually by inspiring abnā al-ṭarīqa with knowledge that 
goes beyond reason and expression, ‘straight to the heart’. It is impossible for the 
followers to explain further and put this experience into words. These things are 
too deep.  
 
There are things that cannot be transferred by speech (lisān). This is why abnā 
al-ṭarīqa learn two languages, the language of the tongue (lisān), and the 
language of the hearts (qulūb). By developing the language of the heart we can 
deal with the Shaykh.151 
 
AM2-2: When we go deep into the ṭarīqa, the relation between us and the 
Shaykh is not by speech. There is something in taṣawwuf that is called ‛ilm al-
ishāra. We are just watching the signs from the Shaykh. But this is a higher and 
very deep level. We cannot talk about it. It is not restricted to talk, but it’s difficult 
to talk about ishāra. When we see the Shaykh angry for example, it is a specific 
language of the sign, and when we see him laughing this is ‛ilm al-ishāra. And 
this directs us, by signs more than by speaking. 
AM2-6: It is not like he will tell us do this and don’t do that. It’s not like this. It’s 
just trying to show us the correct way or the correct answer in a very smooth 
way.152  
 
 By developing the spiritual relation with the Shaykh, the relation between 
their hearts, the followers understand the signs/allusions and the meaning of the 
signs/allusions, and they receive knowledge directly into their hearts. Several 
followers in Amman have written or are writing books about the ṭarīqa, and they 
relate to this notion of inspiration as a major factor in the process of writing. One 
follower says he suffered from a writer’s block but when the Shaykh gave him a 
ballpoint and said ‘write!’ he wrote several pages in one day. Another writer 
recognizes this experience. Once when he was working on a book he got ideas 
in the middle of the night and started writing in the dark, because he knew if he 
                                                  
151 AM3-3 in Interview AM3. 
152 AM2-2 in Interview AM2. 
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turned on the light the inspiration would be gone. This inspiration came from 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā.153 
Guidance and knowledge can thus be transmitted in various ways that 
range from very clear unambiguous language to deep ineffable experiences that 
go ‘straight to the heart’, and the meaning of ishāra for the followers can 
therefore be found on a scale from very concrete signs that can be interpreted 
discursively to the allusive language that seeks to express the deeper 
knowledge, depending on the spiritual level of the followers. 
The idea of ishāra (in the interpretive sense) is connected to the followers’ 
idea that when one loves God, one sees Him in everything. For them, the 
transcendent can ‘break through’ in every time and every place and give them 
guidance in their life. A lower-level ‘charismatic moment’ is thus accessible to the 
followers through the relationship with their Shaykh – the ‘routinization of 
charisma’ in this ṭarīqa might bind the main charisma in all its shining glory in the 
figure of the Shaykh, but by practicing the Path and looking at everyday reality 
with a different eye, they can see sparks of it in everyday life. 
The spiritual development that allows them to participate in his charisma 
and discern his signs is done by practising the path: 
 
AM2-2: Some ikhwānnā for example come and understand nashīd, that’s it. They 
love nashīd, they understand nashīd. Some ikhwānnā love philosophy or the 
mudhākara, they understand the mudhākara. Some ikhwānnā love to interact 
with Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā as a human being. This is the differentiation between the 
students and the murīdīn. (...) the main difference, the most important thing that 
differentiates between the murīdīn, is dhikr and ‛ibāda. (...)‛Ibāda, waẓīfa, dhikr, 
ta’ammul (contemplative thinking, intellectual meditation). Our ṭarīqa is based on 
dhikr and fikr and maḥabba and taslīm. (...) For example there are people, maybe 
they do not read waẓīfa every day, maybe they do not pray, they are free, for 
example maybe they pray the subḥ and not the ẓuhr. All of this leads to the rank 
they have. 
                                                  
153 Semi-informal discussion with the Welcome Committee in the zāwiya in Amman before the 
ḥaḍra on 28-03-2013. 
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AM2-6: Rank of knowledge of course, and understanding.154 
 
The increase of my meetings with the Shaykh makes me used to the signs that 
my Shaykh sends. As soon as I increase my frequenting the zāwiya and the 
vision of the Shaykh by listening to the Shaykh I understand that now I have to 
talk to him, now it is possible to talk with him, now he guides me, the expression 
of his face, maybe they inspire (tūhī) me like this, and every time, through the 
increase of your practice (mumārastak) or your visit to the Shaykh in the zāwiya, 
he gives you this understanding. (...) And second, (...) dhikr and ‛ibāda makes 
you develop your understanding (mafhūmak) or your vision (ru’yatak) of the 
Shaykh.155 
 
The follower does not necessarily actually have to ask a question – the 
Shaykh’s ability to sense what is on someone’s mind is considered one of his 
karāmāt. The Shaykh’s answer can be direct but mostly it will not be direct and 
they have to search his speech and actions for signs that will provide them with 
answers, or the Shaykh might appear to them in a dream.156 Regarding mundane 
issues, the question and the answer can be both direct and indirect. Regarding 
spiritual issues, the question and the answer will always be communicated 
indirectly and spiritually. Either the follower observes the Shaykh and distills the 
answer from his words and actions, or he communicates with the Shaykh in a 
dream. 
Practically, it is considered similar to the Islamic istikhāra prayer, a 
religiously approved form of seeking guidance through dreams.157 When a 
Muslim has a question (for example which mosque to attend), he or she prays 
the istikhāra prayer, keeps the question in mind, and God will provide him or her 
with the answer. It has been noted that while dreaming and istikhara are part of 
the general Islamic tradition and Muslim imagination, the actual dreaming 
                                                  
154 AM2-2 and AM2-6 in Interview AM2. 
155 AM2-1 in Interview AM2. 
156 AM3-5 in Interview AM3. 
157 AM3-5 in Interview AM3. 
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practice and the process of interpretation are culturally informed.158 The 
particular form in which ikhwānnā embrace this Islamic practice is therefore 
revealing.  
Istikhāra done by abnā al-ṭarīqa by turning towards God and their Shaykh 
for guidance: 
 
AM3-5: It is the same between us and Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā. When there are things in 
the ‛aqīda that are difficult to ask it is the same, we remember God / do dhikr 
(budhkor Allah), and our Lord will make happen that the answer to this question 
comes. And this answer will come through a dream or through a specific word, 
you will understand from it that this is the answer to your question. (...) Because 
this ‛ilm is ‛ilm through ilhāmāt that come to the heart. They come through ‛ibādāt, 
they come through dhikr, as long as the question is fixed in your mind. Through 
the quantity (kuthr) of your love for the Shaykh, and his love for you, he will 
answer your question. There will be a spiritual connection between two people. 
AM1-1: Ilhām, ‛ilm ladunnī. 
AM3-5: (...) Because [there is] so much of a bond or a relationship between us, 
he answers the questions which we are shy to ask. And maybe he will not say 
this is your question and ask it, he will talk about the subject... 
AM2-6: He will inspire you with the answer. 
AM3-5: He will inspire you and you will get the answer. 
AM1-1: He inspires [yulhim]. (...) There is knowledge that we call ‛ilm khafī 
(hidden knowledge) or ‛ilm ladunnī. (...) And the murīd that has a strong spiritual 
connection (ittiṣāl) with the Shaykh, he inspires this ‛ilm rabbānī (divine 
knowledge) in the heart of this faqīr. (...) This stage (marḥala) is like the stage of 
inspiration (marḥalat al-waḥy).159 
 
While we cannot access the actual experience, we can still learn a lot from 
this practice for our purposes of understanding authority in the ṭarīqa by 
analysing how the experience is induced, how it is narrated and interpreted, with 
whom it is discussed, and who are the actors involved. In other cases, believers 
                                                  
158 Edgar and Henig, ‘Istikhara’, 251–252; Green, ‘Dreams and Visions in Islam’, 288. See 
paragraph 1.2. 
159 AM3-5, AM2-6 and AM1-1 in Interview AM3. 
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often seek out a religious specialist who does the prayer, receives the answer 
and interprets this for them – as Pinto for example notes for the Shaykh of the 
Qadiri Hilali zawiya.160 In such situations this role gives them a lot of authority 
over the community. In the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, by contrast, the Shaykh is 
not directly involved. The followers pray and experience themselves, and often 
share their experience with ikhwānnā to interpret the signs together and 
incorporate them in the tradition. The Shaykh is considered to give them the 
signs to be interpreted. 
 They believe that the Shaykh gives answers in dreams because it 
happened to all of them, and because it is backed by a ḥadīth on the Prophet 
which says ‘who saw me in his sleep truly saw me, because the devil does not 
impersonate me.’ 
 
The same thing, because for us Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā is the extension (imtidād) of the 
same nūr muḥammadī. So our vision of him in our sleep, in our dreams – we 
believe that we saw him truely, he speaks to us in our sleep and the next day we 
go accordingly, we believe that this is the right (saḥīḥ) answer as if this was really 
reality, analogous with the ḥadīth of the Prophet pbuh.161 
 
 During Interview AM3 some of the participants give examples of their 
spiritual communication with the Shaykh. One lady tells us that her son seemed 
sick, but for three weeks the doctors were not able to find any illness.  
 
And all the night me and my husband prayed and did du‛ā’, we asked Ḥaḍrat 
Sīdnā and God that there was nothing wrong with him. Every night every night 
every night until the morning. (...) we were very tired and sad and we continued 
to do du‛ā’, to ask from Sīdnā night and day, we never slept. 
 
When they travelled to see a different doctor, the Shaykh appeared in her dream 
and told her he was not sick, and the next day the doctor’s analysis confirmed 
                                                  
160 Iain R. Edgar, The Dream in Islam: From Qur’anic Tradition to Jihadist Inspiration (Oxford & 
New York: Berghahn Books, 2011); Pinto, ‘Knowledge and Miracles’, 68. 
161 AM3-5 in Interview AM3. 
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this. Another participant stressed to me that the Shaykh answered their prayers. 
Not only did he have knowledge of the boy’s physical state before the doctors 
did, he also communicated with the parents to calm them. The fact that the boy 
was not ill is also attributed to the Shaykh. Because they prayed and did dhikr all 
the time, he came to their aid.162 
 Another follower tells a similar story: She was very worried for her son 
who studied abroad. She cried when he asked her to pray so he would pass his 
exams, and she read waẓīfa and said du‛ā’. In her sleep the Shaykh told her that 
he would pass and she should not be afraid. She told her son and he was very 
happy and he relaxed (uṭma’an) – and indeed he passed, his teacher even told 
him he was her best student! ‘I relaxed from the vision of the Shaykh.’163 Again 
the Shaykh shares his knowledge with the follower, calming her and her son, and 
the student’s success is attributed to the Shaykh. 
 Another follower tells that he had signed a contract to work in Saudi 
Arabia for four years. When two years had passed, he saw the Shaykh in his 
dreams. 
 
We were sitting in a salon like this. I love guava. I saw Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā in my sleep 
at the other side of the salon and he carried four pieces of guava. Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
walked towards me. When I saw him walking towards me I walked towards him 
because I wanted that I go to him, not he come to me. When I approached him I 
wanted to take the four pieces of guava from him. When he wanted to give them 
to me, they fell from the hand of Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā to the floor. Two of them broke, 
and two of them stayed whole. Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā took the two whole ones and gave 
them to me, and smiled at me, and went.164  
 
He did not understand the dream and discussed it with ikhwānnā, but he did not 
find a satisfying answer. A few days later it all became clear: his employer told 
him his contract was finished and he was asked to return to Jordan. ‘And I 
understood straight away that I was bound to the contract for four years – two of 
                                                  
162 AM3-6 in Interview AM3. 
163 AM3-4 in Interview AM3. 
164 AM3-5 in Interview AM3. 
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them had passed, the ones that stayed well, and two of them broke. I understood 
straight away that I had to return.’165 In this example the Shaykh knows the future 
but does not communicate it clearly and the follower has to search for the 
meaning himself. It is interesting to note that he includes his fellow followers in 
this, discussing the dream with them just like other speech acts of the Shaykh. A 
few days later he understood the meaning of the dream and he knew what to do 
in this situation. Interestingly enough while the Shaykh did predict this 
occurrence, he did not explicitly tell the follower how he should react to the news. 
Probably the follower did not have much choice in the matter as his contract had 
been ended by his superiors, but the way he narrates the event shows he 
understood it as a moment of choice in which he was guided by his Shaykh 
through his dream. 
 In another story, a follower remembers the Shaykh predicting the future for 
him in clear and explicit language, rather than symbols. He had an interview for a 
function which would require him to travel. When he stopped by the zāwiya on 
his way to the interview, the Shaykh told him ‘go with me in the car.’ When they 
reached the place of the interview, the Shaykh said ‘go and smell the air, that trip 
is for you, they will choose you from among a hundred people.’ And indeed they 
did choose him.166 
 Finally, a follower recounts that he was sitting with the Shaykh, who was 
talking about a topic which he knew something about. He said to himself: ‘If the 
Shaykh loves me, he will ask me now,’ and immediately the Shaykh turned 
towards him and addressed him by his name. He saw this as ‘the result of 
tawāṣul. There is a language of the heart (lugha qalbiyya) between you and the 
Shaykh.’167 
 A similar experience is documented in Mawāhib al-Ḥaqq, as another 
follower immediately points out. A Muslim scholar in Damascus who was not ‘min 
aṣḥāb al-ḥaqīqa,’ who did not believe in Sufism and did not belong to a Sufi 
ṭarīqa, met some of ikhwānnā and did not agree with them. He decided to visit 
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166 AM1-1 in Interview AM3. 
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Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din in Acre. When he met him, the Shaykh was sitting in his 
majlis pouring coffee. The scholar said to himself: ‘If the Shaykh is strong and 
truly a true Shaykh, he will give me his cup of coffee.’ And indeed, Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
gave the cup to one of ikhwānnā and told him: ‘Take my cup, give it to him.’ The 
next day this incident was repeated with a glass of milk, and the scholar came to 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā and kissed his hands, and said to him ‘I was blind that you are a 
Shaykh and you are worthy of it (anā ‛amayt innak shaykh wa tastaḥaqq 
dhālik).’168 Here we see a hint of the influence of older stories from the tradition 
acting as narrative patterns used to put a personal experience into words and 
explicitly connect to these earlier times. 
Another story from the time of Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi serves to 
explain the same mode of communication: 
 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā sat in the majlis, and there were ikhwānnā. (...) He asked one of 
them ‘Take that jar, take the jar from here.’ And ikhwānnā exclaimed ‘Ḥaḍrat 
Sīdnā said “Take the jar from here!”’ Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā left the majlis and ikhwānnā 
said to him: ‘Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā tells you to take the jar, why didn’t you take it?’ He 
said to them: ‘Me, the sign I took was that Sīdnā wants to take jar, he takes it, 
with his movement, not me. I am nothing.’ This is the sign between him and 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā. But the ordinary ikhwānnā don’t understand this, this message.169 
 
This same spiritual communication happens between ikhwānnā. Because 
they love each other and because of their spiritual development they can 
communicate without words, as illustrated by the following case: A lady from 
Cyprus saw the Shaykh in a dream and came to find him. She did not speak 
Arabic and never learnt. Followers say that when she comes to the zāwiya in 
                                                  
168 AM3-5 in Interview AM3. The story can be found in al-Yashrutiyya, Mawāhib al-Ḥaqq, 53–54. 
In the written version of the story the scholar Hajj Salim al-Aghar al-Bayruti is from Beirut rather 
than Damascus, and ends with the him reciting a line of a qaṣida: ‘Ya sāqiyan zidnī ‛Alī’ (‘Oh you 
who pour drink, pour me more Ali’).  
169 AM2-2 in Interview AM2. Note that while the previous stories were all from Interview AM3, this 
story comes from Interview AM2. 
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Amman and listens to the mudhākara she understands it through her heart, and 
the other followers also communicate with her through the heart.170 
For the followers, these modes of communication not only enable the 
transmission of ineffable truths, but also the integration of different levels of 
reality and the concretization of the ‛aqīda as it becomes relevant for individuals 
as they experience the guidance of the sacred in their everyday life. These 
moments are explained on the doctrinal level as communication of the Shaykh, 
and engaged with on the communal level and incorporated in the normative 
framework and in tradition. In this act of interpretation there is space for influence 
from the demands of wider society without diminishing adherence to the idea of 
taslīm and obedience to the Shaykh. The complementarity of dhikr, fikr and 
taslīm which exists for the followers in the inner realm beyond reason, is thus 
also achieved in everyday reality. In fact, the followers experience the act of 
interpretation as part of their religious practice and many of these interactions are 
afterwards described as miraculous instances of spiritual communication which 
enhance the Shaykh’s charisma and his authority. 
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have examined the practical aspects of the Shaykh’s authority: 
how are the roles we have found in the previous chapter enacted by the Shaykh, 
or to turn the question around: how are they attributed to him? Bruce Lincoln 
argues that an authoritative speaker cannot speak in a vacuum but has to appeal 
to certain ideas and values that were pre-established by the audience.171 We 
have seen that the primary attributes needed to accept the Shaykh’s authority 
are cultivated through tarbiya in the family and community, enabling the followers 
to see the Shaykh as a caring teacher and guide. In order to activate this role, 
the follower has to accept and develop his or her spiritual relationship with the 
                                                  
170 Informal discussion with AM1-3 in the zāwiya in Amman before the ḥaḍra on 28-11-2013; 
informal discussion with AM2-6 after the women’s meeting on 30-03-2013. 
171 See Lincoln, Authority. See chapter 1. 
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Shaykh, in which he or she is aided by the community. Likewise, the act of 
interpreting the Shaykh’s signs is done in the community. Therefore in practice, 
the enactment of the Shaykh’s teaching role is fulfilled more by the community of 
the ṭarīqa than by the Shaykh himself as values are transmitted, signs are 
identified and interpreted in the community. The validity of understanding 
authority as a relationship is certainly strengthened by examining this case study, 
and the importance to understand the dynamics of the acts of communication 
between Shaykh, community and individual becomes clear. 
 As we have seen in chapter 5, the ṭarīqa is institutionalised on traditional 
kinship lines but maintains the charismatic connection to both earlier Shaykhs 
and the current Shaykh. The shaykhdom is passed from the Shaykh to his son. 
The ṭarīqa – while proselytizing during the time of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din – is now 
passed mainly within the family, and adherence is based on socialisation rather 
than conversion. In classical sociological terms, one could say that there was an 
organizational shift from sect to denomination as people are born and socialized 
into it rather than converted.172 It should be pointed out, however, that there are 
quite a few instances of outsiders joining – mainly through spouses and friends – 
who are introduced into the ṭarīqa through secondary socialisation by significant 
others.173 O’Dea sees the substitution of conversion for socialisation as leading 
to lessening of adherence (what he calls the ‘the dilemma of power’).174 Because 
of the absence of statistics it is impossible to know to what degree affiliation 
changed over time, but for those who are active followers, the shift to 
socialisation in no way made their adherence superficial. Many grew up without 
regular access to the Shaykh, and their first encounter with him was experienced 
in terms similar to a conversion experience and often talked about in such terms 
(see paragraph 5.4). O’Dea does acknowledge this option – socialisation can 
prepare people for a conversion-like moment.175 
                                                  
172 Here we refer to the organisational mode, not their attitude to the world, which does not seem 
to have shifted.  
173 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 176–178; Berger, The Sacred 
Canopy, 41–42, 91–92, 157–166. See paragraph 1.3. 
174 O’Dea, ‘Sociological Dilemmas’, 84–86. 
175 Ibid., 84. 
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The acceptance of the authority of the Shaykh and the internalisation of 
roles of Shaykh and follower happen within the community through the tarbiya – 
similar to the sociological process of socialisation. Attitudes towards the 
doctrines, practices, community and Shaykh are formed in the community. The 
acceptance of the Shaykh’s higher rank and superior knowledge based on the 
doctrine that he embodies the nūr muḥammadī happens through what Berger 
and Luckmann call the internalisation of the symbolic universe and the 
acceptance of social structure through the internalisation of specific roles. This 
happens in the community and continues throughout the individual’s life as the 
socialisation process is never complete; the symbolic universe needs to be 
maintained and reaffirmed in the face of challenges, and the community plays an 
essential role in this. We see the same process in the case of most where the 
new follower’s significant others (a wife, or a dear friend) play an essential role in 
mediating the individual’s love for the Shaykh and the ṭarīqa, supported by the 
larger community into which the individual enters.176 This teaching role of 
ikhwānnā is made explicit in both the answers of the followers and in the quote of 
the Shaykh: 
 
Just as the murīd connects with his Shaykh through undertaking a ziyāra177 to his 
Shaykh and stand in his presence to receive tarbiya through his good example 
and the taking over of the positive characteristics (ṣiffāt), this also happens 
through the muqaddamīn (...) or through his brothers who possess hearts full with 
the knowledge of God and his Prophet.178 
 
Pinto understands tarbiya as the process of spiritual education that follows 
initiation.179 It is important to note that the word tarbiya generally refers to the 
                                                  
176 See paragraph 5.4 Interview AM4 
177 Ziyāra (pl. ziyārāt) means ‘visit’, pilgrimage to a shaykh, holy place, tomb or shrine. This is 
based on the belief that the saint, or any object associated with him, confers his baraka (grace, 
blessings). By visiting, the believers profess their love for God and the saints, who intercede for 
them before God. In the case of a deceased shaykh, he is considered to be spiritually present. 
Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 95–96. 
178 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 15-03-2014, p. 1-2. 
179 Pinto, ‘The Anthropologist and the Initiated’, 464–465. 
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broader concept of education and raising of children in general,180 not just to the 
more narrow meaning of spiritual education following a voluntary initiation. 
Indeed in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya the term is used in its broader meaning. 
This also reflects a different approach to spiritual education and to initiation than 
Pinto noted in his fieldwork in Aleppo. As the ṭarīqa is institutionalized on kinship 
lines and the followers’ children are born into the community and exposed to the 
teachings and practices of the ṭarīqa from a young age, and as there is no 
individualized instruction, the mubāya‛a has a different role. The person doing 
mubāya’a pledges him/herself to a different level of commitment to the Shaykh 
and the ṭarīqa’s devotional practices, but the practices themselves do not 
change. People start participating in the ṭarīqa’s devotional practices from an 
early age as part of their tarbiya. There is no personalized initiation and all 
followers practice the same rituals. 
The importance of ritual in the institutionalisation process has been noted 
by both Berger and O’Dea. The latter stresses they are not only reactions to a 
religious experience, but when institutionalised act as re-presentations and re-
creations of the charismatic moment which elicit emotions and attitudes, and 
reaffirms the relationship with the sacred and with the community.181 Berger 
points to the role of ritual in ‘reminding’ people of their tradition and the 
charismatic moment from which it derives.182 Sufi devotional practices certainly fit 
this description – dhikr literally means ‘remembrance’, in this case the 
remembrance of God. 
Based on his fieldwork among Sufis in Aleppo, Pinto shows that different 
ways of transmission lead to different relationships between shaykh and follower, 
and to different relationships among the followers themselves. He sees a 
difference between a ṭarīqa’s collective rituals such as collective dhikr, which can 
be practiced by both initiates and by non-initiated followers and which allows 
them ‘various degrees of socialization into the symbolic and experiential 
                                                  
180 The basic meaning of the verbal root r-b-y is ‘to increase; to grow; to grow up’, and tarbiya 
means ‘education, upbringing; teaching, instruction; pedagogy; breeding, raising (of animals)’. 
Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, 3rd ed.; ‘Tarbiya.’ 
181 O’Dea, The Sociology of Religion, 39–41. 
182 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 36–37. 
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universe’ of the ṭarīqa, and the more individualized process of initiation which 
allows them to develop an individualized religious self through a personalized 
wird and subjective mystical experiences. Collective rituals produce shared 
experiences and thus promote an egalitarian social structure amongst the 
followers, while personalized initiation promotes a hierarchical structure as it 
creates more individual experiences and hierarchy. He does acknowledge, 
however, that collective rituals can also promote a subtle hierarchization as the 
mystical experiences expressed during collective rituals can be used to evaluate 
the spiritual level of the disciples and to create a hierarchy based on these levels. 
Collective rituals are not the only setting in which mystical states are evaluated, 
however, as such an evaluation can happen in a wide array of social settings.183 
The egalitarian attitudes professed when discussing maḥabba are thus 
reinforced by the particular devotional system, which is an intrinsic aspect of the 
process of tarbiya from a young age, both among initiates and non-initiates. 
There is also no clear conceptual system that arranges different stages on the 
path corresponding with different levels of initiation which could conceptually 
organise religious experiences on which an explicit hierarchy could be based. 
Even though it is not conceptually organised, the need to manifest one’s spiritual 
progress through good behaviour is explicit, and an informal hierarchy can thus 
be established. In the one ritual for which explicit permission needs to be sought, 
the devotional and moral performance of the murīd are considered the main 
criterion, as this is considered closely connected to his/her spiritual state. The 
hierarchy thus established remains informal. The only explicit hierarchy is that 
between the Shaykh and ikhwānnā. 
Pinto further notes that different types of dhikr encourage different types of 
charismatic leaderships. While one group might value order and perform a well 
disciplined dhikr, other groups behave emotionally and ecstatically and perform 
miracles during their meetings. The Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya certainly maintains 
a very disciplined dhikr (for an example, see the description in chapter 7). There 
                                                  
183 Pinto, ‘The Anthropologist and the Initiated’, 465–468; Pinto, ‘Sufism and the Political 
Economy of Morality in Syria’, 125–126; Pinto, ‘Knowledge and Miracles.’ See paragraph 1.2. 
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is no room for ecstasy, which is in line with the general teachings of the Shaykh 
that emphasize good behaviour and participation in society according to the 
religious and mundane law.  
Complementary to dhikr is fikr. We have seen how it encompasses a wide 
range of meanings, from meditative contemplation to rational thought and critical 
thinking. As Pinto noted, study groups can both stress individuality (as they 
provide a platform of moral performance and of rational debate based on 
individual critical thinking) and encourage an egalitarian group cohesion as it 
homogenizes the vernacular knowledge, equalizes the distribution of knowledge 
and monitors the debate, encouraging consensus and adding to these egalitarian 
attitudes and both shared doctrinal understandings and reflections.184 In the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, we see that study groups and moments of mudhākara 
both encourage individual autonomy and communal agreement. There is no 
personal instruction – the Shaykh speaks in general and the followers interpret 
his words according to their own needs, questions, and level of understanding. 
They then discuss this among themselves. Everyone understands the Shaykh’s 
words and actions differently based on his own level of intellectual and spiritual 
understanding, but the discussion among the followers brings these different 
understandings closer together. In the process, the words and actions of the 
Shaykh, and the followers’ interpretations, are incorporated in the vernacular 
tradition. In the mudhākara, the followers negotiate meanings and codes of 
behaviour. 
 As Talal Asad argued (see chapter 1), we should analyse the kinds of 
reasoning and the underlying logic of education processes to understand the 
transmission and maintenance of traditions.185 By taking into account the role of 
education in cultivating attitudes towards the Shaykh, and the role of 
interpretation in the communication with the Shaykh, we can go beyond the 
Weberian distinction between rational and irrational authority. In the previous 
chapter we have seen that in this ṭarīqa traditional and charismatic authority are 
                                                  
184 Pinto, ‘Creativity and Stability in the Making of Sufi Tradition’, 126–127. 
185 Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam, 16. 
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inextricably linked as the traditional institutionalisation includes the maintenance 
of charisma, and in this chapter we see that there is considerable space for 
rational discussion and interpretation in both. Interpretations should remain within 
the boundaries of the Shaykh’s teaching (which is considered the same as the 
Prophet’s teaching). The rational discussion should be rooted in the spiritual 
experience which is cultivated in the ṭarīqa, and one of the main criteria for 
evaluating the validity of an interpretation is the spiritual development of the 
interpreter. The rational and the spiritual are thus not adversaries, but partners, 
and there is space for the individual despite the importance of the community and 
the Shaykh. Similarly, those who say that there is no space for individual 
reasoning in Sufism because of the omniscience and omnipotence of the Sufi 
master, are proven wrong as both can co-exist. 
The Shaykh is the ultimate ‘custodian of tradition’ who sets the boundaries 
within which the ṭarīqa’s teachings can be interpreted. Due to the indirect 
communication of the Shaykh however, the boundaries provided by his teachings 
can be blurred. These blurred boundaries enable the followers to manoeuver in 
their concrete environments, which gives them space for local interpretations that 
maintain the cohesion of the local community. The explicit importance of 
interaction with society and the notion that schools and books are valid sources 
to learn about general Islamic issues support this process. The potential paradox 
between taslīm and fikr, between a centralised ṭarīqa in which the Shaykh is the 
ultimate authority (both in the sense of an authority and the authority), and the 
local interpretations of the followers, is thus solved by the particular mode of 
communication between Shaykh and follower. 
Through the transmission in the community and the discussions of the 
Shaykh’s teachings, the followers negotiate ‘official religion’ and make it relevant 
for their community by stressing different elements, resulting in several parallel 
traditions (Bowman’s ‘folk religion’, that which is generally accepted and 
transmitted belief and practice, regardless of the official view).186 Due to the 
strong centralisation and the strong bonds among communities these parallel 
                                                  
186 Bowman and Valk, ‘Vernacular Religion.’ 
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traditions do not differ significantly from the ‘official religion’ – they are points of 
different stress, rather than real differences in interpretation. In the case of the 
mudhākara in Amman, this knowledge is steered specifically by the Shaykh and 
those in the Welcome Committee in what Berger would call a certain degree of 
social control.187 Even so, individuals, based on their different levels of 
intellectual and spiritual (emotional, affective) understanding, and their different 
characters, life experiences, and degree of exposure to the community and the 
Shaykh, relate to these parallel traditions in different ways. The degree to which 
these individual differences are accepted differ per follower, but in general there 
is space for discussion and differing views that sometimes even go beyond the 
‘official religion’. 
The concept of ishāra has a similarly wide range of meanings in this 
ṭarīqa. Its classical Sufi meaning – allusive language – can be found and is 
considered to be an occurrence on the higher spiritual levels when the disciple 
has developed such a high degree of relationship with the Shaykh that words are 
no longer enough and necessary to communicate, especially when they have 
reached a state of fanā’ – in sociological terms, when he has become integrated 
with the symbolic universe to such a degree to grasp its nuances instinctively. 
Ishāra is not just reserved for the higher levels, however. It is believed that every 
follower can distinguish and interpret isharat on his own level. These ishārāt can 
basically be anything, any word, gesture, action from the Shaykh, or even 
something that happens in everyday life that for an outsider would not seem to 
have any deeper significance whatsoever. In this sense, the meaning of the 
concept ishāra comes closer to the meaning of esoteric Qur’an exegesis, or even 
the pre-Islamic and early-Islamic meaning that simply meant gesture and was 
considered part of the cultural non-vocal symbolic system used to communicate. 
Sometimes these isharat are quite straightforward, for example in the case of the 
ishārāt mentioned when we were discussing the succession of the Shaykh (see 
paragraph 5.3), sometimes they are more so, in which case they can be subject 
                                                  
187 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 72. 
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of discussion among ikhwanna and as thus their interpretation will be a 
combination of the individual and the community, and become part of tradition. 
The practice of istikhāra in this community is a very clear sign of the large 
role the followers have in managing their spiritual communications and 
interpretations. In most cases discussed by Edgar and Henig, istikhāra was done 
by spiritual specialists. Green also points out that the interpretation of dreams 
can be an important task for a Sufi shaykh.188 In the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in 
Amman, the followers do all these things themselves: they ask, pray, dream and 
interpret – the latter typically in the community. This shows that an element which 
in many Sufi communities provided the leader with significant power, is here 
taken up by the followers themselves. They experience this as a miracle from 
their Shaykh, and thus incorporate it into the symbolic system in which the 
Shaykh is the ultimate reference and the one connecting them to the sacred, but 
it cannot be denied that they take on this role. 
For the followers, these indirect and implicit communications are 
manifestations of the ultimate truth and due to their spiritual relation with the 
Shaykh and helped by the community they are steered in their interpretations 
towards the only possible conclusion. From a sociological point of view however, 
such a dynamic gives the followers a lot of space to distinguish and interpret the 
signs within the context of their personal circumstances. Either way, it is a 
mechanism to concretize the ‛aqīda and make the symbolic system relevant in 
the people’s lives. In Bergerian terms, it strengthens the ṭarīqa’s symbolic 
universe and social relationships by incorporating ‘marginal situations’, moments 
in which meta-empirical realms break through into everyday reality in dreams and 
visions.189 These moments are explained on the doctrinal level as communication 
of the Shaykh, and engaged with on the communal level and incorporated in the 
normative framework and in tradition. In addition to this – and this is something 
Berger did not discuss – it also transforms everyday moments into sacred 
encounters, as followers see signs in the most mundane moments and sayings. 
                                                  
188 Edgar and Henig, ‘Istikhara’; Green, ‘Dreams and Visions in Islam.’ 
189 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 28–55. See paragraph 1.3 
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This is part of their belief that through maḥabba they can see God everywhere – 
they can also see the Shaykh’s signs everywhere. This further increases their 
opportunities to concretize the message and make it relevant for their everyday 
reality. Through these experiences, the everyday reality and the reality in which 
spiritual communication happens are integrated to a high degree: Not only are 
incursions from another realm integrated into the everyday reality through the 
teachings of the ṭarīqa (dreams, visions, etc.), but also aspects of everyday 
reality are transformed to be seen as part of another reality as messages from 
the Shaykh are seen in the most mundane of matters. 
This practice of interpretation does not happen in a social vacuum. As we 
have seen, these signs and interpretations are discussed in a communal setting 
and their interpretation is thus influenced by earlier experiences and discussions. 
At the same time these signs and interpretations are incorporated into the larger 
body of communal lore and – in the words of Shils – become part of the tradition. 
Once the sign is perceived, the community takes over its interpretation and 
transforms it into an element of the tradition of the community. In this process the 
Shaykh does not have a lot of direct influence over the development of the 
tradition – although through the space of the zāwiya and the presence of close 
followers he does have indirect influence (see chapter 7). 
In this act of interpretation there is space for influence from the demands 
of wider society. We have seen a similar dynamic in the approach to the sharia, 
where outside influences are negotiated and mediated in the community to 
ensure that both the Shadhuli-Yashruti ‛aqīda and the sharia, as interpreted by 
society, are adhered to. Through both these processes, the ṭarīqa gives the 
followers space to adapt to their time and place and participate in society, while 
at the same time their tarbiya and the practice of mudhākara among the followers 
and meetings in the zāwiya offers a controlling mechanism that ensures that 
followers do not stray from the communal values.  
In this way there is a lot of space for the individual to interpret words and 
actions of the Shaykh and the community, without diminishing his or her 
adherence to the idea of taslīm and obedience to the Shaykh. The 
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complementarity of dhikr, fikr and taslīm which exists for the followers in the inner 
realm beyond reason, is thus also achieved in everyday reality. In fact, the 
followers experience the act of interpretation as part of their religious practice 
and many of these interactions are afterwards described as miraculous instances 
of spiritual communication which enhance the Shaykh’s charisma and his 
authority. This gives us the interesting case of a religious and social group which 
is led by a figure of absolute spiritual authority, while at the same time giving 
great scope to individual followers to interpret the texts and law within their own 
lives and social context, mediated by the community – and we come to 
understand the internal dynamic of a strongly centralized ṭarīqa in which the 
Shaykh is the ultimate authority (both in the sense of an authority and the 
authority) which places great value on social participation and adaptation to time 
and place. 
This points to the large role of the community in the construction and 
maintenance of the tradition, the symbolic universe and the social structure. It 
begs the question addressed by Stjernholm: how much influence they have on 
the definition of the symbolic and social universe as a whole? It seems that they 
have more autonomy than their adherence to the explicit doctrine that the 
Shaykh is always right as embodiment of divine light and knowledge would at 
first sight imply, while maintaining their adherence to taslīm. 
There is more to taslīm than simple obedience to the Shaykh’s words, 
however. It’s primary meaning is to surrender one’s will to God and accept His 
plan, which in the words of the Shaykh will provide the follower with comfort in 
the face of affliction.190 From a Bergerian perspective, such surrender to God and 
to the Shaykh, and the goal of reaching fanā’ in the Shaykh, Prophet, and finally, 
God, can be seen as an example of the mystical ‘religious attitude in which man 
seeks union with the sacred forces or beings’ which aims to solve the theodicy as 
a strategy for ‘world-maintenance’.191 Berger points out that the attitude of self-
transcendence ‘brought about by complete identification with the collectivity’ is 
                                                  
190 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 14-10-2013, p.5-6. 
191 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 46–56. 
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extra strong in societies that are tied together through kinship bonds and the 
belief in the ‘ontological continuity between the generations’.192 In the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, the bond between the current and previous followers is 
experienced as a strong familial bond and does implicitly encourage this 
transcendence into the collectivity. Explicitly, however, the focus is on the 
Shaykh and on transcendence into him and through him into God. Even if 
followers have not yet reached this union, by cultivating maḥabba and taslīm they 
are taught and trained to see and love God in everything, which Berger points out 
is part of the process of solving the theodicy.193 Not only does this attitude of 
taslīm therefore strengthen the position of the Shaykh, it strengthens the position 
of the entire community and the beliefs and practices they share. 
Through the process of tarbiya, in which ideas and practices are 
transmitted and ādāb are cultivated, social actors are created that function both 
within the ṭarīqa and in wider society. The desire to participate in and be 
accepted by society at large is especially clear in the ṭarīqa’s attitude to the 
sharia – they stress their adherence to it, but the concrete interpretation of the 
sharia depends on society at large and actual codes of behaviour are negotiated 
in the community by referring both to social understandings of sharia and ‛aqīda. 
The central pillar of the ṭarīqa, maḥabba, leads them to become a strong 
community, to see God in everything, see the Shaykh’s signs in everything, and 
to adhere to the rules of the sharia. It thus strengthens their community and 
positions it securely in the historical narrative of the Islamic Sufi tradition, and 
does not take them into the realm of love as a universal mystical force that 
transcends particular religions and their law systems. They do not adhere to any 
‘new spiritual’ narratives with their focus on perennial truths and universal 
mysticism. While they love everyone as God’s creatures, they define themselves 
as explicitly Muslim. 
While I have gained a good theoretical understanding of the underlying 
logic and dynamics of education and discussion among the followers in Amman 
                                                  
192 Ibid., 51–55. 
193 Ibid., 46–56. 
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mainly due to the conditions in which I was allowed to conduct my fieldwork, 
these same conditions have prevented me from gaining a more thorough 
understanding of the actual dynamic in the daily life of the followers in Amman. 
A discussion of the relationship between the Shaykh and his followers 
would not be complete without referring to the space where this relationship 
takes place, and its location in society. As Lincoln puts it, authority is enacted on 
a stage (see chapter 1).194 Therefore, we need to discuss the stage on which the 
communication between Shaykh and follower and the education of the followers 
takes place. It is to the stage in Amman that we will now turn. 
                                                  
194 Lincoln, Authority, 143–144. 
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Chapter 7 
The Zāwiya in Amman 
 
 
This chapter discusses the question on which stage the Shaykh’s authority is 
enacted, in other words: where does the relationship between Shaykh and 
follower take place? This relationship can be seen as a communication, both 
spiritual and physical, which happens through practice in the community. This 
brings us to question how the stage where it happens affects this communication. 
 
 
7.1 The Meaning of the Zāwiya 
 
The exercise of authority is an act of communication. When seeking to locate the 
‘stage of authority’, we should therefore keep in mind that the communication 
between the Shaykh and his followers happens in two realms, the material and 
the spiritual, the ẓāhir and the bāṭin. The main space in which the followers meet 
the Shaykh is the zāwiya. The followers envisage the spiritual inner realm – the 
bāṭin – in which the spiritual communication with their Shaykh takes place as 
zāwiyat al-qalb, the zāwiya of the heart.1 This is where the true relation with their 
Shaykh occurs, this is where the Shaykh fulfils his function as murabbī and 
murshid, and this is where his authority is enacted. This is why they feel that their 
main concern is not with the outer world but with the inner hidden realm. 
 But as we have seen, this relationship has to be developed through 
tarbiya, spiritual practice and ethical behaviour (ādāb) in the material realm. This 
happens in the social context within the family, the community – and also the 
zāwiya near the Eighth Circle in Amman. It is a central place for the tarbiya of the 
community and the main worldly stage of authority for the followers in Amman 
and Zarqa. From 1960 to 1980 the meetings and rituals of the ṭarīqa were held in 
                                                  
1 AM3-5 in Interview AM3. 
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the residence of Sīdī Ahmad in al-Weibdeh and in the houses of two followers. 
Between 1980 and 2005 the zāwiya was near the Fourth Circle, and in 2005 the 
new zāwiya near the Eighth Circle was inaugurated – the old zāwiya is now 
Shaykh Ahmad’s house. 
The children are raised by giving the good example, and the zāwiya is 
seen as a place which brings together many role models, both the Shaykh and 
other followers. This is also where they hear the teachings of the Shaykh in the 
form of the weekly mudhākara, where they go to meet and discuss during 
monthly study meetings, and where they practice the collective rituals. The 
zāwiya strengthens their attitudes towards the Shaykh, their beliefs and their 
community feeling: 
 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā is the muwajjih and the murshid and the mu‛allim and the ustādh 
and the murabbī, both in religion and in my normal life. This opinion is not 
because someone told me, no – because for thirty years I am educated in the 
zāwiya. I always go to the zāwiya, and I see, I see Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā and I see the 
zāwiya, I see what he says and I feel Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā, he is the one who gives me, 
he leads you directly to the good, in everything. Whether in approaching (iqbāl) 
God, or in dealing with people, or even when dealing with yourself. This is why I 
do not see it in any different way. (...) Everything he says to me is right. This is 
why I am holding on to Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā, and the ṭarīqa, and my brothers and sisters, 
they who are ikhwānnā. 2 
 
For many the importance of the zāwiya is that it brings them all together. 
‘After a hard work day, we go to the zāwiya, to clarify our mind, to get rest. When 
I pray, when I see my Shaykh, when I see my brothers and sisters, I get 
relaxation after a hard working day.’3 Visiting the zāwiya adds to the community 
feeling and by meeting each other in the flesh and by talking and practicing 
together both the worldly and the spiritual connections are strengthened.4  
                                                  
2 AM1-3 in Interview AM2. 
3 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
4 AM2-1 in Interview AM2, AM3-4 in Interview AM3, ZA1-1 in Interview ZA1. 
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 For the followers in Zarqa the opportunity to meet other ikhwānnā is even 
more important. They have a muqaddam and they have their own meetings on 
Sunday during which they read waẓīfa, but on Thursday evening and for 
important celebrations they go to the zāwiya in Amman when they have the 
opportunity and the economic means. For important occasions they often rent a 
bus to enable as many people as possible to attend.5 
The zāwiya in Amman is the geographical centre of the ṭarīqa. Followers 
from all over the world visit and can be hosted there. One of the activities of the 
ṭarīqa is the establishment of zawāya in places where this is needed by 
ikhwānnā. The Shaykh visits the zawāya in Lebanon regularly (and used to visit 
the zawāya in Syria as well before the civil war). Shaykh Ahmad also mentions 
an exchange of delegations with the African countries in which his followers live 
‘to learn about the spiritual conditions and provide them with advice and 
guidance.’ This happened in 1960, 1980 and 2007.6 It is also the place where the 
ṭarīqa reaches out to society as a ṭarīqa. Active followers (both men and women) 
are recruited into a Welcome Committee who help out in the zāwiya, host 
visitors, show people around, etc.7 All these functions are summarized by a 
follower: 
 
The zāwiya is a place of ‛ibāda in which the believers come together, ikhwānnā, 
Muslims. (...) In this assembly we get to know each other. (…) Sometimes 
visitors will come from abroad. (…) Sometimes Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā invites some of the 
men of the state or for dinner, or for iftār (meal to break the fast) during 
Ramadan. We get to know these people who come to this event. We hear a new 
speech (kalām), sometimes we hear a speech on taṣawwuf and we benefit from 
                                                  
5 ZA1-1 in Interview ZA1. 
6 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 14-10-2013, p.16. 
7 After my first meeting with Shaykh Ahmad and Dr. Ali, I met most of the Welcome Committee 
during my second visit to the zāwiya when they officially welcomed me and we all sat together in 
the diwān before the ḥaḍra on 28-03-2013. I received more information during an informal 
discussion with AM2-6 after the ḥaḍra on 10-10-13, and observed the Welcome Commitee at 
work again during the ḥaḍra on 31-10-2013. 
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these issues. The zāwiya is the cause (sabab) for all of this. It is a meeting (liqā’), 
meaning gathering (ijtimā‛), coming closer (ta’āluf), intimacy (ulfa), maḥabba.8 
 
Some followers are attached to the zāwiya because they saw it being built, 
they were present for the opening, they worked in it – in other words, they are 
part of it.9 But most followers stress that ‘the stones are not important;’ the 
presence of Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā makes the zāwiya important.10 That which connects 
you to the Shaykh, practice, ‛ibāda, dhikr, ṣalāa etc., can be done anywhere and 
any place can receive its share of holiness in this way. ‘That which connects us is 
the Shaykh, not the stones or the place.’11 To stress this point a follower stresses 
that the zāwiya near the Fourth Circle in itself meant nothing: ‘As a building its 
holiness [came] from the existence of the Shaykh.’ ‘When Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā built the 
new zāwiya in Amman we deserted that one. (…) The important thing is that we 
build the zāwiya in our hearts.’12 
 
‘The earth and the heaven cannot contain me but the heart of my believing 
worshipper contains me.’13 The true zāwiya is inside us. Not in a place. We are 
all tied to the light and the faith. But we are like other people, the places and the 
histories, they have something, not like the other places. It is the only connection 
(hadha rābiṭ al-waḥīd). But the basic tie is the ‛aqīda… and the Shaykh.14 
 
We ikhwānnā love the centre of the ‛aqīda, wherever Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā is or goes and 
wherever ikhwānnā are, we love this centre. The centre of the ‛aqīda was in Acre 
and that is for us now something spiritual, we love it in spirit. But the zāwiya in 
Amman, because Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā is the centre of the ‛aqīda and he is in this zāwiya 
                                                  
8 AM2-1 in Interview AM2. 
9 AM3-7 in Interview AM3. 
10 AM1-1 in Interview AM1 and AM3. 
11 AM3-3 in Interview AM3. 
12 AM1-1 in Interview AM1 and in Interview AM3. 
13 This is a ḥadīth qudsī, mentioned by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali in Iḥyā Ulūm al-Dīn. Vincent 
Cornell, Voices of Islam (Westport CT: Praeger Publishers, 2007), 27, 47 note 33. 
14 AM3-1 in Interview AM3. 
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– we love the zāwiya, but we love it and we hold on to it because the the centre 
of the ‛aqīda is Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā.15 
 
 It is clear that the official line of the community is that ‘the stones are not 
important,’ the Shaykh is the centre of the ṭarīqa and one develops the 
relationship with the Shaykh in the heart, and is therefore not tied to any one 
place. The communal functions that the zāwiya performs can be done anywhere, 
and while the memories of past events and spaces are treasured, they are not as 
important as the living relationships between the Shaykh and the community. 
This line of thought prioritizes the relationships in the spiritual realm and makes 
the material world of secondary importance, including the spatial manifestations 
of these spiritual relationships. 
 The attitude towards the zawāya was subject of heavy debate, however. 
The answers of other people showed that they valued the actual geographical 
spaces just as much as the spiritual places. Their answers were centred on the 
communal role of the zāwiya and on the memories that are attached to these 
places, suggesting that they are not abandoned emotionally as easily as other 
speakers might suggest.16 Regarding the zāwiya in Acre, they continue to feel 
attached to it because of its historical role, and due to the continued presence of 
the previous three Shaykhs there.17 While in theory one can connect to the 
Shaykh anywhere and be part of ikhwānnā anywhere through spiritual and social 
ties and practices, in effect the zāwiya in Amman plays a large role in connecting 
people. While any place could potentially be a holy place where the connection 
with the Shaykh is sought, in reality there is only one place in Amman where this 
happens with such a high level of intensity. 
 The zāwiya’s designation as ‘sacred space’18 is therefore mainly due to 
the presence of the Shaykh as the personal symbolic centre, rather than a 
                                                  
15 AM1-3 in Interview AM4. 
16 These answers were in general given by those who did not speak extensively during the 
interviews and their answers were contested by those who had spoken more – often people 
higher in the ‘interview hierarchy’ who were concerned to give the official line of thought. 
17 For an extensive discussion of the role of the zāwiya in Acre, see chapter 11. 
18 See Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, 20–65; Brereton, ‘Sacred Space.’ 
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geographical connection to the sacred or to history, and also due to its communal 
function. 
 
 
7.2 Activities in the Zāwiya 
 
After entering the entrance hall of the zāwiya one crosses the hall to enter the 
prayer room for the men. It is a high spacious circular hall with a glass roof, 
decorated with carpets and a beautiful chandelier. There are some plastic chairs 
against the walls for those who cannot sit on the floor. At the front of the hall 
there are two larger seats for Shaykh Ahmad and Sīdī Ali. Half of the prayer hall 
has a lower ceiling – this is the semi-circular balcony of the women which is 
accessible from the first floor. This prayer balcony is flanked by an additional 
gallery on the second floor overlooking the women’s balcony. The women can 
watch what happens downstairs in the men’s hall on television screens. 
 On the ground floor are the offices of the Shaykh and the dīwān, a large 
room where guests are received. On the first floor are the library and a nursery 
for the youngest children. On the second floor is the ‘control room’ from which the 
technological support for the meetings is coordinated and where the 
broadcasting of these meetings over the internet is done. 
 
 
7.2.1 Daily and Weekly Meetings – Ḥaḍra 
 
Each day one can join the daily rituals – the five prayers and the reading of 
waẓīfa twice a day. On Friday afternoon followers can go to the Friday prayer in 
the zāwiya. The khuṭba is done by one of the followers according to a schedule. 
But the most important weekly meeting is the meeting on Thursday evening 
during which the followers perform the ḥaḍra and listen to the mudhākara of the 
Shaykh. 
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Men meet in the large circular hall downstairs and women on the semi-
circular hall above where they can see what happens downstairs on television 
screens. The men wait for the Shaykh in the prayer hall, forming lines on both 
sides of the doors. The meeting starts with the call to prayer and the ṣalāat al-
‛ishā. The muezzin and the imam are followers who perform these functions 
according to a schedule. Young boys are also given the opportunity to be 
muezzin and sometimes even imam – this is considered part of their tarbiya.19 
The Shaykh and his son sit on their chairs amongst the followers, on the first row 
in the centre.  
After the ṣalāa, Shaykh Ahmad and Sīdī Ali move their chairs to the back 
of the room to face the followers. They read Qur’an and recite waẓīfa, which 
moves smoothly into ḥaḍra at the end of the waẓīfa. During the ḥaḍra the male 
followers stand in several circles holding hands with the Shaykh in the middle. He 
directs the ḥaḍra through hand gestures and slight body movements while slowly 
turning to look around the circle. After some amount of time he sits down and Sīdī 
Ali takes over. After a while he also sits down and someone else takes over – his 
son Sīdī Hadi (if he is present) and the muqaddamīn. The women do ḥaḍra in 
lines holding hands, facing the television screens. This way they make best use 
of the available space, they can see the dhikr downstairs, and they prevent 
themselves from turning their back on the Shaykh.20 After the ḥaḍra a verse of 
Qur’an is recited followed by du’ā and silent dhikr. 
Next is the mudhākara, during which Shaykh Ahmad explains a part of the 
waẓīfa in minute detail. This part is shown on a large board in the men’s hall (and 
is shown on the television screens during the silent dhikr which precedes the 
mudhākara). Shaykh Ahmad started to explain the waẓīfa in this way when he 
came to Amman in 1960 and is reaching the end of the third cycle of 
explanations. Sometimes he spends weeks speaking about one word.21 
                                                  
19 ZA1-1 in Interview ZA1. 
20 Informal discussion with AM1-3 and AM2-6 in the zāwiya in Amman on 06-04-2013. 
21 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 14-10-2013. During my fieldwork in October and 
November 2013, he spent several weeks speaking about the word ‘qul (speak)’ in Surat al-Ikhlas 
112:1, waẓīfa p.17. 
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The mudhākara goes very deep and does not shy away from difficult 
theological issues, often using contemporary scientific news to enlighten these 
complex issues. The first mudhākara I witnessed focussed on the phrase ‘rabb 
hādhā al-bayt’22 and on the link of the Shaykh with God. Because it is a Qur’anic 
verse which is part of the waẓīfa, the followers are already deeply acquainted 
with the phrase, and through the mudhākara their understanding of the phrase is 
deepened. A follower explains that Shaykh Ahmad said there is one Lord and 
one house – which is often explained as the ka‛ba, but for them it also refers to 
the ka‛ba in your heart. A second theme was how the Shaykh is tied to the 
Prophet and the Prophet to God: Muhammad received the ‛aqīda from God 
during the mi‛rāj, and as the Shaykh is tied to Muhammad he is the only one who 
has the entire ‛aqīda inside him. She commented that the idea that their ‛aqīda 
comes from God made her feel comfortable and happy.23  
Because the Shaykh’s authority is so closely connected to the concept of 
the ‛aqīda, it is not surprising that elements on which his authority is based are 
discussed during this mudhākara: his tie to the Prophet, his knowledge of the 
‛aqīda, and the idea of the spiritual and material realm where one connects to 
God (symbolized by the ka‛ba). The follower’s emotional reaction to this shows 
that for her it serves as a confirmation of her beliefs and experiences. This 
confirmation is strengthened by sharing the experience with others in the zāwiya 
and discussing the Shaykh’s words with others throughout the week, as they are 
encouraged to do. These concepts are part of the tools with which followers can 
discuss their experiences; an example of this is given by another follower in an 
interview a few weeks later, when she explains the concept taslīm by referring to 
God as ‘rabb al-bayt’ (see paragraph 6.3.5).24 
                                                  
22 Sūrat Quraysh 106:3, waẓīfa p.16. 
23 Informal discussion with AM1-3 in the zāwiya in Amman after the ḥaḍra on 28-03-2013. 
24 AM2-3 in Interview AM2. 
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The meeting is concluded with nashīd, ḥadra mugharbiyya25 and 
communal announcements, for example of births, engagements, weddings, 
graduations, for which the Shaykh says du‛ā’.26 
 
 
7.2.2. Special Occasions – Mawlid al-Nabī 
 
Also on special occasions such as Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr27 the zāwiya 
functions as a mosque, as people perform the special prayers and meetings that 
are done throughout the Muslim world. But the main event in the year of the 
ṭarīqa – the event for which many followers from all over the world travel to 
Amman – is the mawlid al-nabī.28 
As with a normal meeting, the men wait in the prayer hall forming lines on 
both sides of the doors. When Shaykh Ahmad, Sīdī Ali and Sīdī Hadi come in 
they all take their places in lines for prayer. Shaykh Ahmad, Sīdī Ali and Sīdī Hadi 
sit down on chairs in front of them, facing the same direction. To their right 
stands the choir of ca. 18 men and boys wearing white garments who perform 
the call to prayer. One of the muqaddamīn of Amman walks forward, kisses the 
hands of Shaykh Ahmad, Sīdī Ali and Sīdī Hadi and takes his place next to the 
choir where he performs his function as imam to lead the ṣalaā. 
 When the ṣalaā is finished the choir moves back to its position and 
Shaykh Ahmad, Sīdī Ali and Sīdī Hadi move to the opposite wall of the hall and 
                                                  
25 Ḥaḍra mugharbiyya is a ḥaḍra from the maghrib (North Africa), a ritual in the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya which is usually performed at the end of a meeting. While most people continue to sit 
on the ground and sing nashīd, a few men move in a circle. 
26 Informal discussion with AM2-6 in the zāwiya in Amman after the ḥaḍra on 11-04-2013. 
27 During Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr, the followers come together for ṣalāat al-fajr, followed by 
reading the waẓīfa. Later in the morning there is the special ṣalāat al-‛īd with a khuṭba done by 
one of the followers, followed by waẓīfa and ḥaḍra, after which they meet to drink coffee and tea 
and eat sweets. In addition to the standard Islamic meaning of Eid al-Adha, for them the occasion 
is also about the togetherness of the followers around the Shaykh, their ‘spiritual ka‛ba.’ By 
performing dhikr one can be together with those in Mecca and participate in the ḥajj even if one is 
not there. This does not mean they do not value the ḥajj – on the contrary, they were careful to 
stress how important all pillars of Islam are for them, including the ḥajj if they are able. Informal 
discussion with Shaykh Ahmad, AM1-1, AM1-3 and AM2-2 in in the zāwiya in Amman before the 
ḥaḍra on 17-10-2013. 
28 The following description of the mawlid al-nabī is based on the DVD of the mawlid in the zāwiya 
in Amman in 2013, which Shaykh Ahmad has been kind enough to give me. 
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the men form a circle including them. Sīdī Ali starts the reciting of the waẓīfa. 
They finish with a few repetitions of ‘lā illāha ilā Allāh,’ until Sīdī Ali claps. There is 
a short silence after which the lead chanter recites Qur’an. They finish by all 
reciting the fātiḥa29 silently. 
 The mawlid is recited by the lead chanter (parts 1-3 and 6), interspersed 
with nashīd by the choir and the community. Sweets are handed around. At the 
final sentence they get up while one can hear the women ululate from the 
balcony. They chant nashīd while moving into the circle to do ḥaḍra. The ḥaḍra is 
mainly directed by Shaykh Ahmad and Sīdī Ali, but Sīdī Hadi also directs the final 
minutes. After the ḥaḍra, everyone sits back down while chanting nashīd. After 
reciting Qur’an and praying du‛ā’, the Shaykh gives his mudhākara. After the 
mudhākara two people come forwards and address Shaykh Ahmad, Sīdī Ali and 
Sīdī Hadi with qaṣīdas, and the younger members of the choir chant one of the 
more well-known anashīd. 
 
 
7.2.3 Study Groups – Ijtimā’ al-Nisā’ (Women’s Meeting) 
 
There are many activities in the zāwiya which aim to provide the means to take 
the murīd by the hand on their spiritual path.30 The importance of education 
(tathqīf wa-ta‛līm) for the followers is institutionalized through the spiritual and 
financial support they can find in the zāwiya.31 Examples of this are given by a 
follower who benefited from the library of the zāwiya and who also received 
financial support to study and travel for his research, and said other people 
benefited from this as well.32 The zāwiya also publishes books related to the 
ṭarīqa. First of all of course the old books of the ṭarīqa, especially those of Sittī 
                                                  
29 First sūra (chapter) of the Qur’an, which is recited regularly as praise to God and a prayer for 
guidance and mercy. 
30 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 14-10-2013, p.13-15. 
31 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 14-10-2013, p.16. 
32 AM2-2 in Interview AM2. 
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Fatima, but also the Master’s and Doctoral theses written by followers.33 The 
Shaykh takes great care in editing these books. 
 There are study groups where young people read Qur’an and learn 
nashīd. 34 Once a month there is a meeting for the women in which they read 
waẓīfa and Qur’an, practice nashīd, and discuss a topic relevant to the ṭarīqa and 
their daily lives. The meeting takes place in the semi-circular women’s prayer hall 
on the first floor. I visited these meetings twice, and at both I would give a rough 
estimation of 80 participants. The ladies sit in a circle on chairs and on the floor. 
The teenage girls sit together as they in particular are the ones who are 
considered to be learning, but it is also acknowledged that all of them learn from 
each other all the time. Many brought their children who are surprisingly well-
behaved. The smaller children are brought to the children’s room where they are 
cared for and where the television screens expose them to what is happening. 
The mothers are encouraged to bring their children to these meetings. 
The meeting is recorded and broadcast via the internet to other women of 
the ṭarīqa, together with the text of the meeting. Shaykh Ahmad and his son 
sometimes sit in the control room to see part of the meeting. 
Before the meeting starts they practice nashīd. Often one person starts a 
nashīd and the rest joins in. The teenage girls have papers in front of them with 
the lyrics, the older ladies know them by heart. The meeting starts with the 
reading of the waẓīfa, led by one of the ladies. After this they listen to verses of 
the Qur’an and chant nashīd. One of the ladies says du‛ā’. This is followed by a 
few minutes of silent dhikr, after which the discussion of the topic starts. 
 The meeting is led by one of the ladies who is ‘responsible for khawātnā.’ 
She works closely together with the Shaykh in the preparation of the topic for 
discussion. The choice of topic can be influenced by many factors; sometimes 
she chooses it based on suggestions from the ladies and from the Shaykh, or 
she is inspired by a verse from the Qur’an. The preparation takes a lot of time, 
                                                  
33 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 14-10-2013, p.16 
34 Informal discussion with AM1-3 in the zāwiya in Amman on 06-04-2013. 
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often the whole month. After writing a first draft the Shaykh edits it and sends it 
back – this continues until the text is considered perfect.  
The topic is known in advance by the women so they can prepare. AM2-2 
calls this ‘interactive learning’: they share, they are involved, sometimes in 
groups, sometimes using games.35 The text is handed out during the meeting 
where it is read aloud. After the reading of the text khawātnā can comment or ask 
questions. A microphone is handed round for those who want to talk. Throughout 
the meeting there are numerous references to the Qur’an and to the Shaykh, 
either the writings about Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din, or to Shaykh Ahmad. For 
example, when discussing the seating arrangements, it is pointed out that it is 
min faḍl Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā that they have this space to meet. 
 For several months the women explored topics related to the tarbiya of 
their children and of each other, something which is of direct relevance to their 
tasks of raising their children.36 The meeting in March 2013 is about sulūk during 
the meetings of the ṭarīqa, because ‘behaviour is a practical interpretation and 
active application of that which we reached of dhawqiyyāt, and understanding 
(fahm), and ‛aqīda.’ The murīda has to ‘adapt her appearance to the appropriate 
attitude to undertake the ‛ibāda’, i.e. dress appropriately and behave politely, as 
is written in Sūrat al-A‛rāf 7:31. In the words of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din in Nafaḥāt 
al-Ḥaqq: ‘al-ṭarīqa kullhā ādāb’ as the ṭarīqa is in accordance with the 
Muhammadan ādāb.’ This means cleanliness, modesty and ‘balance in speaking 
and moving.’37 The murīda has to wear ‘modest’ (wide and non-revealing) 
clothing that covers chest, arms and legs, and cover her hair (for which a loose 
scarf suffices). The murīda has to be on time, turn off her phone, sit down in a 
calm manner without disturbing others, and make sure her children do not disturb 
others. She has to listen properly, participate, and respect the opinions of others 
and let them finish their thoughts before interrupting.38 
                                                  
35 Informal discussion with AM1-3 in the zāwiya in Amman on 06-04-2013. 
36 Informal discussion with AM1-3 before Interview ZA1. 
37 Study text discussed at the women’s meeting on 30-03-2013, p.1. Reference to al-Yashrutiyya, 
Nafaḥāt al-Ḥaqq, 57. 
38 Study text discussed at the women’s meeting on 30-03-2013, p.2 
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It is stressed several times that the ladies should maintain the same 
behaviour outside the zāwiya. ‘The arrival of the murīdāt at the noble zāwiya is a 
social appearance (maẓhar ijtimā‛ī) well known with the zāwiya’s surroundings, 
and it reflects the outward image (sūra ẓāhiriyya) of the murīdāt.’39 After the 
meeting they should practice the ādāb they discussed, starting when they leave 
the zāwiya: ‘take care of our external appearance while leaving the zāwiya, so 
that we stay modest as we entered’ and take care not to disturb the neighbours. 
‘And it is known that these behaviours which the murīdāt of the ṭarīqa take on 
develop their positive image, and they are suited to maintain this.’40 
The understanding of the followers is that the good values that are in the 
heart should show, and the good behaviour shown in the zāwiya and among 
ikhwānnā should also be shown outside because exterior behaviour reflects your 
inner thoughts, and it also reflects on the group to which you belong. In addition 
to this the current climate in which Sufis are increasingly under scrutiny for their 
behaviour makes it extra important from a social perspective to show their proper 
behaviour – especially around the zāwiya where every individual will be identified 
as a member of the ṭarīqa and where their attitude to their holy place and place of 
gathering will be scrutinized even more. 
This idea of educating each other also comes back in the discussion: ‘We 
are a group, we complete each other.’ The importance to respect your elders and 
take their advice is stressed. One of the teenage girls says: ‘It is not just your 
father and mother who raise you, we raise ourselves, and then we raise each 
other.’ Both before and after the meeting the ladies should endeavour to spread 
the benefit of the meeting to as many followers as possible. Murīdāt should 
remind each other of the meeting and encourage each other to go. They are 
encouraged to take the lesson home with them to think about it and discuss with 
other family members, combining what they have learnt with their daily life. It is 
                                                  
39 Study text discussed at the women’s meeting on 30-03-2013, p.1 
40 Study text discussed at the women’s meeting on 30-03-2013, p.3 
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pointed out that the ṭarīqa encourages mothers to bring their children to the 
meeting, provided that they do not disturb others.41 
The meeting in November 2013 focussed on the importance of ‛ilm in the 
ṭarīqa and for the first time is prepared by another lady. She quotes from the 
Qur’an and Hadith to show the importance of ‛ilm in Islam in general, and 
continues to show that the Shaykhs in the ṭarīqa have given it great importance 
as well, as the ṭarīqa is based on the Qur’an and Sunna. She quotes from 
Shaykh Ahmad’s introduction to the third edition of Riḥla ilā Al-Ḥaqq (1990): 
‘Taṣawwuf is ‛ilm and fikr and philosophy, and opinion (ra’y) and ijtihād, within the 
boundaries of what God decided for his worshippers, of life and organisation and 
happiness.’42 She also quotes a story in Nafaḥāt al-Ḥaqq in which Shaykh Ali Nur 
al-Din convinces a scholar to stay in his profession until his death. Finally, she 
stresses that fikr is one of the pillars of the ṭarīqa.43 
The Shaykh’s focus on fikr and education can be seen in the monthly 
women’s meetings, both in the preparation and organisation of the meetings and 
in the topics that are discussed. As many followers who are involved in these 
meetings work in the field of education, they have an excellent background to 
organise the meetings using modern education techniques which call for active 
involvement of the participants of these meetings and to encourage them to 
actively participate. They say that the women are encouraged to decide the 
topics, to do their own research in advance and to prepare assignments. The 
lady who is in charge of these meetings is very proud of the advance the women 
are making, especially when one of khawātnā had prepared a topic of discussion. 
Shaykh Ahmad encourages this as he wants them to study, be part of society 
and focus on fikr, while remaining ibnat al-‛aqīda.44  
While the followers are encouraged to study and explore and are free to 
question and discuss their ideas, it is clear that for those in the ṭarīqa the Shaykh 
                                                  
41 Study text discussed at the women’s meeting on 30-03-2013, p.2-3 
42 Study text discussed at the women’s meeting on 30-11-13., p.2. She leaves out the words 
ma‛rifa and niẓām which can be found in the original quote. She mistakenly refers to Nafaḥāt al-
Ḥaqq, p.19; the quote can be found in Shaykh Ahmad’s introduction to the third edition (1990) of 
al-Yashrutiyya, Riḥla ilā al-Ḥaqq, 21.  
43 Study text discussed at the women’s meeting on 30-11-13.  
44 Informal discussion with AM1-3 in the zāwiya before the ḥaḍra on 28-11-2013. 
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is and remains the ultimate reference. In the case of these women’s meetings, 
the Shaykh is intimately engaged in the preparation of the meeting. He gives 
suggestions for topics, and helps to prepare the topic of discussion. He might 
also watch part of the meeting on the computer screens of the control room. 
While encouraging them to learn and think for themselves, the Shaykh is firmly in 
control over what is being taught to the women in the zāwiya – and in their 
opinion rightly so as they consider him the ultimate reference who wants to 
ensure that they get the right knowledge. His preoccupation with their education 
is seen as another sign of how much he cares for them. His encouragement for 
them to learn and explore for themselves is seen as a mark of his respect for 
their individuality – a mark of modernity. His concern that they will get it right in 
the end is seen as a sign of his love for them. 
Shaykh Ahmad takes an interest in everything that happens in the zāwiya. 
The lady who is responsible for the women’s meeting invited me and several 
other followers (also from the Welcome Committee) to discuss some of my 
questions based on the meeting I had attended. I had sent her my questions in 
advance and she was well prepared – she had written the answers down and 
started to read them to me. Half way through Shaykh Ahmad and Sīdī Ali walked 
in, and Shaykh Ahmad announced: ‘I have invited myself.’ He asked what we 
were discussing – which happened to be the ‛aqīda – and he started to answer 
my question and explain the nature of the ‛aqīda of the Yashrutiyya. Some of 
those present started to take notes. After finishing his explanation he took the 
sheet of questions, went through them one by one and told those present what 
the correct answers were, to make sure I got the right information. After this he 
also offered to go through my thesis when it was done to make sure I wrote 
everything down correctly.45 
 Shaykh Ahmad takes great care in editing the texts of the women’s 
meeting, research done by followers on the ṭarīqa and the books that are 
published by the ṭarīqa. He is known for his meticulous editing. This is valued by 
                                                  
45 Semi-informal meeting with Shaykh Ahmad, Dr. Ali, and five followers in the zāwiya in Amman 
on 06-04-2013 
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the followers as they are convinced he is the ultimate source and reference. This 
care to ensure the right information gets out extends to the work done by external 
writers. For example Hassan Abu Hanieh – who wrote his short description of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya without consulting Shaykh Ahmad – was invited by the 
Shaykh and told his work did not reflect the ṭarīqa properly. A similar story was 
told to me by the followers about Josef van Ess.46  
The combination of the particular code of guesthood in the community in 
Amman and the concern to get the right message across has most probably 
influenced their attitude towards me during my fieldwork. As I discussed in 
chapter 2, I think it is the anthropological researcher’s duty to respect these 
codes of guesthood, even if this means that one gains less information. In this 
sense, the control over knowledge that the Shaykh has within the ṭarīqa extends 
to outsiders, as it limits and steers the access to knowledge the researcher has. 
In the case of the editing of publications written by outsiders, the Shaykh’s 
control of course does not extend to outsiders. Ethical academic practice does 
require the scholar to respect his/her respondents’ wishes to see what is written 
about them, and to enter into a dialogue with them, without giving them the final 
say over the produced work. As I discussed in chapter 2, where I felt their 
comments provided an addition or a clarification I referred to them, but where I 
felt limited by their comments in my representation of the diversity within the 
ṭarīqa and in my analysis I have noted their concerns without changing my 
approach, adhering to to Chryssides’ idea that believers are the experts in 
representing themselves, whereas scholars are the experts in the subsequent 
contextualisation and analysis of these representations.47  
                                                  
46 Informal discussion in the zāwiya on 28-03-2013, AM2-2 in Interview AM2. In the words of the 
Review Panel: ‘Generally speaking, external independent writers do not usually consult Sheikh 
Ahmad regarding what they write about the Ṭarīqa, such as Hassan Abu Hanieh and Josef Van 
Ess. But if what they write is not coherent with the reality of the Ṭarīqa, then Sheikh Ahmad calls 
the writer and draws his/her attention to where he went wrong and what is the truth. Usually these 
writers show good understanding of the views of the Sheikh.’ Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments 
and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 31. 
47 Chryssides and Geaves, The Study of Religion, 92–94. For a more thorough discussion of this 
issue, see paragraph 2.4. 
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While the encouragement of followers to study and think and the particular 
mode of communication between Shaykh and follower both lead to a lot of space 
for personal interpretation mediated by the community to keep them within the 
boundaries of the tradition, we have seen that these boundaries can become 
blurred. In the zāwiya in Amman, the Shaykh is very present and in control of the 
information that is disseminated and discussed and presented to outsiders, 
strengthening the boundaries. Those followers who are close to him and are 
entrusted with the education of other followers and with the welcoming of guests, 
assist him in this. Therefore, through the zāwiya the potential space for personal 
interpretation in a particular social context is more limited than our exploration of 
the dynamic of communication in the previous chapter would suggest as the 
boundaries of the Shaykh’s teaching are continuously affirmed. This does not 
cause a clash, however, as the zāwiya is not an isolated space, but located in 
that same social context – or at least, one aspect of it – and has to engage in the 
local rules of the game.  
While we have seen in the previous chapter that there is a lot of space for 
individual and communal interpretation due to the (from an outsider’s point of 
view) indirect mode of communication, in this chapter we see how the central role 
occupied by the zāwiya in Amman gives the Shaykh more influence over this act 
of interpretation than might be concluded from the previous chapter. 
 
 
7.3 The Zāwiya in Society 
 
Shaykh Ahmad writes that the external activities are aimed to connect abnā al-
ṭarīqa to their societies and thus help them on their path. The ṭarīqa encourages 
the followers to participate in society and in economic pursuits, provided that they 
do so in accordance with the sharia, that the spiritual aspect takes precedence 
over the material aspect and that the followers maintain the ‛aqīda in their 
hearts.48  
                                                  
48 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 14-10-2013, p.15. 
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To link to society as a ṭarīqa they participate in public events in the King 
Abdullah Mosque during Ramadan and for Ra’s al-Sana. During Ramadan they 
invite people of different backgrounds to the zāwiya for ifṭār (breaking the fast) to 
share food and opinions, strengthening the bonds of relations between different 
components of society. They regularly invite outsiders to the zāwiya to give a 
lecture: religious scholars, university professors, researchers, etc.49 
The key to their social stance is the ideal to participate in society while 
remaining politically independent. In Amman specifically, independence is 
maintained by registering the zāwiya as private property (mulk khāṣṣ) in the 
name of the Shaykh. The property will be passed on to the next Shaykh. This 
way it will remain for abnā al-ṭarīqa and the ṭarīqa can remain independent.50 
More generally, they stress they do not receive any outside funding but are self-
sufficient. This is a rule that should be followed by all ikhwānnā and zawāya all 
over the world. 
 
We are like a beehive. Every member helps, offers something. Every individual 
helps each other, gives each other advice. (…) The rich help the poor, or the rich 
help to build the zāwiya, we do not follow any other organisation. We refuse to 
accept help from any other side. (…) Because if you want to accept from any 
other side you will become slaves for them. (…) We concentrate on the spiritual 
life, we do not enter politics. But it is asked from all abnā al-ṭarīqa to be good 
(ṣāliḥ) citizens of the country in which they are. A good citizen, a good person, 
but we do not go into politics, we do not accept any help from any state or any 
other side, we are self-sufficient.51 
                                                  
49 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti 14-10-2013, p.15. Among the guests were ‘Dr. Abu 
Wafa Taftazani, shaykh al-mashāyikh of the Sufi ṭuruq in Egypt at the time, the former president 
of Sudan Muhammad Suwar al-Dhahab, the Sudanese leader Imam Ahmad Abd al-Rahman al-
Mahdi, Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali, the Arab writer Fahmi Huwaydi, and many others.’ 
Interview with Shaykh Ahmad, al-Urdun, 26-02-1996, p.8-9. 
50 Informal discussion with AM1-1 in the zāwiya before the ḥaḍra on 21-11-2013. There are two 
other options to register a religious building in Jordan: as waqf, which means it is managed and 
controlled by the Ministry of Religious Affairs who can appoint preachers etc., or as an 
organisation (jama‛a), which means it is managed and controlled by the Ministry of Interior who 
can always require the presence of one of their people to keep an eye on what is happening. 
51 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. This opinion is also expressed by NA1 in Interview NA1 with one 
follower in Nablus (and ca.20 followers present) on 23-05-2013 at the house of a follower after 
the waẓīfa, hereafter referred to as Interview NA1. 
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AM1-2’s idea that the Shaykh possesses holiness is turned into a social 
direction by AM1-1, who says that the Shaykh makes all his followers into good 
human beings and good citizens, and that this is why he is seen as holy (see 
paragraph 5.4 Interview AM1). In this view good ethics relate not only to 
ikhwānnā but to the whole of society. Also, the teaching of being a good Muslim 
on the one hand happens in the family, among ikhwānnā and in the zāwiya, and 
on the other hand in society – implied is that to behave well with non-ikhwānnā 
members in society also means to adapt to the ethics of society while 
maintaining their essential values,52 a point we discussed extensively in the 
context of their attitude to the sharia (see paragraph 6.3.1): they base their 
adherence on the sharia on the hegemonic interpretation of the society in which 
they find themselves. 
While they do not participate in what is commonly understood to be 
politics (state policy and party politics) as a social organisation and a community 
within a certain country they participate in politics in a wider sense. We have 
seen how ‘Muslim politics’ should be understood as the struggle over the right to 
interpret sacred scripture and define ethical behaviour, and how this is 
particularly relevant in contemporary Jordanian politics. As we have seen, to 
understand these politics fully we would do well to go beyond the rivalries of 
religious leaders and include an analysis of the followers and of the relationship 
between leader and follower. This is why Abu Hanieh’s discussion of the political 
role of Sufism in Jordan, which is based mainly on interviews with Shaykhs, does 
not give us a real insight into the role of contemporary Sufism in Jordan. 
While abnā al-ṭarīqa of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya accept and love 
everybody as children of God, the continual stress that they are moderate does 
put them in line with those who oppose ‘radical’ strands of Islam – the ulamā’ and 
the king. The fact that they accept traditional Islamic books and Jordanian 
schools as places to find ethical knowledge is an even stronger indication that 
they accept the official traditional Islam in Jordan as championed by the king. 
                                                  
52 AM1-1 in Interview AM1. 
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The remark that the Shaykh teaches the people to be ‘a good person, a good 
citizen’ fits with this interpretation of their particular place on the spectrum of 
Jordanian Islam. This is also underlined by the participation of the ṭarīqa in public 
religious events. It should be stressed that they do not participate in any of the 
king’s efforts to define Islam such as the Amman Message and the establishment 
of a Sufi Council. Be that as it may, no matter how hard they try to maintain their 
independence – by registering the zāwiya as private property for example, to 
avoid outside interference – for a community living in a certain society – and who 
explicitly want to be a part of this age and society – it is unavoidable to 
participate in politics in a wider sense. 
 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
Shaykh Ahmad’s main stage of authority is the zāwiya in Amman. This is where 
he receives his visitors, acts as teacher (murabbī) and role model (qudwa), leads 
the ḥaḍra, and teaches through his mudhākara. While tarbiya happens in the 
community, the zāwiya centralizes this by providing the focus of the community in 
Amman. The building gives them a tangible centre for their communal life, 
providing stability and thus adding greatly to the ṭarīqa’s institutionalisation, while 
at the same time creating the need for institutionalisation to maintain the building 
and everything that is going on there, leading to a level of bureaucratic 
organisation that is not visible in other communities. While this might lead to 
lessening of this authority, he stays firmly in control of everything that is 
happening in the zāwiya, and everyone refers to him. Similarly, the zāwiya adds 
to the Shaykh’s ability to connect to his disciples through visits and lectures, and 
to perform some of the functions on which his charisma rests, such as providing 
them with educational opportunities – through mudhākara and study groups, 
through the library, and through the funds that are available for those who wish to 
study. 
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The Shaykh is perceived to be the ultimate reference by all followers, but 
in the zāwiya he especially acts as ‘custodian of tradition’, assisted by several 
involved followers. We have seen that while all follower believe the Shaykh is 
always right, the boundaries of the limits within which the tradition could be 
constructed and interpreted can be blurred through the process of tarbiya. He 
supervises the process of tarbiya that happens in the zāwiya by guiding the study 
groups and editing the ṭarīqa’s publications. Through the supervision of the 
Shaykh over this process in the zāwiya, they are reaffirmed and strengthened. 
The zāwiya thus greatly enhances the Shaykh’s authority over the local 
community and over ikhwānnā visiting from abroad. 
The meaning of the zāwiya for the followers is disputed. The original 
doctrine is that ‘the stones are not important’ but that all the importance of the 
zāwiya comes from the Shaykh. Indeed, the main focus of ikhwānnā is on the 
living Shaykh and their charismatic relationship with him, and the previous 
Shaykhs and the geographical places in which the charismatic moment was 
experienced come second. This is not to say that they therefore hold no 
importance at all, and just as people profess their love, respect and devotion to 
the previous Shaykhs, they value the places in which these relationships were 
enacted. The zāwiya therefore classifies as a ‘sacred space’ primarily because of 
its communal function, bringing the community together to perform devotional 
practices and tarbiya, but secondly due to the charismatic moments experienced 
there due to the presence of the Shaykh, and the memories of these moments 
that have become part of the vernacular tradition. 
The zāwiya is also the place where the relationship to the wider society 
and to its political system is most pronounced. The independence of the ṭarīqa is 
ensured by registering the zāwiya as private property, ensuring the absence of 
outside interference, but as a religious group that explicitly aims to be part of 
society and have good relations with everybody, there is more to their socio-
political attitude than that. By encouraging attitudes that value participation in 
society and by defining particular codes of behaviour in interaction with 
understandings of Islam and sharia held onto in wider society and presenting 
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these as normative codes, the ṭarīqa produces authority and discipline and social 
actors – ‘good people and good citizens’. Their stress that they are ‘moderate’ 
and their acceptance of traditional sources of Islamic law and education shows 
that they participate in the historical narrative of traditional orthodox Islam as 
promoted by the king. This is further illustrated by their participation in public 
religious events, also sponsored by the king. It should be stressed that they do 
not participate in any of the king’s efforts to define Islam such as the Amman 
Message and the establishment of a Sufi Council and thus do not participate in 
politics in its narrow sense, but when we take the wider sense as suggested by 
Lincoln, Eickelman and Piscatori, and Mahmood and Mandaville, we can say that 
by creating social actors they do participate in politics in a wider sense, and can 
be classified as a ‘religion of the status quo’.53  
Shaykh Ahmad’s locational authority – his place in the wider arena of 
Jordanian Muslim Politics – therefore places him in the discourse of the 
traditional Islam of the ‛ulamā’ as promoted by the king. While his followers see 
this is yet another sign of his importance, his influence over Jordanian Muslim 
Politics does not seem to exceed his influence over his own followers and their 
behaviour. He acts as a role model for their own role in society. Both his prestige 
and his encouragement of their participation – to be ‘good people and good 
citizens’ – are seen as a mark of this sanctity.  
 This socio-political attitude correlates with the fact that the people I spoke 
to were all from the middle- and higher classes and most of them worked in 
education or were business-owners, and none of them lived in the refugee 
camps. Among those groups of Jordanian Palestinians, Palestinian nationalism is 
often less acute and less channelled into ideas and activities opposing the 
government, which is nowadays mainly done by Islamist and Salafi groups (see 
chapter 4). There is a clear correlation between their social class, their 
occupations, and the values of the ṭarīqa, which encourage the followers to be 
active participants in society and pursue their education. In fact, many of them 
                                                  
53 Lincoln, ‘Notes towards a Theory of Religion and Revolution’; Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim 
Politics, 1–4. Mahmood and Mandaville, quoted in Stjernholm, ‘A Translocal Sufi Movement’, 84. 
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work in education and use their knowledge in the study meetings of the ṭarīqa. 
Without a stronger historical analysis, it is impossible to say whether the Shaykh 
and the values of the ṭarīqa have led people out of the refugee camps and into 
those higher social classes, or whether the followers’ social classes and 
occupations have influenced the values of the ṭarīqa and the roles attributed to 
the Shaykh. This would be an interesting avenue of further research to further 
our understanding of the relation between the Shaykh and his followers. 
The attempts to make the ‛aqīda relevant in society and to make it speak 
to people’s everyday life in society does not lead to O’Dea’s ‘dilemma of 
delimitation’,54 but the result is a strengthening rather than a lessening of 
charisma. The followers’ attitude to see the Shaykh’s signs in all aspects of life 
relates to this – for them, it brings the sacred into everyday reality and thus 
integrates the different levels of experience. 
                                                  
54 O’Dea, ‘Sociological Dilemmas’, 82–84. 
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Conclusion to Part II 
The Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Amman 
 
 
As discussed in chapter 1, Sufism can be understood as a discursive framework 
which is built up of different elements that are in a continuous process of being 
transmitted and reinterpreted, which is (usually) part of the Islamic tradition, and 
which evolves around the relationship between Shaykh and follower. Therefore 
the question may be asked what the relationship is between Shaykh Ahmad and 
his followers. On which elements is his authority based and what does he mean 
to his followers in Amman? Which roles are attributed to him?  
Shaykh Ahmad is the fourth Shaykh of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya. The 
founder of the ṭarīqa, Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din, came from the Shadhuli tradition and 
established the ṭarīqa in Palestine. The ṭarīqa’s silsila traces his spiritual authority 
all the way back to the Prophet, but he is also seen as a charismatic figure who 
embodied the nūr muḥammadī and the ‛aqīda and renewed the ṭarīqa, and he is 
thus seen as the founder. He passed the ṭarīqa to his son and the shaykhdom 
has passed to the ‘most able son’ since.  
Weber saw the routinization of charisma as a move from the raw 
disruptive power of primary charisma to weak secondary charisma that maintains 
the status quo.1 This approach has been questioned by several scholars,2 and in 
chapter 5 we have seen that there was no clear distinction between charisma 
and traditional institutionalisation in the charismatic moment of Shaykh Ali Nur al-
Din, as he continued to act in the Sufi tradition, and as he himself already started 
the institutionalisation process by proselytizing and building zawāya. As our 
analysis of the bases of authority of Shaykh Ahmad shows, the routinization of 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s charisma and the institutionalisation of the position of the 
                                                  
1 Weber, The Sociology of Religion, quoted in Sedgwick, Saints and Sons, 1. 
2 Geaves, ‘Charismatic Authority in Islam’, 42, 58; Berger and Luckmann, The Social 
Construction of Reality, 77–79; O’Dea, ‘Sociological Dilemmas’; Klinkhammer, ‘Traditionalizing 
Spirituality’; Pinto, ‘Performing Baraka.’ 
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Shaykh on traditional kinship lines, does not mean that the charisma is lessened 
at all. 
The elements of authority on which Shaykh Ahmad’s legitimacy is based 
are doctrinal, functional, communal, and emotional. On a doctrinal level he is 
seen as the embodiment of the ‛aqīda and the nūr muḥammadī, on a functional 
level he is seen as a caring guide and teacher, and the followers experience their 
relationship as highly spiritual and emotional, ‘a relationship between hearts’, on 
which they base their engagement with the Shaykh’s teachings. 
The Shaykh’s legitimacy therefore rests on both traditional and 
charismatic elements as he is seen as the person who transmits the ‛aqīda and 
at the same time is the ‛aqīda. The Shaykh has received the ‛aqīda, the 
inheritance of Muhammad, through his predecessors who go all the way back to 
the Prophet Muhammad. This silsila is mentioned in the waẓīfa and the books of 
Fatima al-Yashrutiyya and is respected, but all the attention goes to the four 
Shaykhs of the Yashruti family. The Muhammadan inheritance is transmitted 
through Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din, Shaykh Ibrahim, Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi, and 
Shaykh Ahmad, and because of this connection to the nūr muḥammadī they are 
considered one and the same. Shaykh Ahmad embodies the ‛aqīda and the nūr 
muḥammadī and walks the Muhammadan Path, behaving as Muhammad would 
have done had he been alive in this time. He is therefore a manifestation of the 
light and of the essence of Islam – God and the Prophet – in the contemporary 
world. The followers believe they can participate in this light to a lesser degree by 
connecting to the Shaykh through their hearts. In this sense the Shaykh’s 
authority is charismatic. 
Comparing these findings with the elements of authority Arthur Buehler 
identified, we see that his authority is primarily based on his link to the Prophet, 
both in a traditional and a charismatic sense of transmission via lineage and a 
direct connection. This is where he gets his knowledge from. He is also the 
embodiment of the Sunna and functions as Prophetic exemplar (qudwa). By 
following his example and teachings in everyday life one can be part of his 
spiritual state, the ‘transformative spiritual experience.’ His authority is therefore 
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rooted very strongly in the larger Islamic tradition, the ‘Sufi template for 
sainthood’.3  
During my interviews and observations the predominant image I got was 
that the followers in Amman see the Shaykh as a teacher and a guide. Due to the 
nature of my interactions with the followers in Amman – group interviews and 
informal discussions in the zāwiya and in their homes, also mostly in a group 
setting – it is difficult to conclude whether this is indeed the predominant attitude. 
The people of the Welcoming Committee articulated this image very strongly, 
and sometimes steered other peoples’ answers in this direction. Most of them 
actually worked in the field of education, which might have influenced their 
imagery. This also meant they were articulate and used to public speaking, which 
gave them a distinct advantage in a group interview to make their views heard. 
 Other voices which were less articulate and expressed strong emotional 
statements such as ‘the Shaykh is everything in my life’ were accepted but often 
‘explained’ in terms that the more eloquent speakers had set earlier in the 
interview. In informal discussions the idea and feeling that the Shaykh is like a 
father to them was sometimes expressed, but never articulated during an 
interview. This leads me to assume that there might be more to say about the 
attitudes that the followers have towards the Shaykh than I was able to identify in 
this particular research setting. 
 On the other hand, as we have seen, these strongly regulated interactions 
seem to be common practice in the community in Amman, particularly in the 
zāwiya. Several times a follower told me that our meeting was like a mudhākara. 
While I do not think these meetings truly reflect a mudhākara as they were built 
around the questions that I posed as an outsider and the concern for me to ‘get it 
right’, I do think they reflect a general mechanism of communal meetings in 
which the information that is spread and interpreted among the followers is 
moderated. Without access to more intimate spheres of social interaction such as 
family life it is impossible to gauge to what extent these interactions are 
                                                  
3 Lindholm, ‘Introduction’, 24. 
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moderated and how deeply this influences the spread and interpretation of 
knowledge and elements of tradition. 
 During meetings in the zāwiya this was even more the case, as the 
Shaykh was there in person to monitor meetings if he so wished. During the 
women’s meeting the Shaykh often sits in the ‘control room’ to oversee the 
meeting. The ladies in the hall do not see him but know he might be there and 
feel his presence in the building. As the followers believe that the Shaykh has all 
the knowledge and is the ultimate reference, this is not experienced as limiting 
but as an expression of the Shaykh’s care for them and for their development. It 
is part of his role as a teacher and guide (and to a lesser extent father) and is 
based on the fact that he embodies the ‛aqīda and the nūr muḥammadī, the 
Muhammadan light. 
 The strong regulation of interpretation and behaviour seems to be linked 
to the challenges of the changing religious climate in Jordan and the Middle East 
in general, as intolerance is being fuelled by socio-economic hardship and 
political struggles. The followers respect the centuries of Islamic learning 
institutionalised by the ulamā’ as the ṭarīqa directs its followers to books, schools, 
and teachers for education on more general Islamic principles. It values the 
family and society and ‘culture’ as channels of transmission of general Islamic 
values. In Jordan the king claims to be the champion of this traditional Islam 
based on his lineage and position as ‘protector of the holy sites’ and the ṭarīqa 
silently accepts this by joining public religious ceremonies held by the king and 
by inviting men of the state to the zāwiya during Ramadan. The value of being a 
good citizen that is cultivated by the ṭarīqa adds to this support of the status quo. 
 The Shaykh is clearly very aware of the image of the ṭarīqa in the outside 
world. All publications mentioning the ṭarīqa are read and challenged if 
necessary. The stress on the followers’ proper Muslim behaviour and on their 
participation in society – but not in politics – was the main message that was 
communicated to me. This has probably influenced my access to the ṭarīqa. The 
values of hospitality and the existent mechanisms of mediating the spread and 
interpretation of knowledge and the formation of elements of tradition were useful 
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tools to moderate the message that reached me, while at the same time allowing 
me a glimpse into the communal interactions within the ṭarīqa.  
Understanding authority as a relationship, the next sub-questions are how 
these roles are attributed to the Shaykh and how does he exercise them? 
Following Bruce Lincoln who understands authority as a speech act, we focus on 
the communication between Shaykh and follower in which authoritative 
statements are given by the Shaykh to the follower. The followers’ questions and 
the Shaykh’s teachings are given in a concrete speech act – a concrete question 
or answer, or the Shaykh’s mudhākara – or in a spiritual communication from 
heart to heart. The followers explicitly state that they need to develop their 
spiritual relationship with the Shaykh in order to receive these teachings and take 
part in his light. The etic approach to authority as a relationship and speech act 
corresponds to the emic understanding. The general approach in Sufi studies 
that focuses on the relationship between Shaykh and disciple as the central 
element of a Sufi movement is clearly relevant in this case.4  
The followers develop this relationship with the Shaykh in the community, 
by teaching each other and by practising together. Their concept of tarbiya can 
be explained by referring to Berger and Luckmann’s discussion of ‘socialisation’ 
as followers internalize the symbolic universe of the ṭarīqa and thus maintain its 
social structure. An essential aspect of this is the internalization of ‘roles’ through 
which society is experienced as objectively real, and the internalization of 
relationships between different roles as the only possible ones.5 The followers 
are raised in the family and the community to develop the right attitudes to love 
the Shaykh and ikhwānnā, to accept the teachings of the ṭarīqa, and to accept 
the Shaykh’s authority. When they have internalized the doctrine that the next 
Shaykh is always the son of the Shaykh, neither Shaykh nor followers can think 
of any alternative situation as ‘the murīd has his sulūk and the Shaykh has his 
                                                  
4 Howell and Van Bruinessen, ‘Sufism and the “Modern” in Islam’, 16–17; Chih, ‘What Is a Sufi 
Order?’; Stjernholm, ‘What is the Naqshbandi-Haqqani Tariqa?’; Ernst, ‘Sufism, Islam and 
Globalization’; Green, Sufism, 9. 
5 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 33–34. 
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sulūk.’6 Most of the followers who join the ṭarīqa later in life develop these 
attitudes through their association with other followers in a secondary 
socialisation process in which significant others introduce them and mediate the 
new world for them. Berger points to the importance of the community in the 
continuing socialisation process and the followers themselves point to the 
importance of discussing and interpreting together and encouraging each other 
to practice and study: ‘the individual appropriates the world in conversation with 
others and, furthermore, (…) both identity and world remain real to him only as 
long as he can continue the conversation.’7 Therefore, while the Shaykh is seen 
as a caring guide and teacher, in practice it is mainly the community who enacts 
these roles. 
The importance of ritual has been discussed by Berger and Luckmann as 
it reminds people of the charismatic moment and their tradition8 – O’Dea points 
out that it in fact not only represents the original religious experience but re-
enacts it, and elicits emotions and attitudes.9 Collective dhikr specifically recalls 
such moments and strengthens the relationship between the follower and his/her 
Shaykh, who continues to embody the divine message, and between the 
followers themselves as they share these experiences. Through the followers’ 
mudhākara they transmit the discursive aspects of the tradition and interpret old 
and new elements of this tradition. Pinto has pointed out that collective rituals 
and study groups encourage egalitarian communities and heterogeneous spread 
of knowledge,10 and this seems to be confirmed by this case study as there is 
indeed a heterogeneous spread of knowledge that focuses on the official 
narrative and the ‛aqīda. The ṭarīqa’s explicit teaching of maḥabba for all and the 
egalitarian structure based on this is thus maintained through ritual and 
discussion, dhikr and fikr.  
                                                  
6 ZA1-3 in Interview ZA1. 
7 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 18. 
8 Ibid., 36–37. 
9 O’Dea, The Sociology of Religion, 39–41. 
10 Pinto, ‘The Anthropologist and the Initiated’, 465–468; Pinto, ‘Creativity and Stability in the 
Making of Sufi Tradition’, 125–127; Pinto, ‘Knowledge and Miracles.’ 
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This egalitarian structure is further maintained due to the absence of 
individualised initiation – after the mubāya‛a the followers’ commitment deepens 
but their devotional practices and interaction in the community remains the same. 
Tarbiya is thus a process that starts from the earliest moments and does not start 
at the moment of initiation (as Pinto found in his case studies in Aleppo11). There 
does not seem to be a clear conceptual framework of aḥwāl and maqāmāt that 
could encourage hierarchization, but there is a general idea of progress on the 
path and the need to show this spiritual progress through correct behaviour, 
adherence to sharia and the pillars of the ṭarīqa, and the performance of good 
ādāb. Through this an informal hierarchy can be established, but the only explicit 
hierarchy in the ṭarīqa is the distinction between Shaykh and follower, as it is 
believed that the follower can never reach the level of the Shaykh. 
This analysis of tarbiya and the role of the community in world 
maintenance leads to the question what the role is of the community in world 
maintenance and construction,12 or as Lincoln would put it, the role of the 
audience in the production of authoritative speech and the management of its 
content.13 Sedgwick, for example, noted that this was the only constant he found 
in his analysis.14 This is a question that has been asked in the context of 
contemporary Sufi studies as well, as in many Sufi movements a shift towards 
greater autonomy of the members is taking place.15 Stjernholm, for example, has 
argued that the followers of the Naqshbandiyya-Haqqaniyya play an important 
role in the preparing of publications etc, and even describes an occasion where 
they showed explicit disagreement with and silenced one of their leaders at a 
public event16 – a literal example of Lincoln’s argument that the audience has to 
provide a stage for the leader to engage in authoritative speech acts.17 This level 
                                                  
11 Pinto, ‘The Anthropologist and the Initiated’, 464–465. 
12 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. 
13 Lincoln, Authority, 1–4, 11, 168. 
14 Sedgwick, Saints and Sons, 1–4. 
15 Howell and Van Bruinessen, ‘Sufism and the “Modern” in Islam’, 5, 10–11; Hoffman, Sufism, 
Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 358–359, 422. 
16 Stjernholm, ‘A Translocal Sufi Movement’, 91–93; Stjernholm, ‘What is the Naqshbandi-
Haqqani Tariqa?’, 210. 
17 Lincoln, Authority, 1–4, 11, 168. 
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of autonomy can certainly not be found among the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in 
Amman, where the Shaykh is involved in the editing of all the publications and in 
all the transmission processes. The concept of taslīm is pretty straightforward 
and when one adheres to the basic doctrine that the Shaykh is the embodiment 
of the ‛aqīda and the nūr muḥammadī, there is no way around it, but through the 
subtle process of mudhākara and the interpretation of signs from the Shaykh, 
there is more autonomy than would appear at first sight. Fikr is a concept with a 
wide range of meanings and associated practices, some of which are more in 
line with taslīm than others. Ta’ammul, meditative contemplation, for example, 
need not clash with taslīm at all. Rational study and critical thinking might have a 
more challenging effect, as can be seen from the example of AM2-2 who was 
plagued by doubts because of his philosophy studies. He was greatly helped by 
his peers in the ṭarīqa to overcome this, which can be explained in sociological 
terms by referring to this as a successful socialisation process in which doubts 
have been incorporated in the system and in which the disciple is strongly 
connected intellectually and emotionally to the symbolic universe and its main 
representative, the Shaykh. At this level of commitment to the symbolic universe, 
disagreement becomes increasingly unlikely – in Sufi terms, this would be called 
fanā’. Here, taslīm in the sense of absolute submission to and acceptance of the 
will of God acts as a theodicy that incorporates all marginal situations in the 
overarching symbolic universe.18 
There is another way in which such a realization of the potential paradox 
between fikr – in the sense of critical thinking - and taslīm can be resolved. The 
Shaykh hardly ever communicates directly, but usually communicates in signs – 
ishārāt. The concept ishāra has a wide range of meaning in the ṭarīqa. It can 
refer to the classical Sufi meaning of the allusive language which attempts to 
express the ineffable which can only be interpreted when the hearer can access 
the same experiences,19 but it can also refer to signs in the everyday reality that 
similarly need to be interpreted. The distinction of these signs, the attribution of 
                                                  
18 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 46–56. 
19 Nwyia, ‘Is̲h̲āra’; Poonawala, ‘Taʾwīl’; Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, 28–35; 
Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 249; Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, 7–15. See paragraph 6.4. 
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meaning, and the subsequent interpretation are first done by the individual and 
then in the community, where they are incorporated in the tradition and 
interpreted based on the interaction between community and society, ‛aqīda and 
social understandings of Islam and sharia. This is especially clear in the practice 
of istikhāra, which in many other contexts is practiced by spiritual specialists and 
thus is an important base of authority for Sufi shaykhs and other Islamic 
leaders,20 but in this ṭarīqa is practised entirely by the followers. Through this 
process there is quite a large space for the community to interpret the Shaykh’s 
teachings and traditional elements within their social situations, and quite a large 
measure of autonomy, that is managed however through the process of tarbiya 
to not stray too far from the ṭarīqa ’s values. As such the followers do engage in 
world construction as much as they participate in world maintenance, in 
Bergerian terms.  
Our final concern – again following Lincoln – is the ‘stage of authority.’ 
Where does the relationship take place, where is authority enacted? While the 
official doctrine seems to be that ‘the stones are not important’ and that the 
relationship mainly occurs in the ‘zāwiya of the heart’, there are also clear voices 
that the zāwiya is important for them as a place of gathering and a place of 
memories and continuing ‘states’. The zāwiya in Amman is a place where they 
can have direct physical interactions with the Shaykh, listen to his words and see 
his behaviour, and where they experience how much care he has for their 
education. It is a sacred space21 as it allows them to connect to the personal 
symbolic centre of the ṭarīqa and because of its communal function. 
When understanding the ṭarīqa as a discursive tradition, we see the 
zāwiya is the place where the transmission of tradition is regulated most strongly 
as the Shaykh oversees everything that happens there, welcoming people, 
joining meetings, and meticulously editing books and study material. Several 
followers who are close to him participate in this regulating function – together 
with the Shaykh they regulate the dissemination of the teachings and could be 
                                                  
20 Edgar and Henig, ‘Istikhara.’ 
21 Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, 20–65; Brereton, ‘Sacred Space.’ 
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seen as the ‘custodians of tradition’ (see chapter 1). Because of the followers’ 
understanding of doctrine – especially the tenet that ‘the Shaykh is always right’ 
– and the feeling that the Shaykh cares for them, this regulation is not 
experienced as confining, but as enlightening. 
Where does the ṭarīqa fit in the Jordanian arena of Muslim Politics with its 
fragmented authority?22 Based on our analysis of the role of the sharia in the 
ṭarīqa, and the activities that happen in the zāwiya to reach out to wider society, 
we can say that while the ṭarīqa does not participate in explicit political actions, its 
relations to the realm of traditional Islam as promoted by the king shows it should 
be classified as a religious movement of the status quo through the practice of 
‘engaged distance’.23 The focus on guidance and character formation leads to 
the inculcation of normative frameworks which support the traditional orthodoxy 
and the religious and political hegemony of the king. The Shaykh’s socio-political 
position enhances his charisma in the eyes of his followers’ as he participates in 
society and is respected by other figures of authority, without getting caught up in 
the messy business of politics. Here he acts as a role model for their own role in 
society. Both his prestige and his encouragement of their participation – to be 
‘good people and good citizens’ – are seen as a mark of this sanctity.  
 The ṭarīqa is connected to the discourse of Traditional Islam though its 
connections to the king, and the combination of intellectual engagement, 
practical devotion and ethics and the downplaying of spiritual states also points in 
this direction. Even so, it is predominantly a traditionally organized ṭarīqa centred 
on the Shaykh, and we see little organisational rationalisation .The degree of 
autonomy the followers possess in the development of the vernacular tradition 
does seem high, but remains within limits which are strongly enforced in the 
zāwiya and through the ṭarīqa’s ‘custodians of tradition’ in Amman. The 
adaptation to society and its participation in the general discourse of traditional 
Islam that is done through this process of transmission has probably had some 
influence on the ṭarīqa, but it does not seem to have radically altered its course. 
                                                  
22 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 4–5; Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic 
Activism, 45–48. 
23 Heck, ‘Introduction’, 3–4. See paragraph 1.5.2. 
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All this points to a clear continuation of the original charisma of Shaykh Ali 
Nur al-Din in his successor Shaykh Ahmad, despite the clear institutionalisation 
on kinship lines. None of O’Dea’s dilemmas24 have materialized in the central 
community in Amman. Due to the absence of statistics it is impossible to say 
anything regarding numbers of followers that have remained in the movement or 
that have left, but for those who remain, the ṭarīqa remains very relevant to their 
lives. I have found no indication of mixed motivation (although this of course is 
extremely hard to see and prove by an outsider). Our discussion of the role of the 
ṭarīqa’s ritual and symbolic representations has shown that it supports the 
process of tarbiya in creating emotions and attitudes that bolster the symbolic 
universe and the social structure, including the egalitarian community and the 
authority of the Shaykh. In chapter 3 we concluded that the simple organisation 
in which everything goes back to the Shaykh works efficiently and again 
strengthens the role of the Shaykh. The development of the zāwiya as an active 
religious centre has led to the development of bureaucratic organisation, but due 
to its rootedness in what is already a very tight community and due to the 
absolute control the Shaykh also has over this, it continues to work efficiently. 
Socialisation maintains primary zeal as we have discussed above. Finally, the 
ongoing concretization of the message has not only avoided losing the 
extraordinary element, it has in fact enhanced it as the charismatic can be seen 
to break through in the most mundane moments of everyday reality. 
The theme of spiritual renewal and of keeping the religious message alive 
underlies much of this discussion. Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din came to Palestine as a 
spiritual renewer and his successors have kept this going. It is stressed 
repeatedly that they value the past Shaykhs and the places in which the 
charismatic happened, but the ultimate focus is on the Shaykh who is alive. The 
followers stress that the Shaykh adapts Sufism to this day and age to keep the 
message alive – not only in the sense of ‘surviving’, but mainly in the sense of 
growing and renewing. A thorough historical research will be needed to 
understand exactly how the ṭarīqa developed and which elements were renewed, 
                                                  
24 O’Dea, ‘Sociological Dilemmas.’ 
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but even without that the important point is that the explicit adherence of the 
followers to the notion of renewal is extremely relevant in our understanding of 
the Shaykh’s appeal for them.  
As Berger and Luckmann point out, an institution is only successful if it 
can deal with challenges to its plausibility structure and symbolic universe and 
either isolate or incorporate marginal situations and challenging elements.25 As 
an institution that does not cover the whole of society, and in a religious 
framework that is extremely polarised, such challenges to the ṭarīqa’s symbolic 
universe are manifold, and have to be engaged with in order to continue to speak 
to people. The explicit validation of renewal, and the mode of transmission and 
communication in the ṭarīqa, provide space for this, ensuring that the ṭarīqa 
remains relevant for the followers in negotiating their Sufi identity in wider 
society, and thus strengthen the symbolic universe on which the Shaykh’s role 
depends. This is acknowledged by the Shaykh and followers themselves in so far 
as they say that the ṭarīqa adapts its outer realities to society while staying true to 
its essence.  
Ahmed and Von Oppen also argue for the importance of innovation for the 
maintenance of charisma their study of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in the 
Comoros Islands and in Tanzania.26 It would be interesting to examine the 
relations between these localities to understand better whether this is a 
characteristic that is typical of this ṭarīqa, or can be regarded as a more general 
observation. Werbner’s work in fact points in the same direction, even though 
she draws the opposite conclusion: she notes that waxing of a ṭarīqa can only 
happen when there is a charismatic leader, but it seems equally likely that the 
success of a ṭarīqa bestows charisma on the leader. In fact she herself notes that 
travel and sacralisation of space is an element based on which charisma is 
attributed.27 This sheds severe doubts on Weber’s idea of ‘routinization of 
charisma’ and on theories based on this, like Werbner’s.  
                                                  
25 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 28–55. See paragraph 1.3 
26 Ahmed and Von Oppen, ‘Saba Ishirini’ 
27 Werbner, Pilgrims of Love, 43–47, 73–81; Werbner and Basu, ‘The Embodiment of Charisma’, , 
13. 
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The interplay of what Green calls discursive, miraculous and economic 
power28 leads to the continuity of charisma as it enables adherence to both 
tradition and innovation. As the main ‘custodian of tradition’ the Shaykh exercises 
great influence over the transmission of the tradition, the community’s actions are 
attributed to him as expressions of his spiritual power, and his economic power 
enables him to exercise those functions expected of him – the caring teacher 
who connects them to each other and society and who takes care of their 
spiritual and worldly education. 
 
  
                                                  
28 Green, Sufism, 6–7. 
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Part III 
 
THE SHADHULIYYA-YASHRUTIYYA IN ACRE AND JAFFA
 402
 403
Chapter 8  
Palestinians and Islam in Israel 
 
 
In the previous chapters, we have seen how the relationship between the Shaykh 
and the followers is constituted in Amman, the centre of the ṭarīqa. We will now 
turn to those communities that remained in what became the state of Israel in 
1948, isolated at first but increasingly able to reconnect to their Shaykh in 
Amman and to other followers in the Arab world. In this chapter, the context will 
be sketched in which their relationship with the Shaykh and with each other 
should be understood, first by discussing the situation of the Palestinian citizens 
of Israel, then by looking at the place different Islamic trends have taken in 
society, and then by zooming in to have a closer look at the history of Acre and 
Jaffa since 1948. The chapter will finish with an overview of the development of 
the communities in Acre and Jaffa, which will serve as a framework to 
understand discussions in later chapters. 
 
 
8.1 Palestinians in Israel 
 
After 1948, 150,000 Palestinians remained in what had become the new state of 
Israel, many of them internally displaced.1 The government continued to expel 
people and expropriate their lands for several years after 1948. The Palestinians 
were put under Military Rule based on the mandatory Emergency Regulations, 
which severely limited their movement. The Palestinians staying in the towns 
(both the original townspeople and refugees from the surrounding villages) were 
forced to live in ghettos until 1950. These measures affected their job 
opportunities, social relations and limited their space for political organisation.2 
                                                  
1 Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians, 39; Kimmerling and Migdal, The Palestinian People, 171. 
2 Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians, 18–19, 46–53. 
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The property of those classified as ‘absentees’ was confiscated.3 The 
Custodian of Absentee Property (hereafter: Custodian) had the power to decide 
who classified as ‘absentee’ and this decision was irrevocable. The Custodian 
transferred many of the properties it managed to the Development Authority, 
which had been established specifically for this purpose and was only allowed to 
sell to the state, local authorities or the Jewish National Fund (JNF), which had 
first choice. As the JNF exclusively serves the Jewish community, this meant that 
most properties were transferred irrevocably from the Palestinian to the Jewish 
population.4 As the Custodian was not the owner but the manager of these 
properties, it was questionable whether these transfers were legal. They were 
legalized retro-actively by the 1953 Land Acquisition (Validation of Act and 
Compensation) Law, which called for compensation at the rate of the value in 
1950.5  
Most of the Palestinian elite, including most religious officials, had fled, 
and the traditional institutions on which they had built their position – such as the 
Islamic institutions – were either dismantled or reorganized under strict 
government control, giving them little legitimacy within the Muslim community. In 
this context the family became an important unit of social organisation and 
identity and – as local party politics became tied to families – a political unit as 
well. Heads of villages (mukhtars) and tribes (shaykhs) and other ‘moderates’ or 
‘good Arabs’ were co-opted to function as intermediaries, in return for which they 
were given jobs and leased land. ‘Moderate’ Arab politicians were incorporated 
into satellite lists to Zionist parties. Some operated as informers. This 
                                                  
3 Definition of ‘absentee’ in the Absentee Property Law of 1950:  
‘Any person who was a citizen of the Land of Israel, and left his ordinary place of residence in the 
Land of Israel at any time between 29 November 1948 and the day on which it is announced that 
the State of Emergency declared by the Provisional Council of State is abrogated, shall be 
regarded as an ‘absentee’ if he left the country (during the above period) to: 
a) a place outside the Land of Israel before 1 September 1948, or 
b) a place inside the Land of Israel at that time occupied by forces that wished to prevent the 
establishment of the State of Israel or fought against it after its establishment.’ Quoted in Sabri 
Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, 1948-1966, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969), 59. 
4 Dumper, Islam and Israel, 32–33. 
5 Reiter, ‘The Waqf in Israel’, 108. 
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cooperation came either because of threats or from opportunism or conviction as 
some saw Israel as a democracy and choose to work within the political system.6 
The discussion of the nature of the state is at the heart of the discussion of 
the positions of its minorities. Israeli social scientists analysed the Palestinians’ 
position as a backward minority that would ‘develop’ by living in a democratic 
Western society, in their eyes comparable to the position of migrants in Europe. 
Since the 1990s this approach has been challenged by scholars who understand 
the state to be an ethnocracy, such as As’ad Ghanem: 
 
Israel relies on two policy elements in its dealings with its Arab citizens – a 
maximum ethnic component and a limited democratic one. The ethnic policy 
emphasizes the superiority of the Jews in all spheres. The democratic policy 
incorporates the Arabs to a limited extent and produces an erroneous sense of 
normal development, even among members of the minority group, when in fact it 
exacerbates the distressing situation in which they find themselves.7 
 
 According to Ghanem the Israeli government was driven by three often 
conflicting impulses: Jewish-Zionist considerations, security considerations, and 
democratic-liberal considerations. During Military Rule the first two impulses 
reigned supreme and Palestinians and their institutions (municipal, educational, 
social and religious) were held under close supervision and control to prevent 
subversive activities and cross-border connections. They were subjected to 
restrictions on movement and expression and made economically dependent on 
the government and the Jewish majority. School curricula gave no attention to 
Arab language, culture and history, and the Palestinians could not relate to the 
‘dominant symbols and values of the state and its institutions’. In addition to this 
the government adopted a divide-and-rule policy based on ethnic, religious and 
kinship lines to prevent Arab or Palestinian nationalist feelings. Because of the 
ensuing economic and social hardship, people were less inclined to participate in 
                                                  
6 Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians, 34, 41–42, 60–67, 124–125; Asʻad Ghanem, The 
Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 1948-2000: A Political Study (Albany NY: State University of 
New York Press, 2001), 20–21. 
7 Ghanem, The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 9. 
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political activity.8 Even so, the Communist Party – the only non-Zionist party in 
the Knesset with both Jewish and Palestinian members – was popular amongst 
the Palestinian community as its Marxist discourse enabled them to call for self-
determination and civic equality without directly referring to Palestinian 
nationalism, but the movement remained elitist and male-dominated.9 There were 
also a few attempts to organize on nationalist lines, such as in the Arab Popular 
Front and the al-Ard Movement.10 
After the abolition of Military Rule in 1966 the Palestinians continued to be 
controlled through a system of discriminatory policies, in addition to which the 
Emergency Regulations could still be called upon to deal with Palestinian dissent 
or to enforce Judaization policies. As Ilan Pappé puts it: ‘In general the legislation 
had the appearance of guarding the rights of the Palestinians in Israel, but it 
formed a matrix of power that contained the Palestinians within glass walls.’11 
The Palestinians were economically marginalized and exploited as cheap labour, 
excluded from economic power which was in the hands of cartels and 
monopolies managed by state institutions, the Jewish Agency or Histadrut, 
leading to ‘a bisected economy on ethnic or national grounds.’12 Individuals could 
sometimes carve out a space to advance themselves economically and socially 
and to participate in wider Israeli society, as long as they did not do this as a 
collective, but limited improvements in their situation still lagged behind the 
Jewish standard of living. Representation in the Knesset did not achieve much 
and local councils were very weak. The clan (hamūla) still played an important 
role in the life of the rural Palestinians as ‘a source of solidarity and stability’, and 
patriarchal values continued as political ideologies were subordinated to the 
interests of the hamūla.13 
Due to the increased connections with Palestinians outside the Green Line 
and the Arab world at large after 1967, the Palestinians in Israel developed a 
                                                  
8 Ibid., 19–25. 
9 Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians, 41, 45, 68–69, 75, 92. 
10 Ibid., 82–87; Ghanem, The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 96–100. 
11 Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians, 97. 
12 Ibid., 94. 
13 Ibid., 105–110, 122–123, 136–137, 156, 246–247. 
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stronger Palestinian identity, albeit a very particular one due to their unique 
circumstances. They had been isolated for twenty years and in addition to 
differences in dialect, cultural exposure and standards of living, they were 
confused when it came to their identity. They began to identify more with the rest 
of the Palestinian people and increasingly called for civic equality (on individual 
and communal levels) and a two-state solution.14 Increasing organization in 
political parties, NGOs, the Islamic Movement and other bodies led to an 
increase in communal self-confidence. Because of this, and because the PLO 
became more powerful, tensions in Israel rose as Palestinians in Israel came to 
be seen as a fifth column, especially during the Intifada. While they showed their 
solidarity with the people of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) through 
aid and demonstrations, the Intifada did not cross over into Israel.15 
When the Palestinian Authority (PA) was established based on the Oslo 
framework the Jewish Israelis increasingly saw the Palestinian citizens of Israel 
as outsiders. In this climate racism became increasingly visible, and more critical 
academics came to see Israel as an ‘ethnocracy’.16 While the state renewed its 
Judaization policies and increased its efforts to fragment the Palestinian 
population geographically and socially,17 some Palestinians challenged these 
efforts by moving into ‘Jewish’ neighbourhoods and towns. As Pappé argues, ‘the 
bi-national reality that unfolded in Israel during the 1980s was stronger than the 
ideology of the state.’18 
While some scholars speak of a ‘Palestinian consensus’ amongst the 
Palestinians in Israel, others show that differences in opinion do exist. As’ad 
Ghanem argues that it is reductionist to classify Palestinian political opinions 
                                                  
14 Ghanem, The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 21. 
15 Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians, 121, 174–175. 
16 Ibid., 140–145, 155–158. 
17 The government confiscated land and demolished houses of Palestinians if they did not have 
the right permits – which were impossible to get. On this land roads were built further bisecting 
Palestinian lands, new neighbourhoods for Jews, and industrial plants which were often toxic. 
The clearest example is that of the Bedouin communities in the Negev who were forced to live in 
reservations and new towns, but other examples abound in the Galilee and urban areas (e.g. the 
expansion of Nazareth Illit and town planning in Jaffa and Ramleh). Ibid., 162–164, 211, 245–
246, 256–259. 
18 Ibid., 160–163. 
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solely according to their relationship to the state, and he includes a broader set of 
criteria such as their key ideological values and how they relate to these broader 
ideologies, their organizational basis, the degree to which they wish to challenge 
the status quo and the methods they choose, and their ‘tone’ (their rhetorical 
style and types of arguments, and the extent to which they use alienating and 
threatening terms). He distinguishes the Israeli-Arab stream, the Communist 
stream, the Nationalist stream and the Islamist stream.19 
The ‘Israeli-Arab’ stream is characterized by their call for civic equality 
within a Zionist framework and organization within the Zionist establishment, 
pragmatism and a conciliatory tone. At first Arab politicians joined Zionist parties 
on satellite lists, but they established their own parties in the 1980s, especially 
Mada/Democratic Arab Party (DAP).20 The Communists are represented by an 
umbrella organization of many Palestinian committees, organisations, local 
authorities and clan heads, the Jabha/Hadash/Democratic Front for Peace and 
Equality (DFPE). They were active on issues such as land confiscation and the 
Judaization of the Galilee, but the Communist stream declined in the mid-
1980s.21 Representing the Nationalist stream were Abna al-Balad in the 1970s, 
the Progressive Movement in the 1980s, and Tajamu’/Balad/National Democratic 
Alliance (NDA) since the 1990s. Initially they were linked to the PLO but they 
became dissatisfied with Arafat after the Oslo Accords as they felt themselves 
excluded, while they saw a clear analogy between the treatment of the 
Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip.22 We shall discuss the 
Islamists at length in paragraph 8.2. 
While Palestinian political activity on the national level had little impact, it 
was much more effective on the municipal level. On this level, political party 
                                                  
19 Ghanem, The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 32–37; Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians, 
10. 
20 Ghanem, The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 39–64. 
21 This happened due to the decline of the Communist bloc, their conservatism, the rise of rival 
parties, and their reliance on the people whose main loyalty was to more parochial units such as 
the clan or village. Ibid., 65–94; Alisa Rubin Peled, Debating Islam in the Jewish State: The 
Development of Policy Toward Islamic Institutions in Israel (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 2001), 129. 
22 Ghanem, The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 95–122. 
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activity was strongly intertwined with family- and clan activity. While under 
military rule the village leaders had played mediating roles, from the 1970s 
onwards they became associated with local political parties.23 The Arab local 
government became the ‘most important channel of socio-political development’ 
as it was ‘the only political nexus in which the Arabs have direct influence.’ In 
1974 the representatives of local councils joined in a committee, and they 
increasingly took a stance on national issues such as land expropriation, 
especially after Land Day, March 30 1976.24 In 1982 this committee developed 
into the Follow-up Committee for Arabs in Israel. Ghanem notes this Follow-Up 
Committee was unelected, riven by political squabbles and dependent on clan-
based and clientalist networks, ‘an assemblage of local leaders and not (…) a 
national leadership’.25 In the 1990s the old clan and religious structures and the 
countrywide political parties and movements were increasingly criticized, and 
young people sought to organize themselves through civil society.26 
Increasingly the Palestinians in Israel came to see themselves as ‘victims 
of Zionism and an integral part of the Palestinian movement,’27 awakening ‘to the 
wider historical and ideological context and explanation for their predicament,’28 
stressing that their situation was just as much a result of Zionist colonialism and 
the nakba as that of Palestinians elsewhere. Academics and activists played key 
roles in this.29 During the First Intifada and after the Oslo Agreements in which 
they became sidelined politically, the Palestinians in Israel felt the need to define 
their stance more clearly. They stressed the collective experience they shared 
with the Palestinians in the OPT: ‘cantonization, fragmentation of social 
                                                  
23 Ibid., 26. 
24 Demonstrations against the expropriation of 20,000 dunams near Carmiel as part of a program 
‘Developing the Galilee’ during which six Palestinians were killed by the army. Ibid., 152; Pappé, 
The Forgotten Palestinians, 129–134. 
25 Ghanem, The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 150; Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians, 10. 
26 Civil society is ‘the organization of citizens in political parties, movements, voluntary 
associations, clubs, and every other sort of voluntary organization that falls between the 
institutionalized organization known as state and government, and the primordial organization 
known as family and clan.’ Ghanem, The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 171. 
27 Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians, 11. 
28 Ibid., 173. 
29 Ibid., 195–196, 208, 249–254. 
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networks, and separation of communities as a result of Israeli policies.’30 During 
the 1990s the nakba began to play a larger role in the Palestinian 
consciousness31 and the continuing land confiscations came to be seen as an 
‘ongoing nakba.’ The internally displaced became more active in the struggle for 
their villages.32 At the same time, the Palestinians in Israel recognized their 
different situation which called for a different strategy, challenging the ethnocratic 
nature of the state and demanding their rights as Israeli citizens. While the 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip focussed on liberation, the 
Palestinians in Israel focussed on achieving equality.33  
Pappé points out that the Palestinians in Jordan face similar issues 
regarding their identity as they also ‘had to navigate between a declarative and a 
behavioural mode of identity depending on context.’ The PA’s focus on the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip and their sidelining of the ‘right of return’ are problematic for 
Palestinians in Israel and in Jordan, whose relation with the Palestinian 
representatives has now become a relation to a foreign country, leading to an 
acute question of identity and belonging as the host states ask them to identify 
with one or the other.34 
 
  
8.2 Islam in Israel 
 
In 1948, the Islamic religious establishment was in shreds and the Palestinians in 
Israel had become culturally, socially and religiously isolated from the other 
Palestinians. Most of the Muslim establishment had fled and the sharia courts 
were closed; mosques and other buildings were damaged, abandoned or 
occupied by refugees.35 The Ministries of Minority Affairs and Religious Affairs 
managed the Muslim affairs on an ad hoc basis by re-establishing the sharia 
                                                  
30 Taraki and Giacaman, ‘Modernity Aborted and Reborn’, xviii–xix. 
31 Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians, 213. In 1998 the first Nakba Day was commemorated. 
32 Issam Aburaiya and Efrat Ben-Ze’ev, ‘“Middle-Ground” Politics and the Re-Palestinization of 
Places in Israel’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 36, no. 4 (2004): 647. 
33 Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians, 113. 
34 Ibid., 116–117. 
35 Dumper, Islam and Israel, 26. 
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courts, paying stipends to mosque personel, and surveying the Muslim holy 
places. These should have been temporary measures but they remained in place 
and gradually the ministries developed laws to regulate and control the Muslim 
institutions.36  
Michael Dumper argues that these measures aimed to continue 
expropriation of Muslim properties and co-optation of the Muslim leadership.37 
Alisa Rubin Peled discusses the debates and struggles between those politicians 
favouring security and control, and politicians with ‘a benevolent approach 
emphasizing cultural autonomy towards the Arab minority,’ and argues that there 
was little interest in developing a clear policy towards the Muslim community at 
the highest level of government, which led to an ad hoc formulation of policies in 
which security concerns were the overriding preoccupations.38 As Charles D. 
Smith points out however, both approaches were part of ‘a divide-and-rule 
approach granting local communal autonomy but denying a sense of broader 
communal identity,’ preventing ‘a collective Muslim identity from emerging by 
controlling its leadership,’ which ultimately satisfied the obsession with security 
shown by the state.39  
   
 
8.2.1 Religious Officials and Islamic Education 
 
All Muslim functionaries, from the qāḍīs (Islamic judges40) to the cleaners in the 
mosques, were appointed by the government. While some Israeli officials wanted 
to give the Muslims a certain level of communal autonomy in their religious 
affairs, most were determined to prevent the rise of an Islamic institution such as 
                                                  
36 Ibid., 35–36. 
37 Dumper, Islam and Israel. 
38 Peled, Debating Islam in the Jewish State, 2, 12–13; Alisa Rubin Peled, ‘The Other Side of 
1948: The Forgotten Benevolence of Bechor Shalom Shitrit and the Ministry of Minority Affairs’, 
Israel Affairs 8, no. 3 (2002): 85. 
39 Charles D. Smith, ‘Debating Islam in the Jewish State: The Development of Policy toward 
Islamic Institutions in Israel (review)’, Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 21, 
no. 3 (2003): 201–3. 
40 In the text, I have used the anglicized plural qāḍīs rather than the Arabic quḍāa. 
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the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC). Already in 1948 the sharia courts in 
Nazareth and Acre were re-opened, headed by two government-appointed 
qāḍīs.41 The main Muslim leader in this period was Taher al-Tabari, who had 
been qāḍī in Tiberias since 1924 and a member of the SMC, and had become a 
refugee in Nazareth where he was appointed qāḍī in 1950. In several meetings 
with the government, he stressed the need for the Muslim community to have a 
voice in the appointments of qāḍīs in order to increase their legitimacy.42 Security 
concerns won the day however; in 1953 the Sharia Court Law gave the 
government the final say in the appointment.43 
 There was no proper Islamic education to prepare Muslim officials for their 
jobs. Minority education was divided into Muslim, Christian, Druze, Bedouin and 
Circassian schools in order to prevent the rise of Arab nationalism. The goals 
were to modernize the Arabs and create loyal citizens, and Arab pupils received 
much more education in Hebrew language and Jewish culture than in their own 
religion and heritage.44 While the state lost no time in producing books in Hebrew 
to teach Arabic and history of the Middle East for security reasons, there were no 
schoolbooks to teach religion to the Muslim community and the state did not want 
to import them from other Arab countries. Israeli Arabists produced new books at 
a very slow pace and with very low priority, and more than half of the books 
focussed on ‘the spirit of the noble historical traditions of Jewish-Arab friendship’ 
in topics such as the Golden Age in Spain and co-existence in the Ottoman 
Empire.45 
When the first qāḍīs died in the 1960s this became an even more pressing 
problem. In 1961 the Qāḍī Law stipulated that only five out of nine members of 
the appointment committee had to be Muslim and that qāḍīs had to swear an 
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oath of allegiance to the state. Political considerations and connections became 
increasingly important in appointments and the legitimacy of the Muslim 
leadership sunk even lower. For example Muhammad Hubayshi, qāḍī of Acre in 
the 1980s, had had a local political career on a list associated with the ruling 
Mapai party.46 
 
 
 8.2.2. Attitudes towards Awqāf and Holy Places 
 
Military rule severely disrupted the Muslims’ access to their holy sites. Places 
that had been shared sacred sites among Muslims, Christians, Druze and/or 
Jews, or that were otherwise considered Jewish, were Judaized in a process of 
spatial sacrilisation and nationalisation similar to the one discussed by Werbner 
(see chapter 1).47 Doron Bar distinguishes between bottom-up local efforts, often 
by Mizrahi immigrants who tried to recreate the sacred geography they had left 
behind,48 and semi-official policies to this effect as the government aimed ‘to 
expand and deepen the State of Israel’s map of sacredness by focusing on areas 
and places not necessarily associated with any long-standing Jewish tradition of 
sanctity. This amounted to an effort to appropriate the space and make it Jewish 
– and Israeli (...) nurturing a national cult,’ accentuating the Jewish traditions of 
the sites while ignoring the Muslim and Christian ones. Zionism thus created its 
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own sacred spaces which were related to Hebrew sovereignty over the land, 
ancient and present.49 
In 1948 the Department of Muslim and Druze Affairs at the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs (MRA) had established a Committee on the Preservation of 
Muslim Religious Buildings which had conducted a survey of the religious 
buildings in the new state. While giving suggestions on which mosques to 
renovate, J.W. Hirschberg (head of the Muslim Department of the MRA) had 
been mainly interested in listing awqāf properties.50 The findings were published 
in a report in 195051 in which recommendations and prioritization was given for 
the renovation of the holy places. As Alisa Rubin Peled points out: 
 
Here, the Orientalist and antiquities-oriented approach of the authors came to the 
fore: the actual worshippers in the venerable mosques were not consulted, 
leaving it to the Israelis to determine the relative value of the Muslim sacred sites 
in Israel. (…) In its approach to preservation policy, the Muslim Affairs 
Department appeared to share the goals of an archaeologist or antiquities 
specialist: to return the mosques to their original, pristine form by removing as 
many ‘adulterations’ as possible. This approach strongly contrasted with the 
traditional view of the synagogue as a living place of worship constantly modified 
to meet the needs of the congregation rather than a historical monument. The 
attitude towards Muslim places of worship seemed more appropriate for creating 
a museum than for meeting the needs of an active Muslim community.52 
 
The MRA spent as little money as possible on the preservation and 
security of Muslim sites, including cemeteries, and sometimes even used them 
for Jewish activities. There were controversies over several holy places, including 
several cemeteries, the Haram Sayidna Ali, the Nabi Da’ud Mosque / Tomb of 
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David in West Jerusalem,53 the Hassan Bek Mosque in Jaffa,54 and the Al-Jazzar 
Mosque in Acre. The latter was renovated after pressure from the Foreign Office 
because it was a popular tourist destination, and this renovation was used as 
international PR for years.55 
The control over the waqf administration became an extremely 
controversial issue because of the vast amount of land and resources it 
controlled. The Palestinian waqf system had become an influential institution 
controlling a lot of land and properties and supporting religious functionaries, 
scholars and notables, providing them with considerable wealth and political 
power.56 During the late-Ottoman Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876) most awqāf for 
public benefit had been centralized under Ottoman government administration. 
The British Mandate had given the task of managing the public awqāf to the 
Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), headed by Hajj Amin al-Husayni, which came 
to act as a representative and mediating institution between the Muslim 
community and the Mandate government.57 The SMC increasingly articulated the 
nationalist struggle in religious terms and used the waqf system as a weapon 
against land sales to Zionist settlers by preaching against the practice, issuing 
fatwas against selling land to Jews, and punishing sellers and brokers. The SMC 
bought land themselves (but had limited resources so did not manage to buy a 
significant amount) and tried to convince landowners to transfer their private 
property into waqf.58 For these reasons the SMC was suspended during the 
Great Revolt in 1937 and the awqāf came under the jurisdiction of a three-
member member supervisory committee. In 1948 all three members fled and the 
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awqāf under their jurisdiction came to be classified as ‘absentee property’, and in 
1950 these absentee awqāf fell to the Custodian of Absentee Property.59 
The new Zionist state could not afford to return all this land and property to 
the Muslim community as this would mean a Muslim institution would have 
jurisdiction over 10-20% of the cultivated land of the new state, which would have 
undermined the territorial integrity of the state and given the Muslim elite a 
measure of independence that was undesirable. 60 Measures were taken to co-
opt the religious leadership, integrate the administration of the awqāf in the 
system of the state, and control the awqāf’s resources. 
The Israeli government distinguished between religious and secular awqāf 
– a distinction which has no base in the sharia. In 1951 the ‘religious’ awqāf 
became the responsibility of the MRA and in 1952 advisory committees of local 
notables were appointed in Haifa, Jaffa, Acre, Lydda and Ramla to administer 
small portions of these awqāf and to make recommendations regarding the use 
of the waqf funds. They merely executed decisions made by the Custodian and 
the MRA, they could make no appointments and were not allowed to coordinate 
among themselves, which isolated and fragmented the boards. They were civil 
servants and most probably screened by the security services. Because of their 
corruption and the taint of collaboration they enjoyed little respectability in their 
communities.61  
In 1953, most ‘secular’ awqāf (and some ‘religious’ awqāf that were no 
longer in use) were sold to the Development Authority. Compensation was given 
to the MRA – it is unclear whether it was actually spent for the benefit of the 
Muslim community.62 Privately administered awqāf whose mutawallī was 
classified as absentee shared the same fate. Privately administered awqāf 
whose mutawallī was still present continued to operate under supervision of the 
sharia court.63 
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Palestinians in Israel opposed the fact that the awqāf’s sacred 
inalienability had been violated and that the awqāf’s resources were now mainly 
used for the benefit of the Jewish community. They also opposed what they saw 
as the secular Jewish government’s meddling in their communal affairs, and they 
felt discriminated against as they saw that the Christians, Druze and Baha’i had 
more communal autonomy.64 Indeed, the Custodian had released many Christian 
lands and properties based on the excuse that the organized church structure 
within the recognized Christian communities had remained more or less intact 
after 1948, even though the leaders in whose names property was registered 
might be classified as absentee. They were also allowed to run their own 
schools, appoint their own judges, and receive political and financial support from 
Western Christian organisations.65 
In 1965 the Custodian’s sales of awqāf were retroactively legalized in the 
Third Amendment of the Absentee Properties Law and the government 
appointed boards of trustees in Acre, Haifa, Ramla, Lod and Tel Aviv-Jaffa to 
which waqf property could be released by the Custodian. These boards were 
corporate bodies that were established with the aim to ‘institute policies of 
modern business management’. The board members were appointed and 
supervised by the government rather than the sharia courts; they consisted of 
civil servants or local politicians who worked as volunteers and had been 
screened by the security services, and were not always respected by the people. 
They could only spend the income of the awqāf on limited non-political events, 
and only in their own locality. In the case of privately administered awqāf that 
benefited families who were absentees, they were released to these families. 
The release of the awqāf from the Custodian to the boards was a slow process – 
and by no means all of them were released. The release was done ‘without any 
restriction, qualification or any similar limitation prescribed by or under any law or 
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any document related to the endowment,’ in effect abolishing its waqf character 
and enabling the boards to sell them like any other property.66 
Scholars have debated what the goals were of the 1965 Third Amendment 
and whether these goals were attained. Aharon Layish, who was involved in the 
drafting of the Amendment, compared it to similar moves throughout the region 
and claimed it was done because the waqf was considered an economically 
stagnant institution that should be replaced by a modern system. Yitzhak Reiter 
argues that this assumption was wrong as the waqf has always been transferable 
as long as the new property served the original purpose. According to him the 
second objective of the amendment was to appease the Muslim community, but 
because the execution was flawed (especially due to the appointment of corrupt 
individuals) the policy only worsened the Muslim’s opposition to the waqf policy.67 
Peled understood the process as a negotiation between government bodies with 
conflicting preoccupations: ‘a genuine desire to grant a degree of cultural and 
religious autonomy, a security-minded quest for control, and a desire to mobilize 
the economic resources of the Muslim community for state purposes.’68 Dumper 
sees the Third Amendment as a way to further expropriate the waqf system with 
a ‘veneer of Muslim legitimacy’.69 Dumper writes that the boards sold large 
quantities of the awqāf to Jewish entrepreneurs, often in secret deals in which 
the board members also pocketed money. According to Reiter, only the board in 
Jaffa made any transactions and mainly for personal benefit.70 The discussion of 
this issue goes beyond the scope of this research, but it is clear that the reforms 
and the boards they established are quite controversial. 
These policies and activities were opposed by local groups, community 
leaders, local council leaders, and Palestinian Members of Knesset (MK), 
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supported by some Christians and Jews. They resorted to written protests and 
demonstrations, undertook several legal efforts and organised conferences in 
Acre and Nazareth in 1954, 1961 and 1984, attempting to establish a national 
committee that would coordinate efforts to retrieve the waqf property. While in 
principle all awqāf are sacred, in practice this activism centred on the ‘holy 
places’ – buildings that were used for worship, tombs, and cemeteries.71 
Recently the issue of the holy places has become even more politicized as 
secular and Islamist activists have made the Muslim holy places and awqāf part 
of their campaigns as they are part of their religious and national heritage, and as 
the holy places play a central role in the ‘peace process’.72 Issam Aburaiya and 
Efrat Ben-Zeev see this as part of the development of ‘middle-ground politics’ 
which seeks to combine the abstract Palestinian nationalist narrative which 
focuses on the nakba as an abstract, monumental hegemonic discourse on the 
one hand with individual refugee narratives on the other. For those who were 
able to return temporarily, their short visits took on the character of pilgrimages – 
often modelled on the prototype Islamic pilgrimage, the ḥajj. Under influence of 
the Oslo Accords in the 1990s – which sidelined the refugees’ right of return – 
these individual pilgrimages became part of the larger nationalist narrative, and 
the restoration of parts of these villages (often the holy places, as they were the 
only buildings left standing) provided an even more tangible way to reconnect to 
these places. For the Islamist movement, with its grassroots approach and focus 
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on local as opposed to national issues, this provided an ideal activist 
programme.73 As Aburaiya and Ben-Zeev pointed out: 
 
The abuse of their holy shrines proved especially painful as it robbed them of the 
solace and comfort the large majority of them would seek in the embrace of 
religion and tradition. After being pushed into marginality, Palestinians under 
Israeli occupation have sought recourse to their old traditions to help them 
develop new forms of community and identity and so confront the outside enemy. 
Holy shrines in contemporary Palestinian society are being revived or re-invented 
to help build or re-imagine a new identity that can help people cope with the daily 
aggression that threatens their existence.74 
 
Since no research exists on Palestinian Sufism in Israel during Military 
Rule, we cannot say how this affected Sufi communities in particular. The 
remaining followers of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya lost contact with their Shaykh 
and most of the community, who had all become refugees, and except for those 
who lived in the zāwiya in Acre, access to it was extremely difficult for those living 
under military rule. The fact that the loss of the Shaykh and most of their zawāya 
did not rob them completely of their tradition and the solace it could provide, 
testifies to the strong community that had been built around the Shaykh and was 
able to act independently. For those who had lost their zāwiya, its communal 
function was continued in people’s houses. As we shall see, those followers who 
remained sought solace in their local communities, maintaining their traditions 
until ties with the Shaykh and the zawāya in Acre and Amman were re-
established. The renovations of their shrines should primarily be seen as the 
reaffirmation of those continuing ties. There is however, also a strong sense of 
hope that the social role of the zāwiya and the community can be renewed, and 
in this sense the role of the zāwiya and the community is re-invented as a sixty 
year hiatus needs to be bridged and today’s circumstances are very different 
from the Mandate period. For more on this, see chapter 11. 
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8.2.3 Rise of the Islamic Movement 
 
In 1967 when the Israeli Palestinians reconnected with friends and family in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, they also came in touch with the well-established 
religious life there. In an attempt to counter the growing popularity of Fatah and 
the PLO, the Israeli government supported Islamic institutions in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip and encouraged Israeli Palestinians to study there.75 The 
Palestinians in Israel had renewed access to religious sites in Hebron and 
Jerusalem, they obtained copies of religious literature, and many Palestinians in 
Israel went to study at universities and seminaries in the West Bank, Gaza and 
further abroad. They were exposed to Islamist ideologies such as that of Hassan 
al-Banna and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which had stressed the religious 
roots of Palestinian nationalism as part of their anticolonial struggle. In a global 
context in which secular nationalism and Communism were discredited and 
Islamism was on the rise as a movement opposing political and cultural 
Westernization, and in a local context where Jewish fundamentalism and settler-
colonial ideology and activities were flourishing, Islamism became a viable 
alternative for Israeli Palestinians.76 
 Writing in 2002, Aburaiya distinguished four phases in the rise of the 
Islamist Movement in Israel. The first phase, in the 1970s, was one of da‛wa led 
by Shaykh Abdallah Nimr Darwish from Kafr Qasim who had graduated from the 
Islamic Institute in Nablus in 1972.77 Darwish was the spiritual leader of Usrat al-
Jihad, a paramilitary unit established in 1979 which engaged in acts of sabotage 
and arson against Jewish and ‘collaborating’ or secular Muslim targets. Two 
years later all members were arrested and when the leaders were released in the 
early 1980s they adopted a grassroots approach rather than returning to 
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violence, establishing a communal-social network, mobilizing people and material 
resources. They organised themselves in a loose network of non-profit 
organisations undertaking public works which the government had neglected. 
Using volunteer labour and financed by zakāa and funding from the Gulf they 
established over a hundred mosques that competed with government mosques 
in the villages and which functioned as community centres. They established 
schools and an Islamic University in Umm al-Fahm to train religious leaders.78 
The state reacted by supporting a Sufi ṭarīqa, the ṭarīqa Khalwatiyya 
Jāmi‛a Raḥmāniyya, when they established a seminary in Baqa al-Gharbiyya in 
1989.79 According to Peled, the university is accredited and funded by the 
Ministry of Education and guarantees all graduates a job as teacher of religion, 
but the students are prohibited from participating in political activity. This is an 
interesting point which shows the lenient attitude the government displays to 
‘non-political’ Sufi groups as a counterweight to political groups (a tendency we 
see world-wide, see also chapter 4 for the situation in Jordan), but her reference 
to the ṭarīqa as ‘the Khilwayiyya Sufi sect’ shows that she has not delved deeply 
into the matter. Had she visited the zāwiya, spoken to one of its adherents, or 
read one of its publications, she would have realised that its name is 
‘Khalwatiyya’ and that ‘Khilwayiyya’ is either a typo or misreading – the difference 
between the Arabic yā’ and tā’ being only two dots above or below the same 
letter.80 
Between the mid-80s and the early 90s the Islamic Movement expanded 
their power to the level of local government. In the local elections they 
cooperated with the local family-based political parties, ‘emphasizing their shared 
concern with family values.’ Their ideology remained vague and they 
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pragmatically disengaged national and local issues which enabled them to 
cooperate with the government to improve the situation for their constituents.81  
The 1990s saw increased disagreements within the Islamic Movement 
along religious and political lines as they competed for status and political 
legitimacy. They became more involved in national issues such as land 
expropriation, national planning, and economic development. They became 
involved in issues in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, mainly by sending 
humanitarian aid, but also by attempting to mediate between Hamas, Islamic 
Jihad and the PA in the early 90s. This led to increased internal debates as they 
disagreed on these activities, their attitudes towards violence, towards the Oslo 
Agreements, and whether to provide aid to the Occupied Territories or only to 
Palestinians living in Israel.82  
The climax of these discussions was the debate whether or not to 
participate in the 1996 Knesset elections. Theologically, the discussion centred 
on the issue of participation in a secular, non-Muslim legislative body, particularly 
one belonging to a state regarded as hostile by Arabs and Muslims, and on the 
question who is authorized to decide upon this issue. This discussion took place 
in a clear socio-political context and considerations of political strategy also 
played a role in the theological interpretations. Darwish argued they should use 
their civil rights and participate in the political process offered by the state, 
whereas Ra’ed Salah and Kamal al-Khatib opposed participation in Israel’s 
political framework as they believed this harmed the Muslim Palestinians’ 
interests, would mean the recognition of Israel as a Zionist Jewish state, and was 
not in accordance with Islam. The Islamic Movement split into the Southern 
Faction, headed by Darwish, and the Northern Faction headed by Salah and 
Khatib.83  
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The restoration of holy places such as mosques and graveyards continues 
to occupy an important part of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement’s 
programme. In 1990 they established the al-Aqsa Association, an umbrella non-
profit organization that coordinates activities related to holy places and awqāf. 
They charged the government with ‘negligent care of Muslim holy sites, to the 
point of intentionally changing these places to designations that are incompatible 
with their sanctity,’84 while emphasizing the Muslim’s own duty to improve their 
situation through volunteering and fund-raising. They gathered information on 
pre-1948 holy places, organized trips to sites of sacred significance in the 
Western Galilee, and renovated mosques and cemeteries. In 1996 they restored 
Solomon’s Stables on the Haram al-Sharif, as a reaction to the opening of the 
Western Wall Tunnel.85 When in 1997 plans were announced to build a plaza 
opposite the Basilica of the Annunciation in Nazareth to celebrate the Christian 
millennium and the visit of Pope John Paul II, the Islamic Movement claimed that 
this land belonged to the Shihab al-Din waqf. The situation escalated between 
1997 and 2003,86 and the deteriorating communal relations in Nazareth are 
increasingly becoming a divisive issue between Muslim and Christian 
Palestinians in a global climate of Islamophobia. 
 
 
8.2.4 Sufism in Israel 
 
It has been noted in paragraph 1.5.3 that the categories of ‘East’ and ‘West’ – 
while problematic from the start – have lost their value in the face of globalization 
as people and ideas and practices travel across the globe. As Geaves, Dressler 
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and Klinkhammer point out, the process of globalization and migration diminishes 
the value of traditional centre-periphery models, to the point that ‘the meaning of 
East and West starts to lose its geographical significance’.87 This is especially 
true of the situation in Israel. Geographically located in the Middle East, and with 
a large amount of its citizens (both Palestinians and Mizrahim) originating in the 
area and maintaining ties with their relatives and acquaintances abroad, a large 
part of the culture in the country can be classified as ‘Middle Eastern’. The influx 
of Jews from across the globe and their continued ties to their countries of origin 
have given Israeli society cultural and spiritual input from all over the world, even 
though the social, economic and political dominance of the Ashkenazi Jews has 
imposed ‘Western’ culture and socio-political organisation on all those living in 
Israel. 
 Dominguez Diaz and Stjernholm’s criticism of Hermansen’s classification 
of contemporary Sufi movements in the West rings even more true in the case of 
Sufism in Israel. Apart from the generally valid criticism that the categories of 
‘East’ and ‘West’ are problematic and that different attitudes can exist within one 
ṭarīqa or community,88 the categories themselves are not very useful. Concepts 
such as ‘perennial’ and ‘hybrid’ Sufi movements are useful in discussing the 
Jewish Israeli ‘new spirituality’ and its relations to traditional and global Sufism. 
However, Hermansen’s third category of ‘transplants’ is less useful, as the 
traditional Sufi ṭuruq in the Jewish state are not reproductions of ṭuruq and shrine 
cults in the homeland by migrant populations, but are the products of the 
indigenous and internally displaced people who are attempting to maintain their 
traditions while having become a marginalized minority in their own land. In many 
cases their shrines and zawāya have been taken (see paragraph 8.2.1) and their 
connections to their genealogical and spiritual kin in diaspora are disrupted. 
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Stjernholm’s suggestion to focus on a group’s relation to a historical tradition and 
narrative and cultural milieu is indeed more useful here.89 
 While it has been discussed occasionally, it is only in the past few years 
that Sufism in Israel has been approached by scholars, and the literature on the 
subject only sheds light on small aspects of the field. Weismann’s 2004 overview 
article of ‘Sufi brotherhoods in Syria and Israel’ has become the starting point for 
mapping Sufi activity, but the focus on ṭuruq as units of analysis he employs has 
been problematized by scholars such as Pinto, who points out that in the Syrian 
context there is a co-existence of centralized ṭuruq, decentralized ‘practical’ Sufi 
networks, and autonomous zawāya, all of which have the personal and 
devotional relationship between shaykh and disciple as their main structuring 
principle and can be connected through networks of personal relations.90 The 
shaykhs in Aleppo, for example, all participate in a ‘religious circuit’ in which 
disciples of one shaykh often go to others to obtain baraka and participate in their 
devotional practices.91 In addition to these institutions and their explicit 
affiliations, there is the wider cultural milieu of ‘individual piety or pragmatic 
religiosity’ that is connected to the shaykhs: the use of amulets (ḥijāb), the cult of 
saints, and the reading of mystical texts.92 In the contemporary context many 
alternative modes of Sufi organisation have sprung up, some of them not even 
including a shaykh. The Israeli Sufi milieu is also more diverse and 
interconnected than Weismann’s ṭarīqa-focused gaze presents. Based on the 
sparse secondary literature, a first hypothetical distinction can be made between 
traditional ṭuruq, Traditional Islam, and Jewish Sufi circles as part of Jewish 
Israeli ‘new spirituality’. 
Another problematic feature of Weismann’s approach is his distinction 
between urban-elitist ṭuruq, rural-populist ṭuruq (associated with ‘retrograde 
traditionalism’), and reformist ṭuruq that transcend the urban-rural divide and 
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adapt to the modern situation93 – even though the descriptions he then gives of 
the Syrian ṭuruq show that they have adherents in all sectors of society. Pinto’s 
research into some of the ṭuruq Weismann mentions shows how misrepresenting 
this distinction is. For example, Weismann speaks of the decline of the ‘urban 
elitist’ Qadiriyya and Khalwatiyya, noting that the ‘Hilaliyya’ combines the two and 
is still performing dhikr in Aleppo, but not initiating disciples.94 Pinto shows that 
the Aleppine Zawiya Hilaliyya is not so much a sub-branch but a single zāwiya of 
the Qadiriyya ruled by the Hilali family, who are the leading Qadiris in Aleppo (an 
office which is a remnant of the Ottoman period) and who are also initiated into 
the Khalwatiya. While the Hilalis focus on education and do not give out initiation 
any more, another Aleppine Qadiri zāwiya (the Zawiya Badinjkiyya) is still 
initiating disciples and has a baraka-focused spirituality.95 Pinto also writes about 
a Qadiri zāwiya which is led by the Kurdish Shaykh Muhiy al-Din, who helps 
Kurdish rural migrants to Aleppo negotiate their identities and socio-economic 
place in Arab Aleppo, and connects semi-Arabized Aleppine Kurds to their rural 
and Kurdish roots by maintaining relations with a Naqhbandi shaykh in Afrin.96 
These examples show that the distinction between urban, rural and reformist 
obscures more than that it illuminates, and an exclusive focus on ṭuruq as units 
of study does not do justice to the diversity of Sufi groups in the Levant.  
Weismann seeks ‘to analyze the various ways by which different Sufi 
brotherhoods in Syria and Israel have responded to the challenges of modernity 
in general, and to the peculiar political circumstances in which they live in 
particular’ by ‘accommodating an agent of modernity’ (‘Western rationalism, 
Islamic fundamentalism or, most important, the all-powerful state’).97 He does not 
give explicit criteria of what he considers successful adaptation, although one 
can deduct that he means the level of coherence, activities and membership, and 
cooperation with the government. His classification of the Israeli ṭuruq in terms of 
successful adaptation to ‘Israeli realities’ by tapping into their reformist roots 
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95 Pinto, ‘Creativity and Stability in the Making of Sufi Tradition.’ 
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therefore does not tell us much of contemporary Sufism in Israel. His examples 
do show that in Syria and Israel, similar dynamics are at play as in the rest of the 
world as Sufi ṭuruq and individuals are negotiating their place with regards to the 
nation-state, universalizing reformist movements, Traditional Islam, and ‘new 
spirituality’, and the related shifts in authority and organisation.  
 The Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya is only mentioned sporadically in the 
secondary literature,98 and in this study the question arises where the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya fits in the Israeli Sufi landscape – as we shall see, the 
restoration of the zāwiya is of the utmost importance in answering this question. 
 
 
8.2.4.1 Traditional Sufi Groups 
 
The process of decline that Sufi ṭuruq in the Levant went through in the early 
twentieth century continued under the different Mandate governments of the 
region, and Palestinian Sufism was no different. The unrest and war of 1948 that 
led to the expulsion and displacement of most Palestinians eliminated most of 
the Palestinian ṭuruq. As De Jong points out, the Palestinian ṭuruq had been less 
strongly organized than for example those in Egypt and Syria (see paragraph 
3.2). The Mawlawiyya had disappeared by the beginning of the twentieth century, 
and the Rifa’iyya disappeared in 1948.99 The Naqshbandiyya in Ottoman 
Palestine was restricted to the Uzbek zāwiya in the old city of Jerusalem.100 Only 
the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, the Khalwatiyya-Rahmaniyya and the Qadiriyya 
were left, and they were in a sorry state. When contacts were renewed with the 
wider Arab and Muslim world, these ṭuruq went through a process of revival, and 
shaykhs of new lineages came to Israel.101 
Weismann considers the Khalwatiyya-Rahmaniyya to be the most 
successful in its adaptation to ‘Israeli realities’, focusing on its lodge in Baqa al-
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Gharbiyya which since 1967 has been developed into ‘an impressive religious-
educational complex’ including a large mosque and zāwiya, a library and the al-
Qasemi Academy (established in 1989, officially recognised by the Ministry of 
Education) which also hosts conferences.102 The ṭarīqa has excellent relations 
with the Israeli government.103 
 Weismann judges the Shadhuliyya to be less successful in its adaptation 
to ‘Israeli realities’, but does not give any criteria for this qualification.104 The 
Yashrutiyya suffered severely from 1948 as Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi fled to 
Beirut and most of the ṭarīqa’s awqāf were lost. Only the zāwiya of Acre 
somehow remained in the hands of the ṭarīqa, but the awqāf supporting it were 
confiscated, leaving the few remaining followers with no economic means for the 
maintenance of the buildings and the community. When contacts were re-
established with the rest of the ṭarīqa in 1967, the zāwiya in Tarshiha was 
regained and money came flowing in from followers outside of Israel, the 
community managed to start renovating the zāwiya in Acre. By this time Umm al-
Fahm had developed from a village into Israel’s largest Arab town and the 
Shadhuli community had likewise become the largest Shadhuli community in the 
country, and Umm al-Fahm’s muqaddam Ibrahim Abu al-Hashish was 
considered the de facto leader of the ṭarīqa in Israel. Shaykh Ahmad visited the 
zāwiya in 1981 to rebury his father who had died in Beirut, and in 1996 to 
commemorate the centenary of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s death.  
 On Jerusalem’s Mount of Olives we find another Shadhili ṭarīqa, led by 
Shaykh Sidi Muhammad Jamal, an ‛ālim at the Azhar Mosque complex who 
performs the Friday sermon.105 He has a wide appeal in the West and spends 
much of this time travelling abroad to spread his ṭarīqa. In 1974 a small group of 
members of Hazrat Inayat Khan’s Sufi Order in the West came to Jerusalem to 
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study with him, and he started to visit the US in 1992, where he has followers in 
Santa Fe, Philadelphia and the Bay Area. In 2000, Hermansen pointed out that 
while around 300 people were initiated by him, only a small group follow ‘a 
specifically Sufi path under his teachings.’106 
 Weismann argues that the Qadiriyya has been least successful in its 
adaptation ‘to Israeli realities’. Before 1948 it consisted of local groups which 
disintegrated after 1948, but recently new local groups have appeared under 
leaders who were initiated by Qadiri leaders in the Occupied Territories, and 
sometimes combine their Qadiri affiliation with affiliations to the Rifa’iyya and 
Alawiyya. He mentions Sa’id Abu Laban (a descendant from the leading Qadiri 
family of Ramla, who were responsible for the annual pilgrimage (ziyāra) to Nabi 
Salih’s tomb), Abu Filastin from Sakhnin, and Abd al-Salam Manasra, an ex-
Communist from Jerusalem who recently moved to Nazareth after he and his 
family were attacked by Salafis for their Sufi practices and their collaboration with 
Israelis (see next paragraph).107 The remarks made above criticizing Weismann’s 
ṭarīqa-focused approach are especially relevant here. While he draws 
conclusions about ‘the Qadiriyya’ as a whole, they seem to consist of largely 
unconnected local groups with little continuity before and after 1948. 
Throughout Jerusalem’s Islamic history, there have been autonomous 
zawāya to cater for the pilgrims coming to Jerusalem, led by Sufi shaykhs from 
Palestine and elsewhere. Until recently the most well-known of these was the 
Naqshbandi zāwiya, which for generations was operated by the Uzbek Bukhari 
family to host Central Asian pilgrims. The last Shaykh, Shaykh Aziz al-Bukhari 
(d.2010) was a very prominent figure in many interfaith initiatives. After his death 
the property fell empty.108  
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The history of the Indian zāwiya (the Zawiya Faridiyya)109 and the Ansari 
family heading it since the 1920s has been researched by Indian diplomat Navtej 
Sarna and can be found in his non-academic book Indians at Herod’s Gate 
(2014). Sarna mainly focused on the zāwiya as a hospice for Indian pilgrims and 
its place in Jerusalem society, and not so much on the religious aspect of life in 
the zāwiya. He mentions that before 1948, between ten and fifteen ‘dervishes’ 
used to live in the zāwiya for a longer period of time, ‘sleeping, praying, going to 
the mosque, cleaning the place’.110 He does not discuss the religious position of 
the Shaykh; there is no mention of him belonging to a specific ṭarīqa or having 
specific spiritual powers, although he describes the succession of Shaykh Munir 
Ansari to his father’s position as being decided by a gathering of shaykhs led by 
Shaykh al-Bukhari, before being registered at the sharia court.111  
Geaves describes the Afghan zāwiya, led by Shaykh Abdul Karim Afghani 
of the Alawiyya ṭarīqa, as a neighbourhood zāwiya which teaches ‘Traditional 
Sufism re-branded as street ethics (adab) with an emphasis on shaykh/murid 
instruction, dhikr attendance and other traditional practices’. In the eyes of his 
followers in the neighbourhood, the Shaykh preaches the return to traditional 
religion and practice, ‘that which has been forgotten’.112 
 Among ‛ulamā’ of the al-Aqsa complex, Geaves also found 
representatives of Traditional Islam with an implicit allegiance to taṣawwuf. They 
told him that several senior ‛ulamā’ at al-Aqsa (especially the Shadhili Sidi 
Jamal), and several Sufi-oriented professors at al-Quds University, cooperated to 
establish several institutions associated with the Qadiriyya.113 
 Despite the low opinion most Palestinians have of Sufism as ‘charlatans, 
illiterate, unlearned and irrelevant in the struggle to liberate Palestine from Israeli 
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occupation’,114 several types of indigenous Sufism seem on the rise in Israel and 
Jerusalem, as centrally organised ṭuruq, as local Sufi groups around a shaykh, or 
‘rebranded’ as ‘Islamic ethics and religious education framed within tradition’, 
renamed ‛ilm al-tawḥīd. Geaves argues that Werbner’s model of ‘waxing and 
waning' related to charismatic leaders is not adequate to explain these trends, 
and explores possible explanations of this phenomenon, which he suggests 
might be seen as a ‘third option’ between Fatah’s secularism and Hamas’s 
Islamism in order to reconnect with the cultural and religious heritage. As 
modernisation and liberalisation provided Palestinians with more options, one 
option was to return to spirituality rooted in Islam, potentially combining 
‘academia, culture and Islamic knowledge, presenting an indigenous option for 
intellectual endeavour with an historic heritage in the Middle East.’ This trend is 
opposed to the Israeli alternative ‘new spirituality’, which is criticized by 
Palestinian Muslims for both spiritual and political reasons, as it sees Sufism 
through a perennial lens as Universal Sufism, and is often connected to 
problematic initiatives of interfaith dialogue.115 
 
 
8.2.4.2 Jewish Sufi Circles 
 
A final development to be discussed on the scene of Sufism in Israel is that of the 
‘Jewish Sufis’, Israeli Jews who are interested in Sufi philosophy and practices, 
either from an intellectual or from a spiritual perspective. Chen Bram argues that 
they should be seen as ‘part of the wider Israeli field of current spirituality’ in the 
context of Israeli counter-culture which has been influenced by Western ‘new 
spirituality’ in general.116 As such this phenomenon has also been heavily 
influenced by the trajectories of Sufism in the West (in its ‘hybrid’ and ‘perennial’ 
forms), particularly by North American Sufism.117 As we have seen in paragraph 
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1.5, an important component of this Western interest in Sufism is its perceived 
universal and apolitical character and its presentation as ‘moderate Islam’ as an 
alternative to ‘radical Islam’ in what Ernst calls ‘Sufism and the politics of peace’. 
Serving a similar purpose in Israel, this trend has developed since the 1990s in 
the context of disappointment with Oslo, the consequent radicalisation on all 
sides, and general Islamophobia since 9/11, which led to the search for an 
‘alternative’ Islam and for ‘a new basis from which Jews and Muslims might relate 
to one another’.118 
Like in Europe and the United States, this trend encompasses the 
translation of Sufi literature (especially the poetry of Rumi), the performance of 
music and dancing, the practice of spiritual tourism, and the organisation of 
events such as the annual Sufi Festival in the desert near Eilat. Organized 
groups engaging in study and spiritual practice have come up among Israeli 
Jews since the 2000s,119 such as Ya’qub ibn Yusuf’s study groups,120 mainly 
focussing on Kebzeh,121 and several local Mevlevi study circles around students 
of Shaykha Khadija (formerly Marcia Radin) from the US.122  
The most notable Jewish Sufi group is Derekh Avraham/Tariq Ibrahim, 
which was founded as a Jewish-Muslim ṭarīqa including both Jewish ‘seekers’ 
and Arab Muslim Sufis in order to create ‘an alternative shared space for 
interpersonal encounters and spiritual activities’. Bram writes that the main 
founders were Professor Avraham Elqayyam (professor of Jewish Mysticism at 
Bar Ilan University), Shaykh Ghassan Manasra (son of Shaykh Abd al-Salam 
                                                  
118 Ibid., 123. 
119 Ibid., 119. 
120 Bram describes Ya’qub ibn Yusuf (originally Joshua Heckelman) as ‘one of the pioneers of 
Sufism among Jewish Israelis’ who defines himself as a Jewish Sufi and ‘represents the 
interaction between global Sufism, local Arab Sufis, and Jewish mysticism’. He migrated to Israel 
from the United States to find a teacher, and studied with Shaykh Sidi Muhammad Jamal and 
Murad Yagan (1915-2013). He owns the spiritual bookstore Olam Katan in the German Colony in 
Jerusalem and is involved in the publishing of translations of Sufi poetry to Hebrew. Ibid., 135 
note 2. 
121 Murad Yagan’s Ahmsta Kebzeh is a combination of Sufism, Christianity, Abkhaz-Circassian 
traditions and New Age developed by Yagan in Canada’s multicultural milieu. For a discussion of 
Ahmsta Kebzeh and ibn Yusuf’s reinterpretation of it, see Chem Bram and Meir Hatina, ‘From 
Sufism to Universal Vision: Murat Yagan and the Teaching of Kebzeh’, Journal of Sufi Studies 3 
(2014): 67–92. It is also mentioned in Hermansen, ‘Hybrid Identity Formations in Muslim 
America’, 177. 
122 Bram, ‘Sufi Circles in Israel’, 132–133. See Shaykha Khadija, http://www.whirling-dervish.org/ 
 434
Manasra and director of Anwar al-Salam), and Rabbi Roberto Arviv (of the 
Conservative Schechter Institute Neve Tzedek Center in Tel Aviv),123 but media 
reports relate that the group was founded during the First Intifada when Rabbi 
Menachem Froman from Tekoa, a settlement in the Gush Etzion bloc, 
approached Shaykh Abd al-Salam al-Manasra to initiate a dialogue.124 Nowadays 
it consists of a small ‘inner circle’ of active members, but there is a wide circle of 
a few hundred people who occasionally attend meetings. Most meetings take 
place in Tel Aviv and Jaffa, but sometimes they visit more ‘Arab’ settings, such 
as the Qadiriyya in Nazareth or the Shadhuli-Yashruti zāwiya in Acre. While they 
aim to bring Jews and Muslims together, most members nowadays are Jews who 
are either intellectually or spiritually interested in Sufism and its connection to 
Judaism.125 
Academic interest for Jewish-Muslim relations plays an important role in 
this milieu, as both academics and Jewish Sufis believe that historical periods of 
Muslim-Jewish interaction can serve to inspire contemporary interfaith dialogue 
and the solution of the conflict.126 One topic of interest is the interpretation of Ibn 
Arabi from a kabbalistic viewpoint as is done by Avraham Elqayyam, one of the 
most prominent members of Derekh Avraham and the teacher of many 
participants in its meetings. Another popular academic is Paul Fenton, who 
lectured at a meeting of Derekh Avraham in Acre in 2012.127 
Paul Fenton specializes in the interaction of Jewish and Islamic cultures, 
especially in the areas of mysticism, philosophy and music. He argues that 
Judaism profoundly influenced the formation of Sufism in its formative period in 
Baghdad,128 discusses Spain’s ‘golden age’, the kabbalists, the Shabbatians, and 
                                                  
123 Ibid., 130–131. 
124 Ze’ev Ben Arieh, ‘The Way of Abraham – Jewish Sufi Movement’, Mysteries of Israel, 
accessed 30 October 2013, http://israelmystery.co.il/pws/page!9279; Hadani Ditmars, ‘Across 
Enemy Lines, Into the Mystic’, Canadian Globe and Mail, 13 October 2007, 
http://israelmystery.co.il/pws/page!9272.  
125 Weismann, ‘Sufi Brotherhoods in Syria and Israel’, 317; Bram, ‘Sufi Circles in Israel’, 130–132. 
126 Bram, ‘Sufi Circles in Israel’, 122. 
127 Personal observation. 
128 He expresses his surprise at the fact that while Orientalists studied the influence of 
Neoplatonism and Christianity on Sufism, they failed to see the Jewish influence even though 
Baghdad had been the heart of Jewish learning for centuries: ‘Among the great personalities 
 435
the Hasidic movement, but most importantly has written extensively on the 
ḥasidūt (Jewish pietists) of thirteenth-century Cairo. There was a general interest 
in Sufism in this place and time, as can be seen from the findings at the Cairo 
Geniza which included many Sufi writings and Jewish writings inspired by 
Sufism.129 The most famous of these is Rabbi Abraham Maimonides (1186-1237, 
son of the famous Moses Maimonides), who was the spiritual and political leader 
of Egyptian Jewry in 1205. Rabbi Abraham saw the Sufis as the true heirs to the 
biblical prophets as he believed they had preserved practices which the Jews 
themselves had forgotten. He introduced many Islamic practices into Jewish 
worship (such as ablution, praying in rows facing Jerusalem and adopting 
different poses during prayer, nightly vigils, daily fasts, spiritual retreat (khalwa), 
and the necessity of spiritual development under the supervision of a shaykh). 
This restoration of ‘original Jewish practice’ was meant to ‘accelerate the 
prophetic process’. Fenton points out that the pietist circle around Maimonides 
was elitist and faced much opposition, and therefore gradually disappeared.130 
Others seek the influence of Sufism in contemporary Judaism in the Kabbalah 
and the movement of the Hasidim. Famous kabbalists, such as the Spanish 
Rabbi Abraham Abu-l-Afiyya (d. after 1291), Isaac of Akko (ca.1270-1340) and 
Rabbi Isaac Lurya (1534-1572), had direct knowledge of Sufi practices, and the 
Kabbalah developed in Safed in an Islamic environment. Among the Hasidic 
practices which might have their origin in Sufism, Fenton notes the veneration of 
the tsaddiq (Ḥasidic saint) and the visiting of saints’ tombs, the importance of 
music and dance as forms of worship, the phenomenon of hitbōdedūt [solitary 
                                                                                                                                                   
attached to the Talmudic academies of Baghdad were to be found certain charismatic figures who 
embodied the ancient rabbinic pietistic ideals of simplicity and saintliness, virtues cherished by 
nascent Sufism. Moreover, Sufi hagiography has preserved a number of edifying tales of ‘the 
pious men from among the Children of Israel’, known as isrā’īliyyāt.’ Paul Fenton, ‘Judaism and 
Sufism’, in History of Islamic Philosophy, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 755–756. This oversight on the part of the Orientalists could be explained by 
the fact that, as discussed in paragraph 1.1, the early Orientalists wanted to stress the Aryan 
roots of Sufism as opposed to its Semitic roots. 
129 Fenton points to the severe social upheavals the Egyptian Jewish community underwent in 
this period as many had fled the Almohads and Crusaders, combined with the messianic 
expectations due to the approaching Jewish millennium in 1239, as explanations for this surge in 
‘mystical sensitivity’. Ibid., 758–759. 
130 Ibid., 760–764. 
 436
meditation, khalwa in Arabic], and the visualization of letters composing the 
Divine name.’131 
Many of Derekh Avraham’s members and regular visitors are part of a 
loose network of activists who focus on interfaith dialogue and take part in 
initiatives such as the Jerusalem Peacemakers,132 Solha, Neve Shalom / Wahat 
al-Salam,133 and Abrahamic Reunion.134  
 
 
8.2.4.3 Interaction between Sufi Groups and the Field of Interfaith Dialogue 
 
The development of the Sufi ṭuruq and groups described in this paragraph is 
connected to the occupation and the relations between Jews and Muslims in 
Israel, and so is the interaction between these groups. They developed as part of 
the search for an alternative Islam and a partner for dialogue and are thus 
intrinsically linked to the history of the conflict. This interaction takes place within 
the wider field of the ‘co-existence industry’135 and can take the form of either ‘an 
overt discourse which sees Sufi philosophy and historical ties between Jews and 
Sufis as a model on which to build future relations between Jews and Muslims’ 
as discussed above, or it can use Sufi leaders as representatives of Islam.136  
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 This understanding of Sufism as an alternative, moderate and apolitical 
Islam is not unique for Israel, but has deep roots in Western Orientalist 
scholarship, and is connected to the global trend of ‘Sufism and the politics of 
peace’ that has for example been championed by King Abdullah of Jordan (see 
paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3). Needless to say, this politicizes those groups that are 
chosen for their ‘apolitical’ stance. Furthermore, this perceived dichotomy 
between moderate and radical Islam is problematic because it simplifies a wide 
spectrum of religious and political attitudes held by Muslims. In the Israeli 
context, perpetuating intra-Islamic dichotomies obscures understanding and 
perpetuates stereotypes of the wide spectrum of religious attitudes held by 
Palestinians of all backgrounds. It obscures the fact that there are many 
Palestinian Muslims who are neither Sufis nor ‘radicals’.137 
Most importantly, this focus on interfaith dialogue obscures the fact that for 
many Muslim Palestinian citizens of Israel, ‘the conflict’ is not understood as a 
religious conflict. As Bram points out: ‘the general Muslim reaction to Israel is 
related to their understanding of the continuous occupation of the territories’ – to 
which one might add the Israeli government’s attitude to the Palestinian citizens 
of Israel and to the Middle East as a whole – ‘and it is shared by many Sufis and 
revivalist Islamists alike.’138 Without addressing the grievances continuously 
inflicted on the Palestinians by the Israeli government in the frame of the Zionist 
colonial project, dialogue is pointless.139 In the words of Dr. Dov Maimon, an 
Orthodox Jew who studied thirteenth-century Islamic and Jewish mysticism and 
was a founding member of Interfaith Encounters Association:  
 
If you are not handling the basic problems of unequal power relations, you are 
actually strengthening them (…) political redemption will not come through 
                                                  
137 Ibid., 121. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid., 124. For a critique of co-existence and dialogue projects, especially of the projects based 
on the ‘contact hypothesis’ which assumes that apolitical interpersonal contact leads to large-
scale solutions to political conflicts, see Dan Rabinowitz, ‘Trust and the Attribution of Rationality: 
Inverted Roles Amongst Palestinian Arabs and Jews in Israel’, Man 27, no. 3 (1992): 517–37; 
Rabinowitz, ‘Natives with Jackets and Degrees.’  
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spiritual encounters – there is a need for social change. With all the respect, and 
with all the beauty of these encounters, how many times it can be repeated?140 
 
In addition to this, because most dialogue initiatives are instigated by 
Jews, they closely resemble the state’s stress on the historical periods of co-
existence in the Israeli schoolbooks for Muslims, and its aim to support particular 
religious and ethnic identities to undermine the shared Palestinian identity, for 
example by dividing the non-Jewish population into Muslims, Christians, Druze, 
Bedouin, and Circassians (see paragraphs 8.1 and 8.2.1).141 
Bram analyses several Jewish Sufi groups with this criticism in mind. 
Regarding the meetings of Shaykha Khadija and the Mevlevi study groups, he 
notes that her first visit was organized with the hope to ‘facilitate an encounter 
with a teacher external to the Israeli reality capable of bringing together students 
and friends from different religions, Israelis and Palestinians.’ The continued 
meetings have taken on an apolitical character however, and while they show the 
possibility of an alternative relationship between Jews and Muslims, most people 
involved in these meetings are Jewish.142 Even so, Bram sees ‘a potential for 
creating an interesting Jewish-Arab dialogue.143 
Regarding Derekh Avraham, Bram notes that it is ‘characterized by the 
basic structural inequalities that exist between Jews and Arabs in Israeli society’ 
as the Jewish participants tend to come from the higher classes in the centre of 
the country, while the Muslims come from the peripheries, although he points out 
that this is in a way counterbalanced by ‘choosing a Sufi framework and making 
interreligious dialogue secondary’, which stresses the local Sufis’ ‘cultural 
capital’. While according to Bram they have managed to create a field of spiritual 
exchange, it is also unrelated to political issues.144  
Bram concludes: 
 
                                                  
140 Based on a telephone interview with Maimon, quoted in Bram, ‘Sufi Circles in Israel’, 127. 
141 Ibid., 126–127. 
142 Ibid., 132. 
143 Ibid., 132–133. 
144 Ibid., 131. 
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Indeed, providing hope and gathering together people from different religious 
backgrounds has its own value, but its influence on promoting peace or bridging 
Palestinian-Jewish relations is questionable. As for relations between Jewish and 
Arab citizens inside Israel, the focus on religious encounters can be criticized for 
sidelining discussion of more concrete political issues such as inequality in state 
resources and services to citizens. (…) it is also questionable if such initiatives 
can actually empower the Palestinian population and not reinforce existing power 
structures.145 
 
 Bram notes that there is ‘a tension between serious engagement in 
coexistence activities that values the Sufi contribution, and the temptation to use 
Sufi shaykhs and Sufi ideas as ‘decoration’ for such initiatives.’146 Therefore, 
apart from the abstract discussion on the use of interfaith dialogue in general and 
in the Israeli situation in particular, we should address the question of who 
participates in such dialogue initiatives, why, what role they are given in the 
dialogue, and who do these participants represent? As discussed extensively in 
paragraphs 1.4 and 4.2, authority in contemporary Islam is heavily contested and 
there is no consensus as to who can act as ‘spokesperson for Islam’, and any 
claim that a participant in dialogue represents either ‘true Islam’ or all Muslims is 
nothing more than wishful thinking. If not by popular consent, why are they there? 
While acknowledging that people often are sincere and participate for the 
project’s own sake, Bram also points out that these (often marginalized) Sufi 
shaykhs benefit from participation in the ‘co-existence industry’ as it might 
provide them with material and social power. In the case of East Jerusalem for 
example, most Palestinians boycott the Israeli authorities, and the only religious 
leaders who are willing to participate in municipal events seem to be Sufi 
shaykhs. The story of Shaykh al-Bukhari, one of the main figures in the 
Jerusalem Peacemakers network, is a case in point. As a Naqshbandi Sufi and 
an Uzbeki he was ‘not quite Palestinian’,147 and his participation in the 
                                                  
145 Ibid., 126–127. 
146 Ibid., 124. 
147 This sentiment was also expressed by Munir al-Ansari, the shaykh of the Indian zāwiya in 
Jerusalem. Even though the first Shaykh came in the 1920s, married a local woman and was 
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problematic fields of the tourist and co-existence industry and his connections 
with Shaykh Nazim al-Haqqani of the Naqshbandiyya-Haqqaniyya placed him ‘on 
the front line of a global struggle between different representations of Islam, in 
addition to his problematic position regarding the national struggle of Palestinians 
in Jerusalem.’148 While his personal contribution to these interreligious 
encounters was no doubt formidable, the question remains how representative 
he was of the Muslim community in general. 
These encounters do not only include ‘hybrid’ Sufi groups or ‘foreign’ 
Sufis, but also traditional Palestinian ṭuruq. Considering that in the European 
context, Klinkhammer pointed out that most immigrant Muslims do not approve of 
the type of universalized ‘new spirituality’ of the Sufi movements that are involved 
in these projects (see paragraph 1.5.2),149 we should ask ourselves what is the 
attitude of followers or fellow ṭarīqa-members towards those who participate in 
such dialogue. Shaykh Abd al-Salam not only participates in Derekh Avraham, 
but is also a Qadiri shaykh (although nothing is known about his more traditional 
followers). The state-sponsored al-Qasemi College run by the Khalwatiyya-
Rahmaniyya regularly hosts conferences of an interfaith nature. And most 
importantly for this study, the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya occasionally hosts study 
meetings of Derekh Avraham or the Mevlevi groups in its renovated zāwiya. 
These meetings are hosted by AKR, the head of the board of mutawallīs, who is 
responsible for the renovation and sees his outreach as part of this project. In the 
following chapters, we shall address the questions why he participates in these 
                                                                                                                                                   
accepted in the religious establishment of Mandate Palestine, nowadays his descendants feel 
less accepted as part of Jerusalem society. He is still referred to as ‘the Indian’. As can be seen 
from the recent history of the zāwiya, both local Muslims backed by Yasser Arafat and Jewish 
settlers have tried to take over their properties. He expresses admiration for Shaykh Bukhari, 
which could be due to the fact that both are semi-outsiders. Sarna, Indians at Herod’s Gate, 171–
175. 
148 Bram, ‘Sufi Circles in Israel’, 128–130. See also Shaykh Bukhari’s profile on the website of 
Jerusalem Peacemakers. http://jerusalempeacemakers.org/ For the Naqshbandiyya-
Haqqaniyya’s participation in what Ernst calls ‘the politics of peace’, see Ernst, ‘Sufism, Islam and 
Globalization’; Stjernholm, ‘A Translocal Sufi Movement’; Simon Stjernholm, ‘Sufi Politics in 
Britain: The Sufi Muslim Council and the “Silent Majority” of Muslims’, Journal of Islamic Law and 
Culture 12, no. 3 (2010): 215–26. See paragraph 1.5.2. 
149 Klinkhammer, ‘Sufism Contextualised’, 209–210. 
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dialogues, who he represents, and how this places the ṭarīqa in the Sufi milieu in 
Israel and its ‘Muslim politics’. 
 
 
8.3 Acre 
 
After the fall of Acre on 17 May 1948150 most inhabitants of Acre fled, to be 
replaced by Palestinian refugees from Haifa and the villages in the Galilee, and 
by Jewish immigrants who moved into the new city. About 3,000 Palestinians 
remained in Acre, including the internally displaced, out of 13,400 before 1948. 
The religious and political leaders had left.151 Most of the properties in the old city 
fell to the Custodian and were transferred first to the Development Authority and 
from there to the state-owned housing company Amidar, who leases the 
buildings to the Palestinian residents and for years has let them fall into 
disrepair.152 Acre has been marginalized and neglected by the Israeli 
government. Poverty rates are high, living conditions are bad, and crime has 
soared, especially in the old city where almost all residents are Palestinians. This 
has led many residents in the old city to move to the new town or to the 
surrounding villages – particularly Makr and Judayda which have been 
‘developed’ specifically for this purpose.153 
In 1948 the sharia court had been re-established in Acre under qāḍī Musa 
al-Tabari,154 and in 1958 a local advisory committee was established. As 
elsewhere, the religious officials were often appointed as much for their political 
stance as for their religious credentials, and they were not above criticism of co-
                                                  
150 Abbasi, ‘The Fall of Acre in the 1948 War’; Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, 100. 
151 Abbasi, ‘The Fall of Acre in the 1948 War’, 24. 
152 Dumper, Islam and Israel, 53. Tarabut/Hithabrut estimates that that ‘[i]n the old city the 
Custodian of Absentee Property holds approximately 85% of the houses; 10% are in the hands of 
Muslim and Christian religious institutions, and only 5% are in the hands of private property 
owners.’ Hithabrut - Tarabut, ‘Acre Facing the New and Old Colonizers’, Hithabrut - Tarabut, 25 
January 2012, http://www.tarabut.info/en/articles/article/Colonizing-Acre/. 
153 Dumper, Islam and Israel, 53. 
154 Born in 1891 in Tiberias, Musa al-Tabari studied at the Ahmadiyya madrasa in Acre, then 
continued his education at al-Azhar in Cairo. He was a clerk in Acre’s sharia court and taught at a 
government high school. He was appointed acting qāḍī in 1948 and qāḍī in 1951, a position which 
he filled until he died in 1962. Peled, Debating Islam in the Jewish State, 159–160. 
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optation. Muhammad Hubayshi, qāḍī of Acre in the 1980s, had had a local 
political career on a list associated with the ruling Mapai, and according to Peled 
he had been criticized by nationalists for his alleged collaboration by selling waqf 
properties.155 Dumper gives an example from the 1970s in which the qāḍī ruled in 
the government’s favour, enabling the sale of the Istiqlal cemetery in Haifa.156 
Many properties in the old town were awqāf,157 the largest being the al-
Jazzar waqf which was established in 1786 by the governor Ahmad Pasha al-
Jazzar.158 During the late Ottoman period the waqf fell to the Ottoman Ministry of 
Awqāf, which meant that during the Mandate period it was administered by the 
SMC and taken by the Custodian of Absentee Property in 1950. Most of its 
properties were transferred to the Development Authority, which transferred 
many properties to the government-owned housing company Amidar. The 
controversial Acre Board of Trustees was established in 1966, the same year in 
which the Development Authority established the Old Acre Development 
Company (OADC) ‘to refurbish sites of historical interest to develop the Old City’s 
tourist potential’, planning to turn old Acre into a museum-town as had been done 
in Jaffa. This move was seen with great distrust as Palestinian residents feared 
they would be displaced.159 The Board’s legitimacy was further undermined when 
locals found out in the 1970s that it had agreed in 1966 to lease waqf properties 
for 99 years to the OADC for low rent, allowing the OADC to develop them with 
no benefit for the local residents. The Board resigned in 1978 but the lease was 
                                                  
155 Ibid., 121–123, 136–137, 143. 
156 He gave a fatwa that the remains of the Istiqlal cemetery in Haifa could be removed so the 
Istiqlal committee could sell it and the municipality could develop the area. In 1981 the Istiqlal 
cemetery was destroyed, and by 1984 it was clear that rather than the promised communal 
services, it became commercial property. Dumper, Islam and Israel, 60–61. 
157 Dumper estimates that 80-90% of the old city was endowed, based on J.B. Barron, 
Mohammedan Wakfs in Palestine (Jerusalem: Greek Convent Press 1922). Reiter estimates it 
was 20-25% of the town. Ibid., 52; Reiter, ‘The Waqf in Israel’, 110.  
158 Ahmad Pasha aimed to stimulate commercial and economic expansion of the town by 
encouraging faith, trade, industry and hygiene through the establishment of the al-Jazzar 
mosque, the Ahmadiyya school (which was recognized by al-Azhar in Cairo), khans, markets and 
shops, baths, and an aquaduct. Later the offices of the sharia court of Acre were housed in the 
courtyard of the mosque. Dumper, Islam and Israel, 11.  
159 Ibid., 53. 
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not revoked until the mid-1980s.160 The first three boards of trustees were 
composed of members of local notable families and local politicians and involved 
in personal rivalries and controversies. According to Reiter the fourth Board of 
Trustees, established in 1982, was more able and more accepted and still 
functioning in the 1990s, administering the awqāf according to traditional sharia 
rules, even though they are not obliged to do so according to Israeli law.161 
According to Yitzhak Reiter, the other awqāf in Acre, including the 
Yashruti waqf, were privately administered and remained under the jurisdiction of 
the sharia court, who appointed the mutawallīs as they were ‘never classified as 
absentee property because their administrator prior to 1948 did not leave the 
territory that in 1948 became Israel.’162 We shall return to this issue in paragraph 
8.5. 
The Islamic Movement are also active in Acre. They took over three of the 
six mosques163 and put up many signs in the Old City to remind people of their 
Islamic duties, and to dominate the public space, but Reiter notes their relations 
with the Board of Trustees and the other Islamic officials in the town are good.164 
Recently, plans to exploit Acre’s rich history and its tourist potential have 
been gaining momentum. Between 1993 and 2000 a steering commitee for urban 
planning drew up ‘a heritage-focused Master Plan’. This development gained 
speed when UNESCO declared the old town a World Heritage Site in 2001 after 
the Israeli government had applied for this recognition.165 
                                                  
160 Ibid., 53–54. Reiter says this transfer had already been arranged by the Custodian before they 
released the properties to the board of trustees. According to Reiter, the Acre board did not 
engage in any property transaction because they knew it would be unacceptable to the Muslim 
community: ‘Israeli Muslims who suffered from the obliteration of their past by the Jewish state 
are striving to preserve their cultural and architectural landmarks.’ Reiter, “The Waqf in Israel,” 
115–118. 
161 Reiter, ‘The Waqf in Israel’, 116. 
162 Ibid., 112–114. The other awqāf are al-Sha’bi, al-Sadiqi, Ali Pasha. 
163 Ibid., 126 note 48. The Northern Islamic Movement is in control of the al-Raml mosque, the 
Southern Islamic Movement of the Zahir al-Umar mosque and the Majadla Mosque, the Board of 
Trustees of the al-Jazzar Mosque and the Sinan Pasha Mosque, and the government of the 
Zaytun Mosque. 
164 Ibid., 122. 
165 World Heritage List – Old City of Acre. http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1042, accessed 22-10-
2013. Several actors are involved in this conservation program: the Acre municipality, the Israeli 
Antiquities Authority, and the Old Acre Development Company are all participating in the ‘Saving 
the Stones Program’ by the International Conservation Centre Old Acre. 
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This ‘development’ leads to gentrification as external entrepreneurs – both 
Jews and Arabs – purchase property to turn it into expensive hotels and 
restaurants, driving up the house prices.166 Renovations of residential parts of the 
old town have also met with mixed responses. In various cases, residents were 
presented with the bills for the renovations and evicted if they could not meet 
them. In 2011 Amidar announced its intention to sell real estate under its control. 
Residents were given the first opportunity to buy, but if they could not afford to 
(which was very likely considering the extreme level of poverty in this part of town 
and the inflated real estate prices), Amidar would sell to another buyer and the 
tenants would likely be evicted. This resulted in several reactions from civil 
society, such as the Akka mish li-l-bī‛ (Acre not for sale) campaign, which in 2014 
achieved a success in stopping the lease of Acre’s main monument and tourist 
attraction, the Khan al-Omdan.167 
 This neoliberal gentrification and ‘development’ is also linked to the 
movement to Judaize the town. The Judaization of the Galilee and the Negev 
has been a project of the Israeli government for a long time, including policies of 
economic marginalisation, land expropriation and Jewish settlement.168 Jewish 
neighbourhood committees and rabbis in the region have opposed the move of 
Palestinians to Jewish neighbourhoods. As many Jewish inhabitants of Acre 
moved to nearby towns such as Nahariyya and Karmiel concern grew over the 
Jewish character of the city. Since the 1990s right-wing religious settlers have 
begun to move into Acre with the express aim to ‘protect the Jewish character’ of 
the town, supported by the municipality and the government.169 
Another Judaizing initiative in Acre is Ayalim, founded in 2002 to increase 
Jewish settler activity in the Galilee and the Negev:170  
                                                  
166 Ranit Nahum-Halevy, ‘Acre Is the Place to Be’, Haaretz, 7 November 2011, 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/business/acre-is-the-place-to-be-1.372588. 
167 Sarah Irving, ‘Campaigners Claim Legal Victory in Akka Heritage Battle’, Electronic Intifada, 
30 January 2014, http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/sarah-irving/campaigners-claim-legal-victory-
akka-heritage-battle. 
168 Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians, 25–28, 48, 126–134. 
169 Eyad Barghouti, ‘Akka: A Palestinian Priority’, Al-Majdal 39/40 (2008-9): 18–26; Gershom 
Gorenberg, ‘Israel’s Other Occupation’, New York Times, 25 November 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/opinion/sunday/israels-other-occupation.html. 
170 Barghouti, ‘Akka: A Palestinian Priority.’ 
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The Ayalim Association believes that bringing students to settle in the Negev and 
the Galilee is a national undertaking of supreme importance. The association 
provides incentives such as scholarships and subsidized housing to encourage 
students to settle in such areas. After a period of living in the periphery, the 
association believes that students will become attached to the area and its 
people and that once they complete their studies a large share of them will chose 
to make their lives in the periphery. The association also works together with the 
Prime Minister’s Office and the Office of the Vice Prime Minister to promote 
incentives for graduates of the project that wish to remain in the Negev and the 
Galilee.171  
 
In 2007, the Israel Land Authority (ILA) handed three renovated buildings in the 
old town to Ayalim without any legal auction.172 Anno 2013 they were around 25 
people, including a Christian and a Druze, organising activities for the local 
children every day and organizing activities to bring people together, for example 
by organizing an East-West music evening with students and their friends at the 
Acco Theater.173 
 This Judaization not only takes place on the material real-estate level, but 
is also observable on the level of the narrative that is presented to tourists in 
which the Arab-Palestinian component of Acre’s history and society is ignored. 
The focus is on Acre as a Mediterranean or Crusader town, and in recent years 
an increasing number of plaques throughout the old town draw exclusive 
attention to the Jewish presence in Acre throughout the centuries. Dhaher al-
Omar and Ahmad Basha al-Jazzar are presented as uncivilized brutal leaders, 
and the Ottomans are presented as foreign rulers. No mention is made of the 
continuous local population.174 
Despite all this, Acre is presented as a showcase for peaceful 
coexistence. Since 1979 Acre’s annual Fringe Festival, or Israeli Festival of 
                                                  
171 Ayalim Website, http://ayalim.org.il/settle-the-land/. Accessed 27-02-2012. 
172 Barghouti, ‘Akka: A Palestinian Priority.’ 
173 Meeting with Acre’s local coordinator of Ayalim on 06-05-2013. Ayalim Akko Village: 
https://ayalim.org/akko/ Accessed 21-07-2014. 
174 Personal observations when visiting Acre in 2012 and 2013. 
 446
Alternative Theatre, has played a big role in this image. In 2000 its organisation 
passed to the municipality and since then it has been organised in collaboration 
with the OADC.175 The goal of the festival is to support this coexistence and 
dialogue: 
 
The Acre Festival also hopes to improve the historically tense relationship 
between Arabs and Jews in Acre. ‘The festival supports Arabic plays and Jewish 
and Arab co-productions. These collaborations contribute to the artistic dialogue 
and cooperation between Arab and Jewish creators and audiences,’ [artistic 
director Daniella] Michaeli says. In this spirit, every evening during the event, a 
parade of Arab and Jewish teenagers from around the Galilee will careen 
through the streets of Acre on stilts. The producer of the performance, Sigalit 
Gelfand says, ‘The festival sees theatrical language as fostering the coming-
together of hearts and minds, and creating a basis for cooperation.’176 
 
As described in Haaretz on the occasion of the Festival in 2011:  
 
Acre the festival and Acre the place are deeply intertwined, the city a stage and 
the stage a reflection of the city’s rich culture and history. Artists perform under 
cavernous stone-vaulted ceilings in Acre’s historic citadel, creating an ambiance 
both haunting and warm. ‘Acre is like a condensed model of Israel, with people 
from a wide variety of religions and ethnic backgrounds,’ says Smadar Yaaron, 
co-artistic director of this year’s festival. ‘Jews and Arabs really live together here 
and have a kind of coexistence. Here they have more communication, and things 
are merging more from one into another.’177 
 
 The image of co-existence fostered by the town’s officials and its 
presentation as ‘a condensed model of Israel’ was shown to be superficial as 
                                                  
175 Acco Fringe Festival of Alternative Theatre, General Background, 
http://www.accofestival.co.il/english/content.php?id=19. Accessed 22-02-2012. 
176 Andrew Tobin, ‘A Long Way of Broadway: The 29th Acre Festival of Alternative Israeli 
Theatre’, All About Jewish Theatre, accessed 4 July 2014, http://www.jewish-
theatre.com/visitor/article_display.aspx?articleID=3020. 
177 Ben Kaplan, ‘Acre Fringe: A Theater Festival Unlike Any Other in the World’, Haaretz, 27 
October 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/travel-in-israel/music-theater/acre-fringe-a-theater-festival-
unlike-any-other-in-the-world-1.392294. 
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violence between the communities increased, reaching a climax on Yom Kippur 
2008. A Palestinian resident of the old city drove through a predominantly Jewish 
neighbourhood after which riots broke out that lasted for five days. Palestinian 
residents of the neighbourhood fled – most of them did not manage to return to 
their homes.178 Afterwards, calls were heard to boycott Arab businesses in the 
town, and in particular to boycott the Fringe Festival which was to take place that 
same month. The Fringe Festival was at first cancelled,179 but later postponed to 
December.180 
 
 
8.4 Jaffa 
 
When Jaffa fell on 14 May 1948, 95% of the inhabitants fled. Those who 
remained or were internal refugees from surrounding villages were ghettoized in 
al-Ajami for two years, after which Jaffa was administratively incorporated into 
Tel Aviv-Yafo and the city was rapidly Judaized. The large homes were divided 
into apartments to house both Palestinians and Jewish immigrant families, 
forcing them to share bathrooms and kitchens throughout the 1950s and 60s. 
Arab neighbourhoods and surrounding villages were transferred to the Custodian 
(except for some church property), much old Arab architecture was demolished, 
and the Old City - including its awqāf181 - was turned into an artists’ colony and 
tourist attraction. State Judaization policies mainly focused on the Galilee, but 
                                                  
178 Isabel Kershner, ‘Israeli City Divided by Sectarian Violence’, New York Times, 13 October 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/world/middleeast/13mideast.html; Jack Khoury and 
Haaretz Correspondent, ‘Peres in Acre: We Have Many Religions, but One Set of Laws’, Haaretz, 
13 October 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/news/peres-in-acre-we-have-many-religions-but-one-
set-of-laws-1.255401; Hithabrut - Tarabut, ‘Acre Facing the New and Old Colonizers.’  
179 ‘Curtain Not to Be Raised on the 29th Acco Festival of Alternative Israeli Theatre’, All About 
Jewish Theatre, accessed 22 February 2012, http://www.jewish-
theatre.com/visitor/article_display.aspx?articleID=3024. 
180 Joshua Mitnick, ‘Israeli Palestinians and Jews: Acre Rioting Sparks New Debate On Shaky 
Coexistence’, New York Jewish Week, 10 December 2008, 
https://theshalomcenter.org/node/1460. 
181 Al-Wihda Mosque became a synagogue, al-Siksik mosque became a Bulgarian restaurant and 
nightclub, al-Nuzha was abandoned and used for prostitution. Part of the Abu Nabi cemetery 
became a park and the site of the Tel Aviv Hilton, part of the Taso cemetery became an urban 
expressway. Dumper, Islam and Israel, 55. 
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there was also pressure on the Palestinians in Jaffa in the form of disinvestment 
in Ajami and Jabaliyya, which led to poor education,182 crime, and widespread 
abuse of alcohol and drugs. Combining this with the shock of the nakba and a 
lack of social leadership, the social system broke down. Since the 1980s a 
planned neo-liberal development continues to lead to Judaization and 
gentrification.183  
As in Acre, the appropriation and renovation of religious buildings caused 
controversy, in Jaffa most notoriously surrounding the Hassan Bey Mosque, built 
in 1916 and the only pre-1948 building still standing in the Manshiyya 
neighbourhood. The Board of Trustees established in 1967 caused even more 
controversies.184 By 1978 complaints against the Board had reached such high 
levels that the government had to replace them. The new Board found out that 
the old Board had leased the Hassan Bey Mosque to a Jewish company directly 
after it was released by the Custodian for ‘development’ into a tourist and 
shopping centre. The new Board started a public campaign to put pressure on 
the municipality to annul the lease, culminating in a mass prayer in the mosque in 
1981 which attracted international media attention and substantial funds, after 
which the municipality declared the lease void.185 
The Judaization and gentrification we discussed in the context of Acre can 
also be seen in Jaffa. Amidar has issued hundreds of eviction orders to 
                                                  
182 Many Palestinian children were sent to Jewish schools because Arab schools were of very 
poor quality due to neglect in allocation of resources and quality of education, which amplified 
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Nabi cemetery in 1973. Dumper, Islam and Israel, 55–56; Luz, ‘Self-Empowerment’; Reiter, ‘The 
Waqf in Israel’, 113. 
185 Peled, Debating Islam in the Jewish State, 89–92; Luz, ‘Self-Empowerment.’ 
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Palestinians in Ajami and Jabaliyya. There is also a rise of settlers who aim to 
‘defend Jaffa’s Jewish character’ with support of the government and private 
organisations, especially since the settlements in Gaza were evacuated by force 
in 2005. In 2009 a Hesder Yeshiva was established in Ajami, which combines 
studying Torah with military service.186 Also in 2009, the ILA awarded one of 
Ajami’s few remaining building plots to B’Emuna, a construction company whose 
policy is to build only for Jews, and caters specifically to religious families, many 
of whom come from settlements in the West Bank.187 
 Social and political movements that aim to fight discrimination and protect 
the Palestinian heritage started to form in the 1970s, focusing on housing and 
education and on the renovation of mosques, churches, and public buildings. The 
Palestinian political and cultural revival during the 1990s was also felt in Jaffa, 
and during the Second Intifada activists showed their support for the Palestinians 
in the OPT.188 Many NGOs and activist groups are now based in Jaffa, most 
prominent among them the Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defense of Land and 
Housing Rights (also known as the Popular Committee against House Demolition 
in Jaffa) which was established in 2007 as a direct response to Amidar’s eviction 
orders.189 Several leaders of the Islamic Movement are popular in Jaffa and 
active in the public sphere.190 
 Because of the close interaction between Palestinians and Jews people 
are both close and distanced, giving a veneer of co-existence which covers the 
inequality between both communities, driving up the tension. Because Jaffa lies 
                                                  
186 Abu Shehadeh and Shbaytah, ‘Jaffa’, 14; Daniel Monterescu, ‘Radical Gentrifiers: The 
Changing Landscape of Social Action in Jaffa’, Jadal, no. 18 (2013), http://mada-
research.org/en/files/2013/12/Radical-gentrfiers-Daniel-Final1.pdf. 
187 Jonathan Cook, ‘Palestinians Fight Jewish-Only Housing in Jaffa’, Electronic Intifada, 16 
February 2010, http://electronicintifada.net/content/palestinians-fight-jewish-only-housing-
jaffa/8682. Accessed 20-10-2014. 
188 Monterescu, ‘Heteronomy’; Abu Shehadeh and Shbaytah, ‘Jaffa’, 11–13. 
189 In the words of Daniel Monterescu: ‘A mirror image of the settlers’ new interest in mixed 
towns, left-leaning Jews have become involved in anti-gentrification activism while at the same 
time being part of the city’s gentrification. In the process they are rebranding Jaffa as an 
alternative cultural space.’ Monterescu, ‘Radical Gentrifiers’, 4; Abu Shehadeh and Shbaytah, 
‘Jaffa’, 16–17. 
190 Monterescu, ‘Stranger Masculinities’, 133–135; Jonathan Cook, ‘Israel’s Secret Police 
Surveilling Islamic Leaders’, Electronic Intifada, 4 May 2010, 
http://electronicintifada.net/content/israels-secret-police-surveilling-islamic-leaders/8812. 
Accessed 20-10-2014. 
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within the densely populated centre of the Jewish state with no Palestinian 
villages or towns close by, the Palestinians in Jaffa feel both isolated from their 
Jewish neighbours and from the other Palestinians in Israel, often holding 
ambivalent attitudes to all communities living in Jaffa. Polarization on religious 
lines is increasing with the arrival of religious settlers and the growing popularity 
of the Islamic movement.191 
 
 
8.5 The Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Israel 
 
The absence of a thorough historical research of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in 
Israel and Palestine makes it hard to put the contemporary communities into their 
historical context. This paragraph aims to provide an introduction, but is forced to 
leave many questions unanswered, including the exact numbers of followers (a 
problem that pervades the entire order, see the remarks on statistics in 
paragraph 3.5.4), the issue of the maintenance of the zāwiya and the awqāf, and 
the issues related to the decline and rise of certain local communities and the 
relations between them. Further research is needed to place these contemporary 
translocal relations in their historical context. 
The Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Israel has suffered since 1948, as all 
Palestinian institutions have. A few months before the siege of Acre in April 1948, 
the Shaykh and his family had moved to Beirut. Most followers became refugees 
– it is unknown how many remained. All zawāya and properties were lost, apart 
from the zāwiya in Acre. Under Military Rule it was hard for the followers to 
connect to each other, and it was impossible to maintain relations with people 
outside of Israel. In the confusion following 1948 there were no meetings, but 
after a few months these slowly started again. Without access to a zāwiya or the 
Shaykh, ikhwānnā were completely dependent on the local communities. 
                                                  
191 Monterescu, ‘Stranger Masculinities’; Monterescu, ‘Heteronomy’, 167–170; Abu Shehadeh 
and Shbaytah, ‘Jaffa’, 14. 
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It seems that only two families remained in Acre, and no followers 
remained in Tarshiha and the other Galilean towns and villages. Refugees from 
other towns and villages in the Galilee moved into the zāwiya in Acre, both 
Shadhulis and non-Shadhulis, and it was a residential complex for more than 
thirty years. In Jaffa most followers fled to Gaza and only one family from 
ikhwānnā remained; the zāwiya was lost. The inhabitants in the region of Wadi 
Ara, including the villages of Umm al-Fahm and Mu’awiya remained.192 
When Military Rule was lifted in 1966 and the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
were occupied in 1967, relations between followers were restored. The zāwiya in 
Tarshiha was regained, but it is unclear how exactly.193 The community in Acre 
was diminishing and when muqaddam Nadim Antakli of Acre died,194 no other 
muqaddam was appointed. The community in Umm al-Fahm was thriving, and 
their muqaddam of Umm al-Fahm, Ibrahim Abu Hashish, also became 
responsible for the followers in Acre. In the 1970s they built a zāwiya in Umm al-
Fahm. In the 1980s, De Jong considered the muqaddam of Umm al-Fahm to be 
the de facto leader of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Israel. Van Ess considered 
the muqaddam’s son Mahmoud Abbasi the main spokesperson.195 As relations 
with the rest of the ṭarīqa outside of Israel were restored, it became possible to 
support the zāwiya and the community of ikhwānnā financially from abroad and 
funds started to come in that made renovations possible. 
It is unclear how the zawāya in Acre and Tarshiha remained in the hands 
of the ṭarīqa. On the ground the zāwiya in Acre was inhabited by followers and 
non-followers since 1948.196 From a legal perspective, as Shaykh Muhammad al-
Hadi had been the mutawallī of the Yashrutiyya’s awqāf, all awqāf should have 
been classified as absentee property, including the Yashruti waqf in Acre which 
was considered waqf ahlī.197 Reiter however says that the waqf had never been 
classified as absentee and that the board of mutawallīs had been appointed and 
                                                  
192 See paragraph 3.5.1. 
193 Interview TA1. 
194 One of the followers said he died in the 1960s, but De Jong says it was in 1973. De Jong, ‘Les 
Confréries Mystiques’, 221. 
195 Ibid.; Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 72. 
196 Interview TA1. 
197 De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 179 note 4. 
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supervised by the sharia court since 1948.198 Possible explanations could be that 
the Yashrutiyya community in Acre got its awqāf back just as the Christians had, 
even though their mutawallīs had been classified as ‘absentee’. Another 
possibility is that in 1965 when the Third Amendment to the Absentee Property 
Law gave space for awqāf to be released to the beneficiaries, the remaining 
urban awqāf of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya were released to the ṭarīqa, 
represented by a board of mutawallīs, rather than to the Yashruti family. Also 
relevant could be the 1955 ruling by the Supreme Court that the sharia courts 
had the authority to appoint a new mutawallī in the case of a privately 
administered waqf whose mutawallī was an absentee.199 Despite these 
questions, all sources agree that in 1952 all the other awqāf were confiscated, 
but the two zawāya in Acre and Tarshiha remained in the hands of the ṭarīqa.200 
Also unclear is the exact development of the administration of the zāwiya 
and its properties. By the 1980s De Jong mentioned a seven-member Committee 
appointed by the sharia court.201 According to Reiter the board of mutawallīs 
reorganised the management of the waqf with the support of the qāḍī, ‘to adapt 
the administration to the conditions of the modern economy, in which successful 
financial administration demands influential contacts and knowledge of the 
modern business world,’ organizing it ‘on a commercial basis integrating modern 
planning methods.’202 The previous main mutawallī Ibrahim Abu Hashish – who 
was a fallāḥ (farmer) – was replaced by his son Mahmoud Abbasi, a ‘public figure 
and prominent businessman’ who was then active in the Labour party and a 
candidate for Knesset as a leader of an Arab party.203 
After 1967, it became possible to support the zāwiya and the community 
of ikhwānnā financially from abroad and funds started to come in that made 
renovations possible. The first partial renovations were undertaken by Shaykh 
Muhammad al-Hadi in the late 1970s and early 1980s – De Jong wrote in 1983 
                                                  
198 Reiter, ‘The Waqf in Israel’, 112. 
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that the renovation of the takiya had been finished in 1979 and that the mashhad 
was nearing completion.204 After the agreement between Israel and Jordan in 
1994, the followers in Israel could visit Amman. In the meantime the Shaykh had 
visited Acre twice (to bury his father in 1980 and to commemorate the centennial 
of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s passing in 1996). When Ibrahim Abu Hashish died in 
1999, Shaykh Ahmad appointed two new muqaddamīn, one in Umm al-Fahm 
and one in Acre, a sign that Acre was rising in importance again.205  
Large-scale renovations started in 2006. The new leader of the board, 
AKR, has begun to undertake social projects, host tourists and participate in 
interfaith initiatives. All of this activity raises many questions regarding the social 
and political role of the ṭarīqa and the zāwiya in Israeli society, which shall be 
discussed in the next chapters. 
 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
We have seen that the Palestinians in Israel were isolated under Military Rule, 
and since this was lifted in 1966 they continue to experience marginalisation, 
discrimination, land confiscation and Judaization. The religious establishment 
has been poorly educated and co-opted and declined in authority and many 
Muslim and Christian holy places were Judaized or fell into disrepair. Some 
choose to work within the system, seeing Israel as a democracy, and those who 
choose to remain as aloof from the state as possible as they see Israel as an 
ethnocracy. In general, trust in national politics has collapsed among the 
Palestinian population and they turn to local politics or civil society instead, and 
the family continues to play a large role in their identity and their social and 
political organisation. We see the same issues in Acre and Jaffa, where rhetoric 
of co-existence and dialogue aims to cover up the socio-economic issues and the 
policies of Judaization that are happening there as in the rest of Israel.  
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 Their renewed contact with the rest of the Palestinians and the Arab world 
in 1967 led to the redefinition of their identity and their political agendas. This led 
to an Islamic revival as they reconnected to global trends in Islam and religious 
institutions in the Arab world, and to a rise of political Islamism in the form of 
Hamas in the Occupied Territories and the Islamic Movement in its different 
forms in Israel. Related to the Islamic revival is the issue of the Islamic holy 
places that are now being renovated by Palestinian activitsts of different 
ideological persuasions, but most notably by the Islamist Movement. 
At the same time, we see a limited Sufi revival as several types of 
indigenous Sufism seem on the rise in Israel and Jerusalem – as centrally 
organised ṭuruq, as local Sufi groups around a shaykh, or ‘rebranded’ as ‘Islamic 
ethics and religious education framed within tradition’, renamed ‛ilm al-tawḥīd. 
These trends are similar to global trends among reformist Sufi movements and 
the rebranding of Sufism as Traditional Islam,206 and the renewed focus on Sufi 
spirituality as a reaction to materialist Modernism,207 but have their local 
motivations as well, as they provide a ‘third option’ for Palestinian Muslims 
between secularism and Islamism – a way to reconnect to their religious heritage 
which is not deemed political. Geaves argues that as modernisation and 
liberalisation provided Palestinians with more options, one option was this return 
to spirituality rooted in Islam. It is an option that is more authentic than the Israeli 
‘new spirituality’, which is criticized by Palestinian Muslims for both spiritual and 
political reasons, as it sees Sufism through a perennial lens as Universal Sufism, 
and is often connected to problematic initiatives of interfaith dialogue.208 
The Israeli Sufi milieu shows that an analytical approach which focuses 
solely on Sufi ṭuruq – like Weismann’s and Hermansen’s209 – is inadequate to 
explore all aspects of Sufism. Hermansen’s categorisation of ‘transplants’, 
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‘hybrids’ and ‘perennials’, and of ‘theirs’ and ‘ours’,210 can be used with a lot of 
sidenotes as the categories of ‘East’ and ‘West’, and ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ are 
confused and shifting, and it is therefore more useful to turn to Stjernholm’s 
approach of focusing on the relationship between shaykh and disciple, and of 
analysing in which historical tradition a group, sub-group, or individual places 
him/herself.211 In the next few chapters, we shall examine where the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya fits in this milieu, and what this means for the 
relationship between the Shaykh and his followers. As the zāwiya in Acre is the 
original sacred centre of the ṭarīqa and contains the tombs of the first three 
Shaykhs, we will give extensive attention to its role in the ṭarīqa and how this 
affects the current Shaykh’s position. 
 We are therefore left with the question in what way the current 
developments undergone by the Shadhuliyya-Yashryutiyya, particularly the 
renovation of the zāwiya in Acre, relate to this limited Sufi revival in Israel, both 
amongst Palestinians and Jews, and to the renewed interest in sacred space. Is 
the ṭarīqa participating in a global Islamic revival, as De Jong wondered? Or 
should it be seen as a continuation of its own tradition? Why does AKR 
participate in dialogue initiatives, what role does he take on, who does he 
represent, and what are the attitudes of his fellow ṭarīqa-members?  
The next chapters shall examine how the followers of the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya fared in these circumstances, how this influenced their relationship 
with the Shaykh and with each other, and where to place the ṭarīqa in this 
context. 
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Chapter 9 
The Shaykh in Acre and Jaffa 
 
 
This chapter will first discuss how followers in Israel experienced the changing 
circumstances of access to the Shaykh and each other since 1948. Then we 
shall discuss how they see the Shaykh and which roles they attribute to him, and 
which view of the Shaykh is communicated to outsiders by AKR, the mutawallī 
who acts as the representative to outsiders. 
 
 
9.1 Access to the Shaykh 
 
Most followers in Israel grew up without access to the Shaykh. A few who were 
children in 1948 remember Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi, but had no physical 
contact with him after 1948. They could not travel to Beirut to visit Shaykh 
Muhammad al-Hadi, or to Amman to visit his son Shaykh Ahmad who has been 
based there since 1960. The only option followers from Israel had to visit the 
Shaykh in Amman was to go on ḥajj, which had been allowed via Jordan in 
1978,1 and to take the opportunity to meet him in Amman on the way. 
Sīdī Ahmad himself went on ḥajj in 1978, accompanied by many followers. 
When he became shaykh in 1980 he went on ḥajj a second time, again 
accompanied by many followers, this time including around 40-50 people from 
Israel. A follower from Jaffa recollects that they met the Shaykh in Medina and 
stayed there for a whole week, reading waẓīfa and doing ḥaḍra every day in the 
house of one of the followers who lived there, and inside the ḥarām.2 A follower 
                                                  
1 Rekhess, Islamism Across the Green Line, 1–2. 
2 A follower in Jaffa who was there estimates there were 400 followers in total. Informal 
discussion with JA3 on 11-05-13. 
 457
from Acre saw Shaykh Ahmad for the first time on this occasion. He loved him 
instantly and did mubāya‛a with the Shaykh.3 
A year later, Shaykh Ahmad got approval from the Israeli authorities to 
rebury his father’s body in the zāwiya in Acre. He and many followers were 
allowed to remain in Israel for one day and he visited Acre, Tarshiha and Jaffa. 
For many followers in Israel, this was the first time they saw their Shaykh. A 
follower from Acre remembers this event in fractured language that underlines 
the emotional content of her words: 
 
When they brought the immaculate body (al-jusmān al-ṭāher4) of Sīdnā 
[Muhammad] al-Hadi from Beirut to Acre, I saw the Shaykh in Acre. And Umm Ali 
[his wife]. (...) They were feelings, we could not believe ourselves, we saw the 
Shaykh! We heard heard heard... we see. Truly when we were blessed 
(tbaraknā) and we saw Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ahmad, we felt very much that it is good to 
see him.5 
 
The visit to Jaffa was not planned and is remembered as a miraculous 
occurrence for the followers in Jaffa. The muqaddam at the time was too old to 
travel and had refused to go to Acre to meet the Shaykh. ‘I don’t want to go, I 
want him to come to me’ he said. The Shaykh and those who accompanied him 
were in Tarshiha when someone told the muqaddam’s son: ‘Take your brothers 
and go home, Sīdnā wants to go to your father.’  
 
It is 104 kilometres from Tarshiha to Jaffa, how I went home! ‘Yaba yaba yaba! 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā wants to come visit you!’ (...) Ikhwānnā and Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā came. 
The whole street of my father’s house was full of cars. Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā and all of 
ikhwānnā wore suits. One of our neighbours from upstairs, a Christian, said: 
‘That is the Shaykh!’ I asked her ‘how did you know?’ – there were so many 
                                                  
3 Interview AK3. 
4 Expression also used by a follower in Jaffa in Interview JA1 with three followers in Jaffa on 10-
05-2013, hereafter referred to as Interview JA1 10-05-2013. 
5 Interview with a follower in Acre on 04-05-2013, referred to hereafter as Interview AK1. 
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people wearing suits. She said ‘the light comes from his face, he is different from 
all those present.’ And she was a Christian! She said ‘I saw the light.’6 
  
It was the first time he honoured (sharrafat) [Jaffa]. He saw ikhwānnā, how happy 
we were because of Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā, we chanted nashīd, we kissed hands, we 
were happy because of Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā. He said ‘I am proud of you. Despite all 
temptations that are in the world around you, you continued to hold on to your 
‛aqīda, to the ‛aqīda. You continued to hold on. I am proud of you.’7 
 
In 1996 the Shaykh visited again. Many followers from Jaffa also went to 
Acre and were very happy to see their Shaykh. ‘It was like eid, it was like a 
wedding.’8 The Shaykh gave everyone a Qur’an with his or her name written in it, 
and a maṣbaḥa.9 
Since the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan in 1994 and the 
subsequent opening of the borders in 1996 it has been easier for the followers in 
Israel to visit the Shaykh in Amman. The frequency of the visits naturally differs 
per individual – some visit every month while others visit once every few years. A 
follower in Acre saw the Shaykh for the first time in Amman, and recalls ‘it was 
very emotional. It was awe-inspiring (fī raḥba), he is very great (‛aẓīm).’ For her, 
meeting the Shaykh face-to-face changed her understanding of the Shaykh and 
the practices of the ṭarīqa: 
  
The Shaykh is not present but they talked about him and we saw videos of the 
mawlid. It was a bit difficult to grasp (ishi mish malmūs), but when I went and 
visited the Shaykh and greeted him it became clearer. It was face-to-face, 
different. Of course it changes, it is more beautiful and there is more maḥabba. It 
had been talqīn (learning, memorizing) before meeting the Shaykh. We have to 
pray and read waẓīfa because the Shaykh loves us. (...) A human being remains 
                                                  
6 JA1 in Interview JA1 16-04-2012. 
7 JA1 in Interview JA1 10-05-2013. 
8 JA2 in Interview JA2 with six followers in Jaffa on 10-05-2013 (unrecorded), hereafter referred 
to as Interview JA2. 
9 JA4 in Interview JA2. 
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a human being, flesh and blood, something you can grasp, who sees influences 
more, and of course you feel more secure (bi-l-‘amān).10 
 
A follower from Jaffa said she could never look at his face, not on a picture 
and not in real life – the same goes for his family because they are different. She 
first saw him in Acre when she was a teenager in 1996, but she still cannot look 
at him. She gets nervous, she cannot speak, it’s like her heart jumps out of her 
chest, she cannot express her emotions. Others from ikhwānnā told her this is 
right, there is no wrong way to see him as he is so great (kabīr).11 
Other followers say that while their first meeting with the Shaykh was a 
very happy occasion, they had already developed a strong spiritual connection 
with him.12 One follower from Acre remarks that when he saw Shaykh Ahmad in 
real life, he was not a stranger to him. He was very happy that he could finally tell 
the Shaykh how much he loved him and kiss his hand, but had never considered 
him to be far away because he had met him in his dreams.13 Another follower in 
Acre has a similar story: He never saw the Shaykh, but through his tarbiya, 
through reading waẓīfa and performing dhikr etc. he had developed a spiritual 
connection with him which is stronger than the physical connection. He saw him 
in real life after the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, but he stresses this 
was not the first time.14  
Followers in Jaffa also say this. ‘It doesn’t matter where we go, the 
Shaykh is with us wherever we are, he is ‘ṣāḥib al-waqt, he is wherever you 
go.’15 
 
The borders were closed, we heard Sīdnā, we did what he said. Sīdnā said this, 
we did not change. Whatever he says is sacred (muqaddas) for us. (...) And we 
feel that he loves us... without borders.16 
                                                  
10 Interview with a follower in Acre on 05-05-2013, hereafter referred to as Interview AK2. 
11 Informal discussion with JA5 on 13-05-2013. 
12 Interview with a follower in Acre on 16-05-2013 (unrecorded), hereafter referred to as Interview 
AK5. 
13 Interview with a follower in Acre on 04-05-2013 at the zāwiya in Acre (unrecorded), hereafter 
referred to as Interview AK4. 
14 Interview AK5. 
15 Informal discussion with JA7 on 13-05-2013. 
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 Several followers say that the borders do not make a difference, that they 
do not stop the love and relationship between them and the Shaykh. They all 
believe that the Shaykh knows all of them, even if he has never met them in 
person. Some followers meet the Shaykh in their dreams and therefore do not 
feel estranged from him. Even when the borders are closed, the Shaykh knows 
all the fuqarā’.17 Even so, it is special for them to meet him in person and they 
treasure these memories. 
 Due to the nakba and the relations between Israel and Jordan most 
followers met Shaykh Ahmad for the first time when he came to Israel in 1981 
and 1996, and even now they can travel freely do not meet him often. Their 
answers show, however, that they had been instructed through the community 
and that meeting him was not the beginning of their engagement with the ṭarīqa, 
even though it was a very emotional moment. This shows a similar attitude as 
that of the older followers in Jordan who in their youth only saw Shaykh 
Muhammad al-Hadi sporadically when he visited Jordan from Beirut, and points 
to the attitude that while the outer manifestation is important, it is the spiritual 
relation that counts, and which can be cultivated regardless of actual physical 
encounters.  
 
   
9.2 Views of the Followers in Acre and Jaffa 
 
As in Amman, the followers in Acre and Jaffa agree that ‘all the Shaykhs are 
one,’ meaning the four Shaykhs of the Yashruti family.18 For them, the 
succession is also based on the genealogical and spiritual inheritance. The focus 
on the Yashruti family seems to be even stronger than in Amman, and they refer 
to the Shaykh’s family as ahl al-bayt, ‘people of the house’, a term which among 
                                                                                                                                                   
16 JA1 during Interview JA1 16-04-2012. 
17 Interview AK3. 
18 See paragraph 5.1. 
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Muslims in general is used to refer to the family of the Prophet.19 Like in Amman, 
their main focus is on the living Shaykh, even if they have less access to him. 
The development of the spiritual relationship is even more relevant here. While 
they do have access to the tombs and visit them and value them as connections 
to the ‘charismatic moment’, they have not taken the main focus away from the 
current Shaykh.20 One follower says that Shaykh Ahmad continues (bikammel) 
what the previous Shaykhs have started; there is continuation, it never stops, and 
when a Shaykh passes away, the next will take over.21 A follower in Jaffa 
explains that Sheikh Ahmad follows the footsteps of Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi, 
and this is how it will continue: ‘In other ṭuruq the Shaykh is dead, but our Shaykh 
is present (mawjūd).’22 
The main view of the Shaykh’s role in Acre and Jaffa is the intertwined 
image of the Shaykh as a father figure who is concerned with their well-being, 
education and behaviour, and with the Shaykh as a teacher and guide. A follower 
in Acre says that the Shaykh teaches the ta‛līm and akhlāq muḥammadiya, and 
that his teaching is exactly the same as Muhammad’s teaching, although Shaykh 
Ali Nur al-Din renewed the faith (tajdīd la-l-dīn). This follower left school to work 
at a young age but he learnt from God directly through his spiritual practice – this 
is one of the Shaykh’s miracles.23 Another follower states that ‘the ṭarīqa is a 
good school (madrasa).’ The Shaykh brings them closer to God by showing the 
direct road, not the longer route; for example, ‘he made the distance of a hundred 
kilometers into a hundred meters.’ This follower connects this guidance function 
to the responsibility the Shaykh takes for his followers and the image of the 
Shaykh as a father: he is ‘my father in spirit (rūḥ), he is responsible for me in 
spirit.’24 
                                                  
19 Informal discussion with AK6 on 06-05-2013. The veneration shown by Sufis for the Prophet 
often extends to his family. For an extensive discussion of this in the Egyptian context, see 
Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 68–87. 
20 For an extensive analysis of the role of the zāwiya in Acre for the followers in Amman and in 
Acre and Jaffa, see paragraphs 11.1 and 11.2 
21 Interview AK5. 
22 Informal discussion with JA2 on 12-05-2013. 
23 Interview AK3. 
24 Interview AK5. 
 462
Another follower in Acre also says that the Shaykh is the all-knowing and 
infallible teacher whose teachings come from his predecessors; he teaches them 
the Islamic practices and a community feeling: 
 
The Shaykh is very great (kabīr), I didn’t see like him. First the Lord of the Worlds 
(rabb al-‛ālimīn), then Sayyidnā Muhammad, then the Shaykh.(...) [He is] great 
(kabīr) because he is the ṣāḥib al-ṭarīqa, ṣāḥib al-ḥaqq (master of truth) and he is 
right and we walk on the path because it is right, this is why we believe in him 
and respect him and we consider him holy (menqadsuh). (...) And alḥamdulillah 
we are proud to be from abnā al-ṭarīqa al-Shādhuliyya al-Yashruṭiyya. Many 
times people ask what the ṭarīqa is, who are you? It is known that we are 
Muslims, Sunnis, we pray, we fast during Ramadan, we don’t stop our duties, we 
visit each other, we love each other, that is what is necessary. That is what the 
Shaykh teaches us. (...) [He teaches] from inheritance (min warātha), from the 
inheritance of his grandfather, his father, from one to one he took it. (...) Inshallah 
God will lengthen the age of Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ahmad, after him Sīdnā Ali, and they 
work one after the other, from Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā al-Hadi the grandfather, Sīdnā Ali 
Nur al-Din was before him, Sīdnā Ibrahim, one after the other they follow each 
other through the warātha.25 
 
All followers profess a deep attachment to the Shaykh, regardless of the 
frequency of their visits. The image of the Shaykh as a father is communicated to 
me much more strongly in Israel than in Jordan. They see the Shaykh as a father 
who knows and loves all his children.26 A commonly heard phrase is ‘we love the 
Shaykh, but he loves us more.’27 One follower who grew up in the zāwiya in Acre 
got very emotional while exclaiming that ‘[the Shaykh is] everything in my life,’ 
that the Shaykh is his father and he cannot do without him, like when a child 
needs his mother. All the previous Shaykhs are all Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā, there is no 
difference; as the Shaykh is his father, they are his grandfathers.28 
                                                  
25 Interview AK1. 
26 Informal discussion with AK2 and AK4 on 08-04-2012, Interview AK2. 
27 Interview AK2, informal discussion between two followers from Acre 10-04-12. 
28 Interview AK4. 
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A follower in Jaffa also says that the Shaykh is like his spiritual father who 
will always look after them:29 ‘When he calls us he says “my son.” There are so 
many murīdīn who go to him in Amman, but he knows everyone, he calls them by 
their [given] name. (...) We feel that we are like his children. He is like our 
spiritual father.’30 It is told that when someone asked him how he could 
remember all the names he answered: ‘how can a father forget his son’s 
name?’31 
In Jaffa there is also a very strong focus on the Shaykh as a spiritual and 
moral educator: 
 
We take the rules (awāmir) and the ‛ilm from him, we take madad from him. (...) 
[He is] the guide who guides you on the right path. (...) We love him, we love him 
a lot a lot a lot a lot.32 
 
The Shaykh teaches them to love each other and look after each other. Their 
hospitality towards each other and towards me is explained as one of Shaykh 
Ahmad’s continuing karāmāt. ‘Shaykh Ahmad teaches us, protects us, he makes 
sure everyone has a place to stay everywhere.’33 The Shaykh wants his followers 
to be good people and to give zakāa in the form of love and patience.34 For 
example, a follower in Jaffa works with Jewish Israelis who were prejudiced 
towards Muslims, but changed their minds when they met her – she says this is 
because of the Shaykh, because ‘God and the Shaykh make us strong 
(yuqaddirnā) and we carry the responsibility and the strength.’35 
The roles of the Shaykh as teacher and father are inextricably intertwined. 
A follower in Jaffa puts it the following way: You do what your father says 
                                                  
29 Interview JA1 10-05-2013. 
30 JA1 in Interview JA1 16-04-2012. 
31 JA4 in Interview JA2 10-05-2013. 
32 JA1 in Interview JA1 16-04-2012. 
33 Informal discussion with JA3 on 11-05-2013. 
34 JA4 in Interview JA2. A similar obeservation is made by Pnina Werbner in her discussion of the 
lodge and the langar of Zindapir at Ghamkol Sharif where his generosity is seen as a a miracle ‘of 
deeply enshrined custom’ which is created by his followers but is still seen as a miracle – and as 
she points out, in a sense it is: ‘The fact that this selflessness is inspired by the love of a Sufi 
saint inspires his divine grace.’ Werbner, Pilgrims of Love, 100. 
35 Informal discussion with JA5 on 13-05-2013. 
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because you love him, when you do what he says he will be happy and he will 
love you more. You go, kiss his hand, receive baraka, listen to a few words, and 
you will remain happy inside for years. ‘When Sīdnā said a word maybe twenty, 
thirty years ago, we say it is a ḥadīth from Sīdnā. He says to you “my son go like 
this, do this, say this,” he gives you advice on spiritual and physical matters.’36 
They see the Shaykh as their protector, who protects them from bad 
habits37 and who protects them towards the outside world. When there is a war 
they are not afraid – the Shaykh is their shelter, the ‛ibādāt continue and the 
ḥaḍra makes them calm.38 
According to one of the followers in Jaffa the Shaykh had a lot of influence 
on the Bedouin followers in Gaza, ikhwānnā al-‘arab: according to her, they were 
very closed and conservative (mutsakkirīn) but thanks to the infitāḥ of the Shaykh 
they became more liberal like the other ikhwānnā, and nowadays you do not 
notice their Bedouin background any more. The muqaddam of ikhwānnā al-‘arab 
wore traditional badawī clothes – a large heavy cloak and weapons – but when 
he visited the Shaykh, he wore a simple white cloth and left everything else at 
home. This is an example of the positive value that is attributed to his innovative 
and ‘modernizing’ approach, as he taught this – in her view – traditional closed 
community to become more open and to go along with the times and with 
society.39 
The strong attachment to the Shaykh and his family, the ahl al-bayt, is 
often expressed in a material way: in living rooms in Israel there are portraits of 
all shapes and sizes, from official framed photos in the living room to smaller 
photos amongst the family pictures that an outsider would mistake for the picture 
of a beloved father or grandfather. Of course I only visited the rooms of the 
house to which I was invited, but the difference between the single portrait found 
                                                  
36 JA1 in Interview JA1 10-05-2013. 
37 JA2 in Interview JA2. 
38 Informal discussion with JA2 and JA9 on 13-05-2013. 
39 Informal discussion with JA2 on 12-05-2013. It would be interesting to further explore how the 
different communities of followers see each other. While they love and respect each other, they 
do classify each other in terms of madanī, badawī and fallaḥī, including the relevant stereotypes: 
the followers in Umm al-Fahm are considered fallaḥīn, the followers in al-Qarara Bedouin, and the 
followers in Acre, Jaffa and Gaza City are proud to be urban. 
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in the guest rooms in Amman – which I was not pointed to explicitly – and the 
multitude of portraits, pictures, newspaper clippings etc. adorning the walls in 
living rooms in Israel was striking. When visiting a home in Israel, I was almost 
always given a tour of the pictures in those rooms I was welcome to visit, and 
often more pictures were taken from their rooms and shown to me with a lot of 
enthusiasm and reverence.  
In Jaffa a follower showed me a coin that was made for the occasion of 
Shaykh Ahmad’s younger son Sīdī Essam’s wedding. They celebrated the 
wedding with ikhwānnā in the zāwiya and elsewhere with other guests. She says 
that people took the coins without knowing their meaning, but she attributed great 
importance to it and wears it as a necklace. She says that Shaykh Ahmad has 
the Muhammadan attributes (ṣiffāt muḥammadiya), and passed this on to his 
sons Sīdī Ali and Sīdī Essam. Sīdī Essam is ṣāleh, he has ma‛rifa and ma‛lūmāt, 
but he will not be the next Shaykh. God has told Shaykh Ahmad that Ali will be 
the next Shaykh, it was ilhām from God. They can feel that this is true, from his 
attributes (ṣiffāt).40 
It is common for the followers to ask the Shaykh for advice regarding 
personal issues and they take his advice seriously. One follower told me that the 
Shaykh had given him advice whom to wed, and he did indeed marry the lady. 
The Shaykh sometimes also gives advice on how to name a child. I do not know 
how common these practices are, but they were discussed and told to me as 
normal parts of life.41 
 Many stories told in Israel today refer to the clairvoyance of the Shaykh 
and the possibility of a spiritual connection between the Shaykh and his 
followers. For example, during the Mandate period, Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi 
was sitting on an old capitol stone near the gate of the zāwiya (which is still lying 
on the ground there today) and was watching towards the south, sending signs 
(ishārāt) to a Bedouin tribe because he wanted them to come to Acre and follow 
                                                  
40 Informal discussion with JA2 on 12-05-2012. 
41 Informal discussion with two followers in Acre on 12-04-2012, and with followers in Bayt Hanina 
(East Jerusalem) on 02-05-2013. 
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him, but he was very worried for their journey. Some of them came and joined 
the ṭarīqa and are now known as ikhwānnā al-‘arab.42 
Another story refers to Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s powers and connects them 
to the possibility of spiritual travel: a follower in Acre did not understand how the 
mi‛rāj happened. He wanted to ask Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din, and met him on the 
street when he went to visit him in his horse and carriage. The Shaykh was 
holding a little box, which he tapped twice, and the man was in Mecca with his 
horse and carriage. He tapped it twice again, and he was back in Acre. For this 
follower, it means that you cannot explain how these feelings and spiritual 
journeys happen, you have to experience them. His wife explains that not only 
the Prophet Muhammad can do mi‛rāj – everyone can. In her words, their 
feelings go towards God, he accepts them and sends them back down. By 
following the Shaykh, everyone can experience the mi‛rāj. Implicitly this story 
conveys the message that if one simply trusts the Shaykh without trying to 
understand his powers rationally, one can be part of these secrets.43 
 The karāmāt attributed to Shaykh Ahmad also refer mainly to his mental 
powers – he is said to know everything about all his followers. When followers 
are visiting the zāwiya they always ask for the Shaykh’s permission to return 
home. Once a couple was visiting and the husband wanted to return to go back 
to work, but his wife wanted to stay. The Shaykh told them to stay a few days 
longer, and this follower lovingly blamed his wife that this was because the 
Shaykh knew she did not want to leave.44 When an old lady came from Cyprus to 
Amman to greet him, he had just left to the airport to visit his followers in 
Lebanon. She was very upset, but he came back saying he had forgotten his 
passport – but the followers know that it was because he knew she wanted to 
greet him. 45 It is also said that he can influence what people are thinking. When 
                                                  
42 Informal discussion with AK6 on 06-05-2013. 
43 Informal discussion JA2, JA8 and JA6 on 13-05-2013. 
44 Informal discussion with AK6 on 06-05-2013. 
45 Informal discussion with AK6 on 06-05-2013. 
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a poor person came to the zāwiya to give the Shaykh money, the Shaykh made 
him forget because he knew that he was poor and could not afford it.46 
 One follower delighted in telling me such stories – when asked which 
Shaykh she was referring to exactly she was not always sure. This is an 
interesting illustration that the professed truth that all the Shaykhs are one is 
deeply ingrained in their consciousness – it is not always important which Shaykh 
we are discussing as it is the Shaykh’s essence and the essential truth the story 
refers to that matters.47 
 There are different levels of understanding of the doctrine among the 
followers. Interesting to note is that while the idea of the ‛aqīda is there and is 
sometimes referred to, it plays a much smaller role in the discourse of the 
followers in Acre and Jaffa than we have seen in Amman. A follower in Jaffa, 
when asked how she sees the Shaykh, explains that God loves us and gave us 
the nūr muḥammadiya that never goes out and from which all the anbiyā’ came. 
The Shaykh is present wherever you go because he is the ṣāḥib al-waqt. She 
concludes: 
 
The light is one, Muhammad is one, Sīdnā is one. They are the sun and the 
moon; they are always present because they come from the divine light (nūr 
illāhī). They are the nūr muḥammadī that never goes out, which shines for the 
people because God loves them.48 
 
While most people did not discuss doctrinal issues with me at great length, AKR 
did spend a lot of time explaining his ideas to me. It is to his views that we shall 
now turn. 
 
 
 
                                                  
46 Informal discussion with AK6 on 06-05-2013. 
47 Informal discussion with AK6 on 06-05-2013. 
48 Informal discussion with JA7 on 13-05-2013. 
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9.3 The View of AKR49 
 
All followers in Acre and most in Jaffa grew up within the ṭarīqa. AKR however is 
a recent convert – he comes from a Palestinian Muslim family in Acre but was 
not brought up religious. It is not quite clear what his professional background is 
– he himself told me that he has been a politician and has done neuroscientific 
research on the effect of meditation on the brain,50 but most people seem to 
agree that he worked for the Old Acre Development Company before he met the 
Shaykh and took on the position of mutawallī in 1996.51 
Even though he only converted in the 1990s, there are already several 
versions of his conversion story, all involving him traveling to Amman as part of a 
political delegation and being introduced to Shaykh Ahmad by King Hussayn or – 
more likely – by Mahmoud Abbasi, whom Van Ess considered the main 
representative of the ṭarīqa at the time.52 He described his first meeting with 
Shaykh Ahmad as a spark, an attraction, which cannot be explained.53 According 
to him, this meeting with the Shaykh brings enlightenment (ināra), awareness, it 
is the moment when you change your life, change your direction, you turn the 
corner (zāwiya) of your life, which can also be seen metaphorically as a 
representation of the mi‛rāj. In this moment, the Shaykh inspires you: ‘the Shaykh 
gives me, he makes me drunk, he takes everything that I know, my knowledge, 
                                                  
49 AKR is the mutawallī of the ṭarīqa’s awqāf and as such responsible for the renovations of the 
zāwiya. In addition to this, he hosts tourists and students and engages in social projects and 
interfaith dialogue initiatives, which he sees as part of the same project but which according to the 
Review Panel are not part of his job description. In the first draft of my thesis which I sent to the 
Review Panel I referred to him as ‘the representative of the ṭarīqa in Israel’, because this is how 
he referred to himself. This was heavily contested by the Review Panel, who stressed that he is 
not the representative but simply one of the followers. As a compromise, I have chosen to refer to 
him as AKR – a different code than used for other followers to show his different position, but not 
referring to him as ‘the representative’. His actual position is discussed in the appropriate places 
in the thesis (…). For more on this issue and on the comments of the Review Panel, see chapter 
2. 
50 Unrecorded interview AKR 23-02-2012. 
51 Informal discussions with followers in Acre and Jaffa. 
52 Interview AKR 27-02-2012, informal discussion with JA2 on 12-05-2013, Ben Arieh, Zawiya., 
42. JA2 says the reason for the trip was to offer condolences on the death of King Hussayn’s 
mother, which would place the conversion in 1994, two years before he became the mutawallī of 
the zāwiya in Acre. 
53 Interview with AKR 27-02-2012 and 13-04-2012. 
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and gives me his knowledge.’54 In his words, the Shaykh gives the knowledge to 
the follower as Israfil gives the soul to the body.55 The Shaykh gives you the tools 
to follow the path, which is enacted through the rituals in the community. 
Therefore, after his conversion he practiced in the community – and he studied. 
He read the books of Fatima al-Yashrutiyya and through them he became 
interested in the works of Ibn Arabi. He also met many other Muslim and Jewish 
Sufis in Israel and the West and discussed with them.56 
AKR’s stress on the inspiration given by the Shaykh is quite large when 
compared to the views of other followers in Acre. According to him Shaykh 
Ahmad said: ‘Go back to your heart.’ According to him the Shaykh gives you the 
tools to develop yourself on the path – and make your own interpretations of 
sacred texts and law: 
 
Shaykh Ali [Nur al-Din] said: ‘You and your God.’ Shaykh Ahmad says: ‘You 
alone decide. You must decide.’ It is new you see, Shaykh Ahmad became more 
individual. He strengthened the individuality, more than Shaykh Ali [Nur al-Din]. 
And he made it clear that you have your God inside you. Go back to your God 
which sits inside you. This is the difference between the two Shaykhs.57 
 
An important part of his view of the Shaykh is his omniscience – one does 
not have to ask the Shaykh for anything, because he will know. Even more so, 
one should not ask the Shaykh anything directly. He says that the followers 
asked him to invite the Shaykh and he refused, because according to him when 
the Shaykh would come a calamity would happen: There was a man in Syria who 
had invited Shaykh Ahmad, and the Shaykh had said that he would come on 
such-and-such a day. The man had an accident the day before the arrival of the 
Shaykh, and indeed the Shaykh was there to attend his funeral. The message is 
that one has to be careful when dealing with the Shaykh and not express one’s 
                                                  
54 Interview AKR 27-02-2012. 
55 Interview AKR 27-02-2012. 
56 For an overview of the Israeli Sufi milieu, the Jewish Sufi circles in Israel and the Palestinian 
and foreign Sufi leaders they engage with, see paragraph 8.2.4. 
57 Interview AKR 27-02-2012. The Review Panel says this is not a true story. Review Panel, 
‘Response to email of October 12’. 
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will. ‘When he wants to come let him come, don’t interfere. Ask him nothing, let it 
go.’58 
He explains that the Shaykh has a direct and ceaseless connection to the 
ḥaḍra muḥammadiya, ‘the Muhammadan presence’, the first of God’s creations, 
the spirit of Muhammad which emanated in all the Prophets. The Shaykh 
therefore has duality, a human character and a light character. As such he is the 
barzakh,59 the medium between the realms of the physical and the spiritual, 
holding everything together – he is al-insān al-kāmil. He is the only one who can 
know God completely, he is the ‛ārif bi-llah, the ṣāḥib al-waqt who controls time 
and can be at several places at once.60 AKR also explained Ibn Arabi’s chapter 
on Shu‛ayb in Fusus al-Ḥikām in these terms, saying that on the one hand al-
insān al-kāmil is part of the ḥaḍra muḥammadiya and in connection with God, his 
heart encompassing the whole universe, all-knowing, in constant fanā’ with God, 
while on the other hand he is in connection with the world as a human being who 
approaches God through His Names, His manifestations in the material world. In 
this status he is embraced by God’s Mercy (Raḥma) and he is in baqā’. 61 
According to him the main difference between Ibn Arabi and Shaykh Ali Nur al-
Din al-Yashruti was that while Ibn Arabi focused on this state of baqā’ and on 
approaching God through the Names, Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din focussed on the 
state of fanā’ and how he as al-insān al-kāmil and the quṭb al-zamān embraces 
all and is omniscient.62  
According to him Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din was choosen before time to be al-
insān al-kāmil and quṭb al-zamān and to come to Acre:  
 
He came, he appeared and his family became Shaykhs. (...) Shaykh Ali [Nur al-
Din was] one of the poles of the Shadhuli order. (...) Shaykh Ali [Nur al-Din] was 
                                                  
58 Interview AKR 29-03-2012 and 16-05-2013. 
59 The barzakh is the connection between the Creator and His creation, envisioned either as an 
ontological realm, or as embodied in al-Insān al-Kāmil, the Perfect Man. Chittick, ‘Ibn Arabi and 
His School’, 65–66. 
60 Interview AKR 12-04-2012 
61 Interview AKR 13-04-2012. He suggested this particular translation to me: Ibn al-ʻArabī, The 
Bezels of Wisdom, transl. R.W.J. Austin (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1980), 145–155. 
62 Interview AKR 13-04-2012. 
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something very very very special. He was appointed to be Shaykh before he was 
born. And he had a duty to come to Acre to have this order, this path. (...) He 
knew a lot; whatever you want he knows. Whatever you hide in your mind he 
knew that. He was powerful.63  
 
His successors share in this rank as they are reflections of this quṭb – as a 
column would throw shadows on the ground, so the later Shaykhs are related to 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din.64  
The Shaykh thus has a constant connection to the ḥaḍra muḥammadiya, 
and through him the followers can experience flashes of this connection. AKR 
stresses that Ali Nur al-Din taught them to reach for this state of fanā’, cancel 
their ego in order for them to contain their opposite. According to AKR, the 
followers love the Shaykh because by being part of him, in fanā’ with him, they 
are part of everything. According to him, one of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s sayings 
refers to this: ‘You are not a small star, but you have the whole universe inside 
you.’65 
AKR stresses the importance of the prophet Isa for the Yashrutiyya, and 
tells the story that Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din was identified as Isa by an Armenian 
doctor after he brought someone back to life by saying ‘Allāh Allāh Allāh.’66 AKR 
explains this story in terms of the symbolism of breath which gives life and spirit. 
He also points to architectural features in the zāwiya that for him represent this 
symbolism and the importance of Isa, such as the entrance to the takiya, three 
                                                  
63 Interview AKR 29-03-2012. 
64 Interview AKR 08-03-2012. 
65 Interview AKR 29-03-2012. The Review Panel points out that this is a saying of Ali ibn Abi 
Talib, and is not a saying of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din. Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and 
Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 60; Review Panel, ‘Response to email of October 12’. 
66 Interview AKR 30-04-2012 – tour of the zāwiya. This story can be found in al-Yashrutiyya, 
Mawāhib al-Ḥaqq, 78–79. In the written version there is no mention of a connection with Isa. 
According to this version, Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din spoke in the ear of the deceased calling his name 
three times, after which the deceased came back to life saying ‘Allah’ and chanting a nashīd by 
Ali Wafa, a shaykh from their silsila, while Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din chanted ‘Allāh Allāh’ and the 
other followers who were present participated in the dhikr standing in a semi-circle around the 
bed. He lived for a few more weeks and then passed away. Shaykh Ahmad also mentions this 
particular miracle in his introduction to the third edition of Mawāhib al-Ḥaqq, as an example of the 
greatness of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din. 
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pointed arches united by one larger arch, which he sees as representing the 
Trinity (see figure 2).67 
 
 
 
 
 
 Finally, he referred to the historical social function of the zāwiya as an 
element of the Shaykh’s holiness: ‘Holiness (muqaddas) is how much you serve 
and become a benefit for others.’68 In this sense, the previous Shaykhs are a role 
model for him as he sees them as influential figures in the north of Palestine, who 
dealt with the people and minorities in their area based on the concept of a 
shared humanity and tolerance. Especially Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi, who 
according to him was courageous because ‘he looked at various spectrum of the 
                                                  
67 Interview AKR 30-04-2012 – tour of the zāwiya. The Review Panel says that this is AKR’s own 
interpretation, it was not designed intentionally for this purpose.’ Review Panel, ‘Response to 
email of October 12’. 
68 Interview AKR 23-02-2012. 
Figure 2. The entrance to the takiya in the zāwiya 
in Acre. Photo taken by author on 30-04-2012. 
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groups in society as one (sic),’ because he spoke out against the nationalist anti-
Sufi form of Islam propagated by the Grand Mufti Hajj Amin al-Hussayni and the 
SMC, and protected the Jews and Christians. According to AKR, Shaykh 
Muhammad al-Hadi prevented massacres of Jews in the Galilee in 1929, and 
because of this the Mufti tried to assassinate the Shaykh, his brother Abd al-Latif 
al-Yashruti, and one of the Shaykh’s followers, Dr. Anwar al-Shuqayri. Only the 
latter was killed. He stresses that until this day there is a gap between the 
Yashruti and Husayni family.69  
 
The Husaynis lead the nationalist way and concept, and the Yashrutis are more 
compromising in their way and how the solution must be between Israel and the 
Palestinians. There is no cooperation since the 30s. There is a big distance.70 
 
If historically correct, his portrayal of Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi as a 
moderate leader against the nationalist extremism of the Mufti would be in 
accordance with the general mood in Acre at the time. During the Mandate 
period, the notables in Acre were indeed strongly opposed to the Mufti, the 
Shuqayri family prominent amongst them. Similarly, in 1948 the town’s leaders 
were more open to dialogue with the Jews than the Arab Higher Committee or 
the Arab Liberation Army.71 After 1948 the Shuqayris remained allied with the 
Arab regimes, culminating in Dr. Anwar’s brother Ahmad Shuqayri’s post of first 
chairman of the PLO from 1964-1967 when it was still subject to the Arab 
League.72 
                                                  
69 Interview AKR 29-02-2012. 
70 Interview AKR 29-02-2012. 
71 Abbasi, ‘The Fall of Acre in the 1948 War’, 8–9. Abbasi notes the dependency both Arabs and 
Jews in Acre and surroundings had on Haifa and its industry; the need to keep the roads open 
played a large part in this conciliatory approach. Ibid., 10. For a discussion of Palestinian 
factionalism during the Mandate period that includes both elite politics and attitudes of the 
population at large, see Cohen, Army of Shadows. 
72 Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 358–359; Pappé, A History of Modern 
Palestine, 166–167; Kimmerling and Migdal, The Palestinian People, 248–249. 
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The details of this particular story are doubtful though. First of all because 
in 1929 a massacre did happen in Safed,73 one of the towns in which there was a 
presence of followers of Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi. This suggests that if he had 
indeed spoken out against the massacres his influence did not reach as far as 
AKR suggests, as it clearly did not reach those sections of society that executed 
the massacre in Safed. It is also not certain to what extent the Shuqayris were 
indeed associated with the Yashrutiyya in the Mandate period. Fatima al-
Yashrutiyya mentions As’ad Shuqayri in Mawāhib al-Ḥaqq, but makes it very 
clear that he was a muḥibb, not a follower of the Shaykh.74 As’ad’s son Dr. 
Anwar’s murder in 1939 remains shrouded in mystery, but no historians have 
mentioned the Yashrutiyya in their discussions of the incident.75 The fact that the 
murder happened ten years after the massacres of 1929 further undermines the 
idea that he was killed because of Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi’s attitude towards 
these massacres. 
Regardless of the historical veracity of this account, this story illustrates 
the contemporary adaptive, apolitical values of the Yashrutiyya, teaching love 
and tolerance for all human beings as God’s creatures regardless of religion. 
                                                  
73 On these massacres, see Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 256–257; Pappé, A 
History of Modern Palestine, 91; Kimmerling and Migdal, The Palestinian People, 91–92. 
Especially the massacres in Hebron were a ‘traumatic event in Arab-Jewish relations that 
exacerbated suspicions, mutual anxieties, and stereotypes.’ Ibid., 92. For the development of the 
narrative of the massacre in Hebron as a turning-point in Jewish-Arab relations as part of the 
Zionist focus on violence as opposed to co-existence, construing ‘an important link in the 
nationalist construction of Jewish victimization in Palestine as in Europe’, see Michelle Campos, 
‘Remembering Jewish-Arab Contact and Conflict’, in Reapproaching Borders: New Perspectives 
on the Study of Israel-Palestine, ed. Sandra Marlene Sufian and Mark LeVine (Lanham MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 41–66. 
74 al-Yashrutiyya, Mawāhib al-Ḥaqq, 42–44. 
75 Many people believed (and still believe) he was killed by the Mufti’s rebels, but the exact 
motives are unclear. Ihsan Nimr portrayed this murder as one in a series of murders in which Hajj 
Amin al-Hussayni’s rebels killed a major opposition leader in every region to silence the 
opposition. Hillel Cohen notes that it is unclear whether the principal suspect acted on behalf of 
someone else or of his own accord; he had been involved in land sales to Jews and might have 
wanted to divert suspicions from himself. Ted Swedenburg notes that by this time As’ad Shuqayri 
had broken with the Nashishibi faction as he opposed the Peel Partition Plan, and that he and his 
sons had aided the rebellion. As’ad’s son Ahmad was affiliated with Hajj Amin al-Hussayni, even 
if he did not always agree with him. His other son Dr. Anwar had treated wounded rebels (a point 
also made by Cohen). One of the rebel leaders Swedenburg interviewed said that Dr. Anwar had 
forced him to participate in the rebellion and had protected him. Cohen, Army of Shadows, 133–
134, 142; Ted Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt. The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian 
National Past (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 157–164. 
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AKR uses these values to portray the contemporary Yashrutiyya as moderate 
Arabs who are not interested in Palestinian nationalism. It is interesting to 
contrast this with the ṭarīqa’s attitude in Amman, who note that there is no gap 
between the Yashrutis and the Husaynis, and that Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi 
and Sīdī Ahmad even paid condolences when he passed away.76 
Israeli tourguide Ze’ev Ben Arieh takes this portrayal of the Yashrutiyya as 
‘good Arabs’ a step further in his book. It is a personal reflection on the author’s 
spiritual journey and his encounter with Sufism, in particular the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya in Acre, aiming to serve as a physical and spiritual guide book to the 
zāwiya and to Acre for pilgrims and tourists.77 He focuses on Shaykh Ali Nur al-
Din’s message of love and tolerance for other religions, which according to him 
led Shaykh Ibrahim to maintain a Western orientation and good relations with the 
British,78 and led Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi to accept the return of the Jews to 
Palestine as a divine order. Ben Arieh puts a well-known story among the 
Shadhulis in this framework: Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi dreamt that an arch in 
the zāwiya fell down, which he saw as an omen that Palestine would fall. He left 
for Beirut and – according to Ben Arieh – told his followers that the Palestinians 
should accept the return and rule of the Jews – that if God did not want the Jews 
to return He would not allow it, and if God forgave them who are the Muslims to 
be upset with them? The land is not important, and one should give it up to 
prevent bloodshed. By telling this story this way, Ben Arieh portrays the problems 
between Israel and the Palestinians as a struggle between two parties in which 
                                                  
76 The Review Panel stress that AKR’s version is an individual opinion that does not necessarily 
reflect the Yashrutiyya at large. Their reaction to this story is quite different: ‘That was a long time 
ago, and stories change from one person to another. What AKR mentioned was a hear-say story. 
There is absolutely no gap, Sheikh [Muhammad] al-Hadi al-Yashruti and his son the present 
Sheikh Ahmad al-Yashruti paid condolences to the Husayni family, when Hajj Amin al-Hussayni 
died.’ This different attitude to the Hussaynis reflects the fact that they are a lot less controversial 
in Jordan than they are in Israel. Review Panel, ‘Response to email of October 12’. 
77 Ze’ev Ben Arieh, Zāwiya,6. While it is unclear to what extent Ben Arieh got his information from 
AKR as he did not use any references, his understanding can be understood as part of the same 
narrative. In the preface (p.6), Ben Arieh thanks ‘the representative (nazig) of the Yashrutiyya’ 
and claims the book has been published with his ‘spiritual “approval” (ha-“ishur” ha-rohani)’. 
Furthermore, AKR handed out copies of the book when hosting a study meeting for students of 
the Hebrew University. 
78 Ibid., 10, 64. 
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love and understanding – and acceptance of the Jews as the new masters of the 
land – is the divinely sanctioned solution.79 
The social role Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi played according to AKR, 
serving as a benefit for all factions in society, serves as an example to him: 
 
Shaykh [Muhammad] al-Hadi was a leader. He was also a Sufi, but he translated 
the Sufi concept to reality. The Sufi concept reflects on reality, actions, the real 
world. The spiritual world affects and influences the real world. And this is the 
real Sufi. He lives in the two worlds. (...) And this is the courageous in Shaykh 
[Muhammad] al-Hadi.80 
 
He sees the same characteristics in Shaykh Ahmad, but adapted to these times. 
Whereas in the times before 1948 the zāwiya’s kitchens fed many people from 
the agricultural produce of the ṭarīqa’s awqāf, nowadays the most pressing 
problem in society is violence which according to AKR should be treated through 
education. 
 
All the world around him changed and he must fit. Take the path according to the 
new era. (...) You have to think, you have to develop with the era. And this is the 
point of Shaykh Ahmad. And this is a Sufi point. ‘Bisīr zamanak sīr’ (...) How your 
era goes, go! Don’t make confrontation with the era.81 
 
He gives modernization values to the path. He encourages education, he helps 
people, he lets his followers learn and women participate, gives rights to the 
women. It’s not a must to cover your head, if you like, it’s according to you. We 
did a lot to strengthen the position of the women in the path. And also he gives 
an explanation – a realistic explanation to the spiritual concept, in order to 
                                                  
79 Ibid., 21–22, 31–33, 64. The Review Panel stress that this is the view of one individual which 
does not necessarily represent the Yashruti community and that there is no proof that this is true. 
Review Panel, ‘Response to email of October 12’. 
80 Interview AKR 29-02-2012. 
81 Interview AKR 27-02-2012. 
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implement it. Not to think about it or not to believe it, also to use it for the benefit 
of the mankind, of the community.82 
 
Because of this, AKR says the Shaykh has expanded the concept of fanā’ from 
becoming one with the followers, Shaykh and God; AKR says the Shaykh also 
interprets it as becoming one with the community through communal action (see 
paragraph 11.5). 
 
We take the spiritual principle, spiritual concept, and try to make it more realistic. 
It is the basis of an education value. I’m not going to tell the new generation ‘go 
and make meditation or observation in order to be part of an entity.’ No, I’m 
talking [about] the ground level (...) You have to behave and act collectively. And 
if you are aware to the collective principle, you will be aware and responsible for 
a lot of things inside the society. You restore your society.83 
 
In AKR’s view, the Shadhuli-Yashruti Shaykhs always ‘lived in two worlds’ 
and were always involved in society as their mystical views and experiences 
motivated them to behave ethically, to feed and educate people, and Shaykh 
Ahmad is to be seen in this line. For him, the difference seems to be that while in 
those early days society accepted the Shaykh’s authority as a Shaykh and holy 
person, nowadays people in society at large do not believe in these things any 
more, and in order to reach out to society one has to take an approach that suits 
them – not foregoing the ṭarīqa’s mystical core, but connecting to others on levels 
of social activism based on the ethics derived from this core. In his view, this is 
one of Shaykh Ahmad’s profound innovations which adapts the tradition 
significantly to its time, and in the Israeli context revives the ṭarīqa’s social role 
after a sixty year hiatus, but maintaining the connections between mystical 
experiences and social engagement that have characterized the ṭarīqa from the 
start. While there does seem to be a strong emphasis on the ethical in both the 
official religion taught by the Shaykh, and in AKR’s thought, the mystical is seen 
                                                  
82 Interview AKR 29-02-2012. 
83 Interview AKR 29-02-2012. 
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as its essential complementary component. Also, whether there is a shift of 
emphasis or whether this has always been the case in the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya calls for further research. 
The divergence of AKR’s view of the Shaykh with that of the other 
followers is striking, and underlined by the Review Panel’s comments on most of 
this paragraph that these views do not represent the ṭarīqa but are his own 
personal opinions. This might be explained by his ties to the community. The 
account of his conversion confirms the importance of tarbiya within the 
community, as he practiced and discussed with other followers after his first 
meeting with the Shaykh. As we shall see in chapter 10, the socialisation of 
converts and reaffiliated Muslims in the ṭarīqa is done through secondary 
socialisation or resocialisation in the community, like in Amman. Berger pointed 
out that socialisation is an ongoing process that continues to reaffirm the 
symbolic universe and the social structure: ‘A religious experience in itself is 
nothing, ‘it is only within the religious community (…) that the conversion can be 
effectively maintained as plausible.’84 While AKR’s connection to the community 
might have been stronger when he joined, nowadays the connection is not 
strong. He does meet frequently with other Muslim and Jewish Sufis in Israel and 
the West, who as we have seen in paragraph 8.2.4 have a strong ‘new 
spirituality’ approach manifested in perennial and hybrid forms of Sufism, coupled 
with a strong validation of the individual. His lessening connection to ikhwānnā 
and his continuing orientation on this perennial tradition might explain why his 
ideas are showing such a divergence from the general vernacular ideas of the 
community and the ‘official religion’ in Amman. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
84 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 176–178; Berger, The Sacred 
Canopy, 41–42. 
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9.4 Conclusion 
 
Like the followers in Amman, the followers in Israel adhere to the basic doctrine 
that ‘all the Shaykhs are one’, meaning the four Yashruti Shaykhs. Also like their 
brethren in Amman, they value the previous Shaykhs and can easily visit their 
tombs in the zāwiya in Acre (see chapter 11), but their focus is on the current 
Shaykh Ahmad. As ikhwānnā in Israel lived in isolation from the rest of the ṭarīqa 
for almost 30 years, and they still cannot interact with the Shaykh regularly, they 
developed their image of him predominantly through the community, which is 
considered to be a large family (and to a large degree actually is). Their general 
image is part of the same overarching paradigm of authority, but stressing 
different elements: it consists of the Shaykh as a teacher, whose teaching 
capacities are inextricably intertwined with his role as a spiritual father. He cares 
for the followers, gives them advice, and due to his omniscience knows them 
without interacting with them regularly – they develop their spiritual relationship 
with him even at a distance. This understanding of the Shaykh as a spiritual 
father, and the strong focus on the ahl al-bayt, is much more pronounced than in 
Amman, which could well be due to the development of this image within the 
community-as-a-family. This idea will be explored further in Chapter 10.  
 As Lindholm and Pinto argued, even when charisma depends on a strong 
doctrine and hereditary succession, the Sufi shaykh’s baraka still needs to be 
performed in order for him to be accepted. The karāmāt told of the Shaykh focus 
on his mental powers, such as his clairvoyance, his ability to know people he 
never met. As we shall see in the next chapter, strong community ties are also 
considered to be manifestations of the Shaykh’s karāmāt. 
A telling difference between the two communities is that while in Amman 
the word ‛aqīda was used throughout every discussion, it was only seldomly 
referred to in Acre. The practice of love for God, the Shaykh, and the community, 
is the centre of the belief system of the followers in Acre and Jaffa (which can 
also be seen in the stronger focus on the Shaykh as a father next to his role as a 
teacher). This might be explained by the fact that the discursive transmission of 
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the tradition is more fragmented in Acre and Jaffa, while the practical 
transmission through devotional practices and community relations continues 
without interruption, and the emotional aspects of the message are thus more 
developed and commented on than the intellectual ones. The ‛aqīda is something 
that exists in the heart of the follower, but is not commented on as much. We 
shall explore this issue further in the next chapter. 
  In addition to this, the Shaykh is seen as the teacher who takes them on 
the Path to God and who gives them the opportunity to participate in the 
Prophet’s spiritual journey (mi‛rāj). One follower said she sees him as the light of 
God that continues to shine through the Shaykh. While these charismatic images 
that are essential in the Sufi tradition and according to Buehler the defining base 
of authority for Sufi shaykhs were not articulated by many, they were certainly 
there and part of the local paradigm of authority. 
The ṭarīqa’s ‘routinization of charisma’ in Acre and Jaffa shows a similar 
combination of tradition and charisma as in Amman, with a more explicit focus on 
maḥabba as opposed to ‛aqīda that can be explained from the community’s 
distance from the Shaykh. This distance has not led to the decentring of authority 
of the Shaykh as happened in many Sufi ṭuruq and groups that became 
disconnected from their shaykh and/or shrine in the diaspora.85 Interestingly, the 
followers in Acre and Jaffa did not turn to the tombs of the first Shaykhs as a 
substitute. Their territorialisation might be more pronounced than that of the 
followers in Amman due to their access to the zāwiya and the tombs of the 
previous Shaykhs, but the centre of the ṭarīqa is still Shaykh Ahmad in Amman. 
The maintenance of charisma is thus very clear in Acre and Jaffa, despite an 
even stronger institutionalisation on kinship lines. For an extensive discussion of 
the role of the zāwiya and the tombs of the first three Shaykhs, see Chapter 11. 
 AKR presents quite a different picture. While most followers see the 
Shaykh as father and teacher of the community, AKR stresses individuality and 
individual autonomy. He presents the universe as present in everyone, attributing 
                                                  
85 Raudvere and Stenberg, ‘Translocal Mobility and Traditional Authority’, 5, 10; Geaves, ‘Cultural 
Binary Fission’; Heck, ‘The Politics of Sufism.’ 
 481
a quote from Ali ibn Abu Talib to illustrate this idea (‘You are not a small star, but 
you have the whole universe inside you’).86 Like the followers he talks extensively 
about the Shaykh’s omniscience, but more than the other followers he stresses 
the Shaykh’s role as a renewer and a teacher who inspires the individual and 
gives him or her the space to adapt to his or her environment and interpret laws 
and texts for him or herself, stressing the inspiration the Shaykh gives him in this 
regard He refers extensively to Ibn Arabi, which no other follower has done, and 
gives more weight to the Prophet Isa (and gives quite a Christian turn to his 
references to him). Considering his self-appointed role as spokesperson for the 
.ṭarīqa towards outsiders, stressing these elements make sense as they might 
speak to tourists and people with an interest in Sufism. 
AKR also stresses the historical role of the Shaykh as the leader of a 
community and even the whole of Galilean society which he is working to restore. 
According to him, the Shaykhs provided food and shelter for the community and 
larger society, and nowadays Shaykh Ahmad stresses the need to provide 
opportunities for education. His interpretation of the Shaykhs’ social and political 
attitude aims to place the ṭarīqa in the category of ‘good Arabs’, which is a 
politicization of an apolitical message in the Israeli context. Ben Arieh’s 
presentation of Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi as having given the Zionists divine 
sanction to rule the land, found in a book handed out by AKR, takes this to the 
next level in that it explicitly adheres to the Zionist historical narrative.87 The 
Review Panel found this approach problematic and asked me to delete most of 
it88 as they say this represents the views of individuals and not of the Yashruti 
community. Indeed I have not come across these understandings elsewhere, and 
Ben Arieh provides no footnotes. Most revealing is the diverging account of the 
Yashruti’s relationship with the Hussaynis. AKR, commited to present the ṭarīqa 
as moderate Arabs with no ties to Palestinian nationalism, and especially not to 
such a controversial figure as the Mufti, stresses the breach between the two 
                                                  
86 Interview AKR 29-03-2012. 
87 Ben Arieh, Zawiya, 21–22, 31–33, 64. The Review Panel stress that this is the view of one 
individual which does not necessarily represent the Yashruti community and that there is no proof 
that this is true. Review Panel, ‘Response to email of October 12’. 
88 For more on my relation with the Review Panel, see chapter 2. 
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families. The Yashrutis in Beirut and Amman, who show their regard for the 
political and religious leaders within a political milieu where there is no negative 
image of the Mufti, maintained those ties and showed the Mufti and the family 
respect by paying condolences when he died.89 
These differences can be explained by his particular entrance into the 
community and the setting in which he developed his attachment. He underwent 
socialisation in the ṭarīqa through his contacts with the local community in Acre, 
praying and discussing together with them, but these contacts diminished while 
he maintained his interactions with Muslim and Jewish Sufis.90 Berger points out 
that socialisation is an ongoing process of world construction and world 
maintenance, and that when connections with the community diminish, so will 
adherence to the symbolic universe91 – in this case, AKR’s interpretation 
developed in quite a different way than that of the local community. Here we see 
the use of Stjernholm’s suggestion to classify a Sufi group or sub-group 
according to the relation it maintains with a historical tradition or narrative.92  
In AKR’s narrative we see a development towards a more individual, 
autonomous approach to spirituality, combined with a commitment to social 
activism organised along rational lines but based on a spiritual motivation. He 
considers inspiration to come from the Shaykh, but the concrete actions to come 
from himself, giving more space for individual autonomy than we saw among the 
other followers. These trends have been common in the development of Sufi 
movements during the past two centuries,93 but are here connected to the trend 
of Universal Sufism and Western ‘new spirituality’, as will become more clear in 
                                                  
89 The Review Panel stress that this is an individual opinion that does not necessarily reflect the 
Yashrutiyya at large. In Amman, the reaction to this story is quite different: ‘That was a long time 
ago, and stories change from one person to another. What AKR mentioned was a hear-say story. 
There is absolutely no gap, Sheikh [Muhammad] al-Hadi al-Yashruti and his son the present 
Sheikh Ahmad al-Yashruti paid condolences to the Husayni family, when Hajj Amin al-Hussayni 
died.’ This different attitude to the Hussaynis reflects the fact that they are a lot less controversial 
in Jordan than they are in Israel. Review Panel, ‘Response to email of October 12’. 
90 For an overview of the current Jewish Sufi milieu in Israel, see paragraph 8.2.4. 
91 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 176–178; Berger, The Sacred 
Canopy, 41–42. 
92 Stjernholm, ‘What is the Naqshbandi-Haqqani Tariqa?’, 215–218.  
93 Howell and Van Bruinessen, ‘Sufism and the “Modern” in Islam’, 5, 10–11; Hoffman, Sufism, 
Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 358–359, 422. 
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our discussion of his approach to sharia, religious practice, and the form his 
social activism takes in practice, discussed in the next chapters. His presentation 
of the ṭarīqa’s history shows an adaptation to the hegemonic Zionist narrative, 
which is reflected in some of the social projects he engages with.  
 The followers, on the other hand, maintain their focus on their community 
and on their Shaykh, see themselves as standing in the authentic Islamic Sufi 
tradition with its roots in Palestine, and as a community are not interested in 
engaging with any political narrative, Palestinian nationalist or Zionist. As will 
become clear in the next chapters, their approach to religious practice underlines 
this attitude.  
We thus see two very different approaches within the same local 
community. This community in Acre can be seen as both the original centre and 
the periphery of the translocal ṭarīqa as its current centre is now in Amman, and 
while most resembling a ‘transplant’ – an ethnically homogeneous ṭarīqa in a 
Western environment but with its roots elsewhere – its adherents are indigenous. 
Stjernholm’s suggestion to look at the tradition in which people place themselves 
in order to understand contemporary Sufi movements is therefore much more 
illuminating than Hermansen’s classification based on ‘transplants’, ‘hybrids’ or 
‘perennials’.94 
Let us now turn to examining how the followers understand the exercise of 
the roles attributed to the Shaykh, the roles of the father and the teacher, and 
which role the community plays in tarbiya, the transmission and enactment of 
knowledge and communal (family) values. The issue of the attitude towards 
religious practice, spiritual development, communication and interpretation is 
very relevant as it is in Amman, and acquires a more political aura in AKR’s 
interpretations, as we will continue to explore when discussing the place of the 
zāwiya in Acre’s society. 
                                                  
94 Stjernholm, ‘What is the Naqshbandi-Haqqani Tariqa?’, 215–218. 
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Chapter 10 
Tarbiya in Acre and Jaffa 
 
 
This chapter examines the practical aspects of the Shaykh’s authority: how are 
the roles we have found in the previous chapter enacted by the Shaykh, or to 
turn the question around: how are they attributed to him? The Shaykh is seen as 
a father – what does this mean in practice, and through which dynamic is this 
role attributed to the Shaykh and maintained? He is also seen as a teacher – 
how does he teach his followers and how do they teach each other? How does 
the community perceive itself in their relation to the Shaykh? How is the 
relationship between the Shaykh and the followers developed, and what is the 
role of the community and the individual in this process? In other words, which 
processes and dynamics of education and communication are at play here?  
 
 
10.1 Ikhwānnā in Acre and Jaffa 
 
The practical roles of the Shaykh that were expressed by the followers in Acre 
and Jaffa, the teacher and the father, are enacted in practice by the community. 
We have already seen in Amman that the community is envisaged as a family, 
and to a certain degree indeed is a family. We have seen that the followers in 
Amman often express their devotion to the current Shaykh in terms of their family 
tradition – the ‛aqīda is transferred from father to son in the Yashruti family, and 
the followers’ adherence to the Shaykhs is also passed from one generation to 
the next. Their adherence to the tariqa in this time not only transforms the current 
moment into a possible ‘charismatic moment’, it also connects them translocally 
and transhistorically to the original ‘charismatic moment’ and to the participation 
of the ancestors in this moment. This is even more the case in Acre and in Jaffa, 
and in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a whole. Many members of 
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ikhwānnā choose to marry someone from among them and the communities in 
Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip are all linked in this way. There are 
also family ties with the community in Amman and other places, but they are less 
strong. 
The community in Acre is small (ca.25 people), and half of the followers 
there belong to one family. After 1948 the zāwiya became a residential complex 
where ca. 200 people lived, Shadhulis and non-Shadhulis, some of them 
originally from Acre and some of them internal refugees.1 Therefore most 
followers either grew up in the zāwiya or moved there after their marriage, and 
the memories and bonds of this period in the zāwiya are still strong. For them, 
the zāwiya literally was their home, an idea we shall explore further in paragraph 
11.2.  
In Jaffa the ca. 200 followers2 are actually all members of the same family. 
They marry amongst each other, but it is not a closed system as people join and 
leave – often because of marriages to outsiders, and children who do not relate 
to the ṭarīqa anymore. The people are very proud of the fact that they all belong 
to one family and that the family has such a good name – all min faḍl Sīdnā and 
the ṭarīqa. 
This is expressed by one of the followers through stories that show her 
pride in the family and its connection to Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din and the founding 
moment of the ṭarīqa. She says that all the followers in Jaffa nowadays descend 
from two brothers who joined the ṭarīqa in Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s time. One of 
them, Mahmoud, was educated and heard about Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din at the 
kuttāb (Qur’an school). He wanted to visit the Shaykh in Acre and took his 
brother Mustafa. They travelled to Acre by sea – but their boat was small and the 
sea was wild. The first time they arrived in Acre the Shaykh was not there and 
they had to go back. The second time was similar. The third time he was waiting 
for them at Acre’s Sea Gate and said ‘Shaykh Mustafa, did the sails bring the 
                                                  
1 For an historical overview of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Israel after 1948, see paragraphs 
3.5.1 and 8.6. 
2 There are around 20-30 heads of family. Adding wives and children, this number will 
approximately reach 200 followers in Jaffa. JA1 in Interview JA1 16-04-2012. 
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spirits? Or did the spirits bring the sails?’ – which meant that the Shaykh is the 
one who brought them to Acre, not the sea.3 This story shows their determination 
to meet the Shaykh and the Shaykh’s care for their physical and spiritual 
wellbeing – their spirits yearning to meet the Shaykh kept them going with the 
power of the Shaykh who steered them safely into the harbour, which is also a 
metaphor for their spiritual journey guided by the Shaykh who led them safely 
into their harbour – most likely symbolizing fana in the Shaykh and in God. 
Through this story she aims to show her family’s connection to the founding 
Shaykh through their ancestors, connecting the family history to the ṭarīqa’s 
history (as the followers in Amman also do, see chapter 5). This way, she 
stresses that she not only has a personal connection to the current Shaykh 
Ahmad, but also a genealogical connection to the previous Shaykhs as her 
ancestors cultivated their personal links with them, and all of them were 
connected to the founding Shaykh through their ancestor, Shaykh Mahmoud. 
 Another story she tells is an example of the spiritual communication that 
ikhwānnā with high spiritual levels are capable of. Just as the Shaykh lets them 
participate in the Prophet’s spiritual journey, they can partake of his karāmāt, 
such as his ability for spiritual communication (see also the example of the 
Cypriot lady who never learnt Arabic and communicated with the followers in the 
Amman ‘through the heart’, paragraph 6.4) and his ability of ṭayy al-‘arḍ, the 
ability to travel across the earth in a single moment.4 Shaykh Mahmoud, who 
travelled to meet the Shaykh in the previous story, advanced far on the spiritual 
path. One day he decided to go on ḥajj and he told his sister Maryam he would 
bring her a gift. The pilgrims had left long before and she did not believe him. He 
travelled to Mecca in a single day, and met other murīdīn from Jaffa there. He 
went back to his sister – again in a single day – and brought her palm dates from 
Mecca. But she did not believe him, until the other murīdīn came back and told 
                                                  
3 Informal discussion with JA2 on 12-05-2013. 
4 Ṭayy al-arḍ means ‘traveling distances over the earth [with supernatural speed]’, timeless travel 
over the earth, shortening of space and time, ‘folding up of spatial distances’. Bernd Radtke, 
‘Walī. 1. General Survey’, EI2 XI 109-112; Muḥammad ibn ʻAlī Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, The Concept of 
Sainthood in Early Islamic Mysticism: Two Works, (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1996), 125. 
Schimmel calls this phenomenon ṭayy al-makān. Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 205.  
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her they had really met him there. 5 Mahmoud had thus participated in his 
Shaykh’s ability of ṭayy al-‘arḍ. 
These stories serve to stress the individual’s connection to the founding 
moment and to further strenghten the institutionalisation of the community on 
kinship lines. These stories are told to me by one of Mustafa’s descendants, and 
she has to stop talking several times because it gives her goosebumps. For her, 
this story is clearly more than a miracle story about the Shaykh’s powers – it is a 
direct connection between her family and Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din, and of the way 
they participated in his high spiritual levels to which she connects emotionally: ‘It 
is the truth, we live it.’6 By telling these stories they are recreated and made 
relevant for her own situation. The transmission of the ṭarīqa through the family is 
thus given extra meaning as it brings them in a transhistorical connection with the 
founding Shaykh and the ‘charismatic moment’, in addition to the contemporary 
connection they develop with the current Shaykh. 
All followers I visited place great value on hospitality. Hospitality is a very 
important part of Middle Eastern society and the Islamic umma in general, which 
goes back to pre-Islamic Arabian values and has made its way into Islam through 
the Hadith. Sufis value it especially as ‘a method of purification and a way of life’, 
and it is seen to convey baraka.7 Ikhwānnā see hospitality as a karāma of their 
Shaykh: ‘When you love the Shaykh, you look after each other from your heart. 
So you do it for the Shaykh rather than for ikhwānnā.’8 Hospitality is seen as the 
part of the ‛aqīda. The guest is the direct reason but the Shaykh is the origin, the 
reference (aṣl, marja‛). This hospitality is seen as one of the Shaykh’s karāmāt, 
‘and one of the fruits of his ṭarīqa’.9 People often visit each other and rather then 
treating each other as guests on such occasions they treat each other as 
members of the same family. They are proud of this – when accompanying a 
lady from Acre on her visit to ikhwānnā in Jaffa she went to the kitchen and 
                                                  
5 Informal discussion with JA2 on 12-05-2013. 
6 Informal discussion with JA2 on 12-05-2013. 
7 Valerie J. Hoffman, ‘Hospitality and Courtesy’, Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, ed. Jane Dammen 
McAuliffe (Brill Online, 2015); Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 230. 
8 Informal discussion with AK6 on 06-05-2013. 
9 JA1, JA10 and JA11 in Interview JA1 10-05-2013, Interview JA2, Informal discussion with JA2 
and JA4 on 12-05-2013. Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 46. 
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served herself, talking me through the whole process to show me how at home 
they are at each other’s houses.  
 There is a strong correlation between the importance of the family as a 
unit of social and political organisation among the Palestinians in Israel (see 
chapter 8), and the strong family values shown by abnā al-ṭarīqa in Israel. As the 
Palestinians in Israel feel alienated from the state and those institutions and 
people related to it, the family remains an important institution for communal 
organisation. These circumstances may have strengthened the link between 
family and religion as both are understood in terms of the other, and may have 
strengthened the interpretation of the Shaykh as a spiritual father.  
As we have already touched upon in chapter 9, the role of the father and 
the teacher are inextricably intertwined, and the followers accept the teaching of 
the Shaykh because they love him as a father. A follower in Jaffa put it in the 
following way: he loves you and wants the best for you. You do what your father 
says because you love him and want to make him happy, and when you do what 
he says he will be happy and he will love you more.10 
While the Shaykh is considered their teacher, the actual education in the 
ṭarīqa is done by the community. The following extensive quote illustrates how 
this follower from Acre sees the religious and social practices of abnā al-ṭarīqa as 
the result of the teaching of the Shaykh, but how closely it is linked to the 
community: 
 
AK1: The Shaykh is very great (kabīr), I didn’t see like him. First the Lord of the 
Worlds (rabb al-‛ālimīn), then Sayyidnā Muhammad, then the Shaykh. 
LS: Why is he great? 
Ak1: [He is] great because he is the sāḥib al-ṭarīqa, sāḥib al-ḥaqq and he is right 
and we walk on the path because it is right, this is why we believe in him and 
respect him and we consider him holy (menqadsuh). 
When we were small, we were a Shadhuli house. This is why when we grew up 
and became aware of the path (masār) of my father, how my father and mother 
were, a Shadhuli house, we walked on the same path (ṭarīqa). We love each 
                                                  
10 JA1 in Interview JA1 10-05-2013. 
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other – brothers and sisters, we kiss each other’s hand, we are the same, no one 
is better than the other. If someone is sick we have to visit him, we do not cut the 
bond. We have to visit, we have to feel that we are entering the house of our 
brother or sister. Also, we pray (...), we read waẓīfa, we go to the ḥaḍra, and after 
that we visit each other, we always have to visit each other. (...) And 
alḥamdulillah we are proud to be from abnā al-ṭarīqa al-Shādhuliyya al-
Yashruṭiyya. Many times people ask what the ṭarīqa is, who are you? It is known 
that we are Muslims, Sunnis, we pray, we fast during Ramadan, we don’t stop 
our duties, we visit each other, we love each other, that is what is necessary. 
That is what the Shaykh teaches us. 
LS: How does the Shaykh teach these things? 
AK1: From inheritance (warātha), from the inheritance of his grandfather, his 
father, from one to one he took it [the inheritance]. (...) Insha’allah God will 
lengthen the age of Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ahmad, after him Sīdnā Ali, and they work one 
after the other, from Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā al-Hadi the grandfather, Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din 
was before him, Sīdnā Ibrahim, one after the other they follow each other through 
the heritage / dynasty.11 
LS: How do you see the previous Shaykhs? 
AK1: I was not in their time, but they told me how they were (...) those that 
walked along their path. This is why these things continue among the children. 
For example my father [lived] in the time of Sīdnā [Muhammad al-) Hadi. His 
father, my grandfather, Sīdnā Ali, Sīdnā Ibrahim. My grandfather and 
grandmother were also Shadhuli, and all of us [will be] from a house that will 
continue to be (min bayt mutasalsil) Shadhuliyya, insha’allah.12 
 
We see how this follower inserts a discussion of her upbringing in the community, 
spontaneously, without any prompts from the side of the interviewer. It is flanked 
by her mentioning the Shaykhs’s holiness, greatness, and his teaching, which 
shows that in her understanding the life and practices of the community and the 
holiness of the Shaykh are closely linked; she further articulates this by calling 
him the teacher. When asked how he teaches concretely, she refers to the 
                                                  
11 Interview AK1. 
12 Interview AK1. 
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transmission of teachings from one Shaykh to another, equating it with the 
parallel transmission from one follower to another, stressing the traditional aspect 
of the succession of the Shaykhs and how it is connected to the education within 
the family, the knowledge and attitudes transferred from parents to children. 
Without access to the Shaykh and with limited access to a zāwiya for 
most, the followers in Israel were completely dependent on the local 
communities. One follower’s story of her education in the ṭarīqa shows the extent 
to which ikhwānnā in Israel lived in isolation and how this changed in 1967. She 
remembers how after 1967 the muqaddam from Tubas used to visit them in 
Jaffa. When she was a teenager, the muqaddam from Tubas asked her to sit in 
front of him, he took her small hands in his big hands, and she did the mubāya’a. 
She did not understand at first as she had never seen it done before, and had 
never heard about the dhikr. As she had lived away from home for a large part of 
her childhood she had not had much exposure to the Shadhuliyya yet, and her 
tarbiya was in the hands of the muqaddam of Tubas. Her father used to take her 
to the different zawāya, which is how she came to love the ṭarīqa. For her 1967 
was the opening of her Shadhuli world: ‘the war helped the ikhwānnā to meet.’13 
Nowadays this situation is better as they can travel to Amman freely and 
the zāwiya in Acre is accessible to all ikhwānnā in Israel, but of course their main 
practice remains in the community. Maḥabba is the basis. The first education is 
done in the home. As children they saw the picture of the Shaykh and asked who 
he was, they saw the ḥaḍra, they saw ikhwānnā and how they greeted each 
other. They listened to the muqaddam. They have their books and learn from 
them.14  
 
Of course among us are the elderly for whom many years have passed in the 
ṭarīqa, they teach the younger, and they guide the younger. The Shaykh cannot 
sit with all of them, not all of them are present with him, we are in two countries. 
                                                  
13 Informal discussion with JA2 on 12-05-2013. 
14 Interview JA2, informal discussion with JA7 on 13-05-2013. 
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(...) First of all everyone is responsible for his family (...) we read waẓīfa in the 
house every day, we pray with them, or we read the wird with our children.15  
 
The role of the muqaddam as an intermediary is important in this situation: 
‘How do they hear Sīdnā’s words (kalām), those who believe in him? A faqīr from 
ikhwānnā hears the word of the muqaddam. Because who put the muqaddam? 
Sīdnā.’16  
Generally speaking, the Shaykh appoints a muqaddam after 
communicating with the community. For example, the current muqaddam in Jaffa 
has taken over from his father in 1990. After his father passed away the people 
from Jaffa sent a few names to the Shaykh and he chose from among them. He 
asked ‘What is the name of his son? (...) Yes, he fits.’ He sent ikhwānnā from 
Tubas to Jaffa to tell them the decision in a meeting (because they were free to 
travel both to Jordan and to Israel, while the Palestinians from Jaffa could not 
travel to Amman). The new muqaddam wanted to meet the Shaykh to seek 
advice on his duties and he went on ḥajj (which Palestinians in Israel have to do 
via Jordan, and which was their only opportunity to visit Jordan at the time). On 
his return from ḥajj he stayed in Amman for three days. 
 
When I saw Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā he said ‘Come here my son.’ I had not been in Amman 
ever before. He said ‘Come here my son.’ I stood between his hands, I spoke 
with him, I greeted him and told him how the ḥajj was, and I went with ikhwānnā 
to sleep. (...) The next morning at 10 o’clock I went to the zāwiya to Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
(the old zāwiya). I went and took the greeting from Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā. I said to him 
‘what does Sīdnā order me (bi’umurnī). He said to me: ‘Sit down my son.’ I sat 
down. Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā spoke for about two hours about things, how the 
muqaddam’s relations should be with ikhwānnā (...) It was difficult because we 
are not experienced, we are not always beside Sīdnā. (...) He told me a lesson 
(mathal) about the muqaddam and I remember, I always tell it to ikhwānnā. He 
told me a story about the muqaddam in Brazil. ‘There is a muqaddam in Brazil, 
my son. He has been muqaddam (yumāris al-muqaddamiya) for 30 or 35 years. 
                                                  
15 JA1 in Interview JA1 16-04-2012. 
16 JA1 in Interview JA1 10-05-2013. 
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He became old and could not come and go. He sent a letter to Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā, 
from Brazil to Amman: ‘I cannot be muqaddam any more, take another 
muqaddam.’ Ikhwānnā in the town found out. All ikhwānnā sent a letter to Sīdnā: 
‘No, I want akhīnā (our brother), let him stay muqaddam.’ Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā sent a 
letter, he said ‘stay muqaddam, and take someone to help you, as a deputy, and 
you stay everything.’ Why? Because ikhwānnā loved him. When someone loves 
someone he loves to follow him, to sit with him and learn his words. And finally 
he told me ‘My son, there are muqaddamīn and muqaddamīn.’ I passed this to 
ikhwānnā, Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā said this, that the muqadddam should not act as God for 
ikhwānnā. Don’t behave like your highest God (rabbakum al-a‛lā) or rule... the 
muqaddam has to serve ikhwānnā. (...) He has to be soft (ṭarī), see what they 
want and what hurts them. (...) [As with a small child], if there is something 
bothering him, when you go and understand everything, you will win him 
(tiksabuh).17 
 
 When the muqaddam of Acre died,18 no other muqaddam was appointed 
as the community was deemed too small. The muqaddam in Umm al-Fahm also 
became responsible for the followers in Acre until his death in 1999, when 
Shaykh Ahmad appointed two muqaddamīn, one in Umm al-Fahm and one in 
Acre. 
In both communities we therefore see a strong community feeling as the 
main functions of the Shaykh, raising his followers as a father, a teacher and a 
guide, are in practice undertaken by the community itself. 
 
Because the Shaykh is not always [physically] with you. The Shaykh is in Acre, in 
Amman, in Beirut, in Brazil... but present with you are ikhwānnā. You want there 
to be mercy (raḥma) between me and my brother and my brother.19 
 
Many stories told amongst each other illustrate how the community 
conceives of itself: these stories stress the strong physical and spiritual bond of 
                                                  
17 Meeting with the muqaddam of Jaffa on 10-05-2013. 
18 One of the followers said he died in the 1960s, but De Jong says it was in 1973. De Jong, ‘Les 
Confréries Mystiques’, 221. 
19 JA1 in Interview JA1 10-05-2013. 
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the community, the fact that they consider themselves chosen and the spiritual 
levels they can reach. The many references to how well society thinks of them 
show how important it is for them to be accepted by society. For example, they 
stress that the whole town knows their family and knows that they are good 
people. They stress that they are ‘in the middle,’ moderate in all aspects of life, 
and go according to their times: ‘We do not wear a beard and jalabiya, and we 
don’t go to the sea every day.’20 They are not involved in politics, and say 
explicitly that this is why the Shaykh was allowed to come to Acre in 1980, even 
when there was no peace yet between Israel and Jordan. For these reasons they 
have good relations with everybody.21 
This strong community feeling is narrated through miracle narratives of the 
Shaykh’s baraka and karāmāt. B. Flusin suggests that in order to analyse miracle 
narratives anthropologically, one should classify them according to functionality 
in the social world. This is followed by Denise Aigle for the study of Islamic 
karāmāt, who distinguishes between a miracle’s social function in responding to 
believers’ demands, and its educational function.22 While the miracle narratives 
of the firāsa-type we discussed in the previous chapter serve the stress the 
spiritual power of the Shaykh and his role of a father who knows and cares for all 
his children, these ‘community karāmāt’ communicate their values and 
strengthen their beliefs, especially the conviction that they can see and 
participate in the charismatic in everyday life.23 In Jaffa, it is pointed out to me 
that everything I see is a karāma: It is a miracle that we are here, that I choose to 
study the Yashrutiyya, that they all welcome me – this is all because of Ḥaḍrat 
                                                  
20 Informal discussion with JA2 on 12-05-2013. 
21 JA1 in Interview JA1 on 10-05-2013. 
22 Aigle, ‘Miracle et Karāma’, 29. For an emic typology based on the works of Sufi scholars and 
hagiographies, see Gramlich, Die Wunder der Freunde Gottes. Aigle notes that there are many 
classifications, ranging from a list of ten types in the work of Abdallah al-Yafi’i (d.1366) to some 
hundred in the work of Yusuf Nabhani (d.1931). Aigle, ‘Miracle et Karāma’, 27–28. On the latter, 
see Michel Chodkiewicz, ‘La “Somme des Miracles des Saints” de Yūsuf Nabhānī’, in Miracle et 
Karāma, ed. Aigle, 607–22. 
23 The first category corresponds with Gramlich’s category of ‘spiritual powers of the friends of 
God (die geistigen Kräfte des Gottesfreundes)’, in which he incorporates clairvoyance (to know 
someone’s thoughts, to recognize strangers, to see someone’s religious state, to answer 
questions before they are asked, and to see and influence what happens far away), knowledge of 
God, the universe, the future, etc.. Gramlich, Die Wunder der Freunde Gottes, 148–241. There is 
no mention of ‘community miracles’ in Gramlich’s classification. 
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Sīdnā: ‘you are merely a secondary cause, but the Shaykh is the primary cause, 
the general foundation, the underlying principle (anti al-sabab wa al-shaykh al-
aṣl).’ For them, the manifestation of the Shaykh’s baraka does not have to 
happen through miraculous supernatural occurrences, but can be seen and 
experienced in everyday life. In such instances, the barrier between the sacred 
and the mundane world is brought down in a much more profound way than in 
what is commonly seen as miraculous. This is part of the same teachings that 
enable the discernment of ishārāt in everyday life – God can be seen in 
everything, the Shaykh’s signs can be seen everywhere, and the Shaykh’s 
karāmāt can be found everywhere.  
The Shaykh’s baraka is thus manifested in the everyday world, and 
especially in the community. The strong community relations they have are 
attributed to the Shaykh and the loving, caring actions they perform towards each 
other are seen as karāmāt of the Shaykh.24 They illustrate this bond through 
stories. These also strenghten their feeling of belonging to the community (as do 
the stories of their ancestors that connect them to the charismatic moment and 
strengthen the institutionalisation on kinship lines, discussed above). These 
stories are part of the vernacular tradition, and by sharing them they recreate the 
moment and the attitudes performed in them, and provide each other with role 
models. 
In Jaffa it is told that one of ikhwānnā went to see someone who 
happened not to be at home. He was hungry and took some of their food, but he 
had no money to leave behind so he washed his second shirt and left it. They 
sold it and bought food.25 For those involved in the telling, the fact that someone 
entered the house and ate what was there without the residents being at home, 
illustrated the degree to which they are like a very close family, as you would not 
do this with anyone else. The fact that the guest gave the only thing he had – his 
worn shirt – for them shows how he wanted to show his appreciation and care for 
them in return. This exchange has the character of sharing the little they have, 
                                                  
24 Informal discussion with JA2 on 12-05-2013. 
25 Told by JA2 during Informal discussion with JA1, JA2 and two other followers on 11-05-2013. 
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‘they give each other the shirts off their backs’, and looking after each other no 
matter what. This attiude of love and care and responsibility is also attributed to 
the Shaykh, so by acting this way they emulate his example. In telling this story, 
those involved in the telling of the story recreate the moment and are reminded to 
act in similar ways. 
They see ikhwānnā al-‘arab as the most hospitable amongst them – even 
when there is no space in their home they will invite people and sleep 
somewhere else. An old story tells how a couple had guests and one of the 
guests stepped on the baby who was sleeping on the floor without noticing. 
When the parents found out their baby was dead they did not say anything until 
the next day after breakfast to spare the feelings of their guests, because for 
them the guests were more important than their own sorrows, again showing the 
strong bond as they put the other before themselves. J2 sees this hospitality as a 
sign of fanā’ – which she sees as ‘living in’, truly belonging to something – 
because ikhwānnā al-‘arab ‘live in’ ikhwānnā by following the code of love and 
hospitality and putting their brothers and sisters first.26 Such a story illustrates 
and confirms their strong bond, and inspires those involved in the telling to live 
the same way. 
Their strong bond is also expressed in the ability to communicate 
spiritually with each other. They have a spiritual connection to all ikhwānnā, even 
those they have never met before. For example, during the war between Israel 
and Lebanon, Israeli hospitals treated Lebanese patients. A non-Shadhuli 
inhabitant of Jaffa went to one of these hospitals and found out that one of the 
patients was from ikhwānnā by mentioning the name of the Shadhuli family in 
Jaffa. Some Shadhulis from Jaffa and Umm al-Fahm went to the hospital to meet 
him. They saw someone sitting underneath a tree and without talking they knew 
this was him, and he knew they were from ikhwānnā, and they greeted each 
other without saying anything.27 We have seen that by developing their spiritual 
levels they communicate with the Shaykh, and they can participate in this ability 
                                                  
26 Informal discussion with JA2 on 12-05-2013. 
27 JA2 in Interview JA2. 
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amongst each other. It is related to the general Sufi idea that someone on the 
Sufi path can discern other people’s spiritual levels, as the following story 
illustrates. 
They know when people are only pretending to be from ikhwānnā. Once 
people came to the house of one of ikhwānnā pretending to be one of them. 
They were received well, given food and a place to sleep. The next morning their 
hosts said: ‘We know you are not from ikhwānnā, but you are welcome all the 
same.’28 This story aims to show their love and hospitality for everyone in God’s 
creation, including those who are not from their community, and to inspire the 
listeners to cultivate the same love. It also shows that they can distinguish abnā 
al-ṭarīqa from outsiders based on their general manner as an expression of their 
inner state, which is connected to Sufi ideas that those on the Path can tell 
someone’s spiritual level or state of purity. As another follower explained: ‘If 
someone comes and greets us like we greet each other, if he is not from 
ikhwānnā I feel it. (...) There is no gentleness (ṭarāwa); that is not the heart of a 
faqīr. Because God [said]: “If you had spent all that is in the earth, you could not 
have brought their hearts together, but God brought them together [Sūrat al-Anfāl 
8:63].” And he chooses for whom to open, and the faqīr listens.’29 
There are many stories of spiritual communication between ikhwānnā. A 
famous story, known in Israel and Amman, tells how a very advanced follower in 
Tubas spoke to other ikhwānnā through his belt.30 This is an illustration of their 
belief in the spiritual communication at the basis of the maintenance of a 
translocal community across borders, just as the relationship with the Shaykh is 
maintained through the development of a spiritual relationship, encouraging them 
to practice in order to achieve this level of relationship.  
 Some of ikhwānnā are told to have supernatural powers due to their high 
spiritual status. A couple from Acre went to visit a follower in Irbid and his son 
told them that they should not leave, as they would not be able to travel. They did 
not heed his advice and decided to travel back, but found the border closed. This 
                                                  
28 JA2 in Interview JA2. 
29 JA1 in Interview JA1. 
30 Informal discussion with JA5 on 13-05-2013. 
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follower participated in the omniscience of the Shaykh through his high spiritual 
development. On another occasion the couple visited someone in al-Walaja and 
when they wanted to leave he tried to persuade them to stay for the night. They 
did not want to because they had their infant son with them, but when they tried 
to depart their car would not start. The next morning the car was absolutely fine. 
The follower who related these stories ascribed this to the level of maḥabba and 
belief: ‘He who has maḥabba and is mu’min (believer), he can do everything.’31 
The message is that through maḥabba for God, the Shaykh, and ikhwānnā one 
can participate in the spiritual powers of the Shaykh. 
There are indications that they consider themselves to be chosen to be 
the followers of the Shaykh. In Jaffa I am told that there was a Bosnian lady who 
had seen a vision of the Shaykh when she still lived in Bosnia. Later she married 
a Palestinian soldier from Jerusalem who had fought for the British in the Balkans 
(presumably during World War II). He took her to Palestine, where they lived in 
Jaffa. In 1948 they fled to Jordan and from there went to Saudi Arabia, where 
she met people from ikhwānnā. The follower who told me this story met her in the 
zāwiya in Amman.32 It is one of two stories I heard of a conversion without 
previous introduction to the Shaykh and/or the ṭarīqa by loved ones (the other 
one being the Cypriot woman, see paragraph 6.1), and as such is not typical for 
the way people relate to the ṭarīqa, but it does give an explicit example of an 
attitude I encountered with several people, that is that the Shaykh came to find 
them – in a way, chose them to be his followers, in order to spread his grace and 
let them participate in his message. While thus not being a story to which many 
followers can relate in its externals, the underlying emotion will be recognized 
and strengthened by recounting this particular moment of election. 
Several stories reflect the esteem attributed to the Shaykh by outsiders. 
We have already seen how the Shaykh was recognized by a Christian neighbour 
in Jaffa. People in Jaffa also like to recall the favourable words spoken by the 
Christian and Jewish dignitaries who attended the festivities in 1996. Another 
                                                  
31 Informal discussion with AK6 on 06-05-2013. 
32 JA1 in Interview JA1 16-04-2012. 
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story deals with a Jewish woman in Acre who dreamt about the Shaykh. She did 
not know who he was, but when she saw one of the followers in the old city she 
felt this was someone she could ask about her dream. He took her to the zāwiya 
and when she saw a picture of the Shaykh she recognized him and donated 
money to the zāwiya.33 Not only did she recognize the Shaykh as a spiritually 
powerful man, she also confirmed the presence of the community in Acre very 
concretely by donating money to the zāwiya, just as the dignitaries did in 1996 
when they visited the zāwiya – and renamed the street leading to it Nur al-Din al-
Yashruti Street. 
The recounting of these examples of Christians and Jews recognizing the 
spirituality of the Shaykh and the community shows that they value their 
acceptance in society. It shows them that they are on the right path spiritually 
and ethically – and in the Israeli context, ensures the concrete continuation of 
their presence as a ṭarīqa in the public sphere. As we saw in Amman, this 
acceptance by society is seen as part of the Shaykh’s holiness: someone who 
inspires them and teaches them to be good human beings and good members of 
society must be a holy man. In Israel, the interfaith dimension is extremely 
relevant – especially in Acre and Jaffa, both mixed cities. The charisma of the 
Shaykh and the spiritual and ethical level of the followers are recognized by 
members of all faiths, and the community is accepted by all members of Israeli 
society. The follower in Jaffa who says that the Shaykh had given her 
responsibility and strength to change the prejudices of Jewish Israelis she 
encountered in her work (see paragraph 9.2) alluded to the same notion.34 The 
spread of maḥabba in the relationships among ikhwānnā and from there reaching 
out to society is attributed to the Shaykh – it is considered to be because of his 
teaching, his inspiration, and the strength that he gives them. 
It is important to note that while I discuss these stories as separate from 
the stories told about the Shaykh’s miraculous powers (see chapter 9), the 
followers consider them to be of the same genre. These stories are considered to 
                                                  
33 Informal discussion with JA2 on 12-05-2013. 
34 Informal discussion with JA5 on 13-05-2013. 
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be stories of the Shaykh’s karāmāt just as much as the other ones that we would 
more commonly term ‘miracle stories’. The spiritual levels reached and the strong 
community bond, their love and hospitality towards each other and towards 
outsiders, are in fact considered the most important karāmāt of the Shaykh. They 
do not include supernatural rifts in the material world or explicit moments of 
‘breaking through of the transcendent’, but they are signs of the presence of the 
Shaykh in their community, and ‘charismatic moments’ in the sense that they 
partake of his spiritual powers, themselves becoming the tools through which he 
manifests his baraka. They thus underline the teaching that God is visible in all of 
His creation, and through these stories they position themselves in relation to 
these manifestations. 
These stories re-affirm the followers’ belief in the Shaykh’s spiritual 
authority and their dedication to ikhwānnā. By incorporating experiences from 
their communal life into their symbolic universe, this community is rooted strongly 
in the sacred and its social structure and the Shaykh’s authority is strongly 
affirmed. By retelling these stories, the followers re-create these moments and 
participate in them anew. They are not only stories that convey how the Shaykh 
manifests his baraka leading to his recognition of his spiritual authority, but also 
tales aimed to instruct ikhwānnā in ādāb. Through these stories, they are inspired 
to go above and beyond their care for each other and their good participation in 
society. These stories thus teach and inspire them to practice the community’s 
main value maḥabba – within the local community, the translocal ṭarīqa, and 
wider society. They transmit knowledge about the tradition and ideas on correct 
behaviour, presenting their brothers and sisters as role models. Followers are 
encouraged to heed these stories so they can live according to the Shaykh’s 
teaching and example, and partake of his attributes and spiritual powers. The 
stories sometimes refer to the distant past, but more often speak to their 
circumstances – referring to historical experiences of Israeli ‘co-existence’, 
separation, and war. By presenting these stories as karāmāt, the experience of 
the charismatic nature of the Shaykh and the community is perpetuated and the 
concretization of the message which O’Dea thought would lead to the lessening 
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of the charismatic nature of the message is avoided.35 Their acceptance in 
society is not only seen as a sign of their spiritual and moral status, but also 
provides them with a more secure place in this society, and the ability to continue 
their ṭarīqa in the public sphere. This becomes very tangible in the case of the 
zāwiya in Acre, which is currently being renovated, and which we shall discuss in 
the next chapter. 
We have seen how ikhwānnā in Acre and Jaffa see the Shaykh 
predominantly as a father and a teacher. These roles are mainly enacted by the 
community as they act as a caring family (which they actually are) and take care 
of each other’s tarbiya, but are attributed to the Shaykh as they are considered 
min faḍl Sīdnā. The role of the community is larger than in Amman, where access 
to the Shaykh is more frequent. While in Amman there is more opportunity for 
mudhākara and study groups, the tarbiya of the communities in Acre and Jaffa 
seem to revolve more around stories such as those discussed above, which 
might explain why adherence to the ṭarīqa and the cultivation of values and 
codes of normative behaviour is put more in terms related to the community than 
in terms related to the ‛aqīda. The maintenance of charisma in this traditional 
kinship organisation is evident as the community itself is the medium through 
which the Shaykh’s spiritual power is experienced. 
 
 
10.2 Practising the Path 
 
As we have seen in Amman, the first step on the Path is the mubāya‛a. It is 
administered in the same way as in Amman (see paragraph 6.2), but the place it 
takes in the life of an individual and of the community is somewhat different. For 
some this is a big moment (‘I felt that I had become a man’36), but others say it is 
something normal that everyone does and that is part of growing up in the 
                                                  
35 O’Dea, ‘Sociological Dilemmas’, 82–84. 
36 Interview AK4. 
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Shadhuliya.37 Some do mubāya‛a when they are still children and do not really 
understand what it means, others do it much later in life even when they have felt 
attached to the ṭarīqa for years.38 We have already seen how a follower from 
Jaffa did mubāya‛a at the hands of the muqaddam from Tubas when she was 
young and did not fully understand.39 In a group discussion in Jaffa however the 
current muqaddam in Jaffa and several followers stress that someone who asks 
to do mubāya‛a should be a good Muslim and a good person. 
 
First of all you have to be a straight human being in your normal life. Don’t cheat, 
don’t steal, don’t drink alcohol, go straight. (...) After that you have to adhere to 
the pillars of Islam. (...) There are people who say we are not Muslims. What do 
you mean, not Muslims? We do everything that Muslims do. But we do 
something extra. (...) 
Because our ṭarīqa is very valuable (ghālī) to us (...) we fear that someone will 
damage this. This is why we only take good people. Because if someone does 
something, (...) leaves the sharia, does something not good, they will say ‘he is 
Shadhuli, what does he do?’40 
 
The followers continuously stress that they are good Muslims as ‘[t]here is 
no ṭarīqa without sharia.’ If a non-Muslim would want to join he first has to 
become a Muslim and learn Arabic, because one needs to fully understand the 
Qur’an and the Sufi literature.41 As in Amman, they pledge to adhere to the 
sharia, to read waẓīfa and wird twice a day followed by dhikr bi-ism al-qasr, and 
                                                  
37 Interview AK1 and AK2. 
38 Interview AK1, Informal discussion with a former follower in Acre. In the case of those who do 
mubāya‛a when they are children, the Review Panel says: ‘it seems this is done only to 
encourage them, as they have to do mubāya‛a again when they become eligible and mature to do 
so.’ Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 48. None of my respondents 
mentioned this second mubāya‛a. 
39 Informal discussion with JA2 on 12-05-2013. 
40 JA1 in Interview JA1 16-04-2012. 
41 JA3 in Interview JA1 16-04-2012. An exception is made for those people who grew up in the 
ṭarīqa without learning Arabic (for example followers in the Comoros Islands and in North 
America). 
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to do ḥaḍra when they can.42 They have to be good people, good Muslims, and 
adhere to the pillars of maḥabba, fikr, dhikr and taslīm.  
 In Acre when they all still lived in the zāwiya, they read waẓīfa together in 
the evening, but the community was too small to do ḥaḍra. Practices like 
mudhākara, ta’ammul and the chanting of nashīd were done in informal 
meetings, whenever ikhwānnā met and felt like it.43 Nowadays there is a meeting 
on Thursday evening once a week in which they pray, read waẓīfa and do silent 
dhikr together, after which they talk for a short while and go home. There are no 
official study groups (though the women talk about setting up a women’s 
meeting). Because of the renovations there is less going on than usual and there 
are less visitors, but people still visit each other due to family and friendship ties. 
Once a month followers come from all over Israel (and sometimes from 
the West Bank and Gaza if they have received the right permits) to attend the 
ḥaḍra in the zāwiya in Acre. The followers from Umm al-Fahm rent a touring car 
and the followers from Jaffa sometimes stay overnight in the zāwiya in Tarshiha. 
The men form a circle in the hall next to the takiya, and the women sit 
somewhere else – in the back of the hall, in the opposite room, or outside if the 
weather is good. The followers pray, read waẓīfa and do ḥaḍra, and sometimes 
listen to the muqaddam. After this they chant nashīd and do ḥaḍra 
mugharbiyya.44 It is also an important social gathering as people might arrive up 
to two hours in advance and stay afterwards to socialise while sweets are being 
handed around. 
In Jaffa there has been no zāwiya since 1948, so the meetings take place 
at someone’s house. On Thursday evening they meet for the reading of waẓīfa 
and the ḥaḍra in the muqaddam’s house. The men sit in the spacious living 
room, and the women in a smaller adjacent room. After the rituals they sit 
together in the living room to chat. On Monday evening they have another 
                                                  
42 JA1 in Interview JA1 16-04-2012. 
43 Interview AK1, Informal discussion with a former follower in Acre. 
44 Ḥaḍra mugharbiyya is ‘ḥaḍra from the maghrib (North Africa)’, communal dhikr, a ritual in the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya which is usually performed at the end of a meeting. While most people 
continue to sit on the ground and sing nashīd, a few men move in a circle. 
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meeting where they pray, read waẓīfa, read and discuss one of the Shaykh’s 
mudhākarāt, and chant nashīd. This meeting is meant to pray and talk together, 
and to teach the children, to bring abnā al-ṭarīqa closer together and benefit from 
each other’s words.45  
In the meeting I attended, two of the more knowledgeable men explained 
about the ādāb of the meeting and gave a short introduction and discussion of 
the mudhākara, and explained some parts of the nashīd that were sung. A few 
days later a follower explained that there was a structure to the meeting, but that 
the spirit came from Sīdnā, as was proven when one of the participants used a 
certain combination of words which they later also read in the mudhākara. After 
the meeting they had a more social chat, which was mainly dedicated to 
discussing the preparations to build a new zāwiya.46 
 It is stressed to me repeatedly that this meeting is mixed because they 
are a family. These meetings used to be just for men and on Monday afternoons, 
but a few months ago Sīdī Ali suggested that they move the time to later in the 
evening so more people could attend and that they sit all together as they are 
members of one family anyway. Since then the meetings have been a success.47 
Part of the meeting is dedicated to the reading and discussing of one of 
the Shaykh’s mudhākarāt. These are written down every week in Amman, but 
are not spread systematically. It does not matter which one they read during the 
meeting as it will remain the truth – the one during this meeting was from 1994 
for example. The meeting in Amman is broadcast live via the internet for those 
who cannot attend and sometimes the followers in Jaffa watch after their own 
ḥaḍra, but mostly they have their own meeting at the same time.48 
The four pillars of the ṭarīqa are also deemed very important by the 
followers in Acre and Jaffa. They all agree maḥabba is the first, as it is their main 
attitude towards the Shaykh, each other and all human beings. Dhikr is the most 
important part of the spiritual practice. Fikr is understood as ta’ammul 
                                                  
45 JA1 in Interview JA1 on 16-04-2012. 
46 Meeting of ikhwānnā in the house of a follower in Jaffa on 12-05-2013. 
47 Informal discussion with JA7 on 13-05-2013./ 
48 Informal discussion with JA8 on 13-05-2013. 
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(contemplation): ‘Focus (twajjahū), think about what is created, the heavens and 
the earth. How God, the Glorified the Exalted, created the heavens, created the 
earth, created the sea, created the sun, the moon.’49 Taslīm is understood as the 
highest level of īmān as it dictates your relationship with God, it means accepting 
the will of God and obeying the Shaykh: ‘sallim amrak la-rabbak. Sallim amrak la-
shaykhak.’50 As everything on the path, it is based on the first pillar of love: 
‘When one loves someone, he obeys him right? You go as God wants. You go as 
your Shaykh wants.’51 
 AKR also discusses the four pillars, but he stresses the value of fikr above 
all others. When talking to an outsider, ta’ammul is often the first practice he talks 
about and he presents it as a central practice of the ṭarīqa. For him ta’ammul and 
mudhākara (in the sense of dialogue among the followers and with outsiders) are 
the most important values that Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din and Shaykh Ahmad 
respectively gave their followers, and for him it is what characterizes the ṭarīqa. 
He explains the practice of ta’ammul as observation and listening to nature, to 
each other, to collect awareness, transcend the differences and become one. 
AKR says that Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din taught his followers to have a spectrum of 
opinions. In his opinion, everyone has a bit of the truth and by listening you 
accept diversity and suspend your judgements – there is no good and bad, no 
believer and unbeliever, no reward and punishment, no heaven and hell. ‘My 
thesis and your antithesis become a synthesis.’52 ‘There is no right or wrong, we 
all have different backgrounds. I have a secular background and understand 
things differently from someone with a religious background.’ According to him, 
there is a full exchange between the Shaykh and the followers.53 
                                                  
49 JA1 in Interview JA1 16-04-2012. 
50 JA1 in Interview JA1 16-04-2012. 
51 JA1 in Interview JA1 16-04-2012. 
52 Interview AKR 23-02-2012 (our first meeting); lecture by AKR on the study day of the Hebrew 
University’s MA in Islamic Studies, hosted by AKR in the zāwiya in Acre on 26-03-2012; 
presentation of AKR during the meeting with Shaykha Khadija and her followers in the zāwiya in 
Acre on 08-12-2013. He refers to the story of Rabi’a al-Adawiyya (713-801) who walked through 
the streets of Basra holding a torch and a bucket of water to burn heaven and extinguish hell. The 
Review Panel states: ‘This is the person`s own opinion, and does not coincide with the teachings 
of the ṭarīqa.’  
53 Interview AKR 16-05-2013. 
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According to AKR, ta’ammul is the basis of mudhākara: after his first 
meeting with the Shaykh, he developed his understanding through mudhākara, 
by listening to and discussing with the other followers.54 He also classifies the 
dialogue he has with other groups in society as mudhākara, a dialogue in which 
ta’ammul is practised, listening to each other’s potentially conflicting opinions: 
 
We educate our followers to be tolerant, to respect, to accept, not to judge. We 
begin from our self first and then we dialogue with the others. (...) The spiritual 
aspect affects the real aspect. (...) It is connected, it is a chain. So spiritual and 
realistic are connected with each other.55 
 
While the idea of developing the spiritual relationship with the Shaykh, 
advancing on the path and achieving higher levels of knowledge is essential for 
their practice, the concrete definition of different levels is hardly discussed.56 A 
follower in Jaffa explains to me that there are many levels (darajāt), but that 
normal people can never reach the level of the Shaykh and stay on earth with 
ikhwānnā and other people and focus on ādāb, taslīm and iḥtirām. Some are 
further on the Path and understand more, but only the Shaykh knows who they 
are. Examples from the past show that it is possible, however, such as Mahmoud 
Abu al-Shamat and Abd al-Qadir al-Homsi to whom God gave the nashīd (fataḥ 
‘alayhim).57 
The point we made regarding the mubāya‛a in Amman – that it is not a 
strong watershed – is therefore even more valid in Acre and Jaffa. Like in 
Amman, the absence of personalized initiation and of clearly defined stages of 
the Path and the focus on communal dhikr leads to a strong egalitarian 
community. In Amman we saw that the mudhākara and study groups led to a 
relatively homogeneous body of knowledge, as expected based on Pinto’s 
                                                  
54 Interview AKR 27-02-2012. 
55 Interview AKR 27-02-2012. 
56 JA1 in Interview JA1 16-04-2012. 
57 Informal discussion with JA7 on 13-05-2013. Also told to me by AM3 in Interview AM1. 
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observations in Aleppo.58 In Acre and Jaffa, therefore, we might expect that the 
focus on informal tarbiya, e.g. through the stories we analysed in paragraph 10.2, 
and the lower level of mudhākara and study groups, leads to the spread of a less 
homogeneous body of knowledge. We shall now turn to the issue of the 
transmission and communication of knowledge. 
 
 
10.3 Modes of Communication 
 
We discussed ikhwānnā’s understanding of ‛ilm al-ishāra in Amman. While this 
has not been explicitly discussed in Acre and Jaffa (except by AKR, whom we 
shall discuss later), there have been cases in which this interpretive mechanism 
was at work. We have seen how the Shaykh is seen as a teacher and father 
whose words should be obeyed. How are his words interpreted in daily life? We 
shall now discuss a case which shows the dynamic in which the followers take 
space to interpret the Shaykh’s words from within their own contexts, even in the 
case of a direct clear order from the Shaykh. 
 Shaykh Ahmad has clearly stated that he does not approve of smoking, 
either cigarettes or narguila, and advises his followers to avoid it.59 Followers 
agree that it is because the Shaykh cares for them and for their health that he 
wanted to put a stop to this unhealthy and expensive habit. While I have no idea 
to what extent this is adhered to in Amman as I had no informal interactions in 
which a cigarette might be lit or a narguila might be presented, in Israel and the 
West Bank this ban is not strictly adhered to. I myself was sometimes the main 
                                                  
58 Pinto, ‘The Anthropologist and the Initiated’, 465–468; Pinto, ‘Creativity and Stability in the 
Making of Sufi Tradition’, 125–127; Pinto, ‘Knowledge and Miracles.’ See paragraph 1.2. 
59 While this is clearly an attitude that can be found in the tradition of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya 
since the time of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din (or at least since his teachings were recorded in the 
publication of Fatima al-Yashrutiyya’s books), it also coincides with a public discussion in Jordan. 
In 2008 the Ministry of Health passed Public Health Law Number 47 which prohibits smoking in 
public places, but has hardly been enforced since then. Elizabeth Whitman, ‘Water Pipe Ban 
Lights up Jordan’s Smokers’, accessed 19 February 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/02/water-pipe-ban-lights-up-jordan-smokers-
2014214185149588570.html. 
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excuse: ‘the Shaykh has said to look after our guests and treat them well, and we 
know that Linda likes narguila, so we smoke narguila.’ 
 Another follower did not manage to quit smoking cigarettes entirely, but 
says that as he is over fifty it is enough if he cuts down on the number of 
cigarettes: 
 
Five years ago he [Sīdnā] said ‘Ikhwānnā, I do not want anyone to smoke 
arguileh and I do not want smoking.’ Around ninety percent of ikhwānnā stopped 
smoking and stopped smoking arguileh. Now there are those like me and like my 
older brother who have smoked for fifty years, he said ‘he whose age is this high 
I cannot tell him no, but smoke less.’ He does not want smoking for us, he fears 
for us, for our health, and he saw how much the smoking of arguileh happened. 
He said ‘I never want arguileh.’ And truly, every ikhwānnā from any town in the 
world stopped the arguileh. They listen to the word of Sīdnā because they know 
that Sīdnā wants our health. I obey him.60 
 
In this case we see that even though the Shaykh made his point very 
clear, followers still interpret it in a way to suit them in a particular situation.61 We 
can see this as an example of the mode of communication we have discussed on 
a theoretical level in chapter 6 – while the followers did not refer to these ideas 
explicitly, their treatment of this prohibition by the Shaykh as a sign which can be 
interpreted in their own individual and communal setting points to this frame of 
reference. Of course the clash of such a clear communication by the Shaykh 
(which is a rare occurrence) and such an addictive habit which is not only 
physically addictive but also plays a role in the social interactions of people in the 
Levant in general, asks for such divergent interpretations and discussions. 
Another issue which requires individual and communal interpretation is the 
wearing of ḥijāb (veil covering head and chest). Shaykh Ahmad said in a 
                                                  
60 JA1 in Interview JA1 10-05-2013. 
61 The Review Panel explains this divergence by referring to the different degrees of commitment 
to the ṭarīqa. While it is not for me to judge the level of people’s commitment, the people with 
whom I discussed the issue of smoking struck me as very dedicated to the Shaykh and ikhwānnā, 
and this issue of individual interpretation seems to happen on all levels of commitment. Review 
Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 50. 
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newspaper interview in 1996 that a woman has to dress modestly according to 
time and society,62 and in a television interview in 2014 that he does not 
encourage ‘certain clothes’ that are imposed on women, but leaves women free 
to decide.63 While not aiming to give an all-encompassing discussion of the dress 
habits of the women of the ṭarīqa (as the following lines are based on informal 
discussions and observations, not on systematic inquiry into that particular topic), 
I do wish to point to a few observations I made that are relevant to the issue of 
interpretation of the teachings of the Shaykh. Some women in Acre wear ḥijāb, 
other women cover their head with a loose scarf when visiting the zāwiya, but do 
not cover elsewhere. In Acre the wearing of ḥijāb did not seem to be an issue of 
discussion at all. The religious climate in Acre and its surroundings has been 
quite liberal for decades and most women do not wear ḥijāb. While 
interpretations of Islam that do require women to wear ḥijāb are becoming 
stronger and some women of the ṭarīqa do wear ḥijāb, it is not a divisive issue in 
society and it is not a matter of discussion among ikhwānnā in Acre. 
In Jaffa however it is more of an issue. Some middle-aged ladies started 
to wear ḥijāb recently and this has become an issue of contention. Followers who 
oppose it, often including their own husbands, take any opportunity to state they 
do not agree. I once found myself in a particularly fierce discussion between two 
ladies, a ḥijābī and a non- ḥijābī, in which the non- ḥijābī argued that wearing 
ḥijāb is taqlīdī, traditional, and not part of sharia, referring to her interpretation of 
the Shaykh’s statement that they are free to dress as they please outside of 
meetings. The ḥijābī lady responded that the Shaykh had also said that it is 
important for them to be part of their society and for her, wearing ḥijāb is a sign of 
respect to other people in society. For her, being part of society meant to be in 
touch with those around her, and she said she went to the mosque regularly 
(once a month).64 Another ḥijābī said she watched television preachers and 
                                                  
62 Interview with Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti, al-Urdun, 26-02-1996,p. 8-9. 
63 Interview by Akram Khuzam with Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti. See paragraph 6.3.2. 
64 Informal discussion with JA2 and JA7 on 13-05-2013. 
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learnt from them as well, to which a disgruntled follower replied ‘there is only one 
Shaykh.’65 
  It is typical of the ṭarīqa that people can follow their own interpretations 
and that there is a free discussion about these interpretations and practices. 
What is interesting is the difference between Acre and Jaffa that might point to a 
different religious climate in the two towns as combining being part of society and 
adhering to one’s own communal values seems to be harder in Jaffa. 
 AKR is the only person in Israel who explicitly refers to the dynamic of 
communication that we have discussed in chapter 6. He strongly stresses the 
space for the individual’s adaptation to his or her context and free interpretation 
based on the practices of ta’ammul and mudhākara. He says that Shaykh Ahmad 
encourages free and critical thinking, but he also understands taslīm as 
accepting what the Shaykh says, so in his thought the potential paradox between 
fikr and taslīm becomes strong. He resolves this potential conflict quite explicitly 
by referring to the Shaykh’s mode of communication. 
 
Taslīm – there is one point you have to begin from. You have to accept that God 
exists. This is taslīm. And from this point you have the rights and the freedom to 
think about everything. (...) 
Taslīm means when the Shaykh tells you something you accept it. (...) Dr. Ali 
Yashruti told me one day ‘That point is black.’ I said ‘No no, that point is not 
black, it is red.’ He said ‘Okay.’ After one day I thought: ‘That point is black.’  
Sometimes you have to think but (...) the final word is for the Shaykh.66 
 
According to AKR, it is very rare for the Shaykh to speak so directly or to 
give direct instructions. He says Sīdī Ali usually listens, he does not contradict or 
argue, but he makes you think afterwards,67 because he wants the followers ‘to 
believe in something that you are convinced of, not persuaded by.’68 Shaykh 
Ahmad 
                                                  
65 Informal discussion with JA1 and JA12 on 11-05-2013. 
66 Interview AKR 08-03-2012. 
67 Interview AKR 29-02-2012. 
68 Interview AKR 29-03-2012. 
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gives you signs. Either you collect them or you don’t. (...) Every week he gives 
one mudhākara. There is no explanation during the mudhākara. You have to 
understand during the mudhākara, according to your position. It is not objective, 
it is subjective. Maybe you understand something but your brother doesn’t 
understand it. (...) He speaks generally. You have to understand what you want. 
What the Shaykh says, you explain it. You explain it. Maybe you have questions 
and your brother has a different question. The mudhākara of the Shaykh gives 
answer to all the questions, according to your knowledge. (...) There is an 
outward and inward. He speaks in the level of outward, your duty is to explain 
inwardly. (...) So you have to be all the time in awareness status in order to 
understand, otherwise you miss. [pause] It’s not asking or answering. You have 
to understand by signs.69 
 
One can even get answers without being in the vicinity of the Shaykh:  
 
If you have any question, you meditate, in order to make a connection with the 
Shaykh. Even [if] you are far away you will get an answer by sign, but you have 
to be aware. One day we discussed something and needed the opinion of the 
Shaykh. A small boy came and (...) answered us.70 
 
The ability of a follower to read the Shaykh’s signs depends on his/her spiritual 
development. During discussions madad will come which will enable you to 
‘discover a lot of meanings’. As we have seen, this madad is understood within 
the ṭarīqa as inspiration coming through the Shaykh, and AKR uses the concept 
the same way.71 
 But the question of the Shaykh’s role in his individual interpretations 
seems unresolved or difficult to put in words:  
 
For myself if I want to make a research, I make it not what the Shaykh said, yes I 
respect what the Shaykh says, but what I say. This is the most important. What I 
                                                  
69 Interview AKR 08-03-2012. 
70 Interview AKR 08-03-2012. 
71 Interview AKR 08-03-2012. 
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understand. Not what God says. God said in these verses so and so. My opinion 
about what he said, I have to know it. My response, my understanding, to these 
verses.72 
 
When explaining a line of poetry, he says: 
 
This is my explanation. (...) When he gives me the ability and the energy and 
enlightenment happened I could explain. It’s not mine. He lent me the knowledge 
to explain. It is not mine.73 
 
 Following this line of thought, AKR says that when you have reached a 
higher spiritual level you can decide for yourself which religious laws to follow. 
According to him, this is one of the new understandings Shaykh Ahmad gives to 
adapt the ṭarīqa to this day and age; not a change, but a renewal (tajdīd), a 
development, a more suitable explanation according to the era:74 
 
LS [summarizing the preceding discussion]: So do you decide yourself which 
laws you follow? 
AKR: Exactly. 
LS: It is not the path, the Shaykh, but it is you yourself who decides. 
AKR: The Shaykh gives you the knowledge, tools. 
LS: And then you can decide for yourself. 
AKR: Exactly. Go back to your heart. (...) Shaykh Ali [Nur al-Din] said: ‘You and 
your God.’ Shaykh Ahmad says: ‘You alone decide.’ It is new you see, Shaykh 
Ahmad (...) strengthens the individuality, more than Shaykh Ali [Nur al-Din]. And 
he makes it clear that you have your God inside you. Go back to your God which 
sits inside you. This is the difference between the two Shaykhs.75 
 
                                                  
72 Interview AKR 14-03-2012. 
73 Interview AKR 27-02-2012. 
74 The Review Panel states that this is his own opinion, and does not coincide with the teachings 
of the ṭarīqa. Review Panel, ‘Response to email of October 12’. 
75 Interview AKR 27-02-2012. The Review Panel stresses that this is his own opinion and not a 
true story. Review Panel, ‘Response to email of October 12’. 
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 In his thought we see a strong adherence to the idea of autonomy for the 
individual based on the bodily experience that is common in ‘new spirituality’ 
movements. He frames it in classical Sufi terms that enable fikr and taslīm to co-
exist without problems, but his interpretation of fikr as critical thought and his 
strong stress on inspiration and individual interpretation, based on the 
relationship with ‘your God inside you’ takes these concepts far towards the 
paradoxical. In his thought, the authority and responsibility of the Shaykh is 
decentralized and transferred to the individual who refers to ‘God who sits inside 
you’. This way, only he is responsible for his interpretations and the behaviour 
based on them, even though the initial inspiration has come from the Shaykh. 
While maintaining his reverence for his spiritual master and claiming adherence 
to the principle of taslīm, this understanding of ishāra, inspiration, and individual 
interpretation provides him with a large degree of individual autonomy. This does 
not seem to be accepted by most followers in Acre and does not provide him with 
any legitimacy among ikhwānnā, who focus on the Shaykh and the community 
rather than the individual, but it is seen as a mark of great spirituality by members 
of the Jewish Sufi ‘new spirituality’ network, who value the individual spiritual 
experience before everything else. 
In his understanding, this relativist attitude to the sacred texts and the law 
and this space for individual interpretations and actions are part of the Shaykh’s 
teachings. He sees the spiritual meaning of all the rules as more important than 
the material, mechanical exercise of them – the five pillars of Islam are 
necessary, but other rules depend on your personal circumstances. ‘Not all the 
laws of the sharia fit me. Because the forbidden became [forbidden] for a reason. 
And if I do not have this reason, the law does not fit me.’76 In his lectures to 
outsiders he stresses the space for this critical attitude. During a lecture to 
students of the Hebrew University he takes this relativist attitude even further by 
stating explicitly that in the West (to which he considers Israel to belong) one 
does not have to be a Muslim to be min abnā al-ṭarīqa.77 
                                                  
76 Interview AKR 27-02-2012. 
77 Lecture AKR HU Study Day 26-03-2012. 
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Ben Arieh gives a similar interpretation of a discussion he says he had 
with Shaykh Ahmad and Sīdī Ali: 
 
‘Could a non-Muslim be initiated in Sufism (li-hitkabel derekh ha-nika ha-sufit)?’  
I asked Professor Ahmad Yashruti in the meeting that occurred in Amman. 
‘Yes, of course’ he replied. 
‘Is it necessary to have a teacher?’ I continued to ask. 
‘Yes’ was the answer. 
‘Is there a possibility to learn from a teacher without meeting him face-to-face?’  
I asked. 
‘In special circumstances, there is such a possibility’ answered the Shaykh.78 
 
Ben Arieh believes this dialogue referred to the role of new media in reaching out 
to non-Muslims with a universal message of love and tolerance. While the ṭarīqa 
does indeed connect its followers using digital media, spiritual communication is 
more important for the followers than such direct communications, as we have 
discussed in the previous chapters, and the Shaykh’s answer would more likely 
refer to spiritual communication rather than modern communication tools. Shaykh 
Ahmad’s reply that one does not have to be a Muslim to be initiated is puzzling 
as he has always made it perfectly clear to me that all followers of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya are good Muslims, both in his written answers to my 
questions and during my visits to the zāwiya.79 When asked, the Review Panel 
says that the meeting never took place.80 
 We thus see how the same dynamics of communication and interpretation 
explicitly discussed in Amman and connected to the Sufi concept of ‛ilm al-ishāra 
are enacted in two very different ways in Acre and Jaffa. Most followers – who as 
we saw in chapter 9 place their ṭarīqa clearly in the historical Islamic Sufi tradition 
                                                  
78 Ben Arieh, Zāwiya, 40–41. 
79 See also Shaykh Ahmad in an interview conducted in Beirut in 1999, in Sawafta, al-Madrasa al-
Shādhiliyya al-Yashruṭiyya, 840. ‘Our ṭarīqa is Muhammadan in origin and development and 
meaning. And Sayyidnā Muhammad pbuh is master of the sharia and master of the truth (ḥaqīqa) 
simultaneously. And everyone who says differently, he does not know anything about the ṭarīqa 
and her rules (ahkām).’ 
80 Review Panel, ‘Response to email of October 12’. 
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– see their Shaykh and community as the centre of their symbolic universe and 
the social structure based on it, and their tarbiya, their development of their 
relation with the Shaykh, and their interpretation of his teachings, happens within 
the community. AKR, on the other hand, is less connected to the community and 
maintains strong relations with people in the Jewish Sufi ‘new spirituality’ milieu, 
and his understanding of the relation between the Shaykh and the individual is 
influenced by this as it shifts towards a greater autonomy of the individual. The 
idea of the social structure centred on the relationship between Shaykh and 
disciple is maintained, but the meaning he attributes to it is very different. As we 
saw in chapter 9, when the connection with the community is disrupted, the 
socialisation process becomes less complete, and the symbolic universe and its 
plausibility structure will weaken, which seems to happen in the case of AKR. 
Connected to this spiritual focus on the individual as found in the ‘new 
spirituality’ framework, is the perennialist idea that Sufism goes above and 
beyond the Islamic normative framework, which is connected to elements of the 
Sufi tradition that state that the sharia is no longer necessary for those who are 
advanced on the Path. By stating that he only abides by the rules of the sharia 
that fit him, AKR is at the same time claiming that he has reached high stages on 
the Path, and speaking to this perennialist audience. Such a statement is 
absolutely not accepted by the rest of ikhwānnā, however. 
 While the followers in Acre and Jaffa do engage with and interpret the 
Shaykh’s words and base their actions on these interpretations, they would never 
go so far as to say that one does not have to be a Muslim to join. While – again – 
their understanding of what it means to be a Muslim is influenced by the ṭarīqa 
and by their immediate surroundings – the religious climate in Acre and Jaffa – 
the idea that one has to be a Muslim is heavily stressed. The followers in Acre, 
Jaffa and Amman, while loving and welcoming towards outsiders in their 
everyday life, do maintain those boundaries on the religious level as they 
consider their ṭarīqa to be essentially Islamic, and while they accept and love 
everyone as a part of humanity, they do not accept everyone in their ṭarīqa. The 
practice of mubāya‛a might almost be a matter-of-fact practice amongst those 
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who grew up in the ṭarīqa and those who got to know and love them through 
marriage, but they maintain strict standards for their members, and when 
someone clearly misbehaves they do not associate themselves with them any 
more. 
 
 
10.4 Conclusion 
 
In the time of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din, the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya was a 
proselytizing movement. It is unclear when this stopped, but nowadays there is 
no notion of this and adherence to the ṭarīqa is passed on within the family and 
sometimes to spouses and close friends. The move from a ‘sect’ in which 
membership is voluntary and based on conversion, to a ‘church’ or 
‘denomination’ in which one is born into the religious movement, is part of the 
institutionalisation of a religious movement.81 O’Dea argues that this might lead 
to a ‘weakening of the interior disposition of the nominally religious’, although he 
also notes that socialisation and education might substitute for the ‘dramatic 
conversion experience’ (or prepare for such a conversion).82 This is clearly the 
case in the Shadhuli-Yashruti process of tarbiya, in which the followers are 
prepared to accept the Shaykh as the leader who connects them to God and who 
lets them participate in his religious experience and spiritual power.  
 The practical roles of the Shaykh that were expressed by the followers in 
Acre and Jaffa, the teacher and the father, are in practice enacted mostly by the 
community. While the followers say that the Shaykh is their teacher, in practice, 
most of their tarbiya is done by the community. Through tarbiya (or socialisation), 
the community instills the initial emotions and attitudes towards the Shaykh that 
enable them to develop the spiritual relationship to such a degree that they 
consider themselves directed by him from afar. The community is therefore just 
as much the teacher as the Shaykh is (if not more so). The care the Shaykh 
                                                  
81 Berger, ‘The Sociological Study of Sectarianism’, 468–469; Swatos, ‘Church-Sect Theory.’ 
Based on what we know of the ṭarīqa’s history, this is only an organisational shift, not a shift in 
attitude to the world. 
82 O’Dea, ‘Sociological Dilemmas’, 84. 
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shows them as a father figure is manifested through the community – their love 
and care and hospitality towards each other is considered to come ultimately 
from the Shaykh, but in practice is enacted by the community.  
This is mainly because the followers have been isolated for many years 
and still face challenges to meet their Shaykh. The importance of family for 
Palestinians in Israel is reflected in the image of ikhwānnā as both a family and a 
religious community – while this image is present in Amman, it is much more 
pronounced in Acre and Jaffa. The form of institutionalisation the ṭarīqa in Acre 
and Jaffa has taken is connected even stronger to the family than in Jordan. 
There is a strong correlation between the importance of the family as a unit of 
social and political organisation among the Palestinians in Israel (see chapter 8), 
the ṭarīqa’s organisation on kinship lines, and the strong family values shown by 
abnā al-ṭarīqa in Israel. These circumstances may have strengthened the link 
between family and religion as both are understood in terms of the other, and 
may have strengthened the interpretation of the Shaykh as a spiritual father who 
has authority over his children in family-related matters.  
While the exact dynamic needs to be historically researched, we can 
surmise that the tendency to see the ṭarīqa as a family was already present 
before the nakba. It is an old Sufi theme that already existed in the earliest period 
of Islam in Palestine.83 In addition to this classical Sufi attitude, due to their 
isolation after 1948 the identification of the ṭarīqa as the actual and spiritual 
family most likely increased. The transmission of the tradition had to happen 
exclusively by the followers themselves without input from the Shaykh, and there 
were no resources and therefore no means and little need to develop an effective 
administration outside the family and the community living in the zāwiya. Their 
presence in the zāwiya and the role of the family as the main means of 
transmission led the followers to trace their adherence to the Shaykh 
genealogically and thus connect to the ‘charismatic moment’ and the ‘golden age’ 
of the ṭarīqa, of which they still saw the physical remnants but of which they were 
the only living testifiers. It was a way to hold on to their heritage when there were 
                                                  
83 Ephrat, Spiritual Wayfarers, 102. 
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few other ways available – even the numbers to do ḥaḍra where often too small 
and the re-creation of the original religious experience through this ritual was 
often denied them. Circumstances were so challenging and different that their 
attitude needed to be redefined, and the family / community in the zāwiya was 
the group with which their attitudes were negotiated.  
This was part of the same development in Palestinian society in Israel at 
large. As the Palestinians in Israel felt alienated from the state and those 
institutions and people related to it, the family remained an important institution 
for communal organisation. The religious establishment was considered co-opted 
and people turned to other places for their values – turning to the family and 
understanding religion in terms of the family is one such reaction. Political party 
activity on the municipal level was often intertwined with family and clan-
networks, and the family continued to play an important role in social 
relationships. In the older generations, family affiliation is an important social 
identifier and a source of pride, and in some families, parents are still eager to 
see their children married and take an active role in matchmaking and in 
approving or disapproving their offspring’s choice.84 
This does not explain the whole phenomenon though – as we have seen 
in previous chapters, ikhwānnā in Amman use similar concepts to describe the 
ṭarīqa as a family and also use the image of the Shaykh as a father, if not as 
often and as explicitly. The tendency to trace adherence to Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din 
through the generations happens in both Israel and Jordan. It allows ikhwānnā 
an additional access to the charismatic moment, in addition to their relationship 
with the living Shaykh. This tendency is more pronounced in Acre and Jaffa, 
however, probably due to the more difficult access they had and still have to the 
Shaykh. When contacts were re-established the local communities in Israel were 
re-incorporated in the translocal ṭarīqa and connections with the Shaykh were 
                                                  
84 Ghanem, The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 26. Majid al-Haj, ‘The Changing Arab Kinship 
Structure: The Effect of Modernization in an Urban Community’, Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 36:2 (1988) 237-258; Majid al-Haj, ‘Social Research on Family Lifestyles among 
Arabs in Israel’, Journal of Comparative Family Studies 20:2 (1989) 175-195; Majid al-Haj, 
‘Kinship and Modernization in Developing Societies: The Emergence of Instrumentalized Kinship’, 
Journal of Comparative Family Studies 26:3 (1995) 311-328.  
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strengthened, but in Acre and Jaffa the attitude towards the community and the 
Shaykh had been firmly established and we can still see the small differences of 
focus. As there is still less interaction with the Shaykh than in Amman, the actual 
education is still done in the community. In addition to this, it should be noted that 
the sociological phenomenon that the ṭarīqa is transmitted through kinship 
affiliation, is also driven by the natural desire for spouses to share their religious 
views and emotions, and thus to marry someone from the same religious group, 
or to invite their partner into it. As in Jordan, a more thorough historical analysis 
of the development of the ṭarīqa would be needed to understand this dynamic 
fully. 
The followers value the love, hospitality and tarbiya in the ṭarīqa as 
karāmāt from the Shaykh, but it is the followers themselves who enact these 
values. Through the stories they tell about this love, hospitality and spiritual 
connections among ikhwānnā, and the good relations they have with the rest of 
society, the followers transmit their values discursively and aim to inspire actions 
according to these values. By presenting these acts of love and hospitality 
towards the community and wider society as the Shaykh’s karāmāt they 
participate in his spiritual power, allowing them to participate in his charisma 
through the cultivating of ādāb and the practicing of the ṭarīqa’s main value of 
maḥabba. The fact that they are widely accepted in society strengthens their 
position and allows them to continue the activities of the ṭarīqa in the public 
space, which is especially relevant in the light of the renovation of the zāwiya in 
Acre. 
The Shaykh’s love and care is thus manifested through the community. 
The followers’ presentation of stories of communal love and hospitality as 
karāmāt of the Shaykh underscores this point. Lindholm and Pinto have argued 
that even when charisma is routinized, it still needs to be manifested by each 
new shaykh.85 Shaykh Ahmad manifests his charisma through his behaviour 
(which is seen as a manifestation of the Prophet Muhammad’s behaviour in our 
times), and through his karāmāt. In chapter 9 we saw some examples of his 
                                                  
85 Lindholm, ‘Introduction’, 9.  
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karāmāt of the firāsa-type, and in this chapter we have discussed the ‘community 
karāmāt’, in which the Shaykh’s baraka is experienced as flowing through the 
community. The Shaykh inspires them to be good to each other and be like a 
family, and to be good people who are accepted by society – these are seen as 
great miracles. 
 The forms the classical Sufi concepts of karāmāt and ishārāt take in the 
understanding of the followers in Acre and Jaffa are connected to the doctrine 
that God can be seen everywhere through maḥabba and spiritual development. 
As in Amman, the experience of the ‘breaking through’ of the sacred, the 
‘charismatic moment’ and ‘religious experience’, are thus incorporated in the 
symbolic universe, both made possible through it and reaffirming it, and adding to 
the vernacular tradition in the process. All of this strengthens the social structure 
which depends on the relationship between Shaykh and follower. Everything 
good that happens to them is attributed to the Shaykh, and everything bad that 
happens is incorporated through adherence to the pillar of taslīm. In Acre and 
Jaffa, the community is experienced even more as a medium of the charismatic, 
and the social structure is thus tied even more closely to the symbolic universe. 
The charismatic is maintained and considered to be enacted through the 
community, and charisma and institution continuously reaffirm each other. In the 
case of Acre and Jaffa, this is even clearer than in Amman, as the essential role 
of the community in manifesting the Shaykh’s spiritual powers is very 
pronounced. 
Berger argued that an important aspect of the routinization of charisma is 
the containment of the disruptive breaking through of other realities to specific 
times and spaces.86 This is only partly the case in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya. 
While charisma is primarily contained in the person of the Shaykh, the belief in 
karāmāt and ishārāt in everyday life enables the experience of the charismatic in 
everyday reality. This does not lead to disruption or rejection of society, rather 
the opposite: it is an important value of the ṭarīqa that they adapt to society and 
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participate in it, and explicit moments of such adaptation, participation and 
acceptance are considered karāmāt and moments in which one can see the 
Shaykh’s baraka, in other words, charismatic moments. The Shaykh’s 
charismatic authority is thus continuously reaffirmed in their experience in the 
community, and the community’s transmission of the Shaykh’s teaching 
continuously reinforces itself as the tool of the Shaykh’s baraka. This way, 
institutional and charismatic authority reinforce each other. The followers thus 
maintain their emotional and spiritual focus on the Shaykh, but the community 
has reached a high degree of self-perpetuation in which the physical presence of 
the Shaykh is desired, but not necessary. We have reached the same conclusion 
in Amman, but the followers never had to be this independent as they have never 
been as isolated as the followers in Israel. 
Tarbiya encompasses general Islamic practices and the ṭarīqa’s four 
pillars of maḥabba, dhikr, fikr, and taslīm. Building on Pinto’s observations in 
Aleppo,87 we saw that the absence of personalized initiation and dhikr, the 
absence of clear stages on the Path, and the communal dhikr, leads to a strong 
egalitarian communal cohesion in Amman. In Acre, this is even more the case as 
the mubāya‛a is even less of a watershed for most followers than it is in Amman. 
While for some it is experienced as almost a rite of passage, for most it was 
something that was a normal part of growing up in the community. The process 
of tarbiya is thus experienced as an ongoing continuum from a very young age 
until one’s final moments, and the mubāya‛a is not a break in that (as opposed to 
Pinto’s observation that tarbiya in Aleppo only happen after the initiation88).This 
further underscores the character of the ṭarīqa in Acre and Jaffa as a community 
one is born into, not a group one explicitly joins. 
An important aspect of tarbiya in Acre and Jaffa is the discussion of 
stories about the Shaykh’s karāmāt of love and hospitality within the community 
and towards wider society. These stories function to affirm the Shaykh’s authority 
and the community’s cohesion (see above), but also function as modes of 
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instruction as they provide role models and inspiration and thus cultivate good 
behaviour and ādāb. There are less occasions for mudhākara and there are 
hardly any study groups in Acre and Jaffa; there are no organised study groups 
in Acre, and only one in Jaffa which only recently began to acquire a high level of 
attendance. Such meetings are important moments of transmission in Amman in 
which the Shaykh’s weekly mudhākara is discussed, and probably focus strongly 
on the ‛aqīda (as our group interviews did). In Acre and Jaffa, however, the use 
of stories from the vernacular tradition that focus on love and hospitality in the 
community rather than discussions on ‛aqīda, might lead to the strong focus on 
maḥabba rather than ‛aqīda we noted. 
Pinto has observed in Aleppo that study groups lead to the spread of a 
homogeneous body of knowledge.89 The lesser degree of mudhākara and study 
groups in Acre and Jaffa as expected leads to a wider variety of interpretations in 
Acre and Jaffa. The more informal settings in which I met with followers in Acre 
and Jaffa gave me more of an insight into the dynamics of the mode of 
communication and the resultant interpretations in individual and communal 
situations. Due to their successful tarbiya they envisage mudhākara as a meeting 
of kindred spirits and as based on a more contemplative interpretation of fikr, and 
their discussion of matters within the ṭarīqa therefore keeps them closer to the 
community consensus. Even so, the sources from which they draw information 
are wide, due to the fragmented nature of their society, and this leads to quite 
opposing interpretations in some cases, could best be seen from their divergent 
attitudes towards the ḥijāb. 
The only person who explicitly referred to the ideas behind this dynamic 
was AKR, who sees fikr mainly in terms of critical thinking, and in whose thinking 
the paradox between fikr and taslīm becomes very strong. He referred explicitly 
to the indirect communication by the Shaykh which gives the individual space for 
interpretations. While he acknowledged the importance to adapt to 
circumstances, he gave more weight to the individual in this dynamic, and to the 
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individual’s autonomy and freedom to move away from rules that do not fit him or 
her. For him, mudhākara is not a meeting of kindred spirits, but a dialogue 
between opposites. When speaking to a non-Muslim public in a study meeting, 
he universalized the message of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din and explicitly stated that 
in the West (in which he includes Israel), one does not have to be a Muslim to 
join. He legitimizes these acts of interpretations through an initial encounter with 
the Shaykh but mainly be referring to the ‘God within’, which is more in line with 
Western ‘new spirituality’ which is also found in the Jewish Sufi milieu in Israel 
(see paragraph 8.2.4). As discussed in chapter 9, his divergence from the 
attitude of the rest of the followers can be explained by the fact that he is less 
connected to the community and that the ongoing socialisation which is 
necessary for the maintenance of a symbolic universe and its social structure, 
has been disrupted in his case. His contact with people from the Jewish Sufi 
milieu, however, explains the development of his thought in that direction. 
 Such interpretations go too far for the other followers in the ṭarīqa, who do 
not always agree with his outreach to other groups in society based on such far-
reaching interpretations of the Shaykh’s teachings. They place themselves firmly 
in the Islamic tradition. Here we see the usefulness of Stjernholm’s suggestion to 
focus on the historical tradition and narrative a group or individual adheres to,90 
as here we see a clear difference between the Islamic Sufi tradition of most 
followers in Acre and Jaffa, and the Israeli ‘new spiritual’ narrative with its Zionist 
undertones, of AKR. In order to fully understand the social consequences and 
controversial nature of such interpretations, we shall now turn to the discussion 
of the zāwiya in the life of the community and in local society. 
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Chapter 11 
The Zāwiya in Acre, al-Zāwiya al-Umm 
 
 
This chapter will discuss the role of the zāwiya in Acre in the relationship 
between Shaykh and followers. Even though the zāwiya has hardly been 
functioning the past eight years due to the renovations, this unusual situation 
does permit us to examine the dynamic within the ṭarīqa from an interesting 
angle. First we will discuss what the zāwiya means to the followers in Amman 
and in Acre and how we should therefore understand the current renovations, 
and second how the ṭarīqa’s particular diasporic situation creates a situation in 
which AKR, the mutawallī, has a lot of space to interpret the Shaykh’s ideas 
regarding the development of the zāwiya. 
The zāwiya in Acre is located in the northern part of the old town, adjacent 
to the Citadel – the eastern wall of the zāwiya complex is the western wall of the 
Citadel, and the northern boundary of the zāwiya complex is overseen by that 
part of the Citadel which was used as a prison and now houses the Underground 
Prisoners Museum. To the west the complex is bordered by the Majadla mosque, 
behind which to the West there is a complex belonging to the Baha’is, beyond 
which is the sea. During the Ottoman period the zāwiya was far from Acre’s two 
gates, the sea gate and the land gate, but during the Mandate period the British 
opened the northern wall at two places to enable connections with the new 
neighbourhoods. 
 The zāwiya was established in 1868 after Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din returned 
from his exile in Rhodos. The waqfiyya mentions the takiya (the main hall used 
for prayer and study), a public kitchen, an inn, stores, and 613 acres of 
agricultural land in four villages near Acre.1 After his the death, Shaykh Ali Nur al-
Din was buried in the zāwiya and the mashhad became an important part of the 
complex. Later, Shaykh Ibrahim and Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi were also 
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buried there. Many other members of the Yashruti family rest in the Muslim 
cemetery immediately outside the city walls. There are two tombs in which 
several members of the family are interred, and several graves of followers 
around them, as they prefer to be buried close to their Shaykh’s family.2  
Before 1948, the zāwiya was always busy. Followers came from all over 
the Levant, from all levels of society, to visit the Shaykh, pray, study and 
participate in life in the zāwiya. They brought in produce from the ṭarīqa’s awqāf 
in the Galilee to provide food for those staying in the zāwiya and for the people in 
the neighbourhood. Nowadays, this period is seen as the golden age of the 
ṭarīqa, and by connecting to the zāwiya people seek to connect to the charismatic 
moment.  
 
 
11.1 The Zāwiya in Acre as al-Zāwiya al-Umm 
 
We have seen that the sacredness of the zāwiya in Amman comes primarily from 
the presence of the Shaykh, and secondarily from its function as a centre of 
devotion and communal life. While they treasure the memories attached to it, the 
building in itself means little to the followers. The zāwiya in Acre has a different 
status however:  
 
There was a zāwiya [on Jabal Amman], but when the Shaykh built a new zāwiya 
[in Wadi Seer] it doesn’t mean anything to us, that building as a building. As a 
building its holiness comes from the existence of the Shaykh. But if the Shaykh 
moved to another zāwiya or went to live in Beirut, the zāwiya in Acre would still 
be the first in our hearts. The zāwiya of Acre is the mother of all zawāya, and all 
of the poets from abnā al-ṭarīqa sing (yataghannū) and chant nashīd (yanshidū) 
on the zāwiya in Acre; their spirits are turned towards it.3 
 
                                                  
2 Informal discussion with AK6 on 06-05-2013. 
3 AM1-1 during interview AM1. 
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The zāwiya in Acre is considered al-zāwiya al-umm (the mother zāwiya) 
by all followers. Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din came from the West to the East to found 
the ṭarīqa and build the zāwiya. ‘The waḥy came upon him and told him to anchor 
in Acre. (...) The light exploded and flowed from it and there were karamāt and 
gathering (iltifāf) around the Shaykh.’ In a well-known nashīd, ‘Acre’ is a symbol 
for the message of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din which started there, the embodiment of 
the Prophet’s revelation in Mecca, and Acre made them ‘bear witness’ of God in 
their hearts.4 In a twist on the familiar kinship notions used to describe the ṭarīqa, 
the zāwiya in Acre is described as the mother from whom the other zawāya 
sprang to continue the family (a’ila).5 As they chant in a nashīd: 
 
Akkā al-munā, yā Sīdī, kull al-hanā’ fīhā 
Tasharrafat bi-‛Alī, Allāh yahanīhā 
Acre is the thing you yearn for, o Sīdī, all the longing is for her 
She welcomed Ali, may God give her the good life6 
  
The old buildings and heritage witnessed the times of Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-
Din. She represents (bitmathel) the origin (aṣl) and the maqāmāt are there, she 
has a unique position compared to the other zāwiya that are outside. All of her 
ties one to the foundation (kullhā bitrūd al-waḥad li-l-usūl).7 
 
Therefore, even though historically the zāwiya in Tarshiha was established 
earlier, the zāwiya in Acre is considered to be the first and the one from which 
the ṭarīqa spread. 
 
Acre, she is the mother, the mother of the zawāya. From Acre the ṭarīqa 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya was spread (intalaqat) to the surrounding Palestinian 
villages, from there to the Arab lands, then it connected to other foreign regions, 
                                                  
4 See paragraph 5.4 Interview AM4. 
5 AM1-3 during Interview ZA1. 
6 ZA2 in Interview ZA1. This nashīd was probably written in the time of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din. It 
appears in a handwritten collection of anāshīd that was compiled at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, kindly shown to me by the muqaddam of Acre. 
7 ZA1-4 during Interview ZA1. 
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Europe or the West or Africa etc. And that is why – when we see Acre – a view of 
respect, a view of esteem, a view of sanctification (taqdīs), she has something 
holy (qudsiyya) for us, like the Muslims see Mecca. (...) She is the foundation 
from which the ṭarīqa al-Shadhuliyya al-Yashrutiyya spread, and that is why she 
is always in our hearts.8 
 
The followers love Acre as the centre of their ṭarīqa and it pulls their hearts 
because their spiritual roots are there,9 because the place connects them to the 
founding Shaykh, Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din. He and his successors are spiritually 
present in their tombs and their light and baraka flows from there like their 
message did during the original charismatic moment: ‘We visited Acre and we 
were honoured by Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā there and we saw the nūr muḥammadī radiating 
from all of Acre (min ajwā’ Akka kullhā), and specifically from the zāwiya of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya itself.’10 
However, as was discussed in chapter 4, for the followers in Amman the 
relation with the living Shaykh is considered more important than the relation with 
the previous Shaykhs.  
 
What is the meaning of umm al-zawāya? In my opinion, the meaning is Ḥaḍrat 
Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din, he is the founder of the ṭarīqa. And in my belief the founder 
of the tarīqa did not go. He went by the body – as did the Prophet – but the 
teaching of the ṭarīqa is with Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā [Ahmad] now. (...) I went to Acre one 
time, in 1996. (...) Before I heard about Acre from my family, and through the 
teaching of the ṭarīqa I loved the founder. (...) When I saw Acre – I saw Acre 
before I saw the zāwiya – I feel... something different. In my heart (...) I feel more 
and more and more. Inside, I feel my Shaykh here. I feel my Shaykh, the founder 
of the ṭarīqa. (...) I am very happy. The Shaykh is the reason for my happiness, 
for my life, for everything. (...) 
[When I see Acre, it makes me] extra happy, of course, because when you see 
Acre you feel and you know Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā the founder. (...) I feel very happy 
                                                  
8 AM2-1 during Interview AM2. 
9 Informal discussion with a follower in Amman on 26-03-2013. 
10 AM2-1 during Interview AM2. 
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when I hear about Acre from anybody. (...) We cannot forget Acre, never we 
cannot. (...) Of course we ikhwānnā love Acre and everything in Acre. But the 
most important thing in our life is the relationship between us and Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
Ahmad because we believe he is alive. The madad, the ilhām, is from Ḥaḍrat 
Sīdnā to me.’11 
 
Similarly, several followers stressed that the physical relation to Acre is 
secondary to the spiritual relation. They are just stones.  
 
According to us, the stones are not important. [It is] the symbolic representation 
which is important. Regarding Acre, we look behind the stones, like when we go 
to the ka‛ba. It is not the stones of the ka‛ba that are important, but God. We 
concentrate on the symbol which is a representation of the worship of God 
(‛ibādāt Allāh). We turn towards God, not the stones!12 
 
 Just as the person of the Shaykh combines a connection with the timeless 
essence of the ‘aqīda and the nūr muḥammadī with a connection and adaptation 
to social circumstances, so the same attitude can be discerned amongst the 
followers in Amman towards the zāwiya in Acre. They respect and love it as part 
of their communal history and it is the focus of love and nostalgic longing, while 
at the same time the followers live their lives in Jordan. This attitude is illustrated 
by the following quote: 
 
We see the zāwiya here [in Amman] as very important because of the presence 
of Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā. But we do not forget the mother. When people live together 
there will be love (ulfa wa-maḥabba) between them, but they do not forget their 
origin (aṣl). People get married, have children, but they do not forget their 
mother. The mother is the foundation (asas) that is present in our hearts, and the 
love for her will stay in our hearts. But now we live in the present reality, we live 
in the life in which Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā is present.13 
                                                  
11 AM1-3 during Interview AM1. 
12 AM1-1 during Interview AM1. A similar opinion was expressed by TU1 in Interview TU1 with a 
follower in Tubas on 13-05-2013, hereafter referred to as Interview TU1. 
13 AM2-1 during Interview AM2. 
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The followers’ view of the zāwiya in Acre is also influenced by their view of 
their Shaykh. One follower says that for him the zāwiya is mainly important 
because that is where Shaykh Ahmad was born. An older follower remembers 
what life was like when he and Shaykh Ahmad were both young in the zāwiya in 
Acre.14 In this context it is also mentioned that Shaykh Ahmad himself values the 
zāwiya and is spending millions to renovate it, and they hope to visit it when it is 
ready.15 
They believe that the zāwiya sends love and comfort (maḥabba wa-rāḥa) 
to all those who are present in Acre from all different backgrounds, because their 
‛aqīda is a continuous ‛aqīda of love and comfort for all.16 During the festivities in 
1996 this was acknowledged by the presence and words of guests from other 
religions – which as we saw in paragraph 10.2 was considered one of the 
Shaykh’s karāmāt.17 This notion and the value of the continued position of the 
zāwiya in Acre as beacon of love and comfort for all inhabitants of Acre shows 
that the zāwiya has a continuous value for these followers that goes beyond the 
historical and symbolical. 
 
I think Acre is a symbol for this group of people who have the right to have this 
place to worship God through this ṭarīqa. It’s just a symbol. We want to keep this 
symbol by any means, we want people to visit us in the zāwiya, we want people 
to see what is in there, we want the books of ṭarīqa to be there, we want maybe 
sometime to translate some of the books and give people... (...) It’s just a symbol. 
It’s not the real religion, our religion itself. But we would like to have this symbol, 
to keep this symbol for us. And for other people, just to know that in this area 
people are free. To have any religion, to worship anything, so as a symbol it 
should stay there.18 
 
                                                  
14 ZA1-3 and ZA1-2 during Interview ZA1. 
15 AM1-1 and AM3-5 in Interview AM3. 
16 ZA3-1 in Interview ZA1. 
17 ZA3-2 in Interview ZA1. 
18 AM4-7 in Interview AM4. 
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For many the zāwiya in Acre is important because it is where the followers 
can connect to the first three Shaykhs. While they can know them through their 
teachings found in books and in the traditions of ikhwānnā, in the zāwiya in Acre 
they are spiritually present and they can be reached more directly – as we saw in 
the quotes above, the nūr muḥammadī is considered to shine from their tombs.19 
For example, a follower remembered his first visit to Acre and stressed the strong 
connection he felt there to Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din: 
 
I went to Acre one time, in 1996 together with my Shaykh Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā. Before I 
went to Acre we imagined her because of our tie to the sāḥib al-ṭarīqa, the 
Shaykh of the ṭarīqa – now Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ahmad. [The tie extends to] his father 
Sīdnā [Muhammad] al-Hadi, and Sīdnā Ibrahim, and Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din. I 
always try to live with them in my emotions and spiritual states (ruḥāniyat) etc. 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din is the founder of the ṭarīqa. For us as fuqarā truly 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā is the current Shaykh of the ṭarīqa. There when we went I had 
strange feelings (iḥsās) and it was a big thing for us, because of the presence of 
the maqām of Sīdnā Nur al-Din. Most of our life in the ṭarīqa, we live according to 
his teachings. We read the books, we read his ḥadīth, and we live with him 
through his aḥādīth. That teaching and that ma‛rifa that we obtain through the 
ḥadīth of Sīdnā Nur al-Din, when I went – it was as if I found him there in person. 
And the relation (‘alāqa) was very strong. And in the relation was sanctity 
(qudsiyya), and love (ḥubb) and enthousiasm (sha‛f).20 
 
One of the followers said his main motive for going to the zāwiya in Acre is 
his gratitude: 
 
To show gratitude to the person who introduced you to this kind of life which you 
love. We are enjoying the ṭarīqa. It made us know Muhammad, it made us know 
Jesus, it made us know Moses, it made us know everything. (...) It made us know 
something about God. And Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din and the Shaykh of this ṭarīqa, 
they introduced us to this joyous – this life which we enjoy. (...) His bones maybe 
                                                  
19 AM4-4 in Interview AM4. 
20 AM4-8 in Interview AM4. 
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now are dust but for the memory of the message he brought to us, to show our 
gratitude to him we go there and we just go for a visit.21 
 
When discussing the zāwiya, several followers stress that what is most 
important for them is the zāwiya of the heart (zāwiyat al-qalb) and the relation 
with other followers wherever they are, and ‘the stones are not important.’22 Even 
so, the followers do connect to the zāwiya in Acre very strongly and they feel 
they can participate in the light of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din there. By reaching out to 
the zāwiya a follower can participate in what Kees Terlouw calls ‘traditional 
spatial charisma’ as one can participate in the charisma of the ‘golden age’.23 In 
the case of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, the time of the founding Shaykh is 
considered this ‘golden age’, but it extended to the whole period pre-1948 in 
which the zāwiya in Acre was the centre of the ṭarīqa. 
There are clear parallels between the ḥajj to Mecca and the ziyāra to Acre, 
and the connection between Acre and Mecca is a recurring theme. One 
discussion on the zāwiya ends with several participants telling me 
enthusiastically about their experiences on ḥajj and ‛umra. 24 There is a saying 
among the followers – attributed to Shaykh Ibrahim: ‘Akka Makka ‘ayn al-nabī 
fīha (Acre Mecca the source of the Prophet is in her).’ The ‘ayn – which means 
water source, spring – which is referred to is ‘ayn al-baqara (the source of the 
cow), at which it is said that God gave a cow to Adam, and which is believed by 
some to be located in Acre.25 AM2-2 shows the connection by pointing to the first 
letters of the holy places through time: in the time of Ibrahīm, Makkah was called 
Bakkah. When Muḥammad lived there it was called Makkah, and the town of ‛Alī 
Nūr al-Dīn is called ‛Akkā.26 Another follower adds that the first letter of the 
names ‛Alī and ‛Akkā – the ‛ayn – was also the first letter of the names of all four 
                                                  
21 AM4-1 during Interview AM4. 
22 AM1-1 in Interview AM1 and Interview AM3. 
23 Terlouw, ‘Charisma and Space.’ 
24 AM1-1 in Interview AM1 and Interview AM3. 
25 Told to me by a former follower from Acre and by ZA1-1 during Interview ZA1. 
26 AM2-2 during Interview AM2. 
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rāshidūn and of the Umayyad Caliph ‛Abd al-Azīz, who is also often included in 
this list of righteous Caliphs.27 
As Issam Aburaiya and Efrat Ben-Ze’ev pointed out in the context of 
Palestinian refugees returning to their villages, any pilgrimage undertaken by 
Muslims is modelled on the ḥajj.28 In the case of the followers of the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya, the visit is both a temporary return to their historical roots 
comparable to similar visits by other Palestinian refugees, and a religious act of 
reconnecting to the original charismatic moment. Both the Shaykh and the 
zāwiya in Acre are compared to the ka‛ba in their symbolic function as the 
spiritual centre of the ṭarīqa. While the ka‛ba is the spiritual centre and qibla29 for 
them as it is for all Muslims, the zāwiya in Acre is the physical location of the 
foundation of the ṭarīqa, and the Shaykh continues to embody the message 
spread from this location. By reaching out to the zāwiya in Acre spiritually and/or 
physically, one can partake in the connection of all four Shaykhs to the true 
centre of the ṭarīqa, God. 
This connection to the golden age and claim to continuity is an important 
part of Shaykh Ahmad’s traditional authority, and controlling the zāwiya in Acre is 
part of maintaining this continuity. When discussing the status of Shaykh Abd al-
Jalil, a shaykhin Amman who claims to represent the Yashrutiyya but who is not 
recognized as such by Shaykh Ahmad, one of the arguments against his 
legitimacy is that Shaykh Ahmad controls the zāwiya in Acre.30 Ever since 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din began the institutionalisation process of the ṭarīqa, the 
zāwiya in Acre, the Yashruti family, and the ṭarīqa are inextricably connected. 
This connection to the past and claim to continuity is strengthened by the 
renovations. By following in the footsteps of the previous Shaykhs and adding to 
the development of the zāwiya, Shaykh Ahmad strengthens his link to the zāwiya 
in Acre and thus to the history of the ṭarīqa, the previous Shaykhs and the 
original charismatic moment, stressing the continuity of the shaykhdom and the 
                                                  
27 ZA1-1 during Intevriew ZA1. 
28 Aburaiya and Ben-Ze’ev, ‘“Middle-Ground” Politics’, 645. 
29 The qibla is the direction which Muslims face when praying ṣalāa. 
30 Interview AKR 16-05-2013. 
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ṭarīqa: ‘It is the mother zāwiya, built by Sīdnā Ali Nur al-Din, and now Sīdnā 
Ahmad is also building it.’31 
The followers in Amman hope the zāwiya will be ‘a lighthouse for the 
people’, a gathering place for many people, both ikhwānnā and others. They do 
not proselytize – but if God has chosen someone to be part of the ṭarīqa, s/he 
can come and will be welcome.32 It will be ‘a religious project, a social project, a 
cultural project. Not just for our abnā to read waẓīfa, to study and to meet 
ikhwānnā (...) it will expand and be bigger than that.’33 ‘Our social, practical and 
worldly conditions permit us to be present in this moment, a very beautiful 
moment, in which our dreams are realized.’34 
While the current Shaykh is the main sacred centre of the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya, the zāwiya in Acre does occupy an important place in the hearts of 
the followers and in the ṭarīqa’s symbolic universe as the original geographical 
sacred centre. It classifies as a ‘sacred space’35 primarily due to its connection to 
the original charismatic moment and the continued presence of the previous 
Shaykhs who are buried there, bestowing it with what Terlouw calls ‘traditional 
spatial charisma'.36 By reconnecting to the zāwiya, Shaykh Ahmad bolsters his 
own traditional charisma as he strengthens his connection to the charismatic 
moment and to his ancestors, and seeks to recreate the communal and social 
role of the ṭarīqa’s golden age. The strong connection between Yashruti family, 
ṭarīqa and zāwiya are thus maintained. 
 
 
11.2 The Zāwiya in Acre as a Local Zāwiya – 1948-2000s 
 
Acre’s people in general are very attached to their town, and this is especially the 
case among the Shadhulis. For them Acre is the best place in the world because 
                                                  
31 Interview AK4. 
32 AM4-3, AM4-4 and AM4-8 in Interview AM4. 
33 ZA1-1 in Interview ZA1. 
34 ZA1-3 in Interview ZA1. 
35 Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, 20–65; Brereton, ‘Sacred Space.’ See paragraph 1.4.1. 
36 Terlouw, ‘Charisma and Space.’ See paragraph 1.4.1. 
 533 
she received Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din and he rests in the zāwiya.37 Whenever they 
enter the zāwiya, they first ‘visit’ the tombs of the Shaykhs and ‘greet’ them 
(referred to as ziyāra, the general Sufi word for pilgrimage to a person or a 
shrine, also used to refer to their visits to Shaykh Ahmad). Starting with the tomb 
of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din and moving on to Shaykh Ibrahim and Shaykh 
Muhammad al-Hadi, they recite the fātiḥa,38 sometimes add a personal prayer 
(du’ā), and kiss the threshold or the door post or the tomb itself, after which they 
walk out backwards, never turning their back on the tombs. It shows the special 
value they give to the zāwiya as the spiritual presence of the Shaykhs continues 
and their baraka lingers there. But like the followers in Amman, they focus on the 
living Shaykh and they love Amman because the Shaykh is there.39 They stress 
that the Shaykh and the zāwiya share the same holiness (nafs al-qudsiyya)40 and 
that ‘the spirit (rūḥ) is one.’41  
For those who are originally from Acre and who lived in the zāwiya, these 
sentiments are strengthened by a strong personal connection, which correlates 
strongly with their stress on the Shaykh as a father and ikhwānnā as their family. 
A follower recollects life in the zāwiya during the 1950s and 60s, when the 
Shaykh was gone and many of the residents were not religious. Those who were 
from abnā al-ṭarīqa prayed and read waẓīfa, but there were not enough people to 
do ḥaḍra. They went to the Jazzar Mosque to pray like other people in the 
neighbourhood – but society was not religious and even on a good day there 
were no more than ten people.42 Another follower remembers her happy days in 
the zāwiya. ‘We did everything together. Not all the families were Shadhulis, but 
they respected it. (...) It was very beautiful. All our life was like that, we were one 
family. It was very beautiful.’43 
                                                  
37 Informal discussion with AK6 on 13-05-03, Interview AK3. 
38 First sūra (chapter) of the Qur’an, which is recited regularly as praise to God and a prayer for 
guidance and mercy. 
39 Interview AK1 and Interview AK4. 
40 Interview AK4. 
41 Interview JA2 on 10-05-2013. 
42 Interview AK3. 
43 Interview AK1. 
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 The stress on the Shaykh as a father we have seen in chapter 9 is linked 
by many to the zāwiya as a mother and the house of the family. A follower in 
Acre who grew up in the zāwiya says that it was his house and he still considers 
it to be so; he considers all visitors to the zāwiya to be his personal guests and 
wants them to leave happy. He sees the Shaykh as his father and the previous 
Shaykhs as his grandfathers. Even now, every time he enters the zāwiya, he first 
goes to the mashhad to greet the Shaykhs. ‘It is like when you visit someone, 
you knock the door and ask permission to enter, and you greet them like a child 
greets his grandfather.’44 A follower in Jaffa has similar sentiments: ‘We see the 
zāwiya as we see our Shaykh. Going to Acre is like going to visit your parents.’45 
The social function of the zāwiya is also stressed. ‘The zāwiya is very 
important; it is the only place (al-maḥall al-waḥīd) where people meet because 
they love each other.’ It is a place of raḥma. Another follower in Acre shared this 
sentiment: ‘The zāwiya for me is the place where I feel peaceful (bartah fīhā). 
When I pray or recite waẓīfa there is a feeling of comfort (irtāh rāḥat al-ṣadr), and 
I see people I love there (...) in a place that we love.’46 Also, the people living 
around can see how much love the people have and how they ‘go straight 
(dukhrī)’.47 
As the Palestinians who remained in Israel lived under military rule until 
1966, it was difficult for the followers who remained in Jaffa and Umm al-Fahm to 
visit the zāwiya in Acre. Even so, the zāwiya remained in their hearts and their 
lives. A follower who grew up in Umm al-Fahm in the 1950s and 60s remembers 
how as a girl she used to stay at the zāwiya in Acre for several days because the 
journey was so difficult. All her relatives and friends – also the non-Shadhulis – 
wanted her mother to bring back baraka, so she would put some bread from the 
zāwiya in a piece of cloth and hand it around after her return, and everyone 
would kiss her hand.48 A story told in Acre and Jaffa tells how in the early 1960s, 
a follower from Jaffa saw Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi in a dream. The Shaykh 
                                                  
44 Interview AK4. 
45 Interview JA2. 
46 Interview AK2. 
47 Interview AK4. 
48 Informal discussion with AK6 on 06-05-2013. 
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drove from Acre to Jaffa in a Cadillac, telling him he wanted him to be in Acre. 
Two days later the follower went to Acre with his family and settled in the zāwiya, 
where they worked as caretakers for more than forty years. He and his wife were 
among the last residents to leave the zāwiya in 2006.49 
When military rule was lifted in 1966 travel became easier, and a year 
later when the West Bank and Gaza Strip were occupied by Israel, the followers 
in Israel were also able to reconnect with the ikhwānnā – friends and family – 
there. A follower in Jaffa remembered how the muqaddam from Tubas used to 
come to Jaffa in his Mercedes – fitting seven people in his car – to see her father, 
who would slaughter a sheep for his guests. For her 1967 was the opening of her 
Shadhuli world: ‘the war helped the ikhwānnā to meet.’50 
The followers regularly visited each other and met each other in the 
zāwiya in Acre for holidays. A follower who grew up in the zāwiya in the 1980s 
remembers how he learnt from the people living with him in the zāwiya and from 
those who came to visit. The mawlid al-nabī was the highlight of the year as it 
was so busy and beautiful, and the residents looked after all the visitors. The 
most memorable visit was that of Shaykh Ahmad in 1981, when he came to Acre 
accompanied by many followers to rebury his father Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi 
in the mashhad, next to his father and grandfather. In 1996, Shaykh Ahmad 
visited Acre a second time to commemorate the centennial of Shaykh Ali Nur al-
Din’s passing, again accompanied by many followers. Many civil and religious 
dignitaries were present at this occasion, and the followers remember them 
praising Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din and Shaykh Ahmad.51 For this occasion the street 
to the south of the zāwiya was permanently renamed Nur al-Din al-Yashruti 
Street.52 
Nowadays as the zāwiya is being renovated, there is not much going on. 
The followers meet in the zāwiya every Thursday evening to pray and read the 
                                                  
49 Informal discussion with JA2 on 12-05-2013. 
50 Informal discussion with JA2 on 12-05-2013. 
51 JA1 in Interview JA1 10-05-2013. 
52 Informal discussion with a former follower in Acre. 
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waẓīfa – there are never enough to do ḥaḍra – and once a month they welcome 
followers from all over Israel to meet and do ḥaḍra.  
In addition to its connection to the ‘charismatic moment’ and the ‘golden 
age’, the zāwiya can thus be classified as a ‘sacred space’ because of its 
communal function, which – like the community in general – is often expressed in 
terms of kinship as the zāwiya was a residential complex where the community / 
family lived from the nakba until the start of the renovations. Like the zāwiya in 
Amman nowadays, it was thus the main place where tarbiya took place – but 
obviously in a very different way due to the absence of the Shaykh. As we have 
seen in chapter 10, tarbiya happened within the community and had a more 
informal character, with less influence of the Shaykh over the process. Both the 
mode of tarbiya and the setting will thus have added to the stronger identification 
of the ṭarīqa with the family, the Shaykh as the father, and of the focus on 
maḥabba rather than aqida, and the even stronger stress on kinship in the 
process of traditional institutionalisation. Nowadays there is more connection with 
the Shaykh and community in Amman, but this slightly different focus remains. 
Due to the renovations, little is happening in the zāwiya and tarbiya has moved 
into people’s homes. 
 
 
11.3 Renovating the Zāwiya 
 
When it became possible to support the zāwiya financially from abroad after 
1967, funds started to come in that made renovations possible. The first partial 
renovations were undertaken by Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s – De Jong wrote in 1983 that the renovation of the takiya was 
finished in 1979 and that the mashhad was nearing completion.53 From the early 
1980s, inhabitants were requested to move out (and were financially 
                                                  
53 De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 180, note 3. A few 
pictures of the zāwiya after these renovations can be found on ArchNet Digital Library, 
Shadhiliyya Zawiya, http://archive.today/MEnw6, accessed 21-07-2014. 
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compensated if they wished). The first families moved in the early 1980s, but it 
took more than twenty years before the zāwiya was empty. 
 
Nowadays, there is no one. It is forbidden, it is over (khalas). (...) Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
does not want anyone in the zāwiya. It was an order (‘amr) and we had to leave, 
it was the order of the Shaykh, one cannot say no. (...) They are all far, outside, 
but we go and ask and visit each other, we talk on the telephone if we don’t have 
time. No, we do not leave each other.54  
 
AKR is registered as main mutawallī and as such is responsible for the 
renovations. He also increasingly took on tasks representing the ṭarīqa to wider 
society and showing around groups of students and tourists. In 2006 the 
renovations finally started, accompanied by an increase in social projects and an 
increase in the purchase of additional properties in the old town.55 The project is 
financed by the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya as a whole – every month the followers 
donate a certain amount, depending on how much they can afford.56 
Hopes for the renovations are high. Shaykh Ahmad has expressed that 
 
We hope that the work in the zāwiya in Acre will finish soon, so that it will remain 
a place of Islamic civilization, and a lighthouse of intellectual and spiritual 
radiation, as was the wish of Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā the founder of the ṭarīqa, Shaykh Ali 
Nur al-Din al-Yashruti, raḍī Allah ‛anhu (may God be pleased with him). Since the 
mother zāwiya in Acre has an active role in the gathering of the murīdīn of the 
ṭarīqa who reside in Palestine specifically, and similarly hosts the murīdīn that 
visit from different places of residence in general; to perform the Islamic‘ibādāt, 
and the ceremonies (sha‛ā’ir) of the ṭarīqa Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya. We also 
hope that the zāwiya will perform her most important role as a minbar of 
guidance (minbar irshād wa-hidāya), embodying the exemplary/pioneering (rā’id) 
                                                  
54 Interview AK1. 
55 Informal discussion with a local from Acre, October 2013. 
56 Interview AKR 29-03-2012, Interview JA1 16-04-2012, informal discussions with followers in 
Acre and Jaffa. 
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role of the Sufi Path and its zawāya in the development of contemporary society 
in Acre.57 
 
The followers in Acre also have high hopes for the renovations: ‘The first 
step is to restore the zāwiya and then to restore everything – to restore the world. 
To bring peace. The zāwiya will be open for everyone who loves the ṭarīqa and 
the Shaykh, and will give service to all.’58 The house of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din is 
to become a library and a museum where outsiders are welcome to learn about 
the ṭarīqa – there are plans to construct a special entrance for visitors. There will 
also be rooms for visitors and students – because it is important to spread the 
light and to educate people, including non-Shadhulis. The zāwiya was a place 
where people came from all over the world to learn – it has to be like this again.59 
These hopes and plans are also expressed among followers in Jaffa: ‘Sīdī 
Ahmad wants it to be a place of knowledge (maḥall al-‘ilm), [he wants] the library 
to have books of all topics, so that everyone will see: this is the Shaykh, this is 
the zāwiya, this is ahl al-tarīqa;’ ‘all people will know ikhwānnā and the 
murshid.’60 There will be an infitāḥ, a renaissance, they will be refreshed; there 
will be new relations and new knowledge of God. The happiness they know from 
the stories will be again, albeit in a different way.61 
One follower hopes that the zāwiya will have a beautiful opening with 
many visitors from all countries, and that it will be open for everyone, bringing 
more visitors to Acre – but also: 
 
Acre is the foundation. Inshā’Allāh the Shaykh will also come to Acre (...) 
because Acre is the origin, our fathers were all in Acre. (...) Inshā’Allāh he will 
return, inshā’Allāh all of them will return to Acre.62 
 
                                                  
57 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti, 15-03-2014, p.1. 
58 Informal discussion with AK2 and AK4 on 08-04-2012. 
59 Interview AK4. 
60 JA13 in Interview JA2. 
61 JA4 in Interview JA2. 
62 Interview with a follower in Israel, Spring 2013. The possibility of the Shaykh returning is also 
mentioned by a follower in the West Bank, immediately followed by a discussion of the idea that 
they do not participate in politics. 
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True to the tarīqa’s rule not to involve in or even talk about politics, most 
do not comment on the issue of their brethren in exile. When I asked a few 
people in an informal group setting they replied that times have changed and the 
physical return of the refugees is not linked to the renovation – they should trust 
in God and the Shaykh.63 
We have seen in chapter 9 how the value of being accepted by society is 
articulated in miracle narratives about Shaykh Ahmad – the ability of ikhwānnā to 
be accepted and even respected by Israeli society – Muslims, Christians, Druze, 
and Jews – is considered one of his main powers. For the followers, such stories 
are proof of their spiritual advancement and the good behaviour based on it, but 
it also enables them to continue their public role in society, which is especially 
relevant in the context of the renovation of the zāwiya and the hopes that go with 
it to restore its role in wider society. 
 
 
11.4 The Place of the Zāwiya in Acre’s Society 
 
The ṭarīqa is well-known in Acre and has always been well-respected. I have 
once seen a local Muslim pay his respects to the tombs of the Shaykhs when he 
entered the zāwiya on other business, but in order to understand how the wider 
Muslim community in Acre views the ṭarīqa, the zāwiya, and the shrines, wider 
anthropological fieldwork needs to be carried out. There are good relations with 
the Christian community. The zāwiya has hosted dinners during Ramadan and 
Christmas for Muslims and Christians for years. At the Christmas celebrations 
they have dinner together, they read from the Bible and the words of Sīdnā 
Ahmad, and they sing psalms and nashīd. Sometimes there are similar festivities 
for Easter in Tarshiha. Representatives of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Acre 
also attend other interfaith meetings, such as the annual Easter reception of the 
                                                  
63 Interview with followers in Israel, Spring 2013. 
 540 
Roman Catholic community in Acre.64 In the words of the Review Panel, this 
‘shows that the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya interacts in good faith with the local 
community regardless to [sic] their beliefs as long as this does not contradict the 
‛aqīda.’65 The celebration of each other’s holidays was normal in Palestine and 
has only recently become a point of contention.66 For the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya, maintaining good relations with everyone in society and keeping this 
traditional spirit of neighbourliness alive in the face of Salafi challenges is an 
expression of their ‛aqīda. The followers do not join to celebrate the birth or 
resurrection of the Son of God as the Christians do, but they want to show 
respect for their neighbours’ beliefs and share in their joy.  
More recently, the ṭarīqa has embarked on establishing more ties with 
other groups in society and cooperating with them. This increased effort started 
more or less simultaneously with the start of renovations, and is presented as 
part of the same project to restore the role of the zāwiya in society at large. AKR 
– who is registered as the mutawallī of the waqf and who is primarily responsible 
for the renovation – describes his function as mas‛ūl ‘an al-‘alāqāt al-khārijiyya, 
‘responsible for external relations’ in the absence of the Shaykh, ‘to develop the 
view of the Shaykh and his policy towards other groups.’67 
 
This is the view of the Shaykh Ahmad. He wants to be back here. (...) We have to 
affect and to give the people their needs. I was the man suitable to do this 
function, but it is not my idea. I am just a mediator and I have no existence, I 
have no will, the will is from him, and the idea from him. (...) I do here the dream 
of Shaykh Ahmad. We are not renovating stones. We have to renovate hearts.68 
 
                                                  
64 Informal discussion with Dr. Ali al-Yashruti on 26-03-2012, Interview AK3, Interview AKR 27-
02-2012. 
65 Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 57. 
66 For some examples of such shared celebrations, see Tamari, Mountain against the Sea. 
67 Interview AKR 29-02-2012. According to the Review Panel his mandate is more limited: he is a 
‘public relations person, responsible for external relations in the absence of the sheikh on a case 
by case basis’ (my italics). Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 56. 
68 Interview AKR 29-03-2012. The Review Panel states: ‘This is personal view of one individual 
and does not necessarily represent the rest of the Yashruti community. There is no proof that this 
is true.’ Review Panel, ‘Response to email of October 12’. 
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He says he is mandated by the Shaykh to develop social projects with 
other local groups in the name of the Yashrutiyya, in order to restore the original 
function of the zāwiya adapted to contemporary society. As the Review Panel 
points out, this is to be done ‘without affecting the main purpose of the zāwiya 
and without violating the teachings and principles of the ṭarīqa.’69 Before 1948, 
the main problem in society was hunger and the zāwiya used its resources to 
feed people. Nowadays he sees violence as the main contemporary problem, 
which can be solved through education. This is why he chose to focus on 
educational projects. 
 
Some people see us as passive. We are passive when we declare we are not 
dealing with politics – our tendency not to rule the regime or to rule the country. 
But no, we are not passive. I think we have principles and concepts. We must 
transfer it to the new generation. But it’s an educational issue, not political.70 
 
The zāwiya donates money to the musical band, Tau Banda, of the 
Franciscan Terra Santa school in Acre.71 The zāwiya also provides a venue for 
activities organized by the students of Ayalim student village in Acre, a 
government-funded student movement which aims to develop marginalized 
communities in the Galilee and Negev, driven by a secular settlement ideology 
(see chapter 8). They operate their daily after-school centre for local children in a 
building on the square opposite the zāwiya.72 
AKR welcomes all kinds of groups in the zāwiya for religious, educational 
and tourist purposes. Curious tourists often wander into the zāwiya when the 
gates are open and they are free to look around and ask questions if there is 
someone there to answer them. When tour groups want to schedule a visit in 
                                                  
69 Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 57. 
70 Interview AKR 29-02-2012. 
71 Interview AKR 29-02-2012; informal discussion with the local priest. Website Terra Santa 
School Acco: http://terra-santa-acre.com/ 
72 Interview AKR 27-02-2012.  
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advance they need to contact AKR. He particularly works together with Zeev ben 
Arieh, who specializes on ‘spiritual tours’ (see paragraph 9.3).73 
AKR tells his visitors that he does not believe in nationalism: ‘God created 
the whole universe for mankind. Nationality, the homeland, it doesn’t exist, it 
exists only in our mind, we create it, we divide. (...) For me, the universe is the 
universe, everywhere is my homeland. I belong to everywhere.’74 He says there 
are many groups that appreciate this attitude and come to talk to them.75 One of 
the main groups with whom he is connected is Derekh Avraham / Tariq Ibrahim 
(see paragraph 8.2.4). During the 2010 Fringe Festival in Acre, the zāwiya was 
the stage of a performance advertised as ‘the Sufi/Jewish project: The mystical 
inner journey of the Kabbalah and Sufi mysticism,’ an experiential evening 
including meditation, music, Sufi dance and a ‘spiritual circle for peace,’ with the 
participation of many people associated with Derekh Avraham.76 During Acre’s 
Fringe Festival in 2012, the Mevlavi Shaykha Khadija (see paragraph 8.2.4) gave 
a workshop in a venue owned by the Shadhuliyya. She also visited Acre during 
her Caravan in December 2013 when she held a meeting and a whirling 
workshop in the zāwiya.77 A new initiative undertaken by Jewish Sufis and 
sympathizers in Israel is the Sufi Festival in the desert near Eilat, which was 
organised for the first time in 2012. While both Ghassan Manasra and AKR were 
involved in the preparations, they did not actually participate in the festival.78 
One of Derekh Avraham / Tariq Ibrahim’s meetings (in March 2012) was 
hosted by AKR. The first lectures were held in the zāwiya, and there was a 
whirling workshop in one of the buildings owned by the zāwiya close by, 
                                                  
73 Mysteries of Israel, http://www.israelmystery.co.il/pws/, accessed 11-04-2014. 
74 Interview AKR 27-02-2012. 
75 He also said he talks to settlers, but I have not been able to verify this. 
76 The programme included: Practicing meditation of free space by Prof. Oded Maimon, Music by 
master oud player Yair Dalal and friends, Sufi dance with dancer Ora Balha, Holy utterance: the 
mystical inner journey of the Kabbalah and Sufi mysticism by Shaykh Ghassan Manasra, Dr. Avi 
Elkayam, Dr. Omer Reiss, Spiritual circle for peace with audience participation by Shaykh 
Ghassan Manasra, Rabbi Roberto Arbib. 
http://www.accofestival.co.il/english/catalog.php?id=175, accessed 22-02-2012. 
77 Shaykha Khadija, http://www.whirling-dervish.org/ These meetings are also mentioned in Bram, 
‘Sufi Circles in Israel’, 132. 
78 Informal discussion with one of the organisers. Sufi Festival, 
http://www.sufifestival.co.il/english, accessed 30-10-2013. 
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performed by a follower of Shaykhs Khadija. In the evening there was a dhikr 
session in the hotel led by Shaykh Abd al-Salam al-Manasra, in which Arabic and 
Hebrew chants were combined. On the second day there were several lectures 
in the hotel. Apart from AKR, no-one from the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya was 
present.79 
The zāwiya also welcomes tour groups such as those led by tourguide 
Zeev ben Arieh,80 and study groups. For example, in April 2012 AKR hosted a 
study visit from MA students of Middle East and Islamic Studies at the Hebrew 
University in the zāwiya.81 The Arab-Jewish ensemble Diwan, associated with the 
Acco Theatre Center, has developed a Whirling Dervish act which performed in 
the zāwiya for a journalist from a tourism website while I was visiting the zāwiya 
in May 2012.82 In the words of the Review Panel: ‘Even though the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya is not concerned with the mentioned scientific or touristic functions, 
this is considered as support to science and interaction with the local 
communities.’83 
 
 
11.5 Fanā’ as Collective Action 
 
These efforts are supported by AKR’s interpretations of the Shaykh’s teachings. 
As we have seen in chapter 9 and 10 he presents ta’ammul as the central 
practice of the ṭarīqa, which leads one to accept diversity and realise the oneness 
of one and all. He sees the Shaykh as the contemporary manifestation of al-
insān al-kāmil, and as such he has two aspects: He has a human character 
connected to mankind – in which capacity he is in a state of baqā’, embraced by 
God – and a ‘light character’, a ceaseless connection to the ḥaḍra muḥammadiya 
                                                  
79 Personal observations. 
80 Mysteries of Israel, http://www.israelmystery.co.il/pws/, accessed 11-04-2014. 
81 Study day of the Hebrew University’s MA in Islamic Studies, hosted by AKR in the zāwiya in 
Acre on 26-03-2012. 
82 Israel Arts Directory, Diwan Group. 
http://www.culture.org.il/directory/viewItem.asp?cat=2&subcat=2.3&idNum=7843, accessed 30-
10-2013. 
83 Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 59. 
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– in which capacity he is in a state of fanā’, embracing all existence. He explains 
his love for the Shaykh because by being part of him, in fanā’ with him, you are 
part of everything. ‘The interpretation of Shaykh Ali [Nur al-Din] to fanā’ was to 
(...) capture and control the ego (tatassalat al-nafs). To (...) all the time remember 
that you are part of something huge.’ He repeatedly refers to sayings of Shaykh 
Ali Nur al-Din: ‘You are not a small star, but you have the whole universe inside 
you.’84 ‘If you love me, you’ll be part of me. Even you’ll be me.’ And: ‘In our path 
there is no I, only we.’85 This is the classical Sufi idea of fanā’ in the Shaykh 
(fanā’ fi-l-shaykh) which developed out of the earliest ideas on fanā’ in God as a 
more accessible preliminary goal for those on earlier stages of the Path.86 He 
illustrates this with a story from the Yashrutiyya: 
 
There is a story about one of our followers. He lived in Lebanon. And one day he 
saw a tiger. And when he saw a tiger, he imagined that the tiger was his Shaykh. 
He ran toward the tiger and hugged him and held him and told him ‘My love, 
where are you? My Shaykh, I am looking for you.’ According to the story the tiger 
did nothing, he left the man. Because he believed that the tiger had been 
integrated with the Shaykh and the Shaykh with Muhammad and Muhammad 
with God and he and the tiger and the Shaykh and Mohammad and God are 
one.87 
 
Based on this, AKR says that a Sufi needs to dissolve his/her independent 
existence to contain his/her opposite. On one level one needs to respect 
diversity, only to make the achieving of unity possible on a higher level. He 
                                                  
84 Interview AKR 12-04-2012. The Review Panel points out that his is a saying of Ali ibn Abi Talib. 
Review Panel, ‘Response to email of October 12’. 
85 Interview AKR 29-02-2012. The Review Panel points out that these are not sayings by Shaykh 
Ali Nur al-Din. Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 60. 
86 Mojaddedi, ‘Annihilation and Abiding in God’; Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern 
Egypt, 63–64, 141, 203; Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet, 100, 131–137; Schimmel, Mystical 
Dimensions of Islam, 69–73. See paragraph 1.2 and the glossary. 
87 Interview AKR 29-02-2012. This story can be found in al-Yashrutiyya, Mawāhib al-Ḥaqq, 81–
82. In this version the follower is a shepherd from Tubas who fell asleep and lost his stock. When 
he went to look for them he encountered the lion and he embraced the lion because he thought 
he was his Shaykh. The lion then led him to his livestock who had wandered off in the wadī. In a 
footnote, the author explains that it is necessary for the true murīd (al-murīd al-ṣādiq) to abolish 
himsel (ḥālahu) in his Shaykh, and his Shaykh in Muhammad, and Muhammad in God. 
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explained this through another nineteenth-century story about the relations 
between Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din and Baha’ullah’s son Abbas Effendi: 
 
Abbas, the son of Baha, loved Shaykh Ali [Nur al-Din] very much. And one day 
he asked him: ‘If I ask you to be part of your path, would you agree?’ Shaykh Ali 
said: ‘Ya Efendi, what you have inside you is enough. You don’t need more.’ This 
respecting the concept of the other is a kind of fanā’. Because Abbas must not be 
like me. We must be a spectrum with various colours in order to make fanā’. If we 
are all the same we are not fanā’. We are God, all of us we are God. But God 
created us to be various and different.88 
 
According to AKR, Shaykh Muhammad al-Hadi developed the concept of 
fanā’ to include the relations between the different communities in Mandate 
Palestine (see chapter 9), and Shaykh Ahmad interprets fanā’ as ‘collective 
action’: not just becoming one with God, the Shaykh and the followers, but also 
with the larger community.89 This diversity also relates to questions of power: the 
powerful need to give space for the less powerful and include them rather than 
exclude them. Someone who has more power should not abuse his power but 
use it to be a part of the whole and perform together. ‘You educate these 
powerful people to act with less powerful people in order to build a collective. 
Otherwise gaps will happen between the strong and the weak. And this we call 
injustice.’ In his view, this is also the purpose of the sharia: ‘By making a law, the 
sharia, you allow the strong to be equal before the law like the less powerful. So 
you build collective societies or a collective company or a collective community. 
This kind of collective is a kind of fanā’.’90 
He explains his support for the communal projects mentioned above from 
within this framework. Regarding the musical centre of the Terra Santa School, 
Tau Banda, he says:  
 
                                                  
88 Interview AKR 29-02-2012. 
89 According to the Review Panel, ‘[t]here is no link between fana and Mandate Palestine. This is 
mixing of spiritual matters with political issues.’ Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and 
Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 60-61. 
90 Interview AKR 29-02-2012. 
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The students play in a collective way, to develop among the community the 
character of collectivity; to act collectively (jama‛ī), to work collectively, to do or to 
build collectively, and to play music collectively, not only one to show himself. To 
play collectively means you belong to a group, and you do your best to restore 
the group. (...) This came from the Sufi principle, al-fanā’. You are part of a huge 
entity. (...) You have to kill yourself for the collective. Not physically, but to control 
your ego, not to say ‘I am,’ but to say ‘we are.’91  
 
The dialogue initiatives especially relate to these ideas: 
 
I am in touch with every group, I have no limitation, I make no selection. (...) We 
are open to talk with everyone, about everything. And this is our policy. Any 
group which is willing to talk, we are ready to talk... and to hug. Not to confront. 
To hug, to understand.92  
 
For example, ‘a Jewish group came here, almost every day. And they 
have a stereotype [image] of Islam. By discussing and dialoguing with them, 
most of them got confused. And this is our call. Not to influence them. Just to tell 
there is another way.’93 He is very clear that one cannot call this ‘change’. It is the 
beginning, the initial confusion when ideas are challenged, that might lead to 
change eventually.  
 
The change will happen by yourself. Otherwise, it is not a change. If we control 
the whole change, this is an imposition. We give you tools, small tools (...) We 
give you to think, [we give you] questions... You have to answer it, in any way 
you like. (...) It is not direct action with immediate results. This is a process. A 
process must begin with beliefs. (...) And this is enough for us. It is not our duty 
to repair the whole society. If we contribute one drop to the society it is enough. 
The others will make other drops. But our duty [is] to make one drop only.94  
 
                                                  
91 Interview AKR 29-02-2012. 
92 Interview AKR 29-02-2012. 
93 Interview AKR 27-02-2012. 
94 Interview AKR 27-02-2012. 
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By reflecting love, understanding and tolerance, you can influence those 
around you. Because he sees Israel as a democratic state, he believes these 
grassroots initiatives will make a difference: ‘You have to act at the lowest level. 
When this level demands the upper one will obey because they are politicians.’95 
Following this, it is up to the Muslims to make the Jews feel welcome: 
 
I understand the fears of the Jews. What happened in the Holocaust, it’s not 
easy, but we, the Arabs, must know how to reflect safety and security towards 
the Jews because they need it. They need to live and to feel they live in safety 
and security. You must understand them. If we reflect this, I think we could solve 
big problems. When we negotiate and they feel safety, with security, the 
negotiation will be easy.96 
 
I discussed these ideas with AKR in the zāwiya in Acre during several 
meetings in the Spring of 2012. He encouraged me to prepare questions for 
Shaykh Ahmad based on our discussions and send them to him so he could 
forward them to the Shaykh. Because of this, when meeting Shaykh Ahmad a 
year later in the zāwiya in Amman I included the question ‘AKR said that you 
have a new interpretation of fanā’: fanā’ as ‘collective action’. Could you speak 
about this topic?’97 During my second visit to the zāwiya two days later AKR 
happened to be visiting as well, and Shaykh Ahmad and Dr. Ali asked him to 
explain it. 
When I asked AKR later about this interaction, he said it was not a 
problem, as he is allowed to have his own understanding of these matters. When 
I asked if the Shaykh agreed with this interpretation, he answered that the 
Shaykh never disagrees, he does not explain or impose a way of understanding. 
He gives one sentence and you should explain it for yourself. He guides you to 
the right questions, not to the right answers. He does not direct the followers, he 
makes them think. In the practical issues of the restoration of the zāwiya he gives 
                                                  
95 Interview AKR 27-02-2012. 
96 Interview AKR 27-02-2012. 
97 Email sent to AKR on 15-03-2013, forwarded to Shaykh Ahmad. 
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general outlines, such as ‘connect with others,’ and AKR has the space to decide 
how to implement this.98 
 As we have seen this mode of communication and the space it leaves for 
personal interpretation is a common feature of the ṭarīqa among all followers, and 
is particularly strong in AKR’s view of the Shaykh as he strongly stresses the 
individual inspiration the Shaykh bestows on his followers. In the case of most 
followers this individual autonomy is mediated and thus controlled to a certain 
extent through the community, but in the case of AKR has little mediation and 
has truly become a high level of individual autonomy. He thus legitimizes his 
interpretations and the actions he bases on them, which is accepted by those 
who like him value such autonomy (those of the ‘new spiritual’ movement), but is 
not accepted by those who see the interaction within the community and an 
adherence to its basic principles as an essential prerequisite for the acceptance 
of interpretations.  
Here we see the dynamic of interpretation at work on a level that 
surpasses the individual and the community of ikhwānnā, but directly shapes the 
social role undertaken by the zāwiya in Israeli society. AKR explains his choices 
by referring to his own interpretations of the teachings of the ṭarīqa, explicitly 
referring to the freedom individual followers have to interpret these teachings 
when combining their spiritual life with their life in society. AKR’s interpretation of 
fanā’ – like his interpretation of the role of the Shaykh (see chapter 9) – might be 
explained from his secular background, the alternative influences he had in his 
spiritual path (such as his meetings with Western and Jewish Sufis) and his 
understanding of the political and socio-economic situation. AKR’s 
interpretations, the projects of interfaith cooperation and dialogue he bases on 
them, and his presentation of the ṭarīqa as an organisation of ‘moderate Arabs’ 
place him within a certain stream of thought that is deemed controversial by 
many Palestinian citizens of Israel who understand Israel to be an ethnocracy 
rather than a democracy and do not feel represented by the government (see 
chapter 8). 
                                                  
98 Interview AKR 16-05-2013. 
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As we discussed in paragraph 8.3.4, the practice of ‘dialogue’ is 
problematic in the Israeli context as it presumes two equal partners in dialogue 
who simply need to talk to achieve reconciliation. This is not doing justice to the 
reality on the ground as there is a clear power imbalance. The continuous 
marginalization and dispossession of the Palestinians is turned on its head as 
they become the ones who have to make the Jews feel at home, despite facing 
continuous policies of exclusion and expulsion. In addition to this, dialogue often 
focuses on secondary problems rather than core issues. In the case of interfaith 
dialogue in Israel and Palestine, this is certainly the case. While Judaism and 
Christianity play large roles in Zionism, religion only plays a secondary role in the 
experience of Palestinians, who primarily suffer from dispossession, expulsion 
and discrimination, leading to a range of socio-economic problems. By focusing 
on religious issues, the discussion becomes too abstract and by not 
contextualising the situation it is misrepresented and misunderstood.  
Another problematic aspect of these interfaith initiatives is related to a 
common contemporary (often Western) understanding of ‘Sufism’ as an 
universalist religion which is not concerned with rules and outer forms and can 
therefore be combined easily with other forms of spirituality. This is partly a 
continuation of eighteenth-century ideas of ‘mysticism’ and Orientalist ideas of 
Sufism in which the lines between different religions are blurred in search for a 
‘mystical core’ common to all religions (see chapter 1), but should also be seen 
as part of the development of New Religious Movements and New Age. Geaves 
points to the possibility inherent within certain ṭuruq of individualistic, eclectic and 
antinomian approaches.99 Some contemporary Sufi movements take this to such 
an extreme that they do not consider themselves to be Muslims any more. Most 
Sufis are uneasy with this development however as they stress that they are first 
and foremost practising Muslims and believe one cannot be a Sufi without being 
a Muslim.100 Similarly, most members of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Israel, 
                                                  
99 Geaves, The Sufis of Britain, 140–141, 162–164. 
100 The clearest example is the phenomenon of ‘Universal Sufism’, but there are also traditional 
ṭuruq who have shifted their self-definition. Ibid., 161–188; Lewisohn, ‘Persian Sufism in the 
Contemporary West.’ 
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while very open towards people from other religions, place value on being proper 
Muslims, and do not relate to such purposefully syncretistic interpretations and 
practices as AKR has occasionally uttered. 
These ideas and the projects based on them are considered controversial 
by many locals. The poor, neglected, criminal environment in which many people 
live in the old city, combined with the increasing take-over by rich outsiders, both 
Arabs and Jews, has led to an intense distrust of outsiders (see chapter 8).101 
While many locals respect the Shadhuliyya, others see the Shadhulis as 
outsiders and see the evacuation of the zāwiya in this light as they consider the 
renovations of the zāwiya, the development of its tourist potential and its 
interfaith approach to be part of the development of Acre’s old town which is 
being restyled as a model of coexistence while dispossessing its inhabitants (see 
chapter 8).102 The attitude towards Ayalim should also be seen in this light. In 
2007, the ILA handed three renovated buildings in the old town to Ayalim without 
any legal auction (see chapter 8). They approached AKR in 2011 and have been 
given venues for their after-school activities. According to AKR the Shadhuliyya 
gave Ayalim legitimacy to enter society,103 but the mixed responses Ayalim gets 
in Acre leads to the question if this association is not damaging the Yashrutiyya’s 
position in society. 
For the followers, these projects and initiatives show the respect and love 
of the ṭarīqa for Acre’s cultural diversity: ‘I think the issue here is to work with the 
people of the town, with the factions (ṭawā’if) that are present in the town. This 
will lead to smoothness (sihl) and maḥabba.’104 On the other hand, there is also 
unease and distrust related to the choice of guests that come to the zāwiya and 
the partners that the Yashrutiyya is supporting.105 Some followers oppose these 
projects, but how deep this unease reaches is difficult to fathom. One follower in 
                                                  
101 ‘Acre facing the New and Old Colonizers’, Tarabut-Hithabrut 25-01-2012, 
http://www.tarabut.info/en/articles/article/Colonizing-Acre/. Accessed 22-02-2012. 
102 These observations are based on informal discussions with former followers and people in the 
town, including one recorded interview. Further systematic research would enable us to reach a 
deeper understanding how widespread these views are. 
103 Interview AKR 16-05-2013. 
104 Interview AK2. 
105 Interview AKR 29-02-2012. 
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Jaffa told me that some of ikhwānnā are nervous (bikhāfu), but accept it has to 
be done (hek lāzim).106 Others choose to focus on the positive side of the 
cooperations and the good things that are being done to help the children of the 
neighbourhood.107 As AKR says: ‘Even if they have intentions, so what? Let’s 
see the positive phenomena.’108 
In fact, the answer Shaykh Ahmad gave to my question on fanā’ shows 
that their understandings of fanā’ are quite far apart – or at least the image they 
present. Shaykh Ahmad does not understand fanā’ as the dissolution of the 
individual. He explains that when you get to know someone thoroughly only the 
ignorance of this person disappears, while the two entities remain separate. He 
writes that fanā’ means that all moral imperfections are lost from the worshipper 
(yafnā min al-‘abd) because he is in a state of presence between the hands of 
God (bayna īday al-Ḥaqq). He looses his impurities because he is nearing 
perfection. The Shaykh stresses that the worshipper’s impurities are dissolved 
but the worshipper remains. The worshipper’s attributes (ṣiffāt) are perfected; the 
perfect attributes originate from the attributes of God (al-ṣiffāt al-kāmil aṣalin min 
ṣiffāt al-haqq). The Prophet Muhammad calls for this in his Sunna when he told 
the believers: ‘Have the morals of God (takhallaqu bi-akhlāq-i Allāh),’ and this is 
why he is al-insān al-kāmil, just as the Qur’an is the divine text that expresses the 
will of God.109 
It is unclear how the communication between Shaykh Ahmad and AKR 
operates and to what extent Shaykh Ahmad is involved in these projects. As can 
be seen from his hopes for the zāwiya, he stresses the Islamic character of the 
zāwiya and does not refer explicitly (if at all) to interfaith dialogues – the only 
sentence that could be taken to hint at it is  
 
we also hope that the zāwiya will perform her most important role as a minbar of 
guidance (minbar irshād wa-hidāya), embodying the exemplary/pioneering (rā’id) 
                                                  
106 Informal discussion with a follower in Jaffa on 12-05-2013. 
107 Informal discussion with a follower in Jaffa on 12-05-2013, informal discussion with AK1; 
Interview AK4. 
108 Interview AKR 16-05-2013. 
109 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti, 14-10-2013, p.11-13. 
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role of the Sufi Path and its zawāya in the development of contemporary society 
in Acre.110  
 
Regarding the ṭarīqa’s social projects in Acre, AKR claims to be working on the 
Shaykh’s orders and to openly communicate with him while retaining a lot of 
freedom of interpretation, while the Review Panel states he is only responsible 
for managing the waqf and represents the Shaykh only on ‘a case by case 
basis’,111 and the Shaykh writes the following about these projects: 
 
Every group (jamā‛a) in Acre has social projects which embody its specific vision, 
and we do not go into specifics of any of these groups. We have our own specific 
vision, the Muhammadan Islamic vision, relying on the path (sīra) of the founder 
of the ṭarīqa, featured in the book Riḥla ila al-Ḥaqq, and his tawjīḥat and 
teachings, raḍī Allah ‛anhu, and contained in his sayings featured in the book 
Nafaḥāt al-Ḥaqq, such as ‘the path is the Book and the Sunna’ and ‘all of the 
path is ādāb’ and his saying ‘all of me is Muhammadan.’ Regarding Ayalim, we 
do not know anything about it [my italics].112 
 
As we have seen the idea of ‘spiritual communication’ enables the ṭarīqa 
to function as a highly centralized community which at the same time is 
adaptable to local circumstances enabling the follower to participate on both 
levels, and resolves the potential paradox of fikr and taslīm. In the case of the 
material and social renovation of the zāwiya in Acre, however, these paradoxes 
have reached a socially and politically charged level. AKR refers to the same 
mechanism of ‘spiritual communication’ regarding his mandate for the renovation 
and social activities of the ṭarīqa in Acre, but it is unclear how far this mandate 
actually reaches and whether he is indeed acting on the Shaykh’s orders or on 
his own as their concrete relationship is unclear. The Review Panel’s statement 
                                                  
110 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti, 15-03-14, p.1. 
111 Review Panel, ‘Major Comments and Remarks’, 3-4; Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and 
Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 56-57. 
112 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti, 15-03-14, p.1. 
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that this happens on a ‘case by case basis’ does not really clarify this issue.113 
The impossibility to articulate the exact nature of the spiritual connection between 
Shaykh and follower is thus extended to the material realm when it comes to the 
exact dealings regarding the renovation and the space of the ṭarīqa in society. 
 
 
11.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have seen that the zāwiya in Acre occupies a special place 
among the zawāya of the ṭarīqa: while the Shaykhs and followers may move 
around, Acre will always remain the historical centre of the ṭarīqa which connects 
them to their history – the founding period of the ṭarīqa and the golden age of the 
ṭarīqa in pre-1948 Palestine. Even so, their true sacred centre is the Shaykh, in 
whom the light of God continues to be manifested. 
The zāwiya is a ‘sacred space’ in the true sense of the word, as a space 
where the sacred, God, manifested His light through Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din, the 
embodiment of the same message that was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad 
in Mecca, a ‘hierophanic event’ as Eliade would call it, participating in two realms, 
simultaneously remaining itself and becoming the absolute other, and as such 
‘the ultimate reference to the context of a culture’, or in this case, ṭarīqa.114 Such 
a hierophanic event makes the space in which the divine manifested itself into 
the axis mundi, the cosmic pillar at the centre of the universe around which the 
whole world is constituted.115 Just as the Shaykh, the quṭb al-zamān, is the axis 
of the world, so the space where he manifested God’s light, from which he 
spread his message and from which he continues to spread his baraka and the 
nūr muḥammadī, functions as the axis mundi for his followers. It is not the point 
of origin of the whole world, as is the case of some of the shrines described by 
Joel Brereton,116 but it is the point of origin for the ṭarīqa.  
                                                  
113 Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 56. 
114 Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, 11–12, 20–65; Brereton, ‘Sacred Space’, 526. 
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By connecting to the zāwiya, the followers can participate in the charisma 
of the first three Shaykhs who are still spiritually present there, and connect to 
their history. Sacred spaces remove the temporal distance between follower and 
event, original community,117 to which they are also connected through a 
genealogical bond. The zāwiya thus plays an important role in the 
institutionalisation of the ṭarīqa, as it manifests both the traditional and the 
charismatic. As a symbol of the original charismatic moment in which Shaykh Ali 
Nur al-Din started the institutionalisation of the ṭarīqa, and as the space in which 
the charismatic continues to be present through the tombs of the previous 
Shaykhs and though the community itself, the zāwiya in Acre is an excellent 
illustration of the maintenance of charisma within a Sufi movement – even when 
the Shaykh himself is not present. 
In addition to this, the devotional and communal functions of the zāwiya 
bestow sanctity on the place.118 It strengthens the cohesion and solidarity of the 
community, both the local community in Acre and the translocal community in 
Israel. As Brereton points out: ‘Grounding the precarious and fluid structures of 
social organization in these places imparts to them a sense of conformity to a 
system that is not arbitrary but intrinsic to the very nature of things.’119 The 
socialisation process that happens here therefore strengthens the attachment to 
the traditional and charismatic aspects of the symbolic universe, the Yashruti 
family and the continuing spiritual power that they enact through the community, 
and the particular structure of authority to which this is connected. 
The form of a sacred space can be an essential aspect of its holiness, 
either by conferring sanctity or by representing the order of the universe.120 In the 
case of the zāwiya of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Acre, it is the dynamic 
                                                  
117 Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, 20–65; Brereton, ‘Sacred Space’, 533. 
118 This is comparable to a mosque, which has no sanctity of its own and represents no 
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sacred place. Brereton, ‘Sacred Space’, 528. 
119 Ibid., 533. 
120 Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, 20–65; Brereton, ‘Sacred Space’, 527. 
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nature of the zāwiya that expresses the fundamental value of the ṭarīqa to adapt 
to society and go with the times. By renovating the zāwiya the Shaykh 
strengthens his ties to his predecessors and to the ṭarīqa, and he and his 
followers hope to rekindle the important role the zāwiya had in Acre’s society as 
a lighthouse for the people. We have argued that the notion that the Shaykh 
continues on the path of spiritual renewal and adapts the ṭarīqa to the times, and 
that the community’s participation in and acceptance by society, are seen as 
major marks of his spiritual power and thus important bases for his authority. The 
renovation of the zāwiya is the best proof of this continued care for the 
community and commitment to innovation. In addition to the Shaykh’s connection 
to the original ‘charismatic moment’ of this ancestors, his commitment to the 
ṭarīqa’s future is thus an important aspect of his authority. 
 Such an enterprise naturally calls for an effective administration and a 
larger degree of bureaucratisation. Because of the diasporic conditions of the 
ṭarīqa, the Shaykh cannot oversee the renovations himself and has to rely on 
AKR, who refers to the dynamic relationship and communication between 
Shaykh and follower to legitimate his interpretations of the Shaykh’s will – 
interpretations which do not always reflect the consensus within the rest of the 
ṭarīqa but come closer to the Jewish Sufi milieu with which he has connections. 
This has far-reaching consequences for the social role of the ṭarīqa and the 
zāwiya in Acre as he connects to some people, groups and organisations that 
are deemed controversial by Acre’s society and by some followers, politicizing 
what might on the surface seem an apolitical message of love and tolerance. 
 Here we touch on the question ’who speaks for this ṭarīqa’ – a question 
which is inherent in the contemporary situation characterized by fragmentation of 
authority and Muslim Politics,121 and particularly relevant in the context of 
dialogue initiatives.122 AKR takes the role of ‘representative of the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya’ upon himself, but he is not authorized to do so by the Shaykh in 
Amman, and he does not accurately represent the views of either the ‘official 
                                                  
121 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 4–5. 
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religion’ in Amman nor of the vernacular religion of the followers in Acre and Jaffa 
– in fact, he represents his individual religion, to follow Bowman’s tripartite 
classification of the levels of religion.123 This confirms Klinkhammer and Bram’s 
comments on the problematic nature of interfaith dialogue initiatives as paths to 
peace,124 as the individuals and groups involved rarely represent a large group. 
                                                  
123 Bowman and Valk, ‘Vernacular Religion.’ See paragraph 1.2. 
124 Bram, ‘Sufi Circles in Israel’; Klinkhammer, ‘Sufism Contextualised’, 209–210. 
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Conclusion to Part III 
The Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Acre and Jaffa 
 
 
Several scholars have noted a limited Sufi revival as several types of indigenous 
Sufism seem on the rise in Israel and Jerusalem: centrally organised ṭuruq, local 
Sufi groups around a shaykh, or individiduals interested in Sufism. In some of 
these cases, Sufism is understood as ‘Islamic ethics and religious education 
framed within tradition’, renamed ‘ilm al-tawḥīd, as is common in many reformist 
Sufi movements around the world, and the general trend of rebranding Sufism as 
Traditional Islam1 At the same time, Israeli ‘new spiritual’ groups started to reach 
out to Sufism as ‘the other Islam’.2 As Howell argued, this renewed focus on Sufi 
spirituality might be seen as a reaction to Modernism,3 but we should not forget 
the local factors influencing these developments. Geaves suggests that for 
Palestinians this revival might stem from the need to find a ‘third option’ between 
secularism and Islamism – a way to reconnect to their religious heritage which is 
not deemed political.4 Similarly, the Israeli Jewish Sufis are interested in Sufism 
as ‘the other Islam’, a potential partner for dialogue.5  
Dominguez Diaz and Stjernholm’s criticism of Hermansen’s classification 
of contemporary Sufi movements in the West is thus very valid. In Israel’s hybrid 
society, the categories of ‘East’ and ‘West’ are problematic, and the 
classifications ‘transplants/hybrids/perennials’, or ‘theirs and ours’, confuse more 
than they clarify.6 Jewish Sufi ‘new spirituality’ is heavily influenced by Western 
hybrid and perennial movements, but the traditional ṭuruq and Sufi groups do not 
fall in either category – they are not transplants as they have their centre either in 
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Israel or among the Palestinian diaspora, but they differ significantly from the 
hegemonic culture, as do transplants studied in the Western context. The 
Shadhuli-Yashruti’s local community in Acre, specifically, is located both at the 
centre and the periphery of the ṭarīqa’s spiritual geography due to on the one 
hand the presence of the zāwiya, the continuing locus of spiritual power 
associated with the charismatic moment and the first three Shaykhs, and on the 
other hand, due to its physical separation from the personal symbolic centre, the 
Shaykh in Amman. In addition to this, our case study shows that different 
attitudes can exist in one ṭarīqa or local community. Stjernholm’s suggestion to 
focus on a group’s relation to a historical tradition and narrative and cultural 
milieu is indeed more useful here,7 as it sheds light on the different attitude of 
most of the followers, who explicitly adhere to the Islamic tradition, and AKR, who 
has a hybrid attitude, seemingly influenced by Jewish ‘new spirituality’ and 
Western perennialism in the religious sphere, and Zionist narratives about the 
role of Palestinian Muslims in Israel in the socio-political sphere.The Israeli Sufi 
milieu shows that an analytical approach that focuses solely on the ṭuruq – like 
Weismann’s and Hermansen’s – is inadequate to explore all aspects of Sufism, 
and it is therefore more useful to turn to Stjernholm’s approach of focusing on the 
relationship between Shaykh and disciple,8 which in this case study also goes far 
in explaining the different narratives the followers and AKR adhere to, and how 
the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya fits in the larger Israeli Sufi milieu. 
In Acre and Jaffa, the institutionalisation of the ṭarīqa seems to have 
developed on even stronger kinship lines than in Amman. The Shaykh’s 
legitimacy is based on the same doctrines as those that were explained to me in 
Amman: the Shaykh is the nūr muḥammadī, al-insān al-kāmil. But this is not 
discussed as much as in Amman, and there is much less discussion of the 
concept of the ‛aqīda. The Shaykh’s spiritual and genealogical link to his 
predecessors and to the history of the ṭarīqa, and the followers’ genealogical link 
to this history are commented upon extensively, more so than in Amman. For 
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8 Ibid.  
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most people, the most important aspects of the Shaykh seem to be his 
intertwined practical roles as teacher and father.  
These images can be found throughout the history of Sufism, and are 
found in Amman as well, but the specific potency they have in Acre and Jaffa 
seems to arise from their specific circumstances, especially the settings in which 
their tarbiya took place while they were completely disconnected from ikhwānnā 
outside of Israel. This all happened in a period in which the family was an 
important social unit for the Palestinians in Israel,9 but this is by no means the 
only explanation of their dependence on the family / community. Without access 
to the Shaykh and with their movement generally restricted under Military Rule, 
tarbiya had to happen completely in the local communities, which were 
constituted on strong kinship lines. In Jaffa, all followers belong to the same 
family, while in Acre the few families who remained all lived in the zāwiya. There 
were no resources and little incentives to develop and effective administration 
transcending these family ties. The genealogical connection to the ‘golden age’ 
before 1948 and its connection to the zāwiya was the only way to hold on to their 
heritage as often the community was even too small to participate in their main 
ritual, the ḥaḍra, although they could read waẓīfa collectively. 
We have seen in Amman how the ṭarīqa’s rituals encourage strong 
egalitarian communal bonds, and how the absence of personalized initiation 
adds to this. In Acre and Jaffa, the role of the mubāya‛a is even less of a 
watershed as it is seen by many as part of growing up in the ṭarīqa, rather than a 
life-changing choice to dedicate oneself to the path. One would expect the 
informal mode of mudhākara and the near absence of study groups to lead to 
weaker social control and less homogeneous spread of knowledge, and this is 
indeed seen through my fieldwork. My access to people was easier, my 
discussion with them more informal, and I witnessed some heated discussions 
about the topics of smoking and wearing ḥijāb. Due to their strong communal 
bonds created in other aspects of tarbiya, however, they understand fikr along 
the contemplative line of the spectrum rather than the critical one, and see 
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mudhākara as a meeting of kindred spirits, and their opinions generally do not 
diverge far from the general consensus, and from the ‘official narrative’ in 
Amman. 
Despite their isolation, they maintained the charismatic image of the 
Shaykh, and again the community played an important role in this. This is 
extremely clear in our discussion of miracle narratives. As Lindholm and Pinto 
argued, even in traditional institutions in which charisma is maintained through 
‘templates of sainthood’, charisma needs to be performed.10 The miracles 
narrated by ikhwānnā in Acre and Jaffa can be classified according to 
functionality11 and put in two categories. In chapter 9 we discussed the miracles 
that manifest his strong mental spiritual powers and ability to see into the hidden 
things (firāsa), such as clairvoyance and knowing people’s names even though 
he has never met them before. It should be pointed out that these things are also 
told about followers who have reached high spiritual levels, showing that they 
believe they can share in his charisma.  
The second category is especially relevant for this discussion, as these 
are miracles performed by the community and attributed to the Shaykh, rather 
than miracles performed by the Shaykh himself. As in Amman, the fact that they 
love and care for each other and for the wider society, and are accepted and 
respected by society, are considered to be min faḍl Sīdnā. This acceptance by 
society is considered one of the main aspects of his holiness – the interfaith 
aspect of these stories show that these stories are adapted to the particular 
society in which they are told. Through these stories, the Shaykh’s powers are 
illustrated, codes of behaviour are transmitted, and the idea is firmly entrenched 
that the community is strongly connected to the symbolic universe. The 
charismatic – while found in its strongest in the person of the Shaykh – is thus 
also manifested within the community. Ikhwānnā become the tools of this 
charisma in everyday life. They are signs of the presence of the Shaykh in their 
community, and ‘charismatic moments’ in the sense that they partake of his 
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spiritual powers. This further underlines the teaching that God is visible in all of 
His creation. The stories told by a follower in Jaffa about her ancestors (see 
paragraph 10.1) further strengthens the ṭarīqa’s institutionalisation on kinship 
lines by connecting the individual to the family and to the original charismatic 
moment, also illustrating how the followers can participate in the Shaykh’s 
spiritual powers. 
These experiences are incorporated in the symbolic universe, both made 
possible through it and reaffirming it, and adding to the vernacular tradition as 
they become stories that allow them to relive these moments and to encourage 
other people to see the world this way. All of this strengthens the normative 
codification of behaviour and the social structure which depends on the 
relationship between Shaykh and follower. The charismatic is maintained and 
considered to be enacted through the community, and charisma and institution 
continuously reaffirm each other. The concretization of the message thus 
strengthens the charismatic, rather than lessening it, as O’Dea posited in his 
second dilamma.12 At the same time, the community’s autonomy is strengthened, 
as they become role models for each other, in the absence of their supreme role 
model. 
An important aspect of many of these stories is their acceptance in 
society. This is not only seen as a sign of their spiritual and moral status, but also 
provides them with a more secure place in this society, and the ability to continue 
their ṭarīqa in the public sphere. This becomes very tangible in the case of the 
zāwiya in Acre, which is currently being renovated. In addition to having a 
communal function for the communities in Israel, it plays an important role in the 
entire translocal ṭarīqa. The zāwiya is a sacred space because of this communal 
function, but mainly because it connects the followers to the original charismatic 
moment (in Eliade’s words, the original ‘hierophany’), both as the historical place 
where this happened, and through the continuing spiritual presence of the three 
first Shaykhs who are buried there.13 As such it is the axis around which the 
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ṭarīqa spread. As it manifests both traditional and charismatic elements, it is an 
essential part of the ṭarīqa’s institutionalisation, and it provides the Shaykh with 
‘traditional spatial charisma’.14  
One might expect the followers in Acre and Jaffa to turn to the shrines 
when they lost access to the Shaykh and the wider community, but this did not 
happen, and they continue to see the Shaykh in Amman as their main spiritual 
focus. The maintenance of charisma is very clear in Acre and Jaffa, despite a 
strong institutionalisation on kinship lines. The disruption of ties between Shaykh, 
shrines, and community, has therefore not led to decentring of authority as is 
happening in many Sufi ṭuruq and groups that became disconnected from their 
shaykh and/or shrine in the diaspora.15 
The followers and the Shaykh in Amman, while focusing on the living 
Shaykh in their midst, have similarly not forgotten the zāwiya in Acre. The 
Shaykh is committed to renovating the zāwiya and thus bolsters his own 
traditional charismatic authority, and the followers have high hopes for the new 
role the zāwiya will play in the world once it is finished. The renovation also 
allows Shaykh Ahmad to manifest his role as spiritual renewer, the who inspires 
his followers to participate in society and go with the times. In addition to the 
Shaykh’s connection to the original ‘charismatic moment’ of his ancestors, his 
commitment to the ṭarīqa’s future is thus an important aspect of his authority 
It does not seem therefore that the renovation can be seen as an aspect 
of a wider Islamic revival, as De Jong wondered,16 or the need for a ‘third option’, 
as Geaves noted in Jerusalem,17 but it seems to primarily rise from the traditional 
and charismatic dynamics within the ṭarīqa itself. The deterritorialisation which 
developed among those who had no access to the zāwiya seems to have been a 
phase that is left behind as soon as opportunities arise to reconnect.  
The renovations call for more bureaucratization, and while all those 
involved report back to the Shaykh regularly, it is unavoidable that he has less 
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strong control over what is happening in Acre than he has in Amman. AKR, the 
mutawallī of the ṭarīqa’s awqāf, is in charge, and in addition to overseeing the 
renovations he hosts tourists and students, undertakes social projects and 
participates in interfaith dialogue initiatives. The picture he presents of the ṭarīqa, 
its ideas and practices, is quite different from that of the other followers as he 
focuses more on the individual interpretatoin, even explicitly saying at one point 
that one does not have to be a Muslim to join. 
He explicitly refers to ‘ilm al-ishāra to account for his different 
interpretations, but due to his focus on individuality and inspiration, the dynamic 
involved is different than for those who do their interpretation in the group, and he 
exercises a much higher level of autonomy in interpreting the Shaykh’s teachings 
and communications. He sees both ta’ammul and fikr as essential aspects of the 
ṭarīqa’s practice, but his understanding of fikr as critical thought and his focus on 
the individual gives him a large degree of autonomy, which makes the potential 
paradox between fikr and taslīm very real.  
When discussing the renovations of the zāwiya in Acre and the social 
projects that are being undertaken alongside them, this dynamic of 
communication and interpretation happens on a more social and even political 
level as AKR takes his interpretations quite far from the views communicated to 
me by other followers in Israel and Amman. While he mostly places the ṭarīqa 
within the Islamic tradition, he also takes elements from other traditions, such as 
the one discussed in chapter 1 that sees Sufism as universal mysticism, in one 
occasion leading him to say that in the West one does not necessarily have to be 
a Muslim to join.  
In his opinion, the Yashruti Shaykhs were always involved on both the 
mystical and ethical levels, and were very involved in the community. In this 
sense, he sees them as his role models. In his view, the Shaykh’s focus on 
education and his understanding of fanā’ as communal action is one of Shaykh 
Ahmad’s profound innovations which adapts the tradition significantly to its time, 
and in the Israeli context revives the ṭarīqa’s social role after a sixty year hiatus, 
but maintaining the connections between mystical experiences and social 
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engagement that have characterized the ṭarīqa from the start, and connecting 
these to the Yashruti family and the current Shaykh Ahmad. Rather than a shift 
from the mystical to the ethical, often accompanied with a shift in the role of the 
Shaykh, that can be seen in contemporary rationalizing Sufi movements and 
Traditional Islam,18 in his thought we see a shift away from Islamic norms and a 
more individual spiritual focus on the Shaykh that has more in common with ‘new 
spirituality’, It is comparable to the attitude among the first generation of Western 
adherents to the Burhaniyya.19 This goes together with his presentation of the 
ṭarīqa as ‘good Arabs’ who participate in society and accept Zionist hegemony.  
 His participation in interfaith dialogue should be seen in this light. He 
presents it as an essential aspect of the ṭarīqa’s practices, understanding 
mudhākara as a meeting between opposites rather than a meeting of kindred 
spirits. None of the followers understand it this way, and they do not participate in 
these initiatives. The Review Panel stressed that he does not represent the 
ṭarīqa, but participates in these things on an individual basis. Indeed, he 
represents his own ‘individual religion’ more than the vernacular tradition or 
‘official religion’ (to use Bowman’s categories).20 He does present himself as 
official spokesperson, however, and is accepted as such by outsiders – it 
therefore does not give him any legitimacy in the ṭarīqa itself, but it does provide 
him with prestige in the Jewish Sufi milieu. This confirms Klinkhammer and 
Bram’s comments on the problematic nature of interfaith dialogue initiatives as 
paths to peace,21 as the individuals and groups involved rarely represent a large 
group – in these cases he represents himself. 
The differences between his ‘individual religion’ and both the vernacular 
tradition and ‘religious narrative’ were explicitly underlined by the Review Panel. 
These differences can be explained through his socialisation process. Berger 
points out that socialisation is an ongoing process of world construction and 
                                                  
18 Geaves, ‘That Which We Have Forgotten’; Hamid, ‘The Rise of the “Traditional Islam” 
Network(s)’; Raudvere and Stenberg, ‘Translocal Mobility and Traditional Authority’, 5, 10; Howell 
and Van Bruinessen, ‘Sufism and the “Modern” in Islam’, 10–11; Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi. 
19 Klinkhammer, ‘Traditionalizing Spirituality.’ 
20 Bowman and Valk, ‘Vernacular Religion’, 4.  
21 Bram, ‘Sufi Circles in Israel’; Klinkhammer, ‘Sufism Contextualised’, 209–210. 
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world maintenance, and that when connections with the community diminish, so 
will adherence to the symbolic universe22 – in this case, AKR’s interpretation 
developed in quite a different way than that of the local community as his 
exposure to other Sufi groups and to the hybrid and perennial Jewish Sufi milieu 
influenced his ideas.  
We see how his understanding of the Shaykhs (especially his portrayal of 
their social and political roles), of the practices of the ṭarīqa and of the doctrine of 
fanā’ leads him to support social projects and interfaith initiatives that not all the 
local followers feel comfortable with. While the interpretations of the followers 
seem to be more influenced by local Islamic groups and views, his interpretations 
lean more towards Western and international understandings of Sufism that see 
Sufism as a universal mystical religion that is only partly linked to Islam and that 
is often used by political actors over the world to support a counterweight to 
radical Islam, politicizing an apolitical message in the process. His understanding 
of the social situation of the ṭarīqa is influenced by local Zionist understandings of 
the nature of the Jewish state and its relation to the Palestinian citizens of Israel. 
He claims to be doing all of this with the support of the Shaykh, but the exact 
nature of the relationship between AKR and the Shaykh is unclear. 
These differences between the two ‘official narratives’ that were 
communicated to me, by the Shaykh and his ‘custodians of tradition’ in Amman 
on the one hand, and by AKR in Acre on the other, show the merit of the 
anthropological method as it enables us to get a deeper understanding of the 
dynamic of the ṭarīqa and how to place it in its context. It warns us never to take 
official statements and publications at face value, but seek out the followers and 
hear their points of view as well. While the followers believe that the Shaykh’s 
point of view and communication is the right one, as an anthropologist I do not 
value one over the other but see them all as expressions and variations of the 
vernacular Shadhuli-Yashruti tradition. By understanding the relational dynamic 
between Shaykh and follower we understand in what way their mode of 
communication gives space for these variations and interpretations without the 
                                                  
22 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 18. 
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interpreters giving up their identification with the ṭarīqa and the feeling that they 
belong to a cohesive community which is the same in every time and place. 
 
 567 
Chapter 12 
Final Conclusion 
 
 
This study aims to add to the understanding of Sufism in contemporary society 
and the task of redefining ‘tradition’ by discussing the changing authority of Sufi 
shaykhs in an increasingly globalised world, using the emic concept of tarbiya, 
which corresponds to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s etic notion of 
‘socialisation’1 and Talal Asad’s approach to the transmission of a discursive 
tradition.2  
Increasing flows of people, goods, and ideas, and the spread of 
‘modernity’ – greater reliance on technology, industrialisation, bureaucratization, 
centralisation of government – shaped the development of the ideology of 
Modernism. Important elements of this ideology are the autonomy of the 
individual against authoritarianism, the search for empirical knowledge, and the 
striving for ‘progress’.3 Based on this, many scholars expected science to replace 
religion in what is known as the ‘ secularisation thesis’.4 Sufism has been seen 
as incompatible with Modernism due to its support for irrational as opposed to 
rational approaches to knowledge, its other-worldly orientation that is 
unconcerned with material progress, and its call for absolute submission to the 
authority of the shaykh. For these reasons, it was predicted that Sufism would 
decline in the face of modernity.5  
The secularisation thesis has been challenged and reformulated, but it is 
generally acknowledged that religion continues to play a role in contemporary 
societies. It has developed significantly under influence of and in reaction to both 
                                                  
1 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality; Berger, The Sacred Canopy. 
2 Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam, 14–16.  
3 Howell and Van Bruinessen, ‘Sufism and the “Modern” in Islam’, 5; Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, 
and Saints in Modern Egypt, 358–359, 422; Lawrence, Defenders of God, 27. 
4 Hamilton, The Sociology of Religion, 185–186. 
5 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 358–359. See for example Arberry, 
Sufism. 
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modernity and Modernism.6 Some religious intellectuals have engaged with 
Modernist thought, and in the Islamic tradition there have been fierce debates on 
the attitude to modern technology, institutions, and ideas, and the definition of 
Islam itself (and the place of Sufism within it).7 Opposition to traditional 
institutionalised religion and/or to Modernism for its perceived lack of spirituality 
and morality has led to a focus on the individual and the embodied experience, 
either in the form of a more individualised ‘new spirituality’ (generally associated 
with the New Age movement)8 or in the form of a renewed focus on spirituality 
and morality within the established religions.9  
The continued presence of Sufism has been attested by numerous case 
studies. The intellectual challenge posed to its doctrines,10 the decline of the 
traditional social base of the Sufi ṭuruq, and globalisation have led to far reaching 
changes within Sufi movements. Many have underwent a form of rationalisation, 
which might have lead to increased autonomy for their members in terms of 
affiliation, behaviour and/or interpretation (with space for rational-critical thought). 
Some ṭuruq re-invented themselves as voluntary associations, business 
enterprises and networks, or political parties.11 Modern means of communication 
have provided Sufi shaykhs and movements with new ways of connecting and 
maintaining their movements, and we see ‘new modalities in the global context of 
Sufi networking’.12 The general trend towards deterritorialisation has led to shifts 
in attachment to Sufi shaykhs and shrines, and several scholars have noted the 
rise of a trend of adherence to Sufism without shaykh or ṭarīqa. Geaves for 
                                                  
6 For an overview of the debate on ‘ secularisation’, see Hamilton, The Sociology of Religion, 
185–214. 
7 Raudvere and Stenberg, ‘Translocal Mobility and Traditional Authority’, 3. 
8 Huss, ‘Spirituality.’ 
9 Voll, ‘Contemporary Sufism and Current Social Theory’, 296–298; Howell, ‘Modernity and 
Islamic Spirituality in Indonesia’s New Sufi Networks’; Van Bruinessen, ‘Saints, Politicians and 
Sufi Bureaucrats.’ 
10 As discussed in paragraphs 1.4 and 1.5, criticism of Sufism is not new. Certain Sufi individuals, 
ideas, and practices, have been criticized and sometimes even persecuted for centuries, but 
Sufism as a whole was always considered an essential aspect of Islam. In the modern period, 
however, Sufism as a whole came under attack. For more on this, see De Jong and Radtke eds., 
Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics. 
11 Howell and Van Bruinessen, ‘Sufism and the “Modern” in Islam’, 10–11. 
12 Hermansen, ‘Global Sufism’; Howell, ‘Modernity and Islamic Spirituality in Indonesia’s New Sufi 
Networks.’ 
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example has tracked the development of the Barelvi Sufi coalition in the UK and 
the related development of a global Traditional Islam as reactions to 
deterritorialised universalist Islamic movements. On a different line of 
development, the Western ‘new spirituality’ trend has connected itself with certain 
perennialist Sufi movements.13 The global Sufi scene is thus very diverse, and 
research into its developments has so far only scratched the surface. Our main 
concern in this study is how these trends affect authority within the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya in the particular local circumstances of Jordan and Israel. 
By analysing original material obtained during fieldwork in Jordan and 
Israel, this study analyses the authority of Shaykh Ahmad al-Hadi al-Yashruti, 
contextualising the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya by examining how the challenges of 
the changing religious climate and the challenges faced by the Palestinian 
people affect the role of the Shaykh and the cohesion of the community, as the 
links between Shaykh, community and zāwiya have been disrupted since 1948. 
The centre of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya shifted from Acre to Beirut in 1948 
and to Amman in 1980. Most Palestinian followers became refugees; some 
remained in Acre and Jaffa and were isolated from the Shaykh and the rest of the 
community until 1967 when contacts were slowly restored. We have analysed 
how this influenced their attitude towards the Shaykh, the zawāya, and the 
community. Did they develop a deterritorialised approach according to the 
general trend within Islam, or did they continue to focus on the Shaykh or the 
shrine in Acre to hold on to their identity and community? Can we indeed speak 
of a revival as Frederick de Jong noted in the 1980s,14 and is it a manifestation of 
the larger Islamic revival, or of something else? 
Like most Sufi movements, the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya is embedded in 
other networks.15 While not the entire Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya exists within the 
Palestinian diaspora, the section examined in this study, does. Before 1948 the 
                                                  
13 Geaves, ‘That Which We Have Forgotten’; Hamid, ‘The Rise of the “Traditional Islam” 
Network(s)’; Heck, ‘The Politics of Sufism’, 15. 
14 De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 180. 
15 Hermansen, ‘Global Sufism.’ 
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ṭarīqa spread in a ‘chaordic’ way16 due to explicit proselytizing and general 
migration – after 1948 the ṭarīqa was dispersed together with the Palestinian 
diaspora. Thus while the ṭarīqa as a whole is itself a multi-ethnic diasporic 
movement, its followers in Jordan, Israel and Palestine are all Palestinians, and 
this particular section of the ṭarīqa – which includes the ṭarīqa’s personal and 
geographical symbolic centres, the Shaykh and the central zawāya of Amman 
and Acre – therefore exists within the global Palestinian diaspora. In addition to 
this, this section of the ṭarīqa is interwoven with an extended family network and 
connected through strong family ties. 
These particular movements and shifts of centre challenge the 
classification of contemporary Sufi movements based on centre-periphery 
models and Western/non-Western dyads, particularly Marcia Hermansen’s 
classification of transplants, hybrids and perennials.17 As Ron Geaves, Markus 
Dressler and Gritt Klinkhammer point out, the process of globalization and 
migration diminishes the value of traditional centre-periphery models, to the point 
that ‘the meaning of East and West starts to lose its geographical significance’.18 
In addition to this, Simon Stjernholm and Marta Dominguez Diaz criticized these 
models for assuming unity within a ṭarīqa and for focusing on relations to ‘the 
West’, while processes of dissemination and development are much more 
diverse.19 The Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya is a case in point. When most followers 
became refugees in 1948, the original centre in the original homeland became 
the periphery, while the host city became the new centre. The refugees in 
Amman found themselves in a culture not much different from their own; the 
followers who remained in Acre and Jaffa, on the other hand, found themselves 
in a new environment with a significantly different culture that itself is a hybrid, 
                                                  
16 Werbner, ‘The Place Which Is Diaspora.’ For a discussion of Pnina Werbner’s concept 
‘chaordic’, see paragraph 1.5.3. 
17 Hermansen, ‘In the Garden of American Sufi Movements’; Hermansen, ‘Literary Productions of 
Western Sufi Movements’; Hermansen, ‘Global Sufism’; Dominguez Diaz, ‘Performance, 
Belonging and Identity’, 230; Stjernholm, ‘What is the Naqshbandi-Haqqani Tariqa?’ 
18 Geaves, Dressler, and Klinkhammer, ‘Introduction’, 4. 
19 Dominguez Diaz, ‘Performance, Belonging and Identity’, 230; Stjernholm, ‘What is the 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani Tariqa?’ See for example Lewisohn, ‘Persian Sufism in the Contemporary 
West’; Dressler, ‘Between Legalist Exclusivism and Mysticist Universalism’; Webb, ‘Third Wave 
Sufism.’ 
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but is usually characterized as Western due to Ashkenazi hegemony. The 
categories ‘transplant’, ‘hybrid’ and ‘perennial’ are thus confusing in this situation. 
More illuminating is Stjernholm’s approach to focus on identification with 
historical narratives rather than geography.20 In Amman, Acre, and Jaffa, the 
Shaykh and followers place themselves clearly within the Islamic tradition. In 
Acre, however, AKR has a hybrid approach that comes close to the Jewish Sufi 
milieu, which is characterized by a perennialist ‘new spirituality’ and an implicit 
adherence to Zionist understandings of history.21  
I argue that this internal variation can be explained through the process of 
tarbiya, including the socialisation in the ṭarīqa, the transmission of the tradition 
and the specific mode of communication employed by the Shaykh and his 
followers. Paulo Pinto makes a similar point in his analysis of Sufi groups in 
Aleppo, but it should be noted that his use of the word tarbiya remains restricted 
to the process of education after initiation,22 whereas in the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya it is used in its general Arabic meaning to refer to the entire 
pedagogical process. This different understanding of the concept tarbiya actually 
reflects the different organizational base of the ṭarīqa – while the groups Pinto 
describes are entered by choice and through a moment of initiation, membership 
in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya depends mainly on family initiation and the 
mubāya‛a is therefore not so much based on choice, but rather a natural part of 
the process of tarbiya that happens in the family. Even those people who convert 
or reaffiliate to the ṭarīqa do so through their significant others.  
Following Asad, Green, and Pinto, this study understands Sufism as a 
discursive tradition, a guiding pattern of behaviour, ideas, practices, and 
submission to authority, which is built up of different elements that are in a 
continuous process of transmission and reinterpretation.23 The identification of 
these elements and how they are transmitted and reinterpreted is therefore the 
first step when analysing a Sufi movement. Asad sees education as the process 
                                                  
20 Stjernholm, ‘What is the Naqshbandi-Haqqani Tariqa?’, 215–218. 
21 Bram, ‘Sufi Circles in Israel.’ See paragraph 8.2.3.2. 
22 Pinto, ‘The Anthropologist and the Initiated’, 464–465. 
23 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 14–16; Green, Sufism, 3; Pinto, ‘Knowledge and Miracles.’ See 
paragraph 1.2. 
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during which tradition is transmitted and authority is exercised and can be 
resisted. Bruce Lincoln argues that authority is a speech act and a relationship,24 
and many scholars have pointed out that the relation between shaykh and 
follower is at the centre of Sufism.25 The development of this relationship and the 
knowledge and normative framework that accompany it are developed through 
socialisation, in which the symbolic universe and the connected (sub-)social 
structure (the ‘plausibility structure’) are simultaneously maintained and 
constructed.26 This is similar to Asad’s notion of an ever-evolving dynamic 
discursive tradition in which meanings are transmitted and reinterpreted to 
become incorporated in the tradition. Dale F. Eickelman and James P. Piscatori 
see elements of tradition as symbols which are subject to continuous 
interpretation due to their ambiguous nature, simultaneously providing a 
connection to the past and an opportunity for change.27 As new experiences are 
objectified, they are incorporated in the wider body of knowledge of the 
vernacular tradition through hagiographies, poetry, etc.28 Berger points to the 
important role of the community in the continuing socialisation process: ‘the 
individual appropriates the world in conversation with others and, furthermore, 
(…) both identity and world remain real to him only as long as he can continue 
the conversation.’29 
Therefore, this study discusses the following question: What is the relation 
between Shaykh Ahmad al-Hadi al-Yashruti and his followers in the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya in Amman, Acre and Jaffa? To answer this question, the following 
sub-questions will be examined: On which elements is his authority based? Is his 
authority charismatic or institutionalised? What does he mean to the followers in 
different contexts, which roles does he take on and are attributed to him? How 
does he exercise these roles? What role does this give the community and the 
individual followers in their specific contexts? Where does this exercise of 
                                                  
24 Lincoln, Authority, 1–4, 11, 188. 
25 Green, Sufism, 9; Ernst, ‘Sufism, Islam and Globalization’; Chih, ‘What Is a Sufi Order?’; 
Stjernholm, ‘A Translocal Sufi Movement.’ 
26 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality; Berger, The Sacred Canopy. 
27 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 28. 
28 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 86. 
29 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 18. 
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authority take place (in Lincoln’s words, what is the ‘stage’ of his authority)? How 
does this affect the larger societies in which these communities and individuals 
are present? How does this affect the doctrinal, practical and communal 
cohesion of the ṭarīqa? 
 The main claim to originality of this thesis lies in the fact that I have used 
an anthropological approach to study the contemporary ṭarīqa Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya, which has not been done before. Previous studies on the ṭarīqa 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in the Levant focussed on the life and teachings of the 
founder, Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din al-Yashruti, based on the writings of his daughter 
Fatima al-Yashrutiyya, or only discussed the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in 
passing.30 Since no anthropological research has been done on this ṭarīqa in the 
Levant so far, I have used an adapted grounded approach: I have used 
secondary literature to achieve an initial understanding of the research area and 
to identify useful approaches and concepts to the concept of authority in general 
and Sufi authority in specific, but have also aimed to identify the concepts 
relevant to this particular case study. 
This study has been based on the methodological agnostic approach, 
following Berger and Ninian Smart. I have bracketed the question whether the 
beliefs and experiences of my respondents are actually true, as these are not 
questions that can be answered in a scientific work based on empirical 
observation. This is not to say that the meta-empirical is not valuable and 
therefore not worthy of study, but that the scientific method requires us to stick to 
the empirical.31 As Thomas O’Dea pointed out, this does not in itself deny the 
transcendent, as the transcendent needs to become immanent if it has meaning 
in this world.32 Therefore I have focused on what such statements of belief and 
experience mean to believers and how they affect their ideas and practices, and 
                                                  
30 Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’; De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century 
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Israel’, 308–309, 316; Geaves, ‘That Which We Have Forgotten’, 40–41; Bram, ‘Sufi Circles in 
Israel’, 131; Abu Hanieh, Sufism and Sufi Orders, 138–141. 
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adherence to a particular institution. I will leave arguments on the truth value of 
their religious tradition (or lack of it) to others – here I have been concerned with 
the social meanings and effects of these religious experiences. 
The limits of the anthropological method – in addition to its dedication to 
the empirical rather than the meta-empirical – are due to the fact that the 
respondents have a large degree of control over the access to knowledge. This 
was specifically the case in Amman, where large aspects of their religious 
everyday life and of groups within the ṭarīqa were thus inaccessible. The 
differences in access due to different codes of guesthood and degrees of central 
control further complicate the comparative potential of the research. This is an 
unavoidable result of ethical anthropological research that respects the 
boundaries of the respondents. It might be remedied by a longer period of 
fieldwork and a fuller immersion in the community, but a researcher can never 
completely surmount these limits.33 
The contest over authority in the Islamic framework in general centres on 
the struggle over the authority to interpret the word of God as revealed in sacred 
scripture and define ideas, shape behaviour and set the boundaries within which 
the tradition can be transmitted and reinterpreted – what Eickelman and Piscatori 
call ‘Muslim Politics’, the struggle over who is the ‘custodian of tradition’ and who 
is the ‘spokesperson of Islam’.34 Who is given this authority depends on the 
concrete historical and social situation.  
Arthur Buehler points out that the main element of authority in Islamic and 
Sufi traditions is the connection to the Prophet which can be established in four 
ways: 
- lineage (genealogical and/or spiritual); 
- embodiment of the Prophetic Sunna, in other words ‘being a Prophetic 
exemplar’; 
- transmission of religious knowledge; 
                                                  
33 It should be noted that respecting the limits of access imposed by the community during 
fieldwork is not the same as submitting to censorship of written material after the research has 
been done, which has not been the case. See paragraph 2.4. 
34 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 4–5. 
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- a ‘transformative spiritual experience’ and spiritual travel.35  
In addition to these elements, we have discussed the importance of space as an 
element of authority, especially Kees Terlouw’s notion of ‘traditional spatial 
charisma’ as leaders cultivate places connected to a ‘golden age’ to bolster their 
traditional charisma.36 
The doctrinal base of the authority of Shaykh Ahmad (and in fact all the 
Shaykhs of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya) is the belief that the Shaykh embodies 
the nūr muḥammadī and the ‛aqīda. Followers can see his good Muhammadan 
behaviour, and they believe that those who have developed their ‘eye of the 
heart’ can see the Muhammadan light shine in him. As such they see him as the 
inheritor of the Prophet Muhammad in a chronological succession as exemplified 
by the silsila, but also as a direct embodiment of the Muhammadan light and 
morals, and of the message that was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in 
Mecca. This connects the Shaykh to the personal symbolic centre of Islam and 
makes him the personal symbolic centre of the ṭarīqa; he not only transmits the 
‛aqīda, but he also embodies it enabling his followers direct access to the nūr 
muḥammadī and the ‛aqīda. This is both a traditional and a charismatic image as 
he both transmits and embodies the ṭarīqa’s ultimate values. 
Because this light shines equally in all Shaykhs of the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya, the followers believe that ‘all the Shaykhs are one.’ It is important to 
note that while all Sufi shaykhs are respected, by this they mean the founding 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din and his three successors Shaykh Ibrahim, Shaykh 
Muhammad al-Hadi and the current Shaykh Ahmad. They are the ones who 
embody the light and transmit the teachings from one to the other and to their 
followers. Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s coming to Palestine as a spiritual renewer and 
the subsequent period in which he spread the message is considered the ṭarīqa’s 
‘golden age’ and the original ‘charismatic moment’. This charisma has 
subsequently been transmitted through hereditary succession as the ṭarīqa has 
                                                  
35 Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet. 
36 Terlouw, ‘Charisma and Space.’ 
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been institutionalised on traditional kinship lines and the Yashruti family has 
maintained full control over the ṭarīqa. 
While the followers love and respect the previous Shaykhs, their 
relationship is with the current Shaykh. Seen from this perspective they do not 
yearn for a ‘golden age’ because the nūr muḥammadī is among them, embodied 
in their Shaykh. They consider the previous Shaykhs to be spiritually present – 
especially in the zāwiya in Acre where they are buried – but they focus on the 
current Shaykh, the current embodiment of the nūr muḥammadī. They feel that 
they can participate in this through their love for him, the development of their 
relationship with him by practising on the Path, listening to his words and 
following his example, and by participating in the community as they understand 
their acts of love and hospitality as signs of the Shaykh’s spiritual power for 
which they have become the medium.  
This maintenance of charisma shows that classical sociological theories 
positing the decline of charisma through its routinization should be re-examined, 
as has also been noted by other scholars of Sufism.37 Firstly, the fact that 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din refered to his own silsila as a basis of legitimation and 
acted within the general Sufi tradition with its modes of organisation and 
‘templates of sainthood’38 shows that charisma can happen within an 
institutionalised tradition. 
Secondly, he already started the institutionalisation process – on the same 
traditional lines of the Sufi tradition, if more centralised – during the ‘charismatic 
moment’. This shows that the clear break between charisma and 
institutionalisation does not hold. When he came to Palestine, he began to 
spread his message and build the foundations of its institutionalisation. He issued 
ijāzas to those who spread the message, he appointed muqaddamīn and built 
zawāya, most notably those in Acre and Tarshiha. Most importantly, he brought 
his son from Tunisia to prepare him to be his successor, institutionalising 
hereditary succession from a Shaykh to his ‘most able’ son. This practice is 
                                                  
37 E.g. Pinto, ‘Knowledge and Miracles’; Lindholm, ‘Introduction.’ 
38 Lindholm, ‘Introduction’, 24. 
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based doctrinally on the belief that the nūr muḥammadī is passed genealogically, 
a common belief in recent Sufism as Hoffman has argued.39 The decision who is 
the most able son is made by the Shaykh himself, which is doctrinally justified by 
the belief that due to his spiritual rank he has the ultimate knowledge and can 
see in the deepest hidden essence of things (firāsa), and therefore knows whom 
God has destined to be the next Shaykh. The actual decision making process is 
thus lost to history. 
Finally, more than a century after his passing, his third successor still 
inspires his followers to see him as a charismatic leader who embodies the same 
spiritual power and values as the founder Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din, which shows 
that charisma can be maintained within an institutionalised movement without 
declining. 
Adherence to the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Jordan and Israel – while 
originally based on proselytizing and conversion – is now mainly transmitted in 
the family. The institutionalisation of the succession on genealogical lines is thus 
mirrored in the ṭarīqa’s membership based on family affiliation. The ṭarīqa thus 
moved from a sectarian organisation based on conversion to an organisation in 
which socialisation largely replaced conversion.40 
The followers accept the ṭarīqa’s institutionalisation on traditional kinship 
lines due to their successful socialisation which leads them to accept the social 
structure and the roles in it, and which teaches them to perceive signs that 
confirm the high state of the future Shaykh. Similarly, the Shaykhs have been 
socialised to accept their role and the behaviour that goes with it. As Berger and 
Luckmann pointed out, the inculcation of specific roles is an essential aspect of 
socialisation as people experience reality through these roles and influence it in 
turn.41 The inculcation of the roles of Shaykh and follower within the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya is very explicit – as one of the followers in Amman said, ‘The murīd 
                                                  
39 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 87–88, 128–129, 390 note 129. 
40 Here we use the terms ‘sect’ in the classical sociological sense to refer to mode of 
organisation, not attitude to the world. Berger, ‘The Sociological Study of Sectarianism’, 468–469; 
Swatos, ‘Church-Sect Theory.’ 
41 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 33–34. 
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has his sulūk and the Shaykh has his sulūk.’42 Through this process, the 
followers are prepared to see their Shaykh as charismatic and to recognize his 
spiritual powers. 
 As Charles Lindholm and Pinto have pointed out, even in cases of highly 
institutionalised succession of Sufi shaykhs, a shaykh still has to prove his worth 
by manifestating his baraka, grace.43 The followers consider his baraka to be 
manifested through karāmāt and ishārāt: direct and indirect speech acts, 
gestures, and occurrences in everyday life. Such signs show them who will be 
the next Shaykh, and karāmāt strengthen this belief. Among these are Shaykh 
Muhammad al-Hadi’s explicit statements that Sīdī Ahmad represented him, and 
Sīdī Ahmad’s pious and good behaviour, following the example of the Prophet 
and of his father. The karāmāt attributed to Shaykh Ahmad refer to his spiritual 
mental powers, his omniscience and clairvoyance (firāsa), and to his inspiration 
for people to be good people in their community and in their society, which points 
to his role as spiritual renewer and his call for them to participate in society.  
Ikhwānnā incorporate these ishārāt and karāmāt in their vernacular 
traditions by spreading them as miracle narratives, and interpret them in the 
community. Therefore, not only does their presence confirm the followers’ belief 
in the symbolic universe and its plausibility structure, but the particular form they 
take and the mechanism of interpretation further strengthen the community’s 
cohesion and give it an aura of transcendent facticity that makes them feel they 
participate in the Shaykh’s spiritual state and make them ever more committed to 
the Shaykh, the ṭarīqa, and the community. 
Based on Asad’s notion of ‘disciplinary practices, Pinto shows that the 
particular form of transmission of the tradition shapes the relationship between 
shaykh and follower, and among the followers themselves.44 Pinto sees a 
difference between a ṭarīqa’s collective rituals such as collective dhikr, which can 
be practiced by both initiates and by non-initiated followers and which allows 
                                                  
42 ZA1-3 in Interview ZA1. 
43 Lindholm, ‘Introduction’, 9, 24; Pinto, ‘Performing Baraka.’ 
44 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 77–79, 125–126; Pinto, ‘Sufism and the Political Economy of 
Morality in Syria’, 125–126. 
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them ‘various degrees of socialization into the symbolic and experiential 
universe’ of the ṭarīqa, and the more individualized process of initiation which 
allows them to develop an individualized religious self through a personalized 
wird and subjective mystical experiences. In addition to this, he notes that study 
groups encourage reflection, lead to a homogeneous distribution of doctrinal 
categories and religious knowledge and ultimately to shared doctrinal 
understandings, and an egalitarian moral community.45  
Indeed we see that the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, which is characterized 
by very strong communal bonds, predominantly incorporates rituals that foster 
egalitarian bonds. Not only is there a large role for collective dhikr, study groups 
and mudhākara, but also – and very tellingly – there is an absence of 
personalized initiation that according to Pinto leads to an individualized religious 
self. There are no degrees of initiation or a corresponding clear conceptual 
framework of aḥwāl and maqāmāt, and the hierarchy that goes with them.46 
While people do adhere to the notion that spiritual progress should go hand in 
hand with morality, there is no formal hierarchical framework based on it. Even 
the mubāya‛a is less of a watershed than it seems to be in many other ṭuruq – 
rather than a conversion, it is more an affirmation of adherence.47 Through the 
devotional practices encompassed by the concepts of dhikr and fikr the 
egalitarian community is created which is objectified in the concept of maḥabba. 
The only explicit hierarchical relationship is that between Shaykh and follower; 
the Shaykh is believed to be essentially on a different spiritual level which the 
followers can never reach, and all they can do is submit themselves to him 
completely (taslīm). Following Asad, we can argue that through the disciplinary 
practices incorporated in the process of tarbiya attitudes are created that 
encourage obedience as a virtue in the spiritual and social framework. 48 
                                                  
45 Pinto, ‘Creativity and Stability in the Making of Sufi Tradition’, 126–127; Pinto, ‘The 
Anthropologist and the Initiated’, 465. 
46 Pinto, ‘Sufism and the Political Economy of Morality in Syria’, 126. 
47 Hazen, ‘Conversion Narratives among the Alami and Rifa’i Tariqa in Britain’, 151. In addition to 
Pinto, see Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 130–131; Chih, ‘What Is a Sufi 
Order? ’, 27–28. 
48 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 125–126. 
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Even so, the idea that spiritual progress is manifested in someone’s 
behaviour leads to the formation of informal hierarchies, which affects the 
transmission of knowledge through the aforementioned meetings of mudhākara 
and study groups. Understanding the emic notion of ‘spiritual progress’ through 
Berger and Luckmann’s theoretical framework, we can say that those further on 
the Path have reached higher levels of socialisation, having internalised the 
symbolic universe to a higher degree and negotiating marginal situations without 
problems. Because of this, they have an extensive grasp of the ‘official religion’ 
and can act as ‘custodians of tradition’. The ultimate custodian is of course the 
Shaykh, but also the muqaddamīn and others who are considered high on the 
path. 
We have seen that the followers understand ‘spiritual progress’ as the 
development of their connection with the Shaykh as a spiritual relationship 
between hearts which is developed through spiritual practice; as Hoffman puts it, 
‘an intense spiritual and emotional identification that leads to a merging of the 
boundaries of two personalities.’49 They see their spiritual communication and the 
interpretation of this communication as an important aspect of this relationship. 
They believe that the Shaykh’s gestures and spiritual speech acts (as opposed to 
his explicit verbal statements) can be found in every aspect of everyday life. One 
of the main Sufi doctrines, explicitly taught and encouraged in this ṭarīqa, is that 
‘the life of a Sufi is one that seeks to be God-permeated’50 and the followers are 
taught to see God in everything, and to perceive signs from their Shaykh in 
everything. 
They believe that these signs can be perceived and understood more 
clearly the higher their spiritual development. While those higher on the path 
experience ishārāt in the classical Sufi sense, as allusions used to communicate 
ineffable experiences,51 for those on all levels, including the lower ones, ishārāt 
                                                  
49 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 63–64, 140, 188–195, 203–205. 
50 Ron Geaves and Theodore Gabriel, ‘Expressions of Spirituality in Islam: Unity and Diversity in 
Sufi Thought and Practice’, in Sufism in Britain, ed. Geaves and Gabriel, 21. 
51 Corbin and Izutsu have explained this as a ‘returning’ (ta’wīl) of the sign and the soul to the 
meta-empirical realm in which there is no contradiction between fikr and taslīm and in which the 
Divine is known in both His transcendence and His immanence. This highest level can only be 
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are signs, non-verbal gestures, occurrences – all considered spiritual speech 
acts of their Shaykh. 
According to our methodological agnostic method, we need to bracket the 
question if this is indeed a communication in the meta-empirical realm, seen by 
the followers as the zāwiya of the heart, or whether it springs solely from the 
socialized mind of the follower. Either way, we can say that it is thoroughly 
intertwined with practising the Path, tarbiya in emic terms, socialisation in etic 
terms. The goal of this path is the strengthening of knowledge of, belief in, and 
adherence to the symbolic universe and the plausibility structure, through 
absolute submission to the representative of this universe, the one who 
embodies its message and values. The further one travels on this path, the more 
one will see signs that validate it – regardless of whether these have a divine or a 
human origin. In fact, we see that many manifestations of the Shaykh’s spiritual 
power are actually purely communal acts – the question whether their hospitality 
is of divine or human origin, for example, is less relevant than the question how 
they understand it, why they perform it, and how it strengthens their belief 
system, communal cohesion, and relations to the wider society. ‘Spiritual 
communication’ is therefore an emic term we use to refer to the follower’s 
perception of certain events – of whatever origin – as meaningful moments of 
communication in which the Shaykh teaches them something. 
From an anthropological point of view, it makes sense to understand 
authority as a speech act, but in this case of ‘spiritual communication’ the 
definition of a ‘speech act’ is stretched to the point that we do not have access to 
it any more as it happens on the spiritual level – in the zāwiya of the heart, in the 
terminology of the followers. Therefore we should focus on what the followers 
consider to be a legitimate speech act and how they deal with these speech acts 
– or signs (ishārāt), as they call them. Anything the Shaykh says and does can 
be understood as a directive speech act/sign and seen as the answer to a 
                                                                                                                                                   
reached by al-insān al-kāmil, however, and none of my respondents have talked about ‘ilm al-
ishāra in those terms. Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, 28–35; Izutsu, Sufism and 
Taoism, 7–; Poonawala, ‘Taʾwīl’; Nwyia, ‘Is̲h̲āra’; Berger, ‘Allusion (in Ṣūfism).’ See paragraph 
6.4. 
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question, whether it is intended as such or not. Visions of the Shaykh in dreams 
can be considered a speech act/sign, and anything that happens can be 
considered a speech act/sign from the Shaykh. It is the follower who transforms 
these things into a sign from the Shaykh – depending on the spiritual level of the 
follower as shown in his/her exterior practice of the ‛aqīda it is accepted as such. 
Once identified, the speech act/sign is interpreted in the community. 
The Shaykh engages in explicit speech acts when meeting people in the 
zāwiya, and most specifically, during the mudhākara he does after the ḥaḍra. 
The text of the waẓīfa52 is the subject of the Shaykh’s mudhākara, and as such is 
subject to continuous interpretation and mudhākara among the followers. While 
they believe they develop their relationship to their Shaykh especially through 
dhikr, I have not heard any accounts of spiritual communications during dhikr 
sessions. 
Other signs can be perceived spontaneously – or evoked, as in the 
practice of istikhāra. In istikhāra we see explicitly the large role of the community 
and the autonomy they have in these matters. While in other cases it is the 
religious specialist who does the praying, dreaming, and interpreting,53 here it is 
the followers themselves. Similarly, they are the ones who perceive the ishārāt in 
the world around them, and interpret these. The community thus has a large 
degree of autonomy. They perceive charisma in everyday life, and often 
themselves are the medium of this charisma when the Shaykh’s powers are 
perceived in their social relations and communal actions. 
Both explicit speech acts and such moments of spiritual communication 
are heard and perceived by followers, and then discussed in a communal setting. 
This way they are incorporated in the larger vernacular tradition, the stock of lore 
in the community from which they continue to draw. The Shaykh’s previous 
speech acts continue to be discussed, and those of previous Shaykhs, as written 
down in the ṭarīqa’s books, and as passed orally by ikhwānnā. 
                                                  
52 Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din’s version of the ṣalāa mashishiyya (the prayer of of Ibn Mashish, a 
famous prayer on the Prophet in the Shadhili tradition), and prayers by Muhammad al-Arabi al-
Darqawi. Review Panel, ‘Detailed Comments and Remarks’, 30-08-2014, 5. 
53 See especially Edgar and Henig, ‘Istikhara.’ 
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Those appointed explicitly by the Shaykh to represent him, the 
muqaddamīn or in Amman the Welcome Committee, act most clearly as 
‘custodians of tradition’,54 steering these discussions and interpretations, and 
could be seen as an inner circle from this perspective. Also followers with no 
explicit mandate but who are considered knowledgeable and highly spiritually 
developed – as shown through their devotional and moral behaviour, in other 
words the practice of ādāb – have a stronger influence over these discussions 
and a certain measure of authority in these interpretations. In the end, however, 
these are informal hierarchies, as they all consider themselves equal and value 
each other’s opinions, and a measure of difference in interpretation continues to 
exist. The level of social control is thus of such a degree to maintain communal 
cohesion, but does not extend its power to all aspects of opinion and practice. 
The exception is AKR, who does not discuss them in a communal setting, and 
whose explanations diverge considerably. As Berger points out, socialisation is 
the most powerful form of maintaining cohesion, and when practised 
successfully, no other form of social control is necessary: ‘the fundamental 
coerciveness of society lies not in its machineries of social control, but in its 
power to constitute and to impose itself as reality.’55 
This brings us to the question what the practical relationship is between 
Shaykh and follower, in addition to the doctrinal relationship which posits the 
Shaykh’s absolute authority. To put it in Lincoln’s terms: what is the role of the 
audience in the enactment of the authoritative speech act?56 Or in Bowman’s: to 
what degree can the local communities’ vernacular religions influence the official 
narrative?57 Both Sedgwick and Stjernholm have given examples of the influence 
of Sufi disciples on the sayings and actions of their shaykhs – Stjernholm’s 
example of an incident of the Naqshbandiyya-Haqqaniyya in particular is an 
excellent illustration of Lincoln’s theory as it entailed the literal silencing of 
                                                  
54 Shils, Tradition, 96–97. 
55 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 14–15. 
56 Lincoln, Authority, 1–4, 11, 168. 
57 Bowman and Valk, ‘Vernacular Religion’, 4 
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Hisham Kabbani as he tried to deliver a speech during a meeting of the ṭarīqa in 
London.58  
In the communities of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya we have examined 
here, we do not see this explicit influence as all followers accept the doctrine that 
the Shaykh is the ultimate reference. Because of his largely indirect mode of 
communication, however, and their space to perceive ishārāt and karāmāt 
everywhere that can then be interpreted and incorporated into the vernacular 
tradition, they have a large degree of influence over their own belief system while 
still acknowledging absolute obedience to the Shaykh. Due to the fact that 
adherence to the ṭarīqa rests mainly on family affiliation and socialisation rather 
than conversion, the element of choice which Rachida Chih used as her main 
argument in favour of the followers’ agency is less pronounced (but still valid, as 
the mubāya‛a remains a moment of personal choice with a reciprocal 
dimension).59 We do see this agency in the negotiation of tradition in local 
contexts, and at the same time we see how the local and translocal aspects of 
the ṭarīqa are balanced, while the followers explicitly follow the pillar of taslīm, 
absolute submission to God and to their Shaykh.  
The process of tarbiya accounts for local variations in doctrine and 
practice, which following Marion Bowman can be seen as local vernacular 
religious traditions (‘folk religion’), and in some cases even as ‘individual 
religion’.60 The followers’ belief in the Shaykh’s infallibility as the embodiment of 
the nūr muḥammadī is accepted by all as ‘official religion’, accepted orthodoxy. 
He acts as the ‘custodian of tradition’, the person who selects and interprets the 
relevant elements of tradition and posits the limits within which people can 
engage in the same. Through the transmission in the community and the 
discussions of the Shaykh’s teachings, the followers negotiate this ‘official 
religion’ and make it relevant for their community by stressing different elements, 
resulting in several parallel vernacular traditions. Due to the strong centralisation 
                                                  
58 Stjernholm, ‘A Translocal Sufi Movement’, 91–93; Stjernholm, ‘What is the Naqshbandi-
Haqqani Tariqa?’, 210. Sedgwick, Saints and Sons, 1–4. 
59 Chih, ‘What Is a Sufi Order?’, 28–29. 
60 Bowman and Valk, ‘Vernacular Religion’, 4.  
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and the strong bonds among communities these parallel traditions do not differ 
significantly from the ‘official religion’ – they are mostly points of different stress, 
rather than real differences in interpretation. Individuals, based on their different 
levels of understanding, and their different characters, life experiences, and 
degree of exposure to the community and the Shaykh, relate to these parallel 
traditions in different ways. There is space for discussion and differing views that 
sometimes even go beyond the ‘official religion’.  
 This also accounts for local variations in the local understandings of the 
general paradigm of authority. As Vincent Cornell and Valerie Hoffman have 
argued, the attribution of authority happens within a cultural framework as 
general templates of Islamic authority are understood in their local contexts.61 In 
fact, Roman Loimeier points out that translocal traditions that claim universal 
hegemony often only acquire relevance and acceptance when they are 
translated into a specific local context.62 While all followers subscribe to the 
underlying paradigm of authority and the basic elements of the tradition, they do 
so on different levels of understanding, and they attribute different roles to the 
Shaykh. While some take a lot of time to explain the doctrinal base of his 
authority, others focus on the Shaykh’s roles as a guide, teacher, role model, 
father, protector, and/or spiritual renewer.  
 This different attitude could be explained by a difference in exposure to 
the ṭarīqa’s teachings and the different role of the zawāya in which this happens.  
Shaykh Ahmad encourages theological discussions and in his mudhākara he 
often discusses complicated theological issues, often using recent scientific 
discoveries. In the zāwiya in Amman there are study groups teaching followers 
Qur’an and issues related to the ṭarīqa. The followers in Amman therefore have a 
lot of exposure to the many concepts that are available in the teachings of the 
ṭarīqa and will have a wide range of possibilities to explain their emotional and 
spiritual experiences to an outsider in the language of the ṭarīqa. The exposure to 
these teachings in Israel is limited. Followers do not visit the zāwiya in Amman 
                                                  
61 Cornell, Realm of the Saint, xxxviii; Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 
340–343. 
62 Loimeier, ‘Translocal Networks of Saints.’ 
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regularly. In Jaffa there is a weekly study meeting in addition to the ḥaḍra in 
which a mudhākara from Shaykh Ahmad is read and discussed and texts of 
nashīd are explained, but in a small community like Acre followers meet weekly 
to read waẓīfa but hardly have study meetings. Followers living in ‘mixed cities’ 
such as Acre and Jaffa might have a less developed knowledge of written Arabic 
which could lead to difficulties reading the books of the ṭarīqa. When someone 
has visited the zāwiya in Amman they enjoy hearing about the Shaykh, the 
people and the teachings, but this is of course not the same as a weekly direct 
exposure. Someone in Acre who has a demanding job and/or has to maintain a 
household and goes to the zāwiya once a week will have less exposure to the 
teachings of the ṭarīqa than someone in similar circumstances in Amman. The 
zāwiya in Acre functions more as a symbol of the ‘golden age’ and as a spiritual 
or actual home for the followers, bolstering the essential authority of the Shaykh 
and the community in Acre, rather than the teaching process. 
 The slightly varying enactment of tarbiya in the local communities 
accounts for these differences. Devotional practices are very similar and create 
egalitarian communities with a slight informal hierarchy in all localities, but the 
role of the mubāya‛a in Amman is more pronounced and regulated than in Acre 
and Jaffa, where in many cases it is administered more as a natural part of their 
upbringing in the ṭarīqa than as an explicit choice. This exacerbates the notion of 
an egalitarian process of tarbiya without degrees of initiation. The most important 
difference, however, is that between the settings of the mudhākara, which in 
Amman is supervised heavily by the Shaykh due to the presence of ‘custodians 
of tradition’ – especially when this happens in the zāwiya. In Acre and Jaffa, on 
the other hand, mudhākara happens in the community / family with less 
‘custodians of tradition’ – even when it happens in the zāwiya in Acre, which for 
many actually used to be their home. As we have argued, the zāwiya in Amman 
bolsters the role of the Shaykh and enables his role as teacher, which might 
account for the predominance of this image in Amman’s vernacular religion, and 
their strong focus on the ‛aqīda. The zāwiya in Acre, on the other hand, bolsters 
the local community, which is understood as a family even more than in Amman 
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because it actually largely is connected through kinship ties. This might account 
for the strong focus on the Shaykh’s role as a father, and their overwhelming 
focus on maḥabba, and their many stories that illustrate how the Shaykh acts 
through the community. 
 The image of the ṭarīqa and the Shaykh’s teachings presented by AKR 
diverges from this pattern. AKR’s precise role remains unclear: while the Review 
Panel stresses that his role is limited to his activities as mutawallī of the waqf in 
Acre, except when he represents the Shaykh ‘on a case by case basis’,63 in 
practice he acts as the ṭarīqa’s representative when dealing with outsiders. In his 
communications he focuses on the inspiration the Shaykh gives his followers and 
stresses the role of the individual rather than the community in the interpretation 
of the Shaykh’s signs – and following this takes a lot of space for his own 
interpretations. He visits the zāwiya in Amman more often than most and has 
more exposure to the teachings of the Shaykh, but his ideas on the Shaykh and 
the ṭarīqa seem to diverge considerably from those of Shaykh Ahmad and of 
other followers in Amman, Acre and Jaffa. This could be explained by the context 
in which his ideas developed. He does not seem to be such a close member of 
the community. As we have seen, the community shapes the borders within 
which interpretation takes place. His lack of integration in the local community 
might therefore explain this divergence. He has clearly read many books and 
spoken to many other spiritual figures of all kinds of backgrounds, which has 
brought his ideas closer to the Western idea of Sufism as a universal mystical 
path that does not focus on the exterior performance of rules and that is 
historically but not essentially linked to Islam and can be combined with other 
approaches. The image he communicates is highly theologically developed but 
rests on more sources than just the teachings of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, 
and seems to be aimed mainly at the Jewish community and Western visitors.  
This image is mainly communicated in the zāwiya as this is the place 
where outsiders are received. Therefore the zāwiya in Acre is not only the 
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symbol connecting the Shaykh and followers of today to the ‘golden age’ and 
providing the Shaykh with traditional charisma, or the original family home 
bolstering the community in Acre, it is also the location where an alternative 
interpretation of the teachings of the ṭarīqa and the Shaykh is communicated to 
outsiders as part of the efforts to revive the zāwiya’s ‘golden age’, albeit in a 
different way than envisaged by the Shaykh and most of the community. 
The variations could further be explained by the different circumstances of 
the Palestinians in Jordan and Israel. Education is one of the main career paths 
of Jordanian Palestinians, and in fact many ‘custodians of tradition’ in Amman 
work in the field of education, which probably influenced their imagery (see 
chapter 4). In Israel, the family is still the main social network providing for people 
in the absence of a secure position in the state (see chapter 8) – this was even 
more so during the period of Military Rule when the community’s attitudes were 
formed. The general settings of these communities might have influenced their 
varying atttitudes. 
Here, the role of the muqaddam deserves some attention. Dominguez 
Diaz notes that the ritual function of the muqaddimīn in the Budshishiyya is 
mainly to minimise variations and thus safeguard the legitimacy of the ritual. As a 
link between the local community and the central zāwiya in Morocco, the 
muqaddim reinforces the central zāwiya’s authority and accommodates the 
tensions between the central and the local. This is also done by the European 
leaders, who act as ‘cultural brokers’ by providing a link with the Shaykh, yet at 
the same time allowing for local variations.64 We could say the same for the 
muqaddamīn of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in the localities I have encountered 
as they have a regular connection to the Shaykh enabling them to transmit his 
teachings, act as ‘custodians of tradition’, and thus to a degree control the 
transmission of knowledge and minimise variations, yet acting within their local 
contexts. It is important to note, however, that many followers actually participate 
in these mediating functions and the process of transmission of knowledge and 
providing communal guidance is not limited to the muqaddamīn.  
                                                  
64 Dominguez Diaz, ‘Performance, Belonging and Identity’, 234. 
 589 
At first glance, AKR seems to act as a ‘cultural broker’, but we have seen 
that his ideas should be seen more as expressions of his individual religion rather 
than as expressions of the local vernacular religion or official religion, and he 
therefore in practice does not act as ‘cultural broker’ in the community of 
ikhwānnā. He does help to translate the ṭarīqa’s ideas to interested outsiders, but 
in contrast with the Budshishiyya, these are not actual members. This does 
influence his ideas, however. After his conversion, he at first practised and 
discussed within the community, but nowadays his ties with them are less strong. 
He has maintained his ties with other Muslim and Jewish Sufi groups and 
individual, which seems to have steered his thought in a different direction. This 
shows the need for continuing socialisation in the community, as Berger 
argued.65 
Pinto explains a ṭarīqa's variation of local configurations by referring to 
traditional ṭuruq in which the leading shaykh initiates several khulafā’ who have a 
large degree of spiritual power of their own – to the point where they might break 
away and become a shaykh in their own right.66 In the case of the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya there have been cases of muqaddamīn breaking away,67 but in 
Amman, Acre, and Jaffa, the muqaddam is seen as a brother who – while a 
respected member of the community – does not have spiritual power in his own 
right. The idea of a muqaddam breaking away is therefore inconceivable for 
them.68 The power of a khalīfa in other movements is divided between the 
Shaykh and the community in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya. The local 
configuration of the ṭarīqa's tradition does not depend so much on the Shaykh’s 
local representative, but on the interaction and debate among the followers. They 
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are given this role both through the organisation of the ṭarīqa, and through 
doctrinal and devotional incentives to contemplate and discuss. The strong 
process of tarbiya ensures that they are socialized to the degree that they do not 
diverge significantly from the Shaykh’s teachings. As we have seen, AKR has 
partly separated himself from the ongoing process of socialisation in the 
community, and shows the level of independence that might enable him to break 
away. He presents himself to outsiders as the representative of the Shaykh, and 
is accepted by some outsiders as a shaykh in his own right. He does not occupy 
an official position in the ṭarīqa’s organisation, however, suggesting that Pinto’s 
observation in the Syrian context should be widened from the khulafā’ and official 
leaders to include individual members who occupy a special position.  
Through the exercise of the roles attributed to him, the Shaykh can further 
bolster his functional authority. These roles allow him to act as custodian of 
tradition and charismatic leader who through his charisma bolsters the tradition, 
allowing him to exercise both his discursive and miraculous power. The 
economic power that comes with this further allows him to host and support his 
followers in their visits and studies, and to embark on renovations, as is expected 
from him by his followers. From this he derives functional authority, which further 
roots his authority. This points to the circular logic of authority discussed by Dale 
Eickelman and James Piscatori).69  
In practice, however, most of these roles are enacted by the community. 
The community functions as a family, educates and adapts to society. Through 
the transmission and interpretation of old and new elements of tradition the 
followers explicitly aim to participate in their societies and seek to adapt their 
practices – within limits. These limits are defined by the ‘custodian of tradition’. 
Again, the Shaykh is considered the ultimate ‘custodian of tradition’ who defines 
the boundaries within which this reinterpretation can happen, but only in those 
places where he is often present, most notably in the zāwiya in Amman, can he 
practice this role effectively. In practice the community plays the main role in 
limiting this interpretation. 
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In Amman the zāwiya and the organisational framework of the local 
community serve to strengthen the Shaykh’s influence over their interpretation as 
the followers are constantly exposed to his presence, his words and examples. 
These different levels of influence extend to outsiders visiting the ṭarīqa. As I 
follow Graham Harvey’s preference for fieldwork as ‘methodological 
guesthood’,70 I took the role of guest-researcher and submitted myself to the 
local ‘codes of guesthood’, which differed considerably per community. In 
Amman, my interactions with followers were closely regulated. As a guest-
researcher I remained an outsider who was given a glimpse of the inside but 
within certain clear limits. While I think that my interactions were more closely 
guided than those of the followers themselves, I think the basic dynamic was the 
same. Control over my access to knowledge was large, and affected the data I 
was able to gather as most of what was moderated to closely reflect the ‘official 
narrative’. In Acre and Jaffa, interactions were more informal, and I was able to 
get a better insight into the dynamics that form the ‘vernacular religion’ and 
personal interpretations. These differences seem to me to be genuine reflections 
of the different situations in Acre and Jaffa on the one hand and Amman on the 
other: they are linked to society in general as Jordanian society is much more 
formal than Israeli society, but mainly seem to be strongly related to the presence 
of the Shaykh.  
In addition to this steering of my access to knowledge, the Shaykh and the 
anonymous Review Panel sought to edit my writing to ensure I wrote the right 
message, again based on the idea that there is only one truth that is represented 
by the Shaykh. While I think it is good ethical practice to allow respondents to 
view one’s writing and respond to it, at this stage of the research they cannot 
have the final word. As George Chryssides put it, the believers are the experts 
when it comes to representing their religion, and the academic is the expert when 
it comes to contextualising it.71 Therefore, I have carefully weighed their 
comments and when I felt them to add to my representation of their views I 
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incorporated them in the main text or in a footnote, but when I felt them to 
infringe on my conclusions, I have not heeded them. The role of AKR in particular 
was the main controversial point, further stressing the ambiguous position he 
occupies in the ṭarīqa. 
The question is, in such differing research settings, is it possible to 
compare people’s attitudes? While it is clear that all followers adhere to the same 
underlying paradigm of doctrines and practices, the elements of tradition and of 
authority that people relate to more strongly seem to differ per community: in 
Amman the concept of the ‛aqīda was the centre of most discussions, whereas in 
Acre this was hardly discussed. Whereas the image of the Shaykh as a teacher 
and guide – based on the idea that he embodies the ‛aqīda and the nūr 
muḥammadī – seems to be predominant in Amman, the image of the Shaykh as 
a teacher and a guide is combined with the image of the Shaykh as a father in 
Acre and Jaffa, with less explicit reference to the essence of his spiritual rank but 
with many words that convey deep love and awe, stressed by non-verbal 
communication such as gestures and intonation. There seems to be a different 
level of engagement with the ṭarīqa’s teachings in these localities: in Amman 
many of the people I interviewed and spoke to in the zāwiya explained their 
emotions and experiences using explanations and metaphors they took from the 
stock of the tradition, and showed the ability to combine them with their own 
knowledge and experience, and with the metaphors they expected the outsider to 
be familiar with. In Acre this also happened, but seemingly to a lesser extent than 
in Amman. But does this reflect a true difference, or are these observations the 
result of the differences in research setting? 
 First of all it should be stressed that the fact that someone focuses on an 
intellectual explanation in an interview does not deny his or her spiritual 
involvement. It could simply be the result of the interview setting where an 
outsider who is not emotionally involved has to be made to understand their 
devotion. As it is easier to convey words and ideas than emotions, those with the 
capability to convey words and ideas efficiently will choose this approach. This 
was actually repeatedly stressed by many participants. Similarly, those who 
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communicate in short, emotion-laden sentences (such as ‘the Shaykh is 
everything in my life, that’s all’) with little or no reference to theological concepts 
might know more than they say, but for reasons of their own choose not to 
communicate this. It is a Sufi attitude not to divulge their secrets to outsiders, as 
Hoffman noted.72 They might want to stress the importance of the emotional ties 
over the intellectual ideas. They might feel I know too little philosophy or Arabic, 
or might fear that without the appropriate emotional conviction I would not 
understand these concepts. Or – in the case of group interviews – they might be 
intimidated by others present whom they feel to understand better than they do. 
 The more emotional answers which tend to be less articulate and shorter 
do appear in the group interviews in Amman, but participants might be 
discouraged from issuing them by respect for the hierarchy of rank, age and 
education and by the way their answers are ‘explained’ by other participants who 
are higher in this hierarchy. On the other hand, the group-interviews simulated 
the followers’ mudhākara in which they are used to discuss the ṭarīqa’s 
teachings, and might have led to more expanded answers than would have been 
the case in individual interviews. 
Even so, these differences are backed up by other observations than 
interviews (such as the different attitude to pictures of Shaykh Ahmad and the 
Yashruti family discussed in chapter 9), and we can therefore conclude that the 
interviews do reflect a basic distinction in attitude even though it is hard to 
determine how stark this distinction really is.  
Comparing Shaykh Ahmad’s authority with the elements of authority 
identified by Buehler, we see that the transmission of knowledge and the 
embodiment of the Prophetic Sunna are part of his authority – but rather than 
primary bases of authority they are part of his functional authority as the roles 
attributed to him because he is the Shaykh. The spiritual journey is hardly part of 
the imagery – the exhibition of spiritual states is neither a primary base of 
authority nor part of a role of the Shaykh. His spiritual state is constant and can 
only be witnessed by the followers when they have reached a certain level of 
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understanding through their relationship with him – the acceptance of authority 
has to happen before these states are witnessed (at which point they serve to 
strengthen the conviction of the follower). 
 An aspect of traditional authority which Buehler does not incorporate into 
his elements of authority is the attachment to space. While he sees the zāwiya as 
the space where the communitas of the charismatic community is enacted, he 
does not see the attachment to the zāwiya as an element of authority in itself.  
In the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, the attachment to the founding Shaykh 
and the history of the ṭarīqa is materialised through the attachment to the material 
remnants of this period: the zāwiya in Acre (and to a lesser extent, in Tarshiha). 
The zāwiya in Acre is the ṭarīqa’s geographical symbolic centre, the material 
aspect of the spiritual and genealogical link to the founding Shaykh. The founding 
Shaykh’s charismatic connection to the nūr muḥammadī is brought to the present 
through the embodiment of the current Shaykh, the ṭarīqa’s personal symbolic 
centre, and still radiates from the zāwiya in Acre where the founding Shaykh is 
buried. As such, efforts to renovate the zāwiya and once again make it an active 
spiritual centre should be seen as efforts to reconnect to this charismatic moment 
and bring it into the present. By continuing the work of his forefathers, Shaykh 
Ahmad strengthens his connection to his lineage and the history of the ṭarīqa. In 
this way, the zāwiya provides traditional charisma to the Shaykh. In addition to 
this, the zāwiya in Acre allows him to enact his role of spiritual renewer through 
the renovation. 
 This function of bestowing traditional charisma is unique for the zāwiya in 
Acre. The other zawāya are places where the community comes together and 
where the tradition is transmitted through teaching and practicing. In several 
zawāya, most notably the one in Amman, the Shaykh is often present to 
supervise this transmission of the tradition – when he is absent, other people 
take over this supervising function. Therefore, the Shaykh’s role as ‘custodian of 
tradition’ is stronger in the zāwiya in Amman than in those zawāya and 
communities which he does not visit regularly. 
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All this points to the fact that the routinization of charisma in the form of 
traditional institutionalisation on kinship lines in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya has 
not led to the decline of charisma. This becomes especially clear when 
discussing the ṭarīqa’s institutionalisation through the lense of O’Dea’s five 
dilemmas of institutionalisation.73 There is no sign of what O’Dea called the 
dilemma of administrative order characterized by bureaucratization, elaboration 
and alienation.74 The administrative structure started by Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din 
was more centralised than most traditional ṭuruq,75 which has been perpetuated 
by his successors. It is a simple structure with the Shaykh at the top and 
muqaddamīn in local communities, and some extra staff and volunteers in 
locations where there is a lot of work (especially in Amman). In Amman, this 
structure gives the Shaykh a large degree of control, but in Acre and Jaffa he has 
less direct control because he cannot go there himself and is dependent on 
others. This is a very simple and effective administrative structure which ensures 
the Shaykh’s centrality yet also encourages the followers to get involved. The 
adherence to a translocal ṭarīqa representing a universal truth is therefore well 
balanced with the local needs of the community, both through the positions of the 
muqaddamīn, as we also see in Dominguez Diaz’s discussion of the 
Budshishiyya,76 and through the level of autonomy the followers have in 
transmitting the tradition, which differs per locality. 
We have seen that adherence is largely based on family affiliation. 
Conversion has thus been replaced by socialisation. We have seen that this in no 
way diminishes the charismatic nature of the community, and the first meeting 
with the Shaykh and/or the mubāya‛a are still experienced by many as a life 
changing event. Thus the organisation of the ṭarīqa is quite stable, and there is 
space for the development of loving and reverential relationships between 
shaykh and follower, and for spiritual and emotional experiences, leading to 
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creativity – expression, re-presentation and re-creation of the charismatic 
moment. 
 The issue of mixed motivation77 is difficult to comment on. While the 
institutionalisation of authority and the material power that comes with it provides 
security in the form of wealth and social prestige for the Yashruti family and those 
closely associated with them, it also comes with a great responsibility towards 
the community. The material inheritance enables the Yashruti family and the 
Shaykh in particular to perform those roles that lead their followers to attribute 
authority to them – the lack of performing these functions might lead to the 
lessening of authority (what Eickelman and Piscatori call the circular logic of 
authority).78 In addition to this leadership over a Sufi ṭarīqa also comes with 
challenges in the contemporary religious climate. Being a Sufi shaykh in the 
contemporary world is a mixed blessing, and it seems that the original motivation 
continues to be strong for the Shaykh and for the followers. 
The concretization and objectification of normative codes, practices, ideas 
and relationships has not led to stagnation, alienation and the loss of the 
charismatic,79 but have rather ensured the continuing relevance of the symbolic 
universe and the related system of social relationships. The standardized rituals 
recreate the religious moment and elicit emotions and spiritual experiences and a 
strong communal cohesion – even more so due to the absence of personalised 
devotional practices. The body of knowledge is continuously discussed and 
added to, both in the form of the editing of old books, the production of new 
written material (such as the Shaykh’s mudhākara and studies by followers), and 
the development of the vernacular tradition in the form of oral narratives. 
Concretization – rather than leading to the normalisation of the extraordinary – is 
considered one of the most valued aspects of the ṭarīqa and qualities of the 
Shaykh, and understood as a way for the religious experience to break into 
everyday life. These ongoing charismatic moments strengthen ikhwānnā’s 
adherence to the symbolic universe and plausbility structure as they incorporate 
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all aspects of life into it and transform their world into a divinely sanctioned 
reality. 
This points to the importance of innovation (in the sociological sense, not 
in the contemporary Islamic sense of bid’a). The ṭarīqa’s elements of tradition are 
not simply transmitted as they are but actively engaged with and made to speak 
to the current situation and the follower’s life. While the rituals such as reading 
waẓīfa and performing ḥaḍra are considered to be the same everywhere (and are 
in this moment in time), other aspects of the tradition are explicitly open to 
change. This importance of spiritual renewal is an essential element of the 
ṭarīqa’s self-image, commented on by both Shaykh and followers who see 
Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din as a spiritual renewer, and who see Shaykh Ahmad in the 
same light. The idea that the ‛aqīda is essentially the same but its manifestations 
change allows for this focus on the present. The followers are encouraged to live 
in the present, to participate in society, to ensure that society accepts them. 
Through this explicit dedication to spiritual renewal and the implicit 
adaptation to the local context through tarbiya, and specifically through 
mudhākara, the original message continues to speak to the people, preventing 
stagnation and alienation. His ability to speak to the modern situation of the 
followers, leads to their identification with the spiritual leader and the attribution of 
charisma. Their successful adaptation to society and their good behaviour is 
seen as proof of the Shaykh’s spiritual power and charisma. Innovation 
understood as adaptation of the tradition is therefore an essential aspect of the 
maintance of the charisma in this institutionalised ṭarīqa. We could even argue 
that institutionalisation provides the possibility for innovation, as it strengthens 
the Shaykh’s position from which he can embark on innovation without losing his 
audience. 
Similar remarks have been made by Chanfi Ahmed and Achim von 
Oppen, who argue that the maintenance of charisma in the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya in Tanzania is due to the innovations they have made to adapt the 
annual Saba Ishrin festival to new circumstances.80 It seems likely that these 
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attitudes stem from the fact that they belong to the same ṭarīqa, but more 
comparative research needs to be done to establish this for certain. The 
examples of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in the Levant and in East Africa 
suggest that Pnina Werbner’s theory of ‘waxing and waning’81 due to the 
presence or absence of charisma needs to be rethought, as we see here the 
opposite pattern: innovation actually leads to the attribution of charisma. 
 As part of their adherence to the notion of spiritual renewal and innovation 
and their aim of adaptation to society, the followers make a strong point of being 
apolitical and of being good citizens in their countries. When we use a broader 
definition of ‘politics’ however, the decision to be apolitical is in itself a political 
decision. When examining the Shaykh’s locational authority and the ṭarīqa’s 
attitude to ‘Muslim politics’ (the competition among spokespeople of Islam),82 we 
see that the ṭarīqa in Jordan does not participate explicitly, but implicitly supports 
the ‘traditionalist official Islam’ championed by the king and contested by Islamist 
movements. In terms of Bruce Lincoln’s categorisation of the political roles of 
religious movements – religion of the status quo, of resistance or rebellion83 – the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Jordan is best described as a religion of the status 
quo, because of their self-professed apolitical attitude, their focus on the spiritual 
relationship with the Shaykh, and their value of being part of society and being 
good citizens. Their focus on character formation and guidance thus leads to the 
strengthening of the hegemonic approach to Islam.84 
Similarly we can classify the ṭarīqa in Israel as a religious movement of the 
status quo; the followers’ apolitical attitude implies a passive acceptance of the 
status quo, whereas the controversial social role of the zāwiya actively supports 
the status quo. On the other hand, we should also take into account that the 
strong bond that ikhwānnā build and maintain with each other and with their 
history, both in the spiritual and the physical sense, means that they continue to 
connect to the ṭarīqa’s places of origin, most notably Acre. This connection is 
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materialised through the connection to the zāwiya and its renovation, which 
remains a landmark in Acre, testifying to their presence. As such it can be seen 
as a symbol of sumūd (steadfastness) (which is not a concept free of discussions 
surrounding issues of collaboration85) – although it has to be noted that no-one 
associated with the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya has referred to it as such. 
The Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya is a very interesting example of a translocal 
ṭarīqa. Even when focusing on only three locations a lot interesting points are 
raised. We have already discussed the questions it poses to Hermansens’s 
classification of contemporary Sufi movements, and how Stjernholm’s approach 
serves us better to understand its different attitudes in different localities – being 
a traditional ṭarīqa within the Islamic discursive tradition for most followers, while 
AKR has a more individual and perennial approach that reaches out to the 
Jewish Sufi milieu with its Zionist undertones. Let us now look at several 
characteristics of translocal ṭuruq.  
Several translocal ṭuruq are characterized by ethnic diversity. Dominguez 
Diaz notes that the Budshishiyya in France and Spain consists of transplant 
‘enclaves’ of Moroccan immgrants, and hybrid groups of converts from different 
ethnic backgrounds, while in the UK there are only hybrid groups.86 Tayfun Ayat 
saw little connection between members of the Naqshbandiyya-Haqqaniyya of 
different ethnic backgrounds, but Stjernholm argued that the large meetings in 
London and Cyprus had a strong multi-ethnic character.87 In contrast, the ethnic 
homogeneity of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Amman, Acre, and Jaffa is 
striking as the ṭarīqa in these localities exists completely within the Palestinian 
diaspora. This can be explained by referring to the form of institutionalisation, as 
it is not a proselytizing movement any longer but has become institutionalised on 
traditional kinship lines, and is maintained largely within the family. 
Even though the communities in Israel, Palestine and Jordan solely 
consist of Palestinians, who are mainly connected through family ties, the larger 
ṭarīqa consists of multiple ethnicities. Further research on the multi-ethnic 
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character of the larger ṭarīqa, focusing on other localities where followers have 
different ethnicities and on the role of the zāwiya in Amman as the centre of the 
wider ṭarīqa, would be very interesting, especially when comparing our findings 
with the research of Ahmed and Von Oppen which shows additional focuses of 
authority and sacred space among followers in East Africa.88  
AKR’s ‘individual religion’ and outreach to Jewish spiritual seekers shows 
signs of hybridity, but this is not supported by the rest of the ṭarīqa and has not 
resulted in any conversions or creations of hybrid groups comparable to those 
noted by Dominguez Diaz. Similarly, AKR cannot be seen as a ‘cultural broker’ 
like the Budshishiyya’s Sidi Munirand Skali,89 as his personal hybrid 
interpretation is communicated to outsiders, but does not influence other 
followers within the ṭarīqa. His commitment to ‘Sufism and the politics of peace’90 
call to mind similarities with the activities of Hisham Kabbani,91 with the difference 
that the followers are not involved and have no influence over these initiatives. 
Related to the issue of Hermansen’s classification, is the issue of mutli-
centredness. While this is not an exceptional situation for the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya as many ṭuruq nowadays have multiple centres due to activities in 
the diaspora or migration of the leader (for example the Budshishiyya, 
Naqshbandiyya-Haqqaniyya and Burhaniyya), the particular relation between 
these centres in the case of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya is quite unique. While 
the centre shifted to Amman, the zāwiya in Acre did remain an important spiritual 
centre for the followers and an actual centre for the followers in Israel, giving the 
ṭarīqa a certain multi-centredness. The followers look to the zāwiya as a strong 
connection to the charismatic moment due to its place in history and the tombs of 
the three previous Shaykhs, most notably Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din. Shaykh Ahmad 
encourages this orientation and materially invests in the zāwiya’s renovation, 
hoping to give it a stronger position in the ṭarīqa and in Acre’s society again, in 
the meantime strengthening his own traditional charisma and enacting his role of 
                                                  
88 Ahmed and Von Oppen, ‘Saba Ishirini.’ 
89 Dominguez Diaz, ‘The One or the Many?’ 
90 Ernst, ‘Sufism, Islam and Globalization.’ 
91 Stjernholm, ‘A Translocal Sufi Movement’, 91–93; Stjernholm, ‘What is the Naqshbandi-
Haqqani Tariqa?’, 210; Ernst, ‘Sufism, Islam and Globalization.’ 
 601 
spiritual renewer. AKR’s hybrid approach also depends for a large measure on 
his use of the zāwiya as his platform to present himself as the representative of 
the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Israel and the West, which provides him with 
charisma and authority for Jewish seekers. The zāwiya presents both Shaykh 
Ahmad and AKR with authenticity and a connection to the original charismatic 
moment. 
The situation of the Khalwatiyya-Rahmaniyya might come close to that of 
the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, but more research on the former is needed to 
understand its organisational structure, its different branches, and the relations of 
its leaders. While their zāwiya in Baqa al-Gharbiya houses the tombs of several 
previous Shaykhs, this zāwiya is relatively new and does not have the same 
connection to the ṭarīqa’s history as the zāwiya in Acre does, and a comparison 
between the two would be interesting. The Burhaniyya’s case might be closest as 
the grandson of the founding Shaykh of the Burhaniyya is now based in Germany 
where the German followers play a large role in the organization of the ṭarīqa, but 
the Sudanese followers maintain the charismatic and traditional authority for 
being closer to the source of spirituality, the Sudan.92 The fact that Shaykh 
Ahmad’s separation from the zāwiya in Acre is not voluntary and he is including 
the original centre in his innovative actions shows a stronger focus on the original 
centre than seems to be found in the Burhaniyya. There is also no similar ethnic 
diversity. The question whether the German followers might claim more 
(bureaucratic) authority in the Burhaniyya in future,93 therefore has no parallel in 
the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya. In addition to this, as we saw above, the succesfull 
process of tarbiya also makes the rise of an alternative authority among the 
followers unlikely.  
Finally, a comparable case is that of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in 
Tanzania, where most followers from the original centre in Khilwa Pande moved 
to Dar al-Salam for economic reasons, but reconnect to their history and the 
original spiritual centre in the region every year, showing a similar combination of 
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adherence to tradition and innovation, in which innovation actually is a strong 
factor in maintaining charisma in a ṭarīqa that is strongly institutionalized on 
traditional kinship lines.94 It seems likely that these attitudes stem from the fact 
that they belong to the same ṭarīqa, but more comparative research needs to be 
done to establish this for certain. 
It is important to note that the process of shifting centres is continuous, as 
Werbner also pointed out in her discussion of the multicentredness of diaspora. 
In this sense there is a process of ‘waxing and waning’, not of a ṭarīqa as a 
whole, but of the centres within the ṭarīqa as the followers spread, the Shaykh 
moves, and attention to certain centres is enhanced. As we have seen however, 
the charisma is maintained throughout these shifts through the tarbiya in the local 
communities, and the ‘waxing and waning’ is not the result of a rise of charisma. 
What we see is actually the opposite: the connection to the zāwiya in Acre 
actually bestows charisma on the Shaykh, and the renovation especially so. This 
innovation is possible due to the highly centralised and organised nature of the 
ṭarīqa, as it provides the Shaykh with the funds to renovate the zāwiya without 
outside help. We thus see how institutionalisation and charisma reinforce each 
other, rather than being opposites. 
Therefore, we cannot say that the ṭarīqa is deterritorialized in the sense of 
being unconnected to its geographical roots. It is semi-deterritorialized at best, as 
the official ideology teaches that ‘the stones are not important’ and the centre of 
the ṭarīqa is where the Shaykh is, but the strong connection to the zāwiya in Acre 
remains. The particular conditions of this ṭarīqa’s diaspora have forced it to rely 
more on the official doctrine, but the Shaykh and the followers take every 
opportunity to reconnect to the zāwiya and undo the forced deterritorialization. It 
will be interesting to follow the developments of the zāwiya in Acre as the 
renovation draws to its end.  
While this particular disconnection from the zāwiya is embedded in the 
Palestinian refugee experience, the followers in Amman see it mainly as an 
aspect of the general translocal character of the ṭarīqa that had been established 
                                                  
94 Ahmed and Von Oppen, ‘Saba Ishirini’; Ahmed, ‘Un Pèlerinage Maritime.’ 
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before 1948. The example of the followers in the Comoros is a case in point for 
them. A comparison between the attitude towards sacred space in general and 
the zawāya in East Africa and in the Levant in particular amongst those followers 
would be revealing. The work of Ahmed and Von Oppen shows that the ṭarīqa in 
the Comoros and Tanzania is in no way deterritorialized but attaches great 
importance to their local leaders and their zawāya and ziyārāt. Their visits to the 
zāwiya in Amman show they also attach importance to their relationship with the 
living Shaykh. The question remains what their attitude is towards the zāwiya in 
Acre. 
Despite the strong attachment to the Shaykh and to the zāwiya and the 
strong desire to visit both on the material plane, the main enactment of the ṭarīqa 
in the form of adherence to the four pillars and the maintenance of the strong 
cohesion of the community, happens primarily in the local communities, with or 
without access to the Shaykh and a zāwiya. Through their belief in the possibility 
of a spiritual relationship and spiritual communication in dreams and visions and 
through signs in the material world, a ‘religious experience’ or ‘charismatic 
moment’ can break through in every time and place, sanctifying their everyday 
life and especially the community, the main locus in which such experiences 
happen. Their relationship is developed through love, education, and ritual 
practices in the local communities, and reaffirmed during actual and spiritual 
meetings with people from other communities. In this way they do exchange 
social and cultural ideas that become incorporated in the local vernacular 
tradition, transforming local realities and cultural behaviour, so that enclaves 
become glocal, but this does not lead to ‘characteristic eclectic religiosities typical 
of a glocalized religious hybridity’ as Dominguez Diaz predicted.95 The most 
obvious explanation would be because the different communities we have 
examined here all consist exclusively of Palestinians who adhere to the same 
grand historical narrative that places them within the same Levantine Islamic Sufi 
tradition. Again, the interaction with followers from other ethnicities, most notably 
those from the Comoros, would be interesting to compare with these findings. 
                                                  
95 Geaves, Dressler, and Klinkhammer, ‘Introduction’, 4; Dominguez Diaz, ‘Shifting Fieldsites’, 73. 
 604 
One of the main characteristics of contemporary Sufism is its ‘decentring 
of authority’ as it is characterized by a looser organisational structure, often with 
a large role for modern modes of communication, a stronger focus on the 
community rather than the shaykh, and a high degree of autonomy for the 
believers, either individually or as part of a community, to the point where there 
sometimes not even is a shaykh.96 Howell, for example, describes the 
development of a ‘new urban Sufi network’ in Indonesia,97 and Raudvere and 
Gaši show that the Swedish Bosniak diaspora communities have taken over their 
shaykhs’ community functions and only left them the facilitation of dhikr.98 
 The disruption of the link between Shaykh and community led to the 
distance of the Shaykh and the lower degree of control he has over the 
communities in Acre and Jaffa. Because of the large role of the community in the 
transmission of tradition one could say that the authority of the Shaykh has 
become decentred, but due to the followers’ specific understanding of their mode 
of communication, the act of interpretation is considered a religious act, the very 
practising of which maintains their bond and their identification with the translocal 
ṭarīqa. In classical Sufi theory, the interpretation of ishārāt happens through the 
return of the soul to its origins – both are referred to as ta’wīl.99 Therefore, even 
the interpretation of the most explicit, mundane sign, is considered a religious act 
that is both result and cause of their tarbiya and their relationship to the Shaykh. 
The mode in which the variations of traditional elements come into being ensures 
that these variations are still considered part of the tradition and the followers 
continue to identify themselves with the tradition and see the Shaykh as the 
centre of their ṭarīqa. 
 The followers in Amman on the other hand might be close to the Shaykh, 
but they are separated from the historical centre of the ṭarīqa, the mother zāwiya 
in Acre. This has not led to a clear ‘deterritorialisation’ however. While they do 
                                                  
96 Raudvere and Stenberg, ‘Translocal Mobility and Traditional Authority’, 5, 10; Geaves, ‘Cultural 
Binary Fission’; Heck, ‘The Politics of Sufism.’ See paragraph 1.5.2 and 1.5.3. 
97 Howell, ‘Modernity and Islamic Spirituality in Indonesia’s New Sufi Networks.’ 
98 Raudvere and Gaši, ‘Home, Nation and Global Islam.’ 
99 Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, 28–35; Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, 7–15; Nwyia, 
‘Is̲h̲āra’; Poonawala, ‘Taʾwīl.’ 
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adapt to their circumstances and concentrate on the living Shaykh, and official 
doctrine states that ‘the stones are not important’, the zāwiya in Acre is not 
forgotten and it occupies a central place in their spiritual geography. The 
yearning for the zāwiya is materialized in the Shaykh’s preoccupation with the 
renovation. The need to work through an intermediary is a direct result of the 
challenges the Palestinians face as the Shaykh cannot visit Israel himself, and 
the mode of communication between the Shaykh and AKR, which is presented 
as a more individual version of the mode of communication between the Shaykh 
and the followers in general, leads to a specific social role of the ṭarīqa in Acre 
which is considered controversial by some local followers. 
We have seen that this ṭarīqa is very well compatible with modernity. 
While indeed ‘progress’ is not seen as a goal, they seek to adapt to the situation 
and to participate in society, but basing this on spiritual development. As part of 
this attitude, they are open to science – based on the belief that they hold the 
absolute truth, logically for them there can be no clash with scientific knowledge. 
Finally, we have seen that despite the explicit submission to the absolute 
authority of the Shaykh, in practice there is more space for individual 
understanding and practice – to practice within their society, as is the ṭarīqa’s 
explicit aim. 
One of the main aspects of modern religious movements is their 
organisational and intellectual rationalisation.100 In the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya 
there is a clear valuation of education, science and rational thinking – which they 
present as a traditional element as Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din supported education for 
all his followers from the start (including the women, as is best proven by the 
work of his daughter Fatima al-Yashrutiyya) and is continued in his successor 
Shaykh Ahmad. Even so, it is still considered secondary to emotional and 
spiritual knowledge which only the Shaykh can bestow. References to rational 
and empirical knowledge are used in the mudhākara to explain certain points, but 
there is no sense of a redefinition of the entire tradition on rational terms.  
                                                  
100 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 42–44, 112–119, 133; Raudvere and Stenberg, ‘Translocal 
Mobility and Traditional Authority’, 5, 10; Howell and Van Bruinessen, ‘Sufism and the “Modern” in 
Islam’, 10–11. 
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We do see a certain rationalisation in the attitude to the maintenance of 
the zawāya, which seems a reaction to local circumstances that stems from the 
desire to remain independent yet functioning within society at the same time. 
Other than that, the ṭarīqa remains organised on the same traditional yet 
centralised lines as it was since the beginning. It is an explicitly traditional Sufi 
movement that revolves ideologically and organisationally around the Shaykh, 
who inherited the shaykhdom from his father. There is no hint of the Traditional 
Sufi ideas of Sufism without a ṭarīqa or even a shaykh, or of Sufism as a 
manifestation of a universal Religion of Love, that we have examined in 
paragraph 1.5.101  
We have noted that the followers show a high degree of autonomy in the 
transmission of the tradition and in their interpretations, but this is the result of 
the dynamic of interaction, rather than due to a change in doctrine or 
organisation. Whether this is a new development or whether this was present in 
the ṭarīqa from the start should be subject of further historical research. 
The Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya thus continues the classical ‘template of Sufi 
sainthood’ including the maintenance of charisma based on classical Sufi 
doctrines and manifested through karāmāt – although the karāmāt are more 
adapted to their time and situation as they focus on the Shaykh’s psychological 
spiritual powers, and on his powers to inspire good ethics and to inspire them to 
be good people in their community and in society. The focus does seem to be on 
being good people, rather than reaching high spiritual heights, but this needs to 
spring forth from spiritual development. The downplaying of the aḥwāl and 
maqāmāt and general mystical experiences in favour of the ethical is 
pronounced, however. Whether this is the result of a historical development, or 
whether this is due to my respondents’ hesitance to speak of such hidden things 
as Hoffman pointed out is common among Sufis,102 will need further research. 
In the contemporary Sufi milieu we see a wide variety of different froms of 
Sufi organisation, ranging from informal networks and local groups to traditional 
                                                  
101 Geaves, ‘That Which We Have Forgotten’; Hamid, ‘The Rise of the “Traditional Islam” 
Network(s)’; Heck, ‘The Politics of Sufism’, 15; Lewisohn, ‘Sufism’s Religion of Love.’ 
102 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 11–13. 
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ṭuruq, among others. Many Sufi movements benefited from the general Islamic 
revival in the 1980s. This leaves us with the question whether we can speak of a 
revival that is part of the general Islamic revival, as De Jong wondered in the 
1980s,103 or which Geaves witnessed in Jerusalem.104 The strong aspect of 
traditional institutionalisation on kinship lines among the followers and the 
continued connection to the Yashruti family and the zāwiya in Acre, do not seem 
to support this assumption. The Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in Israel and Amman 
should definitely be classified as a traditional ṭarīqa, revolving around a 
charismatic family, and institutionalised on kinship lines. Their renewed activity, 
especially in the renovation of the zāwiya in Acre, is made possible by the same 
circumstances that made the Islamic revival in Israel possible – renewed 
contacts with the wider Muslim world – but ultimately derives from inner 
dynamics in the ṭarīqa. They do relate to some new trends in Sufism: in Jordan 
they implicitly support the King’s Traditional Islam, and in Israel AKR reaches out 
to the Jewish Sufi milieu, but this does not influence their organisational forms. 
There is indeed a revival, as is illustrated most clearly in the renovation of 
the zāwiya in Acre (but also in the publications of the ṭarīqa’s books and the 
renewed contacts among ikhwānnā across the borders), but it seems to be part 
of the reconnection of the Palestinian diaspora, rather than connected to the 
larger Islamic revival. Tradition was maintained through the community / family 
and is now revived due to reconnections. It does not seem to be connected to the 
general disappointment with secularist nationalism or political Islam, with 
quietism and revolution, or with modernity in general – it does not seem to be a 
‘third option’ for the followers, as Geaves suggested as an explanation for the 
recent revival of Sufism in Jerusalem.105 Indeed, the public face this renovation 
has taken in Israeli society, AKR’s outreach to the Jewish Sufi milieu, seems to 
connect the ṭarīqa to the Zionist historical narrative. This is, as we have seen 
however, rather his personal interpretation than representative for the ṭarīqa at 
large. 
                                                  
103 De Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine’, 180. 
104 Geaves, ‘That Which We Have Forgotten’, 39–46. 
105 Ibid., 44–46. 
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The value of the anthropological method has been seen in this study as it 
has helped us to uncover and explain the differences between the images 
portrayed by the Shaykh and his ‘custodians of tradition’ in Amman on the one 
hand and AKR in Acre. This method has allowed us to look beyond what is 
presented as the ‘official narratives’ to hear the followers’ voices. By 
understanding the relationship between the people in authority and those who 
submit to this authority, we achieve a deeper understanding of what the Shaykh 
and the ṭarīqa mean to the people and what is the social role of the Shaykh and 
ṭarīqa, in other words, how we should locate the Shaykh and community in the 
struggle for authority that Eickelman and Piscatori call ‘Muslim politics’. 
This study has aimed to be a first excursion into the world of the 
contemporary Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya. It does not claim to be the final word on 
the subject, as much more work needs to be done to place the ṭarīqa in the wider 
context of the Sufi and Shadhuli tradition. Specific questions that could be asked 
are how the ṭarīqa developed its conceptual and devotional framework, especially 
its understanding of the Path (marātib, aḥwāl and maqāmāt, and the practice of 
dhikr bi-ism al-madd, for example). More historical research might shed more 
light on the history of the ṭarīqa after the demise of Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din. 
Interesting questions would be the process of institutionalisation, for example 
when the ṭarīqa shifted from being a proselytizing movement to a traditional 
institution based on kinship, and an oral history of the development of the ṭarīqa 
in Israel and Palestine after 1948. A wider focus comparing the attitudes of 
murīdīn, muḥibbīn, ex-followers, and people in wider society would give us 
additional insight into the effectiveness of the tarbiya as it would also include 
those people who chose not to remain connected to the ṭarīqa, and tell us more 
about their position in wider society. As mentioned above, further research into 
other communities and comparisons with other Sufi groups in Israel would also 
be revealing. 
 Important in further research is to include an analysis of the ṭarīqa’s 
published sources. As reflections of the official narrative, these are indispensable 
to get a fuller understanding of the official religion. It is also interesting when 
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researching contemporary vernacular and individual religion to take the role of 
the literature in consideration, focusing on what these texts mean for the 
followers today, and how they use and interpret them. This would surmount the 
narrow anthropological focus of this study. 
 When identifying useful general concepts for approaching Sufi 
movements, we should consider that while silsila and baraka are often seen as 
the emic concepts to best describe tradition and charisma in Sufism, I suggest 
that we are better served by focusing on tarbiya. Following Asad, Pinto argued 
the same, but his focus was on the process of tarbiya after initiation,106 while we 
have seen that in this ṭarīqa it refers to the whole process of upbringing within the 
ṭarīqa from the moment of birth. This fact, and the different role of initiation 
related to it, is due to the specific form of institutionalisation the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya underwent, along traditional lines and dependent on hereditary 
succession and family affiliation. Berger and Luckmann’s concepts of 
institutionalisation and socialisation107 are very useful in understanding the 
dynamics of tarbiya and of the community’s interpretation of the Shaykh’s speech 
acts and spiritual communication in the form of ishārāt, especially in the dynamic 
between the community’s relatively high degree of autonomy while at the same 
time adhering to the doctrine of taslīm, absolute submission to the Shaykh. This 
adds to our understanding of the maintenance of charisma in institutionalised 
Sufi movements, and draws attention to the importance of innovation and 
adaptation to society as a concretization which enables the charismatic to 
continue to speak to people This enables us to understand the development of 
Sufism as a discursive tradition, to understand Sufi authority as a relationship 
between shaykh and follower, to understand the dynamic of the transmission and 
reinterpretation of a Sufi tradition in its context(s), and to see that a Sufi 
movement can be both traditional and innovative at the same time, thus 
maintaining its charisma by looking both to the past and the future. 
  
                                                  
106 Pinto, ‘The Anthropologist and the Initiated’, 464–465. 
107 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality; Berger, The Sacred Canopy. 
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Appendix – Silsila of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya1 
 
 
0. Prophet Muḥammad (ca.570-632) 
1. ‛Alī b. Abū Ṭālib (599-661) 
2. Ḥasan b. Fāṭima al-Zahrā’ (d.669) 
3. Abū Muḥammad Jābir 
4. Sa‛īd al-Qazwīnī 
5. Muḥammad Fatḥ al-Su‛ūd 
6. Sa‛d 
7. Abū Muḥammad Sa‛īd  
8. Abū al-Qāsim Aḥmad al-Marwānī 
9. Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm al-Baṣrī 
10. Zain al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī 
11. Shams al-Dīn as-Sīwāsī 
12. Tāj al-Dīn 
13. Nūr al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan 
14. Fakhr al-Dīn 
15. Tuqayy al-Dīn 
16. ‛Abd al-Raḥmān al-Madanī 
17. ‛Abd al-Salām b. Mashīsh (d.1228) 
18. ‛Alī Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhili (1196-1258) 
19. Abū al-‛Abbās al-Mursī (1219-1287) 
20. Tāj al-Dīn Aḥmad b. ‛Aṭā’Allāh al-Iskandarī (d.1309) 
21. Dāwūd al-Bākhillī 
22. Muḥammad Baḥr al-Ṣafā’ (1301-1363) 
23. ‛Alī Wafā’ (1358-1404) 
24. Yaḥyā al-Qādirī 
25. Aḥmad b. ‛Uqba al-Ḥaḍramī (d.1490) 
                                                  
1 al-Yashrutiyya, Mawāhib al-Ḥaqq, 17–18.  
For an extensive discussion of the silsila, see Van Ess, ‘Die Yašrutiya’, 32–38. 
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26. Abu al-Abbas Aḥmad al-Burnusi, al-Zarrūq (1442-1493) 
27. Ibrāhīm al-Faḥḥām (d.1520) 
28. ‛Alī al-Ṣanhājī (d.1534-5) 
29. ‛Abd al-Raḥmān al-Majdhūb (d.1569) 
30. Yūsuf al-Fāsī (1530-1604) 
31. Muḥammad b. ‛Abd Allāh al-Kabīr (1570-1652) 
32. ‛Abd al-Raḥmān al-Fāsī (1631-1684) 
33. Qāsim al-Khaṣṣāṣ (d.1673) 
34. Aḥmad b. ‛Abd Allāh 
35. al-‛Arbī b. Aḥmad b. ‛Abd Allāh 
36. ‛Ali al-‛Imrān al-Mulaqqab bi-l-Jamal (d.1799) 
37. Abū Aḥmad al-‛Arabi al-Darqawī (1737-1823) 
38. Abū ‛Abd Allah Muḥammad b. Ḥamza Ẓāfir al-Madanī (1780-1847) 
39. ‛Ali Nūr al-Dīn al-Yashruṭī (1794-1899) 
40. Ibrahīm al-Yashruṭī (1844-1927) 
41. Muḥammad al-Hādī al-Yashruṭī (1900-1980) 
42. Aḥmad al-Hādī al-Yashruṭī (1928) 
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Glossary1 
 
 
abnā al-ṭarīqa ‘the children of the ṭarīqa’, used by the followers of the ṭarīqa 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya to refer to themselves 
 
adab - ādāb good quality of the soul, correct behaviour, good manners, 
courtesy, good upbringing, social and ethical etiquette, culture. In 
the Sufi sense it encompasses the embodiment of Sufi values and 
the performance of the spiritual states: ‘he who has achieved 
courtesy has achieved perfect refinement of words and deeds by 
weighing himself in the scale of the Law as embodied in the 
person of the Prophet.’2 It is ‘a lofty code of ethics and a standard 
of etiquette that are essential to traveling the spiritual path’, 
governing relationships with God, then with the shaykh, with other 
disicples, and society at large.3 It is both a means of purification 
and a final goal and as thus is central to the Sufi Path. One’s 
spiritual states and ‘inner qualities of the self’ are to be expressed 
in the correct behaviour, ‘embodied as guiding disposition of all 
concrete actions and choices (...) expressed in his posture, 
gestures, glances, and emotional states.’ As moral performances 
they create a framework of public morality.4  
Fatima al-Yashrutiyya quotes Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din: ‘The ṭarīqa is 
the Book and the Sunna. All of the ṭarīqa is ādāb.’5 
 
ahl al-bayt ‘the people of the house’, used by all Muslims to refer to the family 
of the Prophet Muhammad. The Sufis believe the nūr muḥammadī 
passed through his descendants6. The followers of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya also use it to refer to the Yashruti family 
 
akhlāq ethics 
Islamic ethics gradually developed from several sources: pre-
Islamic Arab codes of behavior, the Qur’an and the Sunna of the 
                                                  
1 The definitions in this glossary are predominantly based on the Encyclopaedia of Islam, second 
and third editions, on explanations from followers of the ṭarīqa Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, and on 
comments by the Review Panel. If additional material has been used, a footnote has been 
provided. 
Please note that for the benefit of those who do not know Arabic, this list is ordered alphabetically 
according to the transcriptions into the Latin script, not according to the Arabic originals. 
2 Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 174–179. 
3 Valerie J. Hoffman, ‘Un Cheikh Soufi peut-il être un Héros Moderne? Le Cas du Cheikh Ahmad 
Radwân (Égypte)’, in Saints et Héros du Moyen-Orient Contemporain. Actes du Colloque des 11 
et 12 Décembre 2000 (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2002), 145–149; Trimingham, The Sufi 
Orders in Islam, 300; Ian Richard Netton, ‘“The Breath of Felicity:” Adab, Aḥwāl, Maqāmāt and 
Abu Najīb Al-Suhrawardī’, in The Heritage of Sufism. Volume 1., ed. Lewisohn, 458.  
4 Pinto, ‘Sufism and the Political Economy of Morality in Syria’, 125. 
5 al-Yashrutiyya, Nafaḥāt al-Ḥaqq, 57. 
6 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 68–87. 
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Prophet and his Companions, and Persian and Greek ethical 
systems. As the Sunna became the basis of the sharia, it also 
strongly influenced the development of ādāb and akhlāq.7 
 
‛ālim - ‛ulamā’ religious scholar who posseses ‛ilm (intellectual knowledge) of the 
Qur’an, ḥadīth, and fiqh. 
 
‛aqīda often translated into English as ‘belief’, ‘creed’, ‘dogma’ or 
‘doctrine’. For the followers of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya it is an 
umbrella term that encompasses both belief (imān) and divine law 
(sharī‛a), which consists of devotional and social rules. It is not just 
an abstract theoretical concept, but is present in the hearts and 
minds of the followers – a good follower ‘has the ‘aqīda inside’. 
 
arkān al-islām the five pillars of Islam:  
shahāda (profession of faith), ṣalāa (prayer), zakāa (charity), 
ṣawm (fasting), and ḥajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) 
 
arkān al-ṭarīqa the four pillars of the ṭarīqa Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya:  
maḥabba (love), dhikr (remembrance), fikr (contemplation), and 
taslīm (submission) 
 
awliyā   friends of God (see sg. walī) 
 
awqāf   religious endowments (see sg. waqf) 
 
awrād   litanies (see sg. wird) 
 
baqā ‘permanence, persistence’, returning to one’s self after fanā’ 
(annihilation in God), subsistence in a higher mode of 
consciousness after annihilation of a lower mode of 
consciousness, ‘surviving’ or ‘abiding’ with God (baqā fi-llāh). In 
this state, the believer keeps the perfect attributes as his will is 
replaced with the will of God8  
 
baraka divine grace, blessing; ‘a spiritual power associated with holy 
people, time, places, or things. It is communicable and can bring 
disaster on evildoers or unbelievers, just as it brings blessing on 
believers’9 
 
barzakh the connection between the Creator and His creation, envisioned 
either as an ontological realm, or as embodied in al-Insān al-
Kāmil, the Perfect Man10 
 
bāṭin   interior, spiritual, as opposed to ẓāhir (exterior, material) 
                                                  
7 Walzer and Gibb, ‘Ak̲h̲lāḳ’; Marlow, ‘Advice and Advice Literature’; Adamson, ‘Ethics in 
Philosophy.’ 
8 Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 59–62; Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 321–324. 
9 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 419. 
10 Chittick, ‘Ibn Arabi and His School’, 65–66. 
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bid‛a ‘innovation’. In Islamic thought it often has a negative connotation 
because it changes the practices of the salaf, but there are also 
Islamic movements which distinguish between good and bad 
innovations. 
 
da‛wa  ‘call, invitation’, used by all Muslims to refer to the 'invitation to 
Islam', education and proselytizing 
 
dhawq - dhawqiyāt lit. ‘taste’. In Sufism: discernments and experiences achieved 
through the inner (non-physical) senses. It provides knowledge 
that cannot be reached by the physical senses and reason, but 
requires the experiencing of the spiritual states, and as such can 
be used in the sense of ‘inspired knowledge’, ‘experience of the 
divine presence’. It is often seen as the first stage on the Path to 
knowledge, the first experience which does not yet provide 
contentment. A common Sufi metaphor that goes back to the 
Prophet and is also used by the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya is that 
one cannot describe the taste of honey, one has to taste it 
oneself.  
 
dhikr ‘recollection’, in Islam ‘remembrance of God’ 
- in Sufism in general: ritualized recitation or recollection of the 
Names of God by ‘gathering together the dispersed powers of the 
soul and focusing them on the Real himself’,11 meditation in which 
a formula is repeated, usually the shahāda or one of the names of 
God, either aloud or silent, solitary or communally12  
- in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya: one of the pillars of the ṭarīqa, all 
those acts that serve to remember God (ṣalāa, du‛ā’, recitation of 
the Qur’an, recitation of the awrād, reading waẓīfa, and several 
kinds of dhikr and ḥaḍra) 
 
dhikr bi-ism al-madd dhikr performed by advanced followers of the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya, during which they repeat the name Allāh aloud and 
with stretched vowel. 
 
dhikr bi-ism al-qaṣr dhikr performed by the followers of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, 
during which they silently repeat the name Allāh with short vowels, 
either as part of a meeting or during their everyday life 
 
dīn commonly translated as ‘religion’. Originally it did not refer to a 
separate system. Rather, it is the obligation mankind has towards 
God. Based on a ḥadīth recorded in the Saḥīḥ al-Bukhāri, the dīn 
of the Prophet Muhammad consists of īmān (faith), islām 
(submission, practice), and iḥsān (interiorization, 'worshiping God 
as if you see him'). 
 
                                                  
11 Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 58. 
12 Waley, ‘Contemplative Disciplines in Early Persian Sufism’; Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and 
Saints in Modern Egypt, 420. 
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du‛ā’ - ad‛iya personal prayer, supplication, invocation (as distinct from the 
obligatory ritual ṣalāa). There are no fixed rituals and words, but 
one’s attitude and ādāb (etiquette) are important. One can use 
Qur'anic verses, traditional prayers or one's own words; one can 
pray silently or aloud.13 
 
fanā’ ‘annihilation’, the annihilation of Self-affirmation until only God’s 
self-disclosure remains. It is the annihilation of self-consciousness 
and of the imperfect human attributes, being replaced by a pure 
consciousness of God and the perfect attributes bestowed by 
God.  
Throughout Islamic history, fanā’ has been understood in many 
interrelated ways: ethically (the annihilation of man’s attributes 
which are replaced by God’s attributes); annihilation of the 
individual consciousness in the divine; seeing God’s oneness 
underlying the multiplicity of the creation. It has to be 
accompanied and replaced – and thus validated – by a new 
subsistence (baqā); it is the annihilation from a specific mode of 
lower consciousness and the simultaneous subsistence through a 
specific mode of higher consciousness.14  
Fanā’ fi-l-rasūl (annihilation in the Prophet) and fanā’ fi-l-shaykh 
(annihilation in the shaykh) were later developed as more 
accessible ‘preliminary goals’ for those on the earlier stages of the 
Path. By focusing on the shaykh, the follower submits his will and 
identifies completely with him.15  
The particular interpretations of the concept in the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya and the relevant social circumstances in which these 
interpretations are articulated and enacted are discussed in 
chapters 9 and 11. 
 
faqīh - fuqahā’ Islamic jurist, an ‛ālim (religious scholar) who specialises in fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence) 
 
faqīr - fuqarā’ 'poor person’, used by Sufis to refer to themselves as they do not 
care for material wealth and are fully dependent on God: ‘a person 
who lives for the Lord alone’ Also used by the followers of the 
ṭarīqa Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya to refer to themselves 
 
fikr discursive or contemplative reflection, ‘the power of thought or 
cogitation, the ability of the soul to put together the data gathered 
by sense perception or acquired from imagination in order to 
reach rational conclusions’.16 Al-Ghazali included both meditative 
reflections (tafakkur and ta’ammul) and more intellectual types of 
thought such as the derivation of conclusions based on 
                                                  
13 Waley, ‘Contemplative Disciplines in Early Persian Sufism’, 516–518. 
14 Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 59–62; Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 321–324; Schimmel, 
Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 141–145, 216. 
15 Mojaddedi, ‘Annihilation and Abiding in God’; Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 216, 
237; Ter Haar, ‘The Importance of the Spiritual Guide in the Naqshbandī Order’, 320. 
16 Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 159. 
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observations in the category of fikr. Subjects of these reflections 
can be human qualities and their corresponding actions, the 
Divine Names and Attributes, God’s creation and the 
manifestations of His Wisdom and Creative Power – never His 
Essence. When performed in the right way it is complementary to 
dhikr, as such a reflection ‘brings to the heart a knowledge which 
transforms it and heightens the consciousness and spiritualizes 
the action of the seeker.’17 Ibn Arabi distinguished between fikr, 
rational thought disengaged from the senses, and ‘imagination’, 
the inner perception that perceives ideas in their sensory form with 
the inner (non-physical) senses, which leads to unveiling (kashf). 
Perfect knowledge of God needs both – one knows God’s 
transcendence (tanzīh) through reason, and one sees His 
immanence (tashbīh) through imagination.18  
Fikr is one of the pillars of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, and has a 
range of meanings and forms in this ṭarīqa, including rational 
thought, reflection, contemplation, contemplative meditation 
(ta'ammul), discussion (mudhākara).  
See paragraphs 6.3.4 and 10.2. 
 
firāsa     discernment, perspicacity, ability to see into hidden things and 
read the hearts of other people, as is stated in the following 
ḥadīth: ‘Beware of the firāsa of the believer, for he sees by the 
light of God’19 It is one of the spiritual powers given to the awliyā. 
 
ḥadīth - aḥādīth ‘narrative, talk, speech’, used by all Muslims to refer to the 
traditions about the words and deeds of the Prophet, and of his 
Companions and Successors. It can refer both to a single 
account, and to the entire body of literature containing these 
accounts. Based on these accounts, one can learn about the 
sunna (model behaviour) of the Prophet. Hence the body of hadīth 
is an important source for sharia (divine law), and has been 
important in the development of ādāb (etiquette) and akhlāq 
(ethics). 
It has often been translated as ‘tradition’ in the sense of something 
handed down from one to another, but this has led to confusion as 
the English term carries the connotation of something oral, 
anonymous and imprecise. The ḥadīth accounts, on the other 
                                                  
17 In his chapter on tafakkur in Iḥyā ‛Ulūm al-Dīn, Ghazali mentions tafakkur, ta’ammul, and 
tadabbur as meditative reflection, and tadhakkur, i’tibār and nazar as intellectual reflection. He 
sees all these forms as part of a ‘process of extending one’s cognition and understanding through 
disciplined and regular meditation.’ Waley, ‘Contemplative Disciplines in Early Persian Sufism’, 
541–547. 
18 Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, 16; Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 69–72. 
19 Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 205; Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 304; 
Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 221–222. It corresponds with Gramlich’s 
category of ‘spiritual powers of the friends of God (die geistigen Kräfte des Gottesfreundes)’, in 
which he incorporates clairvoyance (to know someone’s thoughts, to recognize strangers, to see 
someone’s religious state, to answer questions before they are asked, and to see and influence 
what happens far away), knowledge of God, the universe, the future, etc. Gramlich, Die Wunder 
der Freunde Gottes, 148–241. 
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hand, are textual reports that explicitly name the transmitters and 
their sources to ensure maximum precision.20 
The followers of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya also use the term to 
refer to traditions about the words and deeds of their Shaykhs, 
particularly Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din. 
 
ḥadīth qudsī  an account of speech by God (as opposed to an account of 
speech by the Prophet or one of his Companions). Like the Qur’an 
it might come through Gabriel, but it can also come through 
another medium, such as ilhām (inspiration) or in a dream.  
 
ḥaḍra - ḥaḍrāt ‘presence’ 
- communal dhikr; a ritual in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya in which 
participants stand in a closed circle or line holding hands, slightly 
bending back and forth, and cite the name Allah, often 
accompanied by the singing of nashīd. 
- title of respect, e.g. Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā 
 
ḥaḍra mugharbiyya ‘ḥaḍra from the maghrib (North Africa)’, communal dhikr,  
a ritual in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya which is usually performed 
at the end of a meeting. While most people continue to sit on the 
ground and sing nashīd, a few men move in a circle 
 
ḥaḍra muḥammadiya  ‘the Muhammadan presence’, the first of God’s creations, the spirit 
of Muhammad which emanated in all the Prophets  
 
Ḥaḍrat Sīdnā form of address used by followers of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya 
to address the Shaykh and to refer to him. Ḥaḍra is a title of 
respect; Sīdnā is colloquial for sayyidunā, ‘our master’ 
 
ḥajj one of the five pillars of Islam, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca 
during the month Dhū al-Ḥijja, the last month of the Islamic year. 
On the third day of the ḥajj all Muslims celebrate Eid al-Adha. It is 
a duty for every Muslim to go on ḥajj at least once in his life, if s/he 
has the opportunity. 
 
ḥāl - aḥwāl spiritual state, a fleeting spiritual state received from God,21 the 
‘actualization of the divine encounter’ and ‘the point of equilibrium 
of the soul in a state of acceptance of this encounter’.22  
In Sufi theosophy the concept is paired with maqām, a lasting 
station which is acquired after effort of the seeker. They are ‘the 
psychological, moral, and spiritual attributes and perspectives that 
mark degrees of spiritual growth which travelers on the path to 
God must experience, assimilate, and in most cases pass 
                                                  
20 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 1:63–64. 
21 Schimmel quotes from al-Hujwiri, Kashf al-Maḥjūb,181: ‘State is something that descends from 
God into a man’s heart, without his being able to repel it when it comes, or attract it when it goes, 
by his own effort.’ Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 99. 
22 Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 10. 
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beyond.’23 They are usually grouped in complementary pairs that 
must be actualized together in an ‘ascending hierarchy’.24 Every 
Sufi author has his own progressive classification of maqāmāt and 
aḥwāl with different concepts occupying different places in such 
classifications. 
 
ḥaqīqa muḥammadiyya   
the eternal archetype from which the specific exemplifications are 
derived, ‘the rational principle of the Godhead, mediating the 
creative process.’25 
 
ḥijāb veil covering head and chest 
 
‘ibāda - ‘ibādāt Islamic devotional practice, worship 
 
iḥsān  interiorization, worshiping God as if you see him 
 
ijāza - ijāzāt authorization to transmit a ḥadīth or the teachings of a ṭarīqa, and 
the document given to the authorized person 
 
ikhwānnā ‘our brothers’, used by the followers of the ṭarīqa Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya to refer to themselves. 
 
ikhwānnā al-‛arab ‘our Arab brothers’, used by the followers of the ṭarīqa 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya to refer to the Bedouin followers of the 
Shaykh, who live in Gaza 
 
ilhām divine inspiration, revelation of God who casts knowledge into the 
hearts of those who are prepared for it through spiritual practice 
 
‛ilm knowledge, obtained through teaching and/or sense perception26 
 
‛ilm al-ishāra ‘knowledge of ishāra. See ishāra. 
Used by the followers of the ṭarīqa Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya to 
refer to their spiritual communication with the Shaykh through 
signs (see chapters 6 and 10) 
 
‛ilm ladunnī knowledge that is with and from God, granted by an act of divine 
grace, often translated as ‘gnosis’27 
 
īmān faith 
 
al-insān al-kāmil ‘the Perfect Man’, the archetypal human being, often equated with 
the ḥaqīqa muḥammadiyya, a manifestation of the totality of the 
                                                  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. Chittick gives the examples of hope and fear, expansion and contraction, intoxication and 
sobriety, annihilation and subsistence.  
25 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 61, 385, note 37. 
26 Ibid., 218. 
27 Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 193. 
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divine names and attributes, which are also manifested in the 
created world, taken as a whole. Man is created as an 
intermediary (barzakh) between the divine oneness and the 
created world of manifestations, a microcosmos in which God 
contemplates Himself, which is the goal of creation. In the Perfect 
Man mankind’s potential is fully realized; he sees the flow of the 
Divine through all the planes, both in His transcendence and 
immanence28 and manifests His attributes.  
According to some only the Prophet Muhammad is the Perfect 
Man – others see it as a station that can be reached by the 
prophets and awliyā (Friends of God), especially by the quṭb.29 
 
ishāra – ishārāt literally sign, gesture, indication, used as a non-verbal tool of 
communication.30  
In the context of Qur’anic exegesis, it is the deeper inner (bāṭin) 
meaning for those with spiritual understanding (khawāṣṣ). Its 
interpretation is ta’wīl, lit. ‘returning to its origin or source’ as the 
signs are restored to their true and original meanings, 
accompanied by a similar ‘returning’ of the soul by traveling the 
Sufi Path.31 Ishāra is also an ‘allusion’, an attempt at expressing 
the ineffable visions and experiences encountered when travelling 
the Path, also used as ways to hide these experiences from those 
who do not had the same experiences and might misunderstand.32 
For those who see with the inner eyes the whole of the cosmos is 
pervaded by the Divine’s self-disclosures, by signs that point to 
their Divine origin. Both the everyday reality and alternative 
realities (dreams, imaginations, etc.) are ‘symbolic representations 
of Reality’ – hence Izutsu speaks of ‘the symbolic structure of the 
world’.33 
In the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, the Shaykh communicates with 
his followers spiritually through signs. These range from ‘allusions’ 
in the classical Sufi sense to quite explicit speech acts and 
gestures and everyday occurrences, which are all to be 
interpreted according to the follower’s spiritual level and in 
community to receive guidance from the Shaykh. (see chapters 6 
and 10) 
 
isnād chain of transmission guaranteeing the authenticity of a ḥadīth 
 
islām  lit. ‘submission’, ‘the act of submitting to God (…) accepting 
personal responsibility for standards of action held to have 
transcendent authority (…) a personal acceptance of godly ideals’. 
                                                  
28 Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, 19. 
29 Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 224, 272–273, 280–282; Chittick, ‘Ibn Arabi and His 
School’, 65–66; Knysh, Ibn ʻArabi in the Later Islamic Tradition, 15; Chittick, ‘Ibn Arabi’, 125, 131–
132.  
30 Nwyia, ‘Is̲h̲āra.’ 
31 Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, 28–35; Poonawala, ‘Taʾwīl.’ 
32 Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 249. 
33 Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, 7–15. 
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It has become the name for ‘the whole social pattern of cult and 
creed’ which grows out of ‘the act of islām of the individual 
believer’ and the messages of the prophets.34 
 
istikhāra ‘Islamic dream incubation practice’, ‘an approved form of seeking 
guidance through dreams’. One prays the istikhāra prayer, after 
which one goes to sleep and expects the answer will be provided 
in a dream (although daytime guidance also happens in some 
cases). In many cases, religious specialists pray, dream, and 
interpret,35 but the followers of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya do it 
themselves. For a discussion of istikhāra in the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya, see chapter 6. 
 
ka‛ba the most sacred place in Islam, the centre of the mosque of 
Mecca (al-Masjid al-Ḥarām), the qibla (direction which Muslims 
face when praying ṣalāa), and around which pilgrims 
circumambulate when on ḥajj and ‛umra. 
 
karāma – karāmāt ‘dignity’, often translated as ‘miracle’. Muslims distinguish between 
mu‛jizāt, miracles performed by prophets, and karāmāt, performed 
by other people with God’s grace, although this distinction is not 
always very clear. It is related to the relationship between wilāya 
and prophethood. Karāmāt are considered attributes of the walī, 
given to him, not performed by him. It is the trace of closeness to 
God that can be witnessed and experienced by the believer. 
Miracles can happen both before and after the walī’s death as he 
remains forever present spiritually, especially in his tomb, but also 
elsewhere.36 
 
khalīfa – khulafā’ successor. In Sufism in general it means the one who functions as 
spiritual director of a part of a Sufi Order and who may be heir to 
the shaykh’s position when he dies.37  
In the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, it is used to refer to the 
designated successor of the current Shaykh. 
 
khatm al-wilāya ‘seal of wilāya’, in analogy with the Prophet Muhammad who is 
khatm al-nubuwa (seal of prophethood) 
 
khawātnā ‘our sisters’, used to refer to the female followers of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya (female version of ikhwānnā) 
 
khuṭba sermon in the mosque on Friday and during a religious festival 
 
                                                  
34 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 1:72–73. 
35 Edgar and Henig, ‘Istikhara’; Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 214–215; 
Green, ‘Dreams and Visions in Islam’, 307–308. 
36 Aigle, ‘Miracle et Karāma.’ For a classification of miracles as found in the Sufi literature, see 
Gramlich, Die Wunder der Freunde Gottes. 
37 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 421. 
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madad lit. ‘assistance, protection’, especially the spiritual aid granted by a 
walī due to the his proximity to God which allows him to intercede 
on behalf of those who place themselves under his protection.38  
  In the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya it is used in the sense of spiritual 
energy, divine inspiration 
 
 
maḥabba love for God, love for the Prophet and his family, love between 
shaykh and disciple. Central element of Sufism that pervades all 
its aspects. The love between God and His creation is celebrated 
in Sūrat al-Mā’ida 5:54: ‘He loves them and they love Him.’ Sufis 
love God for His own sake rather than out of self-interest. In later 
Sufism, love is seen not just an attribute or experience but as the 
essence of the Divine. Many Sufis wrote about it in theoretical 
treatises and poetry. It is seen as both a goal and a stage on the 
Path towards losing oneself in the Beloved (see fanā’).39 
It is the first pillar of the ṭarīqa, around which all the others revolve. 
See paragraph 6.3.2. 
 
maqām - maqāmāt - lasting spiritual station, ‘discrete psychological and ethical 
quality’, which the soul acquires after effort. The seeker 
progresses through different stations on the path40  
 In Sufi theosophy the concept is paired with ḥāl, a lasting station 
which is acquired after effort of the seeker. They are ‘the 
psychological, moral, and spiritual attributes and perspectives that 
mark degrees of spiritual growth which travelers on the path to 
God must experience, assimilate, and in most cases pass 
beyond.’41 They are usually grouped in complementary pairs that 
must be actualized together in an ‘ascending hierarchy’.42 Every 
Sufi author has his own progressive classification of maqāmāt and 
aḥwāl with different concepts occupying different places in such 
classifications. 
- shrine 
 
ma‛rifa knowledge of God based on experience rather than discursive 
reason, knowledge of the heart rather than the intellect, attained 
by advanced seekers through a light cast by God into their purified 
hearts, often translated as ‘gnosis’ It is ‘an immediate experience 
of God, a personal realization of a truth heard and believed, but 
now witnessed. The soul that is purified becomes receptive to 
divine revelation.’43 Maḥabba and ma‛rifa are sometimes 
                                                  
38 Chih, ‘What Is a Sufi Order?’, 29; Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 422. 
39 Lewisohn, ‘Sufism’s Religion of Love’; Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 130–134; 
Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 188. See paragraph 1.2 
40 Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 99–100; Ernst, The Shambhala Guide to Sufism, 102. 
41 Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 10. 
42 Ibid. Chittick gives examples such as hope and fear, expansion and contraction, intoxication 
and sobriety, annihilation and subsistence.  
43 Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 130; Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern 
Egypt, 219. 
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considered complementary, and sometimes one is though to lead 
to the other. They lead one to practise the Path in order to draw 
near to the Beloved, until one constantly remembers and 
completely surrenders to the Beloved (see fanā’).44  
 
martaba – marātib level, rank, office, in the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya also used to 
refer to spiritual level 
 
masbaḥa string of prayer beads, used to pray awrād 
 
mashhad 'sacred place', part of the zāwiya in Acre where the first three 
Shaykhs are buried 
 
mawlid al-nabī 1. Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad’s on the 12th of Rabī‛ al-
Awwal. It is an important celebration for most Sufis and it is an 
official festival in some places. It is the biggest celebration for the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya and the occasion for which most 
followers gather in the zāwiya in Amman. 
 2. The poem read at the occasion of the mawlid al-nabī by 
followers of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, composed by Shaykh 
Abd al-Qadir al-Homsi (see chapter 7). 
 
mawrid – mawārid ‘source and resource’, source of knowledge and spirituality, 
spiritual knowledge 
 
mawsim – mawāsim annual religious festival, usually to mark the birth or death of a 
prophet or saint 
 
min faḍl Sīdnā ‘from the grace of Sīdnā’, common expression among followers of 
the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya expressing the conviction that 
everything good they do or that happens to them should be 
attributed to the Shaykh 
 
mi‛rāj the Prophet Muhammad's ascension to heaven, based on Sūrat 
al-Takwīr 81:19-25 and Sūrat al-Najm 53:1-21, often celebrated in 
Islamic communities. Sufis see it as a metaphor for each person's 
spiritual journey.  
In Islamic tradition it is connected to the Prophet’s night journey 
(isrā‛) from Mecca to 'the furthest mosque', which came to be 
defined as al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, from which the mi‛rāj is 
believed to have taken place. 
 
mu‛allim teacher 
 
mu‘amalāt Islamic social regulations 
 
mubāya‛a the pledge of allegiance to the doctrines and practices of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya and the authority of the Shaykh. In the 
Sufi tradition (and in Islamic culture in general), the oath of 
                                                  
44 Hossein Nasr, ‘God’, 321; Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 130–135. 
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allegiance is called bay‛a. It is the acceptance that the person to 
whom allegiance is promised derives his authority from God 
(either due to his spiritual power or due to a political doctrine that 
teaches this), and it is therefore an oath of adherence to this 
person’s teachings and/or a promise of obedience. The pledge of 
new Muslims to the Prophet is the prototype on which both bay‛a 
to the ruler and to a Sufi shaykh build. The mubāya‛a is 
considered to go back to the Prophet’s time and is mentioned in 
the Qur’an in the Āyat al-Mubāya‛a (Sūrat al-Fatḥ 48:10, more 
commonly known as Āyat al-Bay‛a) (see chapter 6) 
 
mudhākara – mudhākarāt  
In Sufism in general, spiritual exhortation45 
 In the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya: 
1. the Shaykh’s lecture, delivered to the followers during the 
weekly meeting in the zāwiya in Amman, during which he 
comments on a part of the waẓīfa. 
 2. the practice of the followers to discuss the Shaykh’s mudhākara 
and other sources, such as sacred scripture, the books of the 
ṭarīqa and religious poetry 
 
muftī scholar qualified to deliver fatwas, official legal opinions (in the 
text, I have used the anglicized plural muftīs rather than the Arabic 
muftūn) 
 
muḥibb - muḥibbīn ‘lover’. Both in Sufism in general and in the ṭarīqa Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya someone who loves and respects the Shaykh but has 
not dedicated him/herself fully to the ṭarīqa through the mubāya‛a 
 
muqaddam – muqaddamīn 
 one of the followers of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya who has been 
authorised by the Shaykh to be responsible for his local 
community and look after the followers (see chapter 3) 
 
murabbī educator, pedagogue 
 
murīd – murīdīn ‘seeker’, religious seeker and follower of a Sufi shaykh. Used by 
the followers of the ṭarīqa Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya to refer to 
themselves 
 
murshid guide, someone who accompanies you. Used to refer to a Sufi 
master who spiritually guides his disciples 
 
mutawallī custodian of a waqf (religious endowment), appointed by the qāḍī 
(Islamic judge) (in the text, I have used the anglicized plural 
mutawallīs rather than the Arabic mutawalliyūn) 
 
muwajjih guide, someone who points you in the right direction 
 
                                                  
45 Michon, ‘The Spiritual Practices of Sufism’, 279–280. 
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nabī – anbiyā’ prophet 
 
nafs ‘self’, lower soul, base instincts. When untrained, the nafs is driven 
by desires and causes blameworthy actions and sins. The seeker 
trains and purifies the nafs until it serves him/her on the path to 
God.46 
 
nakba ‘catastrophe’, the occupation of Palestine and expulsion of most 
Palestinians in 1948 
 
nashīd – anashīd poem composed by a follower of the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya as 
a result of divine inspiration, chanted during ḥaḍra and other 
formal and informal meetings 
 
nūr muḥammadī  ‘Muhammadan light’, the primordial light from which everything 
was created, the first stage of God’s self-disclosure. It is the 
unifying principle of all archetypes. The nūr muḥammadī was 
manifested in all the prophets and lives on in the awliyā. It is one 
of the reasons the Sufis venerate the Prophet Muhammad to such 
a high degree, which is reflected in prayers and songs, and the 
celebration of the mawlid al-nabī, which is the major festival for 
many Sufi ṭuruq.47 
 
qāḍī Islamic judge (in the text, I have used the anglicized plural qāḍīs 
rather than the Arabic quḍāa) 
 
qudwa role model 
 
quṭb al-zamān ‘axis of the age’, the highest rank of awliyā’, the spiritual centre 
around whom the universe revolves48 
 
ṣāḥib al-ḥaqq ‘master of truth’ 
 
ṣāḥib al-waqt ‘master of time’ 
 
ṣalāa the obligatory ritual Islamic prayer which is prayed five times a 
day, one of the five pillars of Islam. It is derived from the verbal 
root ṣ-l-y, which means to join as the believer joins himself to God 
through the prayer. For the Sufi, remembrance of God and 
attentiveness are essential aspects.49 
 
salaf the first generations of Muslims 
 
                                                  
46 Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 112–113. 
47 Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, 236–238; Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 
59–60, 89; Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet, 214–216. 
48 Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 200; Cornell, Realm of the Saint, xxxv–xxxvi. 
49 Waley, ‘Contemplative Disciplines in Early Persian Sufism’, 514–516. 
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salafiyya common denominator for a variety of movements that all aim to 
‘return’ to the Islam of the salaf and ‘purify’ Islam from 
‘innovations’, but have little else in common (see chapter 1) 
 
sharia Islamic law as contained in God's revelation. It is discussed, 
described, and explained in fiqh, which is based on Qur’an, 
Hadith, analogous reasoning (qiyās), the consensus of the 
scholars (ijmā), and sometimes the opinions of individual scholars 
(ijtihād). Because this is the only access Muslims have to the 
divine law, the result of fiqh is often also referred to as sharia. 
There are four legal schools (madhāhib) in Sunni Islam that ‘follow 
the same legal principles and recognize each other as valid 
interpretations of the law’.50 
 
Sīdnā ‘our master’ (colloquial for sayyidunā), used by followers of the 
Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya to refer to their Shaykh 
 
silsila  chain of spiritual descent, chain of initiation, connecting the 
shaykh of a ṭarīqa to the Prophet 
 
sulūk lit. ‘to travel or follow a path’, wayfaring, behaviour. In the Sufi 
context, sulūk refers both to progression on the path to the Divine 
(‘the process of ascension and advancement – psychical, ethical 
and spiritual’), and to the required ‘traveling-manners’ which the 
traveler (sālik) needs to undertake the journey, the ‘appropriate 
spiritual attitude and proper ethical comportment’, in other words 
‘spiritual correctness’ – it thus combines the associations with the 
concepts of the Sufi ṭarīqa and Sufi ādāb.51 
 
sunna ‘custom’, model behaviour, ‘the generally approved standard or 
practice’ introduced by primarily the Prophet, but also his 
companions and successors. After the Qur'an, it is the second 
source of sharia (Islamic law)52 
 
ta’ammul contemplative thinking, intellectual meditation. 
Ghazali classifies it as one of the six forms of fikr, reflection.53  
In the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, it is also considered as a form of 
fikr (see chapter 6). 
 
takiya domed hall in the zāwiya in Acre where most meetings happen 
 
ta‛līm - ta‛līmāt teaching 
 
                                                  
50 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 423–424. 
51 Lewisohn, ‘Sulūk.’ Lewisohn points out that the term came in use in the twelfth century as a 
synonym of the Qur’anic concept ṭarīq (path), was first mentioned by al-Qushayri and then used 
extensively by al-Ghazali in Iḥyā ‛Ulūm al-Dīn, after which it was fully incorporated in Sufi 
terminology. 
52 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 1:63–64. 
53 Waley, ‘Contemplative Disciplines in Early Persian Sufism’, 541–547. 
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tarbiya upbringing, training, education, pedagogy. The basic meaning of 
the verbal root r-b-y is ‘to increase; to grow; to grow up’, and 
tarbiya means ‘education, upbringing; teaching, instruction; 
pedagogy; breeding, raising (of animals)’.54 Similarly, in Sufism it 
is the process of training and education a disciple undergoes with 
his shaykh.55 Ter Haar notes that it has the connotation of the 
father-son relationship.56 For its meaning in the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya, see chapters 6 and 10. 
 
ṭarīqa – ṭuruq ‘path’. In Sufism, it refers to the path towards God, to the practices 
one has to undertake to travel on this path towards God as taught 
by one’s murshid (guide) – devotional, ethical, intellectual, social 
etc. – and to the institution which gathers those who follow the 
same path. It is often translated as ‘brotherhood’ or ‘order’. 
 
taṣawwuf literally ‘the process of becoming a Sufi’. It is the verbal noun from 
the fifth form of the root ṣ-w-f – this fifth form has the basic 
connotation of ‘assimilating or taking on a religious or ethnic 
identity’. Ernst argues it has a didactic rather than a definitional 
purpose: ‘Definitions of Sufism are, in effect, teaching tools.’ It is 
used to cover ‘a broad spectrum of spiritual qualities’, both 
mystical and ethical, and the external social and historical 
manifestations. The European equivalents of the term, especially 
Sufism, came into being during the eighteenth century.57 
 
tashrīf ‘honouring’, the moment in which Shaykh Ali Nur al-Din honoured 
Palestine by settling there 
 
taslīm ‘submission’ – one of the pillars of the ṭarīqa, submission to God, 
acceptance that there is only one Creator and that He is the one 
who rules his creation and his creatures, acceptance of His will. 
Because the Shaykh is the wārith muḥammadī (Muhammadan 
heir), ‘taslīm to the Shaykh’s words means taslīm to God’s will’58 
(see chapter 6) 
 
tawḥīd the act of believing and affirming that God is one and unique 
(wāḥid), as is stated in the first article of the Muslim profession of 
faith: ‘there is no other god but God’ (Lā ilāha illā Allāh), and is at 
the centre of the Islamic faith. Theologians have aimed to prove 
this rationally, and in Sufism it has transformed from an intellectual 
statement into a spiritual experience. 
 
‛ulamā’   religious scholars (see sg. ‛ālim) 
 
                                                  
54 Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, 3rd ed.; ‘Tarbiya.’ 
55 Pinto, ‘The Anthropologist and the Initiated’, 464–465. 
56 Ter Haar, ‘The Importance of the Spiritual Guide in the Naqshbandī Order’, 319. 
57 Ernst, The Shambhala Guide to Sufism, 21. Ibid., 21–31. 
58 Written answers Shaykh Ahmad al-Yashruti, 15-03-2014, p.3 
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҅umra pilgrimage to Mecca that can be undertaken at any time during the 
year 
 
ustādh   teacher 
 
uwaysī an uwaysī initiation is an initiation by the spirit of a physically 
absent or deceased person, often the Prophet or al-Khidr. The 
term derives from Uways al-Qarani (d.657) who was instructed by 
the Prophet Muhammad without ever having physically met him. It 
enables a Sufi to claim initiation without submitting himself to a 
master, but places him within institutional Sufism as well.59 
 
waqf – awqāf ‘religious endowment’, charitable trust founded according to sharia 
(Islamic law). Generally speaking, a waqf is unalienable and its 
proceeds serve towards the upkeep of an institution for public 
benefit (see chapter 8 for the situation in Palestine and Israel)60 
 
walī – awliyā ‘friend, someone who is close, someone who is under protection’. 
In the general Arabic and Islamic tradition, a walī is a ‘next of kin, 
ally, friend, helper, guardian, patron, saint’, and it has a broad 
range of meaning in political and legal contexts.61 
In Sufism, a walī or walī Allāh is ‘a friend of God, someone who is 
close to God, someone who is under God’s protection’, often 
translated problematically as 'saint’. The friend of God has 
acquired God’s good qualities, is blessed with spiritual powers 
(such as the ability to perform karāmāt (miracles), and possesses 
spiritual and sometimes socio-political authority. In Sufi theosophy 
ideas on the awliyā have been discussed since the ninth century, 
including ideas on a hierarchy of awliyā, the highest walī being the 
quṭb (axis), and the khatam al-wilāya (seal of the saints).62  
 
wārith muḥammadī ‘Muhammadan heir’ 
 
waẓīfa ‘task’, devotional text or litany recited daily by the members of 
some ṭuruq as part of their assignment of daily devotions, and also 
as part of a ḥaḍra or communal dhikr,’ usually consisting of 
prayers, invocations, and Qur’anic verses. In the Shadhuliyya-
Yashrutiyya it is the great wird (litany), a combination of Qur’anic 
texts and prayers which is read twice a day, after ṣalāat al-fajr and 
ṣalāat al-‛ishā’, either individually or in a group (see chapter 6) 
 
wirātha muḥammadīya  
‘Muhammadan inheritance’ 
 
                                                  
59 Baldick, ‘Uwaysiyya’; Green, ‘Dreams and Visions in Islam’, 299–301. 
60 See Dumper, Islam and Israel. 
61 For more on the concept in the broader Islamic tradition, including its use in the Qur’ an and its 
political and legal uses in Sunni and Shi’i Islam, see Landolt, ‘Walāyah.’ 
62 Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 199–213; Cornell, Realm of the Saint, xviii–xx; Ernst, 
The Shambhala Guide to Sufism, 58–80; Christmann, ‘Reclaiming Mysticism’, 92–103. 
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wird – awrād ‘set, supererogatory personal devotion observed at specific 
times,’63 a litany consisting of verses from the Qur'an and prayers, 
prescribed by a shaykh to be recited at set times. The practice of 
reciting awrād goes back to the Prophet, and consists of reciting 
pious formulas, Qur’anic verses and prayers composed by 
spiritual leaders. They differ per ṭarīqa, and in many cases the 
shaykh gives the disciple a personal wird according to his 
personal needs and spiritual advancement. In the case of 
collective dhikr, it is regulated by the shaykh or his representative 
(see paragraph 1.2).64 In the Shadhuliyya-Yashrutiyya, the wird is 
read after ṣalāat al-fajr and ṣalāat al-maghreb, using a masbaḥa 
(see chapter 6). 
 
wilāya the verbal noun based on the root w-l-y, with its basic meanings of 
‘friendship’, ‘assistance’, and ‘authority, power’. Broadly speaking, 
wilāya conveys the meaning of ‘power, authority, domain of 
authority’, while the closely related concept of walāya conveys the 
meaning of ‘friendship, closeness’. Due to the general absence of 
vocalization, the two are often indistinguishable in written texts, 
and they rely on each other for their meaning.65 In Sufism, it 
means the spiritual and/or worldly authority exercised by a walī 
based on his closeness to God, often translated problematically as 
‘sainthood’.66 Wilāya is manifested by karāmāt (miracles).67 
 
ẓāhir   exterior, material (as opposed to bāṭin, interior, spiritual) 
 
zakāa charity, obligatory donation of a set portion of one’s property, one 
of the five pillars of Islam 
 
zāwiya – zawāya literally ‘corner’, in the Sufi context usually translated as ‘lodge’ or 
‘hospice’, where followers of the ṭarīqa and visitors live, visit, meet, 
practice their rituals, study, etc. It is a religious institution that is 
connected to a Sufi shaykh and / or ṭarīqa and can take many 
different forms. It can be one building or a big complex. It can be a 
centre of (mystical) religious instruction and practice, a hospice for 
guests, the home of a community. It sometimes includes a tomb-
shrine. It often has an important role in society. 
 
ziyāra – ziyārāt ‘visit’, pilgrimage to a shaykh, holy place, tomb or shrine. This is 
based on the belief that the saint, or any object associated with 
him, confers his baraka (grace, blessings). By visiting, the 
believers profess their love for God and the saints, who intercede 
                                                  
63 Denny, ‘Wird.’ 
64 Waley, ‘Contemplative Disciplines in Early Persian Sufism’, 511–513; Gardet, ‘D̲h̲ikr’; Denny, 
‘Wird.’ 
65 Cornell, Realm of the Saint, xviii–xx; Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet, 13. For more on the 
concept in the broader Islamic tradition, including its use in the Qur’ an and its political and legal 
uses in Sunni and Shi’i Islam, see Landolt, ‘Walāyah.’ 
66 See note 66. 
67 Landolt, ‘Walāyah’, 321. 
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for them before God. In the case of a deceased shaykh, he is 
considered to be spiritually present.68
                                                  
68 Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt, 95–96. 
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